Protecting IDs at a key signing party

[Jerome Baum]

On 2012-01-21 14:58, MFPA wrote:
> More importantly, they are signing UIDs that may well contain email
> addresses, without actually verifying that you "control" those email
> addresses.

Rather, that you "can read an email which they sent that was addressed
to that" email address.

But I do agree it should be the key owner's decision where that
signature is uploaded.


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