Multiple email addresses - any alternative to ask everyone to sign all my keys?

[Christopher J. Walters]

On 7/24/2013 6:06 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> (My original reply went just to Philipp.  My apologies.)

No apology necessary.

I also must apologize, as my original reply got sent to Robert J. Hansen, when 
it was intended for the list.

> On 7/24/2013 1:53 AM, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
>
> Unfortunately, this is not casting very much light on things.  The use
> of phrases like CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET have very specific
> meanings in NATO countries, and you're using them here in ways that are
> at odds with their NATO meanings.

This is true, and NATO countries have very specific and well defined ways of 
dealing with data with those titles, depending on the country.

> Let me try this rephrasing:

[snip]

> Further, each piece of traffic can receive any of three classifications:
> C, S or TS.  You can send C traffic to Bender: the necessary keys to
> decrypt it are held there.  However, although you can technically send
> TS traffic to Fry, Fry can't decrypt it: the keys aren't there.
>
> If I have this right, then you've walked straight into the Bell-LaPadula
> security model.  You'll be well-served by reading up on it: a good
> academic reference will answer many of your questions.

I'll have to look that up and read up on it, when I have the time.

> The short answer is, "OpenPGP by itself will not be sufficient for your
> purposes.  It might be able to provide a couple of tools, but what you
> want to achieve is far beyond the scope of OpenPGP."

That was my conclusion, as well.  That is why I suggested the bootable 
GNU/Linux or *BSD Live CD  (with some vital tools on it, of course) and a USB 
thumb drive - with an encrypted filesystem for storing the keys (I'm not 
familiar with the smart card's capabilities, and as every smart card reader I 
have is non-functional, I cannot test it out).

My suggestion went beyond OpenPGP and GnuPG to try to solve the problem Philipp 
described.

Regards,
Chris