Malformed Revokation Certificate?

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

On 08/10/2012 01:09 AM, Doug Barton wrote:
> Maybe I'm missing something in this conversation, and if so I
> apologize. But how would attaching the revocation cert to a key be
> possible in the scenario where the user lost the password?

Hi Doug,

The discussion entail having generated a revocation certificate using
--gen-revoke while having the passphrase and private key (should usually
be done at key generation and stored at a safe place, and is short
enough that a printed copy can be stored and manually typed need be)

At the time of key revocation it is then appended to the public key
using import, hence doesn't require a passphrase, the same way as A
doesn't need B's passphrase when signing B's public key.

hth

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