How insecure is using /dev/random for entropy generation?

[Jean-David Beyer]

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On 03/30/2013 10:46 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
[snip]
> gpg uses /dev/random. That's why key generation usually blocks due
> to lack of entropy if you do it right and boot a secure medium for
> key generation.
> 
> The kernel fills /dev/random from e.g. key strokes, disk accesses,
> and (if available and configured) internal CPU state (havaged) or a
> real hardware number generator. The kernel should take care that
> the entropy in /dev/random is "perfect".
> 
> The amount of available entropy can be seen in 
> /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail

I run RHEL 6. Last reboot (had to run Windows for a little while) was
a little over 6 days ago.
I tried that and got:

$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
1849

Is that a lot or a little?
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