trust your corporation for keyowner identification?

Werewolf werewolf6851 at
Fri Oct 18 08:41:17 CEST 2013

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 01:54:54PM -0700, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >In my proposed scenario, the corporation is doing nothing more than
> >providing a means for the participants to know that Bob is actually Bob
> >because the company has checked his id and said he is and providing an
> >authenticated means (again, IT being a black-hat aside) to communicate
> >with Bob and verify fingerprints, etc.
> Under this scenario, the entire thing is dangerously bogus.
> When I sign a certificate, I am sending a message: "I am vouching
> for the identity of X."  Under your scenario, I'm no longer vouching
> for the identity of X.  I would instead be saying, "Someone else who
> is not listed on this signature has vouched for the identity of X.
> I am signing this without any direct personal knowledge of X's
> identity."
> If you're vouching for X's identity, you need to take positive steps
> to verify X's identity.  If someone else is vouching for X's
> identity, then let them sign X's certificate.  Why should you get
> involved without doing your own positive verification?

Now what if the Company/HR department had a Notary public, for their documents, and this same Notary had a gpg key he/she treated same his/her stamp equipment, and used the same standards before signing a gpgkey?

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