AES256 & AES192. (Was: Can I revitalise an old key-pair?)

[Nicholas Cole]

On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 10:07 AM, Pete Stephenson <pete at heypete.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 8:28 PM, Nicholas Cole <nicholas.cole at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 5:04 AM, Henry Hertz Hobbit
>> <hhhobbit at securemecca.net> wrote:
>>
>> [snip]
>>
>>>
>>>  Paradoxically, AES256 & AES192 had
>>> weaknesses that made them less safe than AES (AES-128) several
>>> years back.  May I humbly suggest TWOFISH or one of the
>>> CAMELLLIA ciphers as a first choice UNTIL you determine whether
>>> or not the fixes for AES-256 and AES-192 are retroactive?  DID
>>> THEY GET THEM FIXED?  I am just assuming they did but that means
>>> I HOPE the older implementation and the newer one can easily be
>>> discerned when you do the decipher.
>>
>>
>> [snip]
>>
>> I was curious about this. The wikipedia page mentions the "Related Key
>> Attack" on these cyphers, but is vague about whether they were ever
>> fixed.
>>
>> Does anyone know?
>>
>> And did fixes make it into the version used by Gnupg?
>
> Even more importantly, were they ever an issue with GnuPG in the first place?
>
> That is, does GnuPG generate related keys?
>
> I was always under the impression that GnuPG randomly generated
> session keys rather than creating related session keys; if true,
> wouldn't this mean that the related-key attack doesn't apply?

And if that were true, I presume that would mean that the "AES is
stronger than AES256" argument would also fall. Or have I
misunderstood?

N.