how vulnerable is "hidden-encrypt-to"

Hauke Laging mailinglisten at
Sat Aug 18 16:48:22 CEST 2012

Am Sa 18.08.2012, 10:36:21 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor:

> It's worth observing that you can still detect the algorithm used and
> the size of the key, even when the keyid is all zeros.  So if someone
> has a particularly unusual key size (or is an early adopter of an
> unusual key type, like ECC), the pool of possible known recipients could
> actually be pretty small.
> And it's also possible to rule out a given person as an intended
> recipient, e.g. if they have a 2048-bit RSA key and the ESK packet
> targets 4096-bit el gamal.

I think these hints should be added to the documentation.

PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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