determine the source(s) of validity
Hauke Laging
mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de
Sun Dec 8 22:11:25 CET 2013
Hello,
I want to find out what makes a key valid (and with which certification
level): a certification by one of the systems keys or one or more
certifications from the WoT. I think that it is important that applications
show this information in key selection dialogs.
IIRC this has been discussed here a while ago and there is no way to get this
information from GnuPG. I would like to know whether there is already software
available which does this; no need to reinvent the wheel.
If there isn't any I would do this (but maybe there is a better approach):
1) Find all keys which have ultimate trust. BTW: I noticed that a key becomes
invalid if its certifying key expires and has complete trust. But if it has
ultimate trust then the expiration does not make the certification invalid. Is
this intentional?
2) Import all these keys plus the key to be checked (with import-clean) into a
new keyring (with a separate trustdb).
3) If (the key was valid in the normal keyring and) the key is not valid in
the check keyring then it is validated via the WoT. Otherwise I can look for
the signature with the highest certification level (I am interested in this
information).
Another, related question:
I was surprised to read the recommendation to create a local certification for
keys which have been validated via the WoT. But the one who wrote that seems
extremely competent to me with respect to OpenPGP. Is there a general
concensus on that? What are your opinions?
Hauke
--
Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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