From bernhard at intevation.de Fri Aug 1 10:31:05 2014 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2014 10:31:05 +0200 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> Message-ID: <201408011031.07311.bernhard@intevation.de> On Thursday 31 July 2014 at 10:42:37, Wolf wrote: > ? ? gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature > ? ? gpg: signing failed: Bad signature > ? ? gpg: signing failed: Bad signature > The wording of the error seems to suggest that gpg is attempting to verify > the signature it just created but is failing? Try the diagnosis output, sometimes it tells you more. gpg2 -vvv --debug-all --debug-level=expert (Debug Level "guru" mostly is too much, be careful then to check the logfiles for personal information before giving them to anyone else.) > I'm running gnupg 2.0.25-1 on an Arch Linux box via a PuTTY SSH connection. -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO) www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member) Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From green at mm.st Fri Aug 1 14:43:16 2014 From: green at mm.st (green at mm.st) Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2014 13:43:16 +0100 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature Message-ID: <1406896996.1947584.148053898.6D70ACBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> > Try the diagnosis output, sometimes it tells you more. > > gpg2 -vvv --debug-all --debug-level=expert The 'expert' setting didn't seem to tell me enough so I tried the 'guru' option on two different machines and noticed that the Arch Linux machine seems to use two slightly different strings when performing the rsa_verify step: rsa_verify n:+b5cd0db854ba1... .... rsa_verify cmp:+b5cb0db854ba1... Notice that the 4th digit has changed from a 'd' to a 'b'. Other digits in the string are also different (I didn't want to include the whole string as I'm not sure what that would reveal). Looking at the same output on the other machine (performing the same operation on the same file), the two strings match exactly and I don't get the 'Bad signature' error. I'm somewhat out of my depth now so hopefully the above will mean something to you? Many Thanks, Wolf From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 5 11:16:19 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2014 11:16:19 +0200 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> (Wolf's message of "Thu, 31 Jul 2014 09:42:37 +0100") References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> Message-ID: <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 31 Jul 2014 10:42, green at mm.st said: > The wording of the error seems to suggest that gpg is attempting to verify the > signature it just created but is failing? Correct. > I'm running gnupg 2.0.25-1 on an Arch Linux box via a PuTTY SSH connection. What version of Libgcrypt are you using? "gpg2 --version" shows that. Is that an intermittent problem which always happens on the same machine? Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From green at mm.st Tue Aug 5 12:59:31 2014 From: green at mm.st (green at mm.st) Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2014 11:59:31 +0100 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> Many thanks for the reply, Werner. > What version of Libgcrypt are you using? "gpg2 --version" shows that. libgcrypt 1.6.1 > Is that an intermittent problem which always happens on the same machine? Yes. I can run a command such as "gpg2 --clearsign doc" and it will fail with the "Bad signature error" then I can immediately run the same command again and it works (but not consistently). The issue is only happening on this machine. I am using the same private key on a Windows 7 machine with GPG4Win and I don't get this problem. Please let me know if there is any more information I can provide which might help diagnose the issue. Kind regards. On Tue, 5 Aug 2014, at 10:16 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 31 Jul 2014 10:42, green at mm.st said: > > > The wording of the error seems to suggest that gpg is attempting to verify the > > signature it just created but is failing? > > Correct. > > > I'm running gnupg 2.0.25-1 on an Arch Linux box via a PuTTY SSH connection. > > What version of Libgcrypt are you using? "gpg2 --version" shows that. > > Is that an intermittent problem which always happens on the same machine? > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Aug 5 23:05:11 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2014 23:05:11 +0200 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <53E14707.7090405@digitalbrains.com> On 05/08/14 12:59, green at mm.st wrote: > I can run a command such as "gpg2 --clearsign doc" and it will > fail with the "Bad signature error" then I can immediately run the same > command again and it works (but not consistently). It sounds like your hardware is failing. This will often show first on computationally intensive, verified stuff like crypto. Did you overclock your computer? You might need to lower some setting if you did. You could try memtest86+ for several hours. Note that failing tests do not necessarily indicate a broken memory module; it can be something else, like for instance the CPU, the motherboard or the power supply. Another thing you could look for is blown capacitors on the motherboard, especially close to the CPU. When you don't have solid capacitors, i.e. ones containing liquid, they can short circuit, which will cause the liquid to boil and the cap at the top to expand outwards, which can be observed. They will form a slight dome, whereas normally it's flat or even slightly inwards. This will only happen to the large ones. I'm sure pictures can be found, although I'm not sure "blown capacitor" is the correct English term... in Dutch we say "geplofte condensator", and I never discussed the issue in any other language ;). HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From mick.crane at gmail.com Tue Aug 5 22:46:21 2014 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2014 21:46:21 +0100 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: bad hard drive ? From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 6 11:45:25 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 11:45:25 +0200 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <53E1F935.4070000@digitalbrains.com> On 05/08/14 22:46, michael crane wrote: > bad hard drive ? Hard disks store an error detection and correction code with the data[1], and usually fail less subtly and regardless of the content of the data. Whereas failure to motherboard, processor and power supply tend to show themselves in very data-intensive scenarios such as asymmetric cryptography. I think main memory less so, because the crypto is likely completely contained in the cache. HTH, Peter. [1] Although if the embedded processor for instance would start failing, it's possible to damage data with consistent checksums. Note that SATA communication between disk and computer also includes a checksum. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From night at nist.gov Wed Aug 6 17:58:49 2014 From: night at nist.gov (Stephen Nightingale) Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2014 11:58:49 -0400 Subject: draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02 Message-ID: <53E250B9.9030609@nist.gov> We now have a DANE OpenPGP tester up and running in the HAD-Pilot project at NIST. Test descriptions are at https://www.had-pilot.com/openpgp/. The test target is tester at openpgp.had-pilot.biz. The website describes tests for signing, encrypting, authenticating and decrypting, and the associated DNS lookups for your user at domain and our tester at openpgp.had-pilot.biz. If you provision your user, and do DNS lookups for our tester, you should get correct responses for all 7 tests. Without provisioning your user and domain in the DNS, you can meaningfully run the tests: - openpgp ping - returns a 'tester alive' message, - openpgp signed - returns 'NXDOMAIN', - openpgp request sign - returns a signed message for which you don't have the public key. We are trying to get some early users for the system, and wring it out as needed. Error behaviour tests will follow, sometime. Note, the test tool uses 65280 as the RRType code for the OPENPGPKEY RR. Once it is assigned an IANA registration number, we'll change it. Cheers, Stephen Nightingale. From sieutruc at gmail.com Wed Aug 6 16:57:26 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2014 16:57:26 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg Message-ID: Hello, Currently, iam doing a project that uses gpg. I set the working directory for gpg with the permission like : securgpg 775 Test1 groupTest2 -rw-r--r--. 1 Test1 groupTest2 42 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg-agent.conf -rw-r--r--. 1 Test1 groupTest2 7960 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg.conf -rw-rw-r--. 1 Test1 groupTest2 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg -rw-rw-r--. 1 Test1 groupTest2 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg~ -rw-rw-rw-. 1 Test1 groupTest2 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed -rw-r--r--. 1 Test1 groupTest2 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secring.gpg -rw-rw-rw-. 1 Test1 groupTest2 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 trustdb.gpg But when Test1 imports a new key to key store, he changes all the file like -rw-rw-r--. 1 Test1 groupTest1 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg -rw-rw-r--. 1 Test1 groupTest1 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg~ -rw-------. 1 Test1 groupTest1 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed -rw-------. 1 Test1 groupTest1 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secring.gpg and similarly in the case of Test2 -rw-rw-r--. 1 Test2 groupTest2 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg -rw-rw-r--. 1 Test2 groupTest2 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg~ -rw-------. 1 Test2 groupTest2 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed -rw-------. 1 Test2 groupTest2 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secring.gpg So that i cannot access to key store on using two accounts. Can you suggest to me any solution that will preserve the permission/user/group like as it was set originally. Truc -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From htd+ml at fritha.org Wed Aug 6 18:22:02 2014 From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl) Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2014 18:22:02 +0200 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <53E14707.7090405@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> <53E14707.7090405@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <20140806162202.GA12164@fritha.org> On 05.08.2014, Peter Lebbing wrote: > I'm sure pictures can be found, although I'm not sure "blown capacitor" is the > correct English term... in Dutch we say "geplofte condensator", and I > never discussed the issue in any other language ;). Blown capacitor is the correct term, and has widespread use. Actually, most of the capacitors do not "blow", but the electrolyte inside the aluminium/metal can dries out after the pressure relief ventil on top of them has opened due to a failure (to avoid "blowing"). From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 6 20:35:20 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 20:35:20 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <53E27568.4070308@digitalbrains.com> On 06/08/14 16:57, Sieu Truc wrote: > -rw-rw-rw-. 1 Test1 groupTest2 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed > -rw-r--r--. 1 Test1 groupTest2 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secring.gpg > -rw-rw-rw-. 1 Test1 groupTest2 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 trustdb.gpg These three sound rather insecure, especially world-writable stuff?! That's pretty extreme. That opens you up to bugs in a lot of services, not to mention that I think most developers develop with the expectation that world-readable stuff does not need to be protected from reading by anybody / any service, so they're not very vigilant about that either. > Can you suggest to me any solution that will preserve the > permission/user/group like as it was set originally. My strong suggestion would be to change the process, giving each user their own secret keyring. Can't you script a secret key import that would import for both users? Alternatively, and I'm not really in favour of this but it's your setup, the man-pages for gpg and gpg2 mention: > --preserve-permissions > Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user > read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you > are doing. But I would strongly suggest not making the three files mentioned world-readable, let alone world-writable. There is no need at all to share random_seed, so I would definitely give each user their own copy of that for simplicity. It is written much more often than secring.gpg. I think trustdb.gpg is, or might also be, written on public key import. If you fiddle with access permissions, you need to really think about what you're doing. Your world-writable access makes me suspect you haven't thought well about all the implications, so --preserve-permissions might be a great way to shoot yourself in the foot. I suppose you're using GnuPG for some kind of protection against something nefarious, because I wouldn't know what else it is for (a really over-the-top checksum? :). If you then kill off security in another way, you only get a warm feeling, but so will your attacker, when he uses a filesystem-traversal bug in some program running on the same machine. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 6 20:58:55 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 20:58:55 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: (Sieu Truc's message of "Wed, 6 Aug 2014 16:57:26 +0200") References: Message-ID: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 6 Aug 2014 16:57, sieutruc at gmail.com said: > So that i cannot access to key store on using two accounts. Which is in general not a good idea. GnuPG is quite serious about permissions and thus has no option to change that. You may want to rethink your design. userv(1) is your friend. > Can you suggest to me any solution that will preserve the > permission/user/group like as it was set originally. grep for S_IWUSR and add group permissions. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 6 21:24:32 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 21:24:32 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> On 06/08/14 20:58, Werner Koch wrote: > GnuPG is quite serious about permissions and thus has no option to > change that. Can I ask what happened to --preserve-permissions? I checked the man pages on a Debian stable system, which mentioned them. I was a bit surprised to find the option since I agree with your current stance. > userv(1) is your friend. Thanks for the pointer to that service! > grep for S_IWUSR and add group permissions. Additionally, if the group is set to the wrong group, you might need to make the gpghome directory set-gid. Forgot to mention that in my mail :). Bye, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From sieutruc at gmail.com Thu Aug 7 00:52:48 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 00:52:48 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: I know well your advices , but actually i need to assign 3 users to handle the keyring. One like admin , he can modify and add the secret key Another like test1 , he cannot add secret key but he can add public keys And the third callled test2 , he cannot add any key but can use that keyring for do a securisation or desecurisation. And on my file system, i cannot activate acl so i desgin to give world-writable to trustdb and worldreadable to pubring and secring. If not, the test2 cannot do securisation. -rw-r--r--. 1 admin groupTest1 42 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg-agent.conf -rw-r--r--. 1 admin groupTest1 7960 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg.conf -rw-rw-r--. 1 admin groupTest1 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg -rw-rw-r--. 1 admin groupTest1 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg~ -rw-rw-rw-. 1 admin groupTest1 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed -rw-r--r--. 1 admin groupTest1 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secring.gpg -rw-rw-rw-. 1 admin groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 trustdb.gpg > Additionally, if the group is set to the wrong group, you might need to make the gpghome directory set-gid. Forgot to mention that in my mail :). So i have already set the group id to the gpg folder, so all the pubring.gpg, pubring.gpg~,secring.gpg created by gpg have the group of gpg folder. And the permission can be restored to the origin with chmod after itst But the problem still persist because the normal user cannot user chown so the user of 2 files pubring and secring are set to the person that launched the command. > GnuPG is quite serious about permissions and thus has no option to > change that. Therefor, i need only to fix the ownership (user) of those 2 files. Any idea ? i dont know what you mean > grep for S_IWUSR and add group permissions. Truc On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 9:24 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 06/08/14 20:58, Werner Koch wrote: > > GnuPG is quite serious about permissions and thus has no option to > > change that. > > Can I ask what happened to --preserve-permissions? I checked the man > pages on a Debian stable system, which mentioned them. > > I was a bit surprised to find the option since I agree with your current > stance. > > > userv(1) is your friend. > > Thanks for the pointer to that service! > > > grep for S_IWUSR and add group permissions. > > Additionally, if the group is set to the wrong group, you might need to > make the gpghome directory set-gid. Forgot to mention that in my mail :). > > Bye, > > Peter. > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ashok.boppana at wyo.gov Thu Aug 7 00:11:16 2014 From: ashok.boppana at wyo.gov (Ashok Boppana) Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2014 16:11:16 -0600 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.21 install - AIX Message-ID: Hello Team, My name is Ashok Boppana and I'm trying to install GnuPG 2.0.21 software on my AIX P520 machine which is running on AIX 7.1 operating system. I'm following the install steps as per the document but getting an error which I don't understand. Could you pl take a look at the install steps I followed from the attached document and help me with the install? This is my first time using this software and I'm not sure if there are any other packages I need to install before following this process, pl let me know, Also, pl let me know if this software is compatible with AIX or not and any alternative if not compatible. Thank you so much for your time. Have a great day!! Regards, Ashok E-Mail to and from me, in connection with the transaction of public business, is subject to the Wyoming Public Records Act and may be disclosed to third parties. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- # pwd /tmp/gnupg-2.0.21 # ls -latr total 2056 -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 35068 Sep 19 2012 COPYING -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 9416 Aug 02 2013 INSTALL -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 7639 Aug 02 2013 COPYING.LIB -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 76502 Aug 02 2013 ABOUT-NLS -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 3798 Aug 02 2013 TODO -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 10067 Aug 19 2013 acinclude.m4 -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 13460 Aug 19 2013 THANKS -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 2267 Aug 19 2013 README.SVN -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 6320 Aug 19 2013 README -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 2364 Aug 19 2013 Makefile.am -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 29814 Aug 19 2013 ChangeLog-2011 -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 6508 Aug 19 2013 AUTHORS -rwxr-xr-x 1 1000 1000 7670 Aug 19 2013 autogen.sh -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 27941 Aug 19 2013 NEWS -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 47758 Aug 19 2013 configure.ac -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 46417 Aug 19 2013 aclocal.m4 -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 32737 Aug 19 2013 Makefile.in -rwxr-xr-x 1 1000 1000 515745 Aug 19 2013 configure -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 24668 Aug 19 2013 config.h.in drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 scripts drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 m4 drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 jnlib drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 256 Aug 19 2013 include drwxr-xr-x 3 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 gl drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 256 Aug 19 2013 am drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 tools drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 sm drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 scd drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 keyserver drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 kbx drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 g10 drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 common drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 agent drwxr-xr-x 2 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 po drwxr-xr-x 5 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 tests drwxr-xr-x 3 1000 1000 4096 Aug 19 2013 doc -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 7 Aug 19 2013 VERSION -rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 38380 Aug 19 2013 ChangeLog drwxr-xr-x 19 1000 1000 4096 Aug 06 15:56 . drwxrwxrwt 13 bin bin 4096 Aug 06 15:57 .. # ./configure checking for a BSD-compatible install... scripts/install-sh -c checking whether build environment is sane... yes checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p... scripts/install-sh -c -d checking for gawk... no checking for mawk... no checking for nawk... nawk checking whether make sets $(MAKE)... yes checking build system type... powerpc-ibm-aix7.1.0.0 checking host system type... powerpc-ibm-aix7.1.0.0 configure: autobuild project... gnupg configure: autobuild revision... 2.0.21 configure: autobuild hostname... posseold configure: autobuild timestamp... 20140806-160007 checking for style of include used by make... GNU checking for gcc... no checking for cc... no checking for cl.exe... no configure: error: in `/tmp/gnupg-2.0.21': configure: error: no acceptable C compiler found in $PATH See `config.log' for more details # make make: make 1254-025 There must be an existing description file or specify a targ et. # make install make: 1254-002 Cannot find a rule to create target install from dependencies. Stop. ................................................................................... System Model: IBM,9111-520 Machine Serial Number: 10296EB Processor Type: PowerPC_POWER5 Processor Implementation Mode: POWER 5 # oslevel -s 7100-03-01-1341 ................................................................................... From tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net Thu Aug 7 08:56:16 2014 From: tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net (Tristan Santore) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 07:56:16 +0100 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.21 install - AIX In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <53E32310.5090203@internexusconnect.net> On 06/08/14 23:11, Ashok Boppana wrote: > Hello Team, > > My name is Ashok Boppana and I'm trying to install GnuPG 2.0.21 > software on my AIX P520 machine which is running on AIX 7.1 operating > system. I'm following the install steps as per the document but > getting an error which I don't understand. Could you pl take a look at > the install steps I followed from the attached document and help me > with the install? This is my first time using this software and I'm > not sure if there are any other packages I need to install before > following this process, pl let me know, Also, pl let me know if this > software is compatible with AIX or not and any alternative if not > compatible. Thank you so much for your time. Have a great day!! > > > Regards, > Ashok > > E-Mail to and from me, in connection with the transaction > of public business, is subject to the Wyoming Public Records > Act and may be disclosed to third parties. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Ashok, Quick glance here, tells me you have no compiler installed or it cannot find it. I do not use AIX. I suggest you find out where to obtain a compiled compiler package. Maybe the path for the compiler is wrong too ? Symbolic link might help there, in that case. Regards, Tristan -- Tristan Santore BSc MBCS TS4523-RIPE Network and Infrastructure Operations InterNexusConnect Mobile +44-78-55069812 Tristan.Santore at internexusconnect.net Former Thawte Notary (Please note: Thawte has closed its WoT programme down, and I am therefore no longer able to accredit trust) For Fedora related issues, please email me at: TSantore at fedoraproject.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sieutruc at gmail.com Thu Aug 7 09:03:30 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 09:03:30 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.21 install - AIX In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Actually, i did a compilation of gnupg 2.0.22 successfully as showed in this site (AIX 6.1): http://www.perzl.org/aix/index.php?n=Main.Instructions But i couldn't run it because the gpg-agent failed to start (libassuan failed), specified here https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1659 And look at carefully at the output of configure command, gcc no , cc no., you don't have gcc or cc in your system. Please following the site above to set all environment variables ( of course you have to install gcc or xlc if you have ). Truc Tell me if you can run gpg in your machine. On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 9:02 AM, Sieu Truc wrote: > Actually, i did a compilation of gnupg 2.0.22 successfully as showed in > this site (AIX 6.1): > http://www.perzl.org/aix/index.php?n=Main.Instructions > But i couldn't run it because the gpg-agent failed to start (libassuan > failed), specified here > https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1659 > > And look at carefully at the output of configure command, gcc no , cc > no., you don't have gcc or cc in your system. > > Please following the site above to set all environment variables ( of > course you have to install gcc or xlc if you have ). > > Tell me if you can run gpg in your machine. > > Truc > > > > > On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 12:11 AM, Ashok Boppana > wrote: > >> Hello Team, >> >> My name is Ashok Boppana and I'm trying to install GnuPG 2.0.21 >> software on my AIX P520 machine which is running on AIX 7.1 operating >> system. I'm following the install steps as per the document but getting an >> error which I don't understand. Could you pl take a look at the install >> steps I followed from the attached document and help me with the install? >> This is my first time using this software and I'm not sure if there are any >> other packages I need to install before following this process, pl let me >> know, Also, pl let me know if this software is compatible with AIX or not >> and any alternative if not compatible. Thank you so much for your time. >> Have a great day!! >> >> >> Regards, >> Ashok >> >> E-Mail to and from me, in connection with the transaction >> of public business, is subject to the Wyoming Public Records >> Act and may be disclosed to third parties. >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Gnupg-users mailing list >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 7 11:32:29 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 11:32:29 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E27568.4070308@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Wed, 06 Aug 2014 20:35:20 +0200") References: <53E27568.4070308@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87sil81w7m.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 6 Aug 2014 20:35, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > Alternatively, and I'm not really in favour of this but it's your setup, > the man-pages for gpg and gpg2 mention: > >> --preserve-permissions Oops. I forgot about this option despite that I looked at the code fragment: statbuf.st_mode=S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR; if (((secret && !opt.preserve_permissions) || !stat (bakfname,&statbuf)) && !chmod (fname,statbuf.st_mode)) ; Nevertheless, I concur with Peter's assessment. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 11:39:14 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 11:39:14 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 00:52, Sieu Truc wrote: > And on my file system, i cannot activate acl so i desgin to > give world-writable to trustdb and worldreadable to pubring and > secring. If not, the test2 cannot do securisation. That's a really bad solution for your problem. You want to keep secring secret, and world-readable is the absolute opposite of that. And if somebody manipulates trustdb, they can make you believe a key is valid when it is in fact not. I thought about it for a little, and I think your problem can be fixed using just standard UNIX permissions. But I think the more elegant solution might lie in a completely different process where secring is not shared. That means that you should rethink your architecture, so that you don't arrive at the scenario you paint with the shared files. You should really consider that. There are many ways to satisfy your requirements. One of the reasons I write this at all is to show that actually, standard UNIX permissions can be rather flexible. By the way, I inferred admin might add public keys as well. If this is not the case, the thing only becomes simpler. Here's my idea: /etc/group: gpgsecread:x:n:test1,test2 gpgpubwrite:x:n:test1 /var/local: drwxr-xr-x admin nobody gpgshared/ /var/local/gpgshared: drwxrwxr-x admin gpgpubwrite pub/ drwxr-x--- admin gpgsecread sec/ /var/local/gpgshared/pub: -rw-rw-r-- admin gpgpubwrite pubring.gpg /var/local/gpgshared/sec: -rw-r----- admin gpgsecread secring.gpg /home/admin/.gnupg: -rw------- admin nobody gpg.conf -rw------- admin nobody random_seed -rw------- admin nobody trustdb.gpg /home/admin/.gnupg/gpg.conf: secret-keyring /var/local/gpgshared/sec/secring.gpg no-default-keyring keyring /var/local/gpgshared/pub/pubring.gpg /home/test1/.gnupg: -rw------- test1 nobody gpg.conf -rw------- test1 nobody random_seed -rw------- test1 nobody trustdb.gpg /home/test1/.gnupg/gpg.conf: secret-keyring /var/local/gpgshared/sec/secring.gpg no-default-keyring keyring /var/local/gpgshared/pub/pubring.gpg ... and so on for user test2 ... This is an example of the way the standard UNIX permissions can be used to give pretty reasonable granularity of access. The only hitch is that if world-readable access to pubring.gpg is not desired, I wouldn't know how to do that (without sudo). But for pubring.gpg, it's usually not a problem. I haven't tested it, by the way. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 11:46:41 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 11:46:41 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E34B01.9050308@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 00:52, Sieu Truc wrote: > i dont know what you mean > >> grep for S_IWUSR and add group permissions. He means that to get this functionality from GnuPG, you could edit the source and recompile. I don't think you should read it as a suggestion, though. So, that's could, not should. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 11:55:28 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 11:55:28 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 11:39, Peter Lebbing wrote: > I haven't tested it, by the way. Which is obvious, because Werners mail reminded me that in this setup you still need this: /home/admin/.gnupg/gpg.conf: secret-keyring /var/local/gpgshared/sec/secring.gpg preserve-permissions no-default-keyring keyring /var/local/gpgshared/pub/pubring.gpg Though *not* for test1 and test2, they can stay as they were, since they don't write secring. However, I still think you should look for a solution without a shared secring. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From sieutruc at gmail.com Thu Aug 7 13:44:23 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 13:44:23 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: Thank alot for your advices and your solution, so that i understand more about gpg. But actually, it's not me to decide whether i should use a shared secring but the client wants to have 3 users using the shared keyring. Each users belong to one specific group as described above (admin:control all, test1 (groupTest1): can add public key (no operation with secret key), test2 (groupTest2): can use only gpg --encrypt/sign/decrypt) On WIndows, i did that without any problem because the owner of created file can position the access rights like adding more permissions/more user/group on those files. That means after an operation, i have a subfunction that allow restoring its original permissions as well as its ownership. In Linux, it seems impossible to use traditional permission, because one file can have only one user, one group (other -all the others) , and the owner of the file cannot transfer his right to the other. that's reason why i let "others " owner acts like the test2 ( can read pubring and secring) Maybe i will discuss with them to get something that can be feasable. Truc On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 11:55 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 07/08/14 11:39, Peter Lebbing wrote: > > I haven't tested it, by the way. > > Which is obvious, because Werners mail reminded me that in this setup > you still need this: > > /home/admin/.gnupg/gpg.conf: > secret-keyring /var/local/gpgshared/sec/secring.gpg > preserve-permissions > no-default-keyring > keyring /var/local/gpgshared/pub/pubring.gpg > > Though *not* for test1 and test2, they can stay as they were, since they > don't write secring. > > However, I still think you should look for a solution without a shared > secring. > > HTH, > > Peter. > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 14:02:33 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 14:02:33 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 13:44, Sieu Truc wrote: > In Linux, it seems impossible to use traditional permission, because one > file can have only one user, one group (other -all the others) , and the > owner of the file cannot transfer his right to the other. Can you point out where the solution I proposed would go wrong? Is it the ownership of secring.gpg when test1 adds something? Perhaps it goes wrong when the owner bounces between admin and test1. You might want to amend /etc/group: gpgsecwrite:x:n:admin,test1 That way, they can both still read and write the file even when the owner changes to test1. Before, I think admin got locked out then. Oopsie :). Is the problem that you are porting an existing system from Windows to Linux? Is that why you are so constrained in the possible solutions? Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 14:11:42 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 14:11:42 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 14:02, Peter Lebbing wrote: > gpgsecwrite:x:n:admin,test1 Hah, I mixed things. Obviously I meant pubring, not secring, and it should be: gpgpubwrite:x:n:admin,test1 Because otherwise admin might be locked out when test1 updates pubring; although I'm not sure, it depends on the exact way GnuPG will write the file. Creating a new file and moving the old one out of the way is already allowed through the permissions on the directory. I'm really posting a *lot* of amendments to my mails currently, I'm sorry about that. I'm trying to be too fast about it, I suppose. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From sieutruc at gmail.com Thu Aug 7 14:34:58 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 14:34:58 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: >I'm really posting a *lot* of amendments to my mails currently, I'm sorry about that. I'm trying to be too fast about it, I suppose. No need to say sorry, iam really appreciated your help. > gpgpubwrite:x:n:admin,test1 I understood what you suggested. But in the specification of my project , one user can belong to only one groups. It's hard to implement so that why i need your help. I set gid on the gpg folder, so it forces all created files by gpg to have groupTest1 as group owner. It's ok But test1 lauche the gpg command, then change the user owner of file to his, like test1:groupTest1. The result is the admin cannot import a new key to the keyring.... So your solution doesn't resolve that problem. And i have a question to you and Werner, how can gpg change the user owner ship of the file ? normally only root can change the ownership. Truc On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 07/08/14 14:02, Peter Lebbing wrote: > > gpgsecwrite:x:n:admin,test1 > > Hah, I mixed things. Obviously I meant pubring, not secring, and it > should be: > > gpgpubwrite:x:n:admin,test1 > > Because otherwise admin might be locked out when test1 updates pubring; > although I'm not sure, it depends on the exact way GnuPG will write the > file. Creating a new file and moving the old one out of the way is > already allowed through the permissions on the directory. > > I'm really posting a *lot* of amendments to my mails currently, I'm > sorry about that. I'm trying to be too fast about it, I suppose. > > Peter. > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 7 14:44:51 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 14:44:51 +0200 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG is NOT vulnerable to -Get Your Hands Off My Laptop- Message-ID: <87bnrwzcxo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! This is a note about an improved side-channel attack on old versions of GnuPG. Daniel Genkin, Itamar Pipman, and Eran Tromer latest research on side channel attacks is described in the paper Get Your Hands Off My Laptop: Physical Side-Channel Key-Extraction Attacks On PCs They target an older version of GnuPG and come up with awesome results: We demonstrate physical side-channel attacks on a popular software implementation of RSA and ElGamal, running on laptop computers. Our attacks use novel side channels, based on the observation that the "ground" electric potential, in many computers, fluctuates in a computation-dependent way. An attacker can measure this signal by touching exposed metal on the computer's chassis with a plain wire, or even with a bare hand. The signal can also be measured at the remote end of Ethernet, VGA or USB cables. Through suitable cryptanalysis and signal processing, we have extracted 4096-bit RSA keys and 3072-bit ElGamal keys from laptops, via each of these channels, as well as via power analysis and electromagnetic probing. Despite the GHz-scale clock rate of the laptops and numerous noise sources, the full attacks require a few seconds of measurements using Medium Frequency signals (around 2 MHz), or one hour using Low Frequency signals (up to 40 kHz). See http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/handsoff for more. If your GnuPG version is up-to-date there is nothing you need to do! As noted in the paper GnuPG 1.4.16 and later are not vulnerable to the attack. GnuPG 2.x and Gpg4win 2.x are not vulnerable, either. However, if you are still using a GnuPG version older than 1.4.16 you should update to at least 1.4.16 but better to 1.4.18. Note that those version numbers are for the generic GnuPG versions from gnupg.org. Some Linux distributions may have an older version but all major distributions have applied respective security fixes back in December or January. Watching out for possible security problems and working with researches to fix them takes a lot of time. g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by me, is bearing these costs. To help us carry on this work, we need your support; please see https://gnupg.org/donate/ . Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 14:58:08 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 14:58:08 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 14:34, Sieu Truc wrote: > No need to say sorry, iam really appreciated your help. It was also an apology to list subscribers flooded by messages by me :). > I understood what you suggested. But in the specification of my project > , one user can belong to only one groups. It's hard to implement so that > why i need your help. If you can't administrate the machine (i.e., add groups, add users to groups), then it's going to be /really/ difficult. I'm mentally throwing my hands up in the air and muttering something about "not really a group then, is it" :). I find it a fun exercise to think of a permission system that will allow a reasonable granularity of access permissions, but not being allowed to add groups seems like an unreasonable requirement. I'm out of ideas. > And i have a question to you and Werner, how can gpg change the user > owner ship of the file ? normally only root can change the ownership. You need the CAP_CHOWN capability, which normally only root has. I'm not acquainted with changing capabilities; I have never done it. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Thu Aug 7 15:01:33 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 15:01:33 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/07/2014 02:58 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 07/08/14 14:34, Sieu Truc wrote: >> No need to say sorry, iam really appreciated your help. > .. >> And i have a question to you and Werner, how can gpg change the >> user owner ship of the file ? normally only root can change the >> ownership. I've not read the entire thread, but has the possibility of using subkeys (different signing subkey for each participant and shared encryption subkey that is rotated regularly) been considered for this setup? As for the ability to add keys to the public key this seems sub-optimal, what should be important is the validity of aforementioned keys. This would be solved by using a Certificate Authority (depending on the number of people that can add to it, either a stand-alone CA or the primary key itself). - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Ad astra per aspera To the stars through thorns -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT43itAAoJEPw7F94F4TagtuIQALJvShbdl3TX3RL0C+JcN7qN hG1io8doIHv/0YDgSRnsl+c+4K26+wvO9Jsucj8QL6ryPK1JVyuEv/CHBcYtLEHv JnmlkjPhidbjCBOcHFBxJfAjOCElOgSSDPJpxV4LmDltgDnLwrDo0IuZ9Dr4wSR5 xC5Fmb9YvKfW9CiU51A3svH7dYwgHn59TlkAJy1OqsddWDozcPpRTZRWEpt8BHmc QAfOgt1Sh4Cb/u4vXt1cMMWREZZaw4S/nytnBoQ40fH05r5cPNmicryNkrXrmAI0 BGjseLYdHmfIPCLYpToGBjIIwpCfHapWzVrwMy2reNwCiMM05GQNh9LrEogxN5GN cmqStzbKlYLTWHn9VLXtcfPak74dDHwEV0s01fAArWrHNUP36QceJNPRxO7k+cVK oLlBllru6HHoKt5sPH1qqN5BZQslT9P+dk/MGIYuhT/Xbl+UooywzNGGL9IIijLS dVoVy9mKt+jWkYjoGeXcu1xloAebvjmNGMaU+Ali0VdeXEUhDKq/yX821ERvF3PR HWy2HX+wZTGuQnwg+RJVyD5cbdquhuozfCaBBVy2Cj3bLQJCRRDtJ9Mgv/9AAttF erPt0S4h4EVLSy8wbZZHUVaDsrcQvhz0ntpbi7EA47Jn4F0UFfjSyYxwa11TfHbC GSWpMhnNt7+SoSysJjcr =Guy+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From sieutruc at gmail.com Thu Aug 7 16:18:47 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 16:18:47 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: Especially thank to the idea of Peter, i finally got a solution : I describe the full problem and my goal again: I have 3 types of users and each users belong to one specific group as following: "admin" can do anything(add/remove secret or public keys) "test1 (groupTest1)" can only manipulate public key (no operation with secret key) test2 (groupTest2): can use only gpg --encrypt/sign/decrypt so he doesn't touch any key management action. And i have only root so set the access permission only one time when setting up the product, typically gpg folder and its components. And my design (maybe not so good) for those purposes is like: gpgshare drwxrwxsr-x admin groupTest1 -rw-r--r-- admin:groupTest1 42 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg-agent.conf -rw-r--r-- admin:groupTest1 7960 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg.conf -rw-rw-r-- admin:groupTest1/test1:groupAdmin 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 pubring.gpg -rw-rw---- admin:groupTest1 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed -rw-rw-r-- admin:groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 trustdb.gpg drwxr-sr-x admin:groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 secfolder (set gid) -rw-r--r-- admin:groupTest1 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secfolder\ secring.gpg drwxr-s--- admin:groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 admin_pubring_temp (set gid) drwxrws--- admin:groupAdmin 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 test1_pubring_temp (set gid) So everytime, test1 imports a public key ,he copies pubring to test1_pubring_temp folder and and overwrite the result to the original pubring.gpg. At that time, this new pubring has the access permissions like "test1:groupAdmin" (groupAdmin is inherited from test1_pubring_temp folder with setgid). So admin and test can manipulate pubring at the sametime. And similarly if admin importes a public key, the final pubring.gpg has "admin:groupTest1"(groupTest1 is set from admin_pubring_temp folder with setgid) (here i use cp -p ) Of course, the permission numeric mode can be set via chmod ( they can do because they are owners of the files). Thank you. Truc On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 3:01 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand < kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 08/07/2014 02:58 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > > On 07/08/14 14:34, Sieu Truc wrote: > >> No need to say sorry, iam really appreciated your help. > > > > .. > > >> And i have a question to you and Werner, how can gpg change the > >> user owner ship of the file ? normally only root can change the > >> ownership. > > I've not read the entire thread, but has the possibility of using > subkeys (different signing subkey for each participant and shared > encryption subkey that is rotated regularly) been considered for this > setup? As for the ability to add keys to the public key this seems > sub-optimal, what should be important is the validity of > aforementioned keys. This would be solved by using a Certificate > Authority (depending on the number of people that can add to it, > either a stand-alone CA or the primary key itself). > > > > > - -- > - ---------------------------- > Kristian Fiskerstrand > Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com > Twitter: @krifisk > - ---------------------------- > Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net > fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 > - ---------------------------- > Ad astra per aspera > To the stars through thorns > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT43itAAoJEPw7F94F4TagtuIQALJvShbdl3TX3RL0C+JcN7qN > hG1io8doIHv/0YDgSRnsl+c+4K26+wvO9Jsucj8QL6ryPK1JVyuEv/CHBcYtLEHv > JnmlkjPhidbjCBOcHFBxJfAjOCElOgSSDPJpxV4LmDltgDnLwrDo0IuZ9Dr4wSR5 > xC5Fmb9YvKfW9CiU51A3svH7dYwgHn59TlkAJy1OqsddWDozcPpRTZRWEpt8BHmc > QAfOgt1Sh4Cb/u4vXt1cMMWREZZaw4S/nytnBoQ40fH05r5cPNmicryNkrXrmAI0 > BGjseLYdHmfIPCLYpToGBjIIwpCfHapWzVrwMy2reNwCiMM05GQNh9LrEogxN5GN > cmqStzbKlYLTWHn9VLXtcfPak74dDHwEV0s01fAArWrHNUP36QceJNPRxO7k+cVK > oLlBllru6HHoKt5sPH1qqN5BZQslT9P+dk/MGIYuhT/Xbl+UooywzNGGL9IIijLS > dVoVy9mKt+jWkYjoGeXcu1xloAebvjmNGMaU+Ali0VdeXEUhDKq/yX821ERvF3PR > HWy2HX+wZTGuQnwg+RJVyD5cbdquhuozfCaBBVy2Cj3bLQJCRRDtJ9Mgv/9AAttF > erPt0S4h4EVLSy8wbZZHUVaDsrcQvhz0ntpbi7EA47Jn4F0UFfjSyYxwa11TfHbC > GSWpMhnNt7+SoSysJjcr > =Guy+ > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sieutruc at gmail.com Thu Aug 7 16:21:44 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 16:21:44 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: drwxrws--- admin:groupAdmin 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 test1_pubring_temp (set gid) -> drwxrws--- test1:groupAdmin 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 test1_pubring_temp (set gid) Sorry Truc On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 4:18 PM, Sieu Truc wrote: > Especially thank to the idea of Peter, i finally got a solution : > > I describe the full problem and my goal again: > I have 3 types of users and each users belong to one specific group as > following: > "admin" can do anything(add/remove secret or public keys) > "test1 (groupTest1)" can only manipulate public key (no operation with > secret key) > test2 (groupTest2): can use only gpg --encrypt/sign/decrypt so he > doesn't touch any key management action. > And i have only root so set the access permission only one time when > setting up the product, typically gpg folder and its components. > > And my design (maybe not so good) for those purposes is like: > > gpgshare drwxrwxsr-x admin groupTest1 > -rw-r--r-- admin:groupTest1 42 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg-agent.conf > -rw-r--r-- admin:groupTest1 7960 6 ao?t 16:29 gpg.conf > -rw-rw-r-- admin:groupTest1/test1:groupAdmin 9269 6 ao?t 16:38 > pubring.gpg > -rw-rw---- admin:groupTest1 600 6 ao?t 16:35 random_seed > > -rw-rw-r-- admin:groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 trustdb.gpg > drwxr-sr-x admin:groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 secfolder (set gid) > -rw-r--r-- admin:groupTest1 2851 6 ao?t 16:35 secfolder\ > secring.gpg > drwxr-s--- admin:groupTest1 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 admin_pubring_temp (set > gid) > drwxrws--- admin:groupAdmin 1600 6 ao?t 16:38 test1_pubring_temp (set > gid) > > So everytime, test1 imports a public key ,he copies pubring to test1_pubring_temp > folder and and overwrite the result to the original pubring.gpg. At that > time, this new pubring has the access permissions like "test1:groupAdmin" > (groupAdmin is inherited from test1_pubring_temp folder with setgid). So > admin and test can manipulate pubring at the sametime. > And similarly if admin importes a public key, the final pubring.gpg has > "admin:groupTest1"(groupTest1 is set from admin_pubring_temp folder with > setgid) > > (here i use cp -p ) > > Of course, the permission numeric mode can be set via chmod ( they can do > because they are owners of the files). > > Thank you. > > Truc > > > > > On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 3:01 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand < > kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com> wrote: > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Hash: SHA512 >> >> On 08/07/2014 02:58 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: >> > On 07/08/14 14:34, Sieu Truc wrote: >> >> No need to say sorry, iam really appreciated your help. >> > >> >> .. >> >> >> And i have a question to you and Werner, how can gpg change the >> >> user owner ship of the file ? normally only root can change the >> >> ownership. >> >> I've not read the entire thread, but has the possibility of using >> subkeys (different signing subkey for each participant and shared >> encryption subkey that is rotated regularly) been considered for this >> setup? As for the ability to add keys to the public key this seems >> sub-optimal, what should be important is the validity of >> aforementioned keys. This would be solved by using a Certificate >> Authority (depending on the number of people that can add to it, >> either a stand-alone CA or the primary key itself). >> >> >> >> >> - -- >> - ---------------------------- >> Kristian Fiskerstrand >> Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com >> Twitter: @krifisk >> - ---------------------------- >> Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net >> fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 >> - ---------------------------- >> Ad astra per aspera >> To the stars through thorns >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT43itAAoJEPw7F94F4TagtuIQALJvShbdl3TX3RL0C+JcN7qN >> hG1io8doIHv/0YDgSRnsl+c+4K26+wvO9Jsucj8QL6ryPK1JVyuEv/CHBcYtLEHv >> JnmlkjPhidbjCBOcHFBxJfAjOCElOgSSDPJpxV4LmDltgDnLwrDo0IuZ9Dr4wSR5 >> xC5Fmb9YvKfW9CiU51A3svH7dYwgHn59TlkAJy1OqsddWDozcPpRTZRWEpt8BHmc >> QAfOgt1Sh4Cb/u4vXt1cMMWREZZaw4S/nytnBoQ40fH05r5cPNmicryNkrXrmAI0 >> BGjseLYdHmfIPCLYpToGBjIIwpCfHapWzVrwMy2reNwCiMM05GQNh9LrEogxN5GN >> cmqStzbKlYLTWHn9VLXtcfPak74dDHwEV0s01fAArWrHNUP36QceJNPRxO7k+cVK >> oLlBllru6HHoKt5sPH1qqN5BZQslT9P+dk/MGIYuhT/Xbl+UooywzNGGL9IIijLS >> dVoVy9mKt+jWkYjoGeXcu1xloAebvjmNGMaU+Ali0VdeXEUhDKq/yX821ERvF3PR >> HWy2HX+wZTGuQnwg+RJVyD5cbdquhuozfCaBBVy2Cj3bLQJCRRDtJ9Mgv/9AAttF >> erPt0S4h4EVLSy8wbZZHUVaDsrcQvhz0ntpbi7EA47Jn4F0UFfjSyYxwa11TfHbC >> GSWpMhnNt7+SoSysJjcr >> =Guy+ >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 7 17:08:49 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 17:08:49 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security] GPGME 1.5.1 and 1.4.4 released Message-ID: <87bnrwxrpa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! I am pleased to announce version 1.5.1 of GPGME. GnuPG Made Easy (GPGME) is a C language library that allows to add support for cryptography to a program. It is designed to make access to public key crypto engines as included in GnuPG easier for applications. GPGME provides a high-level crypto API for encryption, decryption, signing, signature verification, and key management. This is a security fix release and it is suggested to update to this version. Given that the 1.5 versions are quite new and implement features which may raise problems with some software, I also released version 1.4.4 with backported fixes. * Noteworthy changes in version 1.5.1 (2014-07-30) - Fixed possible overflow in gpgsm and uiserver engines. [CVE-2014-3564] - Added support for GnuPG 2.1's --with-secret option. - Interface changes relative to the 1.5.0 release: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ GPGME_KEYLIST_MODE_WITH_SECRET NEW. * Noteworthy changes in version 1.4.4 (2014-07-30) - Fixed possible overflow in gpgsm and uiserver engines. [CVE-2014-3564] - Fixed possibled segv in gpgme_op_card_edit. - Fixed minor memleaks and possible zombie processes. - Fixed prototype inconsistencies and void pointer arithmetic. * Download You may download version 1.5.1 from: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpgme/gpgme-1.5.1.tar.bz2 (943k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpgme/gpgme-1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig You may download version 1.4.4 from: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpgme/gpgme-1.4.4.tar.bz2 (936k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpgme/gpgme-1.4.4.tar.bz2.sig SHA-1 checksums are: a91c258e79acf30ec86a667e07f835e5e79342d8 gpgme-1.5.1.tar.bz2 1f9f668886c25467987a11c0d37c45e1ffe66b8e gpgme-1.4.4.tar.bz2 * Support Please send questions regarding the use of GPGME to the gnupg-devel mailing list: https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel/ If you need commercial support, you may want to consult this listing: https://www.gnupg.org/service.html The driving force behind the development of the GnuPG system is my company g10 Code. Maintenance and improvement of GnuPG and related software takes up most of our resources. To allow us to continue our work on free software, we ask to either purchase a support contract, engage us for custom enhancements, or to donate money: https://gnupg.org/donate/ Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 7 20:54:37 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 20:54:37 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <53E3CB6D.1080901@digitalbrains.com> Glad you could work it out. I still think the best solution lies somewhere else, not sharing secring and having only one account update pubring (or not sharing pubring). But I have an important, but simple modification to your scheme. Don't share anything else but pubring.gpg and secring.gpg. It's really unnecessary and should be avoided. Include lines like no-default-keyring keyring /path/to/shared/pubring.gpg secret-keyring /path/to/shared/secring.gpg in each user's gpg.conf and don't share the other files. I couldn't properly grasp your plan, so I have no comment on that. As long as world-readable/writable secret files are out the window, it seems a major improvement ;). Oh! I just thought of something! If you include the following: /home/admin/.gnupg/gpg.conf: no-default-keyring keyring /writable/by/admin/pubring.gpg keyring /writable/by/test1/pubring.gpg primary-keyring /writable/by/admin/pubring.gpg /home/test1/.gnupg/gpg.conf: no-default-keyring keyring /writable/by/admin/pubring.gpg keyring /writable/by/test1/pubring.gpg primary-keyring /writable/by/test1/pubring.gpg /home/test2/.gnupg/gpg.conf: no-default-keyring keyring /writable/by/admin/pubring.gpg keyring /writable/by/test1/pubring.gpg Then both admin and test1 can have their own writable pubrings which are only readable by other users, and the users see the total of all keys in either pubring. This still leaves secring which is much simpler, since only admin needs write access. Also, I don't think secrings stack like pubrings do, so you couldn't do this. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 7 20:48:49 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 20:48:49 +0200 Subject: [Announce] Libgcrypt 1.5.4 released Message-ID: <87mwbgw2y6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! The GNU project is pleased to announce an update of the Libgcrypt 1.5 series: version 1.5.4. This is a maintenance release with backports of fixes from the current stable 1.6 series. In general it is preferable to use the latest stable version. However, the 1.6 series introduced an ABI break and thus some older software may not build or work correctly with 1.6. Libgcrypt is a general purpose library of cryptographic building blocks. It does not provide any implementation of OpenPGP or other protocols. Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required for proper use Libgcrypt. Noteworthy changes in version 1.5.4 (2014-08-07) ================================================ * Declare 2016-12-31 as end-of-life for 1.5. Backported from 1.6: * Improved performance of RSA, DSA, and Elgamal by using a new exponentiation algorithm. * Fixed a subtle bug in mpi_set_bit which could set spurious bits. * Fixed a bug in an internal division function. Download ======== Source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 (1478k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig That file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz (1763k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 (17k) In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the signature of the file libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well known key 1E42B367. To retrieve the keys you may use the command "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com". * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum: sha1sum libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: bdf4b04a0d2aabc04ab3564fbe38fd094135aa7a libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 71e432e0ae8792076a40c6059667997250abbb9d libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz 8876ae002751e6ec26c76e510d17fc3e0eccb3ed libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 Copying ======= Libgcrypt is distributed under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPLv2.1+). The helper programs as well as the documentation are distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPLv2+). The file LICENSES has notices about contributions that require these additional notices are distributed. Support ======= For help on developing with Libgcrypt you should read the included manual and optional ask on the gcrypt-devel mailing list [1]. A listing with commercial support offers for Libgcrypt and related software is available at the GnuPG web site [2]. The driving force behind the development of Libgcrypt is my company g10 Code. Maintenance and improvement of Libgcrypt and related software takes up most of our resources. To allow us to continue our work on free software, we ask to either purchase a support contract, engage us for custom enhancements, or to donate money: http://gnupg.org/donate/ Thanks ====== Many thanks to all who contributed to Libgcrypt development, be it bug fixes, code, documentation, testing or helping users. Happy hacking, Werner [1] https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gcrypt-devel [2] https://gnupg.org/service.html -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Thu Aug 7 23:48:18 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2014 22:48:18 +0100 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E3CB6D.1080901@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> <53E3CB6D.1080901@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1534757473.20140807224818@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 7 August 2014 at 7:54:37 PM, in , Peter Lebbing wrote: > Also, I don't think > secrings stack like pubrings do, so you couldn't do > this. Doesn't --secret-keyring work for this? Gpg.man says it's "Same as - --keyring but for the secret keyrings." - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Never interrupt me when I'm trying to interrupt you. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPj9C5XFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5phYkD/Rl/Nv1OpIqIGKJOMrxeETORi2lBs9+rEe5J CvFRKPjYWA24+QVVk7f8uxEJlEtZkEF+JEoOPDIVk0pNUaQpI8vu1KJ0ML/qqSdu nbhvIfZrlde1MBn0axnRHgOYx4p8qCNnH8KuOYJutL9W7RKfm2EZX2OwTXvJQHUB cvu0BHE/ =B96O -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Fri Aug 8 11:06:11 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 11:06:11 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <1534757473.20140807224818@my_localhost> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> <53E3CB6D.1080901@digitalbrains.com> <1534757473.20140807224818@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53E49303.9020207@digitalbrains.com> On 07/08/14 23:48, MFPA wrote: > Doesn't --secret-keyring work for this? Gpg.man says it's "Same as > --keyring but for the secret keyrings." You are completely right. I just tested on Debian stable with gpg 1.4.12 and 2.0.19 and it Just Works(tm). I can have multiple secret keyrings. Maybe it was some old version, or maybe I'm just thinking of something else. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Fri Aug 8 12:17:06 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 12:17:06 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG Message-ID: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi! While evaluating the "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop" [1] paper I missed to describe [2] a software combination which has not been fixed and is thus vulnerable to the attack described by the paper. If you are using a GnuPG version with a *Libgcrypt version < 1.6.0*, it is possible to mount the described side-channel attack on Elgamal encryption subkeys. To check whether you are using a vulnerable Libgcrypt version, enter gpg2 --version on the command line; the second line of the output gives the Libgcrypt version: gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.25 libgcrypt 1.5.3 In this example Libgcrypt is vulnerable. If you see 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 you are fine. GnuPG versions since 1.4.16 are not affected because they do not use Libgcrypt. The recommendation is to update any Libgcrypt version below 1.6.0 to at least the latest version from the 1.5 series which is 1.5.4. Updating to 1.6.1 is also possible but that requires to rebuild GnuPG. Libgcrypt 1.5.4 has been released yesterday [3]; for convenience I include the download instructions below. A CVE-id has not yet been assigned. Many thanks to Daniel Genkin for pointing out this problem. Shalom-Salam, Werner [1] http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/handsoff [2] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q3/000349.html [3] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q3/000351.html Download ======== Libgcrypt source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at https://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 (1478k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig That file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz (1763k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 (17k) In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the signature of the file libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well known key 1E42B367. To retrieve the keys you may use the command "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com". * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum: sha1sum libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: bdf4b04a0d2aabc04ab3564fbe38fd094135aa7a libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 71e432e0ae8792076a40c6059667997250abbb9d libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz 8876ae002751e6ec26c76e510d17fc3e0eccb3ed libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 Watching out for possible security problems and working with researches to fix them takes a lot of time. g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by me, is bearing these costs. To help us carry on this work, we need your support; please see https://gnupg.org/donate/ . -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From sieutruc at gmail.com Fri Aug 8 14:11:40 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 14:11:40 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <53E49303.9020207@digitalbrains.com> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <53E34942.3080801@digitalbrains.com> <53E34D10.1070702@digitalbrains.com> <53E36AD9.8020209@digitalbrains.com> <53E36CFE.5040304@digitalbrains.com> <53E377E0.60401@digitalbrains.com> <53E378AD.1040502@sumptuouscapital.com> <53E3CB6D.1080901@digitalbrains.com> <1534757473.20140807224818@my_localhost> <53E49303.9020207@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: Peter, yeah i see your idea. It's good. So maybe i will ask my client which one he prefers using. On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:06 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > You are completely right. I just tested on Debian stable with gpg 1.4.12 > and 2.0.19 and it Just Works(tm). I can have multiple secret keyrings. But why doesn't gpg have primary secring option ? Thank you very much. Truc On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:06 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 07/08/14 23:48, MFPA wrote: > > Doesn't --secret-keyring work for this? Gpg.man says it's "Same as > > --keyring but for the secret keyrings." > > You are completely right. I just tested on Debian stable with gpg 1.4.12 > and 2.0.19 and it Just Works(tm). I can have multiple secret keyrings. > > Maybe it was some old version, or maybe I'm just thinking of something > else. > > HTH, > > Peter. > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From serge0x76 at gmail.com Fri Aug 8 14:39:48 2014 From: serge0x76 at gmail.com (Serge Voilokov) Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 08:39:48 -0400 Subject: pinentry-curses and dumb terminals Message-ID: Here is pinentry-tty version for dumb terminals: https://github.com/serge-v/pinentry/tree/tty Deploy to /usr/local/bin: git clone https://github.com/serge-v/pinentry.git git checkout tty ./autogen.sh ./configure --enable-pinentry-tty make make install Regards, Serge From green at mm.st Thu Aug 7 10:05:11 2014 From: green at mm.st (green at mm.st) Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2014 09:05:11 +0100 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature Message-ID: <1407398711.992013.150080401.74DEF065@webmail.messagingengine.com> Thank you for the response, Peter. > Did you overclock your computer? You might need to lower some setting if > you did. I haven't overclocked the computer but it is only a (quite old, now) Acer Revo with an Intel Atom 230 1.6 GHz CPU. > You could try memtest86+ for several hours. I will try this and the visual component inspection as soon as possible and see what I can find. > I'm not sure "blown capacitor" is the correct English term It certainly is the correct English term :) I can't imagine how strange it must be to discuss such obscure things in a language other than one's own. I am ashamed to admit that, although I very much enjoy other languages, I could not even say "Hello, how are you" in Dutch. All the best, Wolf. On Tue, 5 Aug 2014, at 10:05 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 05/08/14 12:59, green at mm.st wrote: > > I can run a command such as "gpg2 --clearsign doc" and it will > > fail with the "Bad signature error" then I can immediately run the same > > command again and it works (but not consistently). > > It sounds like your hardware is failing. This will often show first on > computationally intensive, verified stuff like crypto. > > Did you overclock your computer? You might need to lower some setting if > you did. > > You could try memtest86+ for several hours. Note that failing tests do > not necessarily indicate a broken memory module; it can be something > else, like for instance the CPU, the motherboard or the power supply. > > Another thing you could look for is blown capacitors on the motherboard, > especially close to the CPU. When you don't have solid capacitors, i.e. > ones containing liquid, they can short circuit, which will cause the > liquid to boil and the cap at the top to expand outwards, which can be > observed. They will form a slight dome, whereas normally it's flat or > even slightly inwards. This will only happen to the large ones. I'm sure > pictures can be found, although I'm not sure "blown capacitor" is the > correct English term... in Dutch we say "geplofte condensator", and I > never discussed the issue in any other language ;). > > HTH, > > Peter. > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at From al-gnupg_users at none.at Fri Aug 8 13:49:48 2014 From: al-gnupg_users at none.at (Aleksandar Lazic) Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 13:49:48 +0200 Subject: googles End-To-End plugins opinions Message-ID: <384ff9e170c854da4f1d53c83093928b@none.at> Hi. today a message from german site heise have pointed me to a google openpgp solution. https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/ ################ End-To-End is a Chrome extension that helps you encrypt, decrypt, digital sign, and verify signed messages within the browser using OpenPGP. This is the source code for the alpha release of the End-To-End Chrome extension. It's built upon a newly developed, JavaScript-based crypto library. End-To-End implements the OpenPGP standard, IETF RFC 4880, enabling key generation, encryption, decryption, digital signature, and signature verification. We?re releasing this code to enable community review; it is not yet ready for general use. ################ German News info http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Yahoo-Mail-will-Ende-zu-Ende-Verschluesselung-einfuehren-2288983.html Have anybody seen this plugin or maybe used it? Best regards Aleks From jeffenstein at gmail.com Fri Aug 8 16:40:18 2014 From: jeffenstein at gmail.com (Jeff Fisher) Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 16:40:18 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <20140808144018.GA20367@olive> Hello, On Thu, Aug 07, 2014 at 12:52:48AM +0200, Sieu Truc wrote: > I know well your advices , but actually i need to assign 3 users to > handle the keyring. One like admin , he can modify and add the > secret key Another like test1 , he cannot add secret key but he can > add public keys And the third callled test2 , he cannot add any key > but can use that keyring for do a securisation or desecurisation. Maybe you could setup 'sudo' to do this? sudo would let the user run a command as another user, and lets you specify the arguments that can or cannot be used with the command. It's also easy to write a wrapper script to do the function you want and give sudo access to this script. This way, you do not need to change the permissions on any of the files; they would only be owned by the 'admin' user, and in addition you can be more specific in specifying what the other users are able to do. Best Regards, Jeff From sieutruc at gmail.com Fri Aug 8 17:03:44 2014 From: sieutruc at gmail.com (Sieu Truc) Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 17:03:44 +0200 Subject: How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg In-Reply-To: <20140808144018.GA20367@olive> References: <878un130nk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53E280F0.4000204@digitalbrains.com> <20140808144018.GA20367@olive> Message-ID: On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 4:40 PM, Jeff Fisher wrote: > Maybe you could setup 'sudo' to do this? sudo would let the user run > a command as another user, and lets you specify the arguments that can > or cannot be used with the command. It's also easy to write a wrapper > script to do the function you want and give sudo access to this > script. Thank for your suggestion. Actually, my scripts have to work in 2 platforms AIX et Linux, and those users don't have any special access rights. Truc On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 4:40 PM, Jeff Fisher wrote: > Hello, > > On Thu, Aug 07, 2014 at 12:52:48AM +0200, Sieu Truc wrote: > > I know well your advices , but actually i need to assign 3 users to > > handle the keyring. One like admin , he can modify and add the > > secret key Another like test1 , he cannot add secret key but he can > > add public keys And the third callled test2 , he cannot add any key > > but can use that keyring for do a securisation or desecurisation. > > Maybe you could setup 'sudo' to do this? sudo would let the user run > a command as another user, and lets you specify the arguments that can > or cannot be used with the command. It's also easy to write a wrapper > script to do the function you want and give sudo access to this > script. > > This way, you do not need to change the permissions on any of the > files; they would only be owned by the 'admin' user, and in addition > you can be more specific in specifying what the other users are able > to do. > > Best Regards, > Jeff > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Fri Aug 8 22:31:55 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 22:31:55 +0200 Subject: gnupg - pgp reading signed files In-Reply-To: <53C41AD8.90806@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <53C41AD8.90806@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53E533BB.2040601@vulcan.xs4all.nl> I dived a little bit further into the pgp2 signing issue. It seems that GnuPG can't even verify its own output sometimes. When I sign a file with: gpg --sign --local-user 0x0116CEC9 --rfc1991 --digest-algo md5 --output test.pgp test.txt I get a file test.pgp. When I try to verify this file it fails: gpg --verify Test.pgp gpg: old style (PGP 2.x) signature gpg: can't handle this ambiguous signature data I'm using gnupg 1.4.18. During a discussion on sci.crypt someone analysed the files and found out the packet order is incorrect: > Here is a hex dump of the same file signed with GnuPG using the command > > gpg --sign --local-user bontchev --rfc1991 --digest-algo md5 --output Test.pgp Test.txt > > 00: a3 01 01 b7 00 48 ff ac 1d 62 08 54 65 73 74 2e ?..?.H??.b.Test. > 10: 74 78 74 53 c7 ca 4a 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 txtS??JThis is a > 20: 20 74 65 73 74 2e 89 00 95 03 05 00 53 c7 ca 4a test.......S??J > 30: 36 56 97 c6 32 dd 98 d9 01 01 e9 b4 04 00 cc 4e 6V.?2?.?..??..?N > 40: e3 53 12 6e 23 0e f3 4e 59 e3 73 df dd f2 a7 37 ?S.n#.?NY?s????7 > 50: 26 a8 f6 65 d5 c2 15 cf 5d 53 81 20 91 a6 ce d9 &??e??.?]S. '|?? > 60: da 4d cc bc d3 d9 da 1a 5a 72 04 42 fa 65 86 91 ?M? 1/4 ???.Zr.B?e.' > 70: 5c 7d 0e 73 03 87 ac d7 24 e3 71 53 57 13 37 17 \}.s..??$?qSW.7. > 80: 72 67 51 11 cc ec a4 70 c4 03 36 34 9b 38 35 8a rgQ.???p?.64.85. > 90: 3c 4b cb 83 a1 20 87 dc 50 55 d3 a8 23 7a 3f 9a a0: 1f d1 8f 9e 46 3b 0a e7 98 d6 7a 43 8b e6 a8 65 .?..F;.?.?zC.??e > b0: c1 d9 96 19 3f 45 60 28 62 f7 ca 83 64 79 ??..?E`(b??.dy > > As I wrote earlier, GnuPG *itself* is unable to process this (second) file. PGP 2.x does not complain about it - but does not verify the signature, either. Both programs have absolutely no problem with the first file. The obvious difference between the two files is in the order of packets - the second file has the literal packet containing the file name and the file itself at the very beginning, while the first file has it at the end, after the signature packet. > > So, I took a hex editor, cut the literal packet from the beginning of the second file and pasted it at the end. The result looks like this: > > 00: a3 01 01 b7 00 48 ff 89 00 95 03 05 00 53 c7 ca ?..?.H?......S?? > 10: 4a 36 56 97 c6 32 dd 98 d9 01 01 e9 b4 04 00 cc J6V.?2?.?..??..? > 20: 4e e3 53 12 6e 23 0e f3 4e 59 e3 73 df dd f2 a7 N?S.n#.?NY?s???? > 30: 37 26 a8 f6 65 d5 c2 15 cf 5d 53 81 20 91 a6 ce 7&??e??.?]S. '|? > 40: d9 da 4d cc bc d3 d9 da 1a 5a 72 04 42 fa 65 86 ??M? 1/4 ???.Zr.B?e. > 50: 91 5c 7d 0e 73 03 87 ac d7 24 e3 71 53 57 13 37 '\}.s..??$?qSW.7 > 60: 17 72 67 51 11 cc ec a4 70 c4 03 36 34 9b 38 35 .rgQ.???p?.64.85 > 70: 8a 3c 4b cb 83 a1 20 87 dc 50 55 d3 a8 23 7a 3f . 80: 9a 1f d1 8f 9e 46 3b 0a e7 98 d6 7a 43 8b e6 a8 ..?..F;.?.?zC.?? > 90: 65 c1 d9 96 19 3f 45 60 28 62 f7 ca 83 64 79 ac e??..?E`(b??.dy? > a0: 1d 62 08 54 65 73 74 2e 74 78 74 53 c7 ca 4a 54 .b.Test.txtS??JT > b0: 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 74 65 73 74 2e his is a test. > > Note that is not absolutely identical to the first file. This is because the signature was created at a later time and the timestamp in it is different. > > Surprise! Neither PGP 2.x, nor GnuPG have any problems processing this file and verifying its signature. > > Conclusion: GnuPG's support of RFC1991 is not compatible with PGP 2.x (or even with GnuPG itself!) - it outputs the packets in the wrong order. If this order is corrected, the result will become compatible with both programs. > > The reason for this incompatibility is probably because GnuPG tries to be way too smart for its own good and to do everything in one pass, streaming from input to output. The signature is not known before the whole file has been processed. So, GnuPG first stores the file itself, while processing it to compute the signature, and when everything is ready, it appends to the output, after the file, the already computed signature. It might be a much more elegant approach, but the result is something that simply doesn't work. Is there any chance of solving this issue or is rfc1991 considered abandoned? -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From pete at heypete.com Fri Aug 8 23:34:30 2014 From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson) Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 23:34:30 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 12:17 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > Hi! > > While evaluating the "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop" [1] paper I missed > to describe [2] a software combination which has not been fixed and is > thus vulnerable to the attack described by the paper. If you are using > a GnuPG version with a *Libgcrypt version < 1.6.0*, it is possible to > mount the described side-channel attack on Elgamal encryption subkeys. > To check whether you are using a vulnerable Libgcrypt version, enter > > gpg2 --version > > on the command line; the second line of the output gives the Libgcrypt > version: > > gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.25 > libgcrypt 1.5.3 > > In this example Libgcrypt is vulnerable. If you see 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 you > are fine. GnuPG versions since 1.4.16 are not affected because they do > not use Libgcrypt. Does this vulnerability apply to gpg4win users? There's been no gpg4win updates since October of 2013 and there have been several updates of GnuPG since then. I am somewhat concerned. Is there any information about when an update for Windows users might be released? Cheers! -Pete -- Pete Stephenson From samir at samirnassar.com Fri Aug 8 23:44:54 2014 From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar) Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2014 23:44:54 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> On Friday, 2014-08-08 23:34:30 Pete Stephenson wrote: > Does this vulnerability apply to gpg4win users? It should, since the issues the GnuPG update addresses come after the latest release of GPG4Win. > There's been no gpg4win updates since October of 2013 and there have > been several updates of GnuPG since then. I am somewhat concerned. > Is there any information about when an update for Windows users might > be released? The GPG4Win folks are gearing up for a new release this August. Samir -- Samir Nassar samir at samirnassar.com https://samirnassar.com PGP Fingerprint: EE76 B39E 0778 8F95 F796 B044 FE67 9A90 8E99 7AB2 Public Key: https://samirnassar.com/files/key.asc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From pete at heypete.com Sat Aug 9 01:24:09 2014 From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson) Date: Sat, 9 Aug 2014 01:24:09 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> Message-ID: On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Samir Nassar wrote: > On Friday, 2014-08-08 23:34:30 Pete Stephenson wrote: >> Does this vulnerability apply to gpg4win users? > > It should, since the issues the GnuPG update addresses come after the latest > release of GPG4Win. I assumed as such, but it's good to be certain. I'm not sure if there'd be some OS-specific details that would affect the issue. >> There's been no gpg4win updates since October of 2013 and there have >> been several updates of GnuPG since then. I am somewhat concerned. > >> Is there any information about when an update for Windows users might >> be released? > > The GPG4Win folks are gearing up for a new release this August. Excellent. I look forward to it. -- Pete Stephenson From wk at gnupg.org Sat Aug 9 10:44:24 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2014 10:44:24 +0200 Subject: gnupg - pgp reading signed files In-Reply-To: <53E533BB.2040601@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of "Fri, 08 Aug 2014 22:31:55 +0200") References: <53C41AD8.90806@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53E533BB.2040601@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <87k36it5lj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 8 Aug 2014 22:31, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said: > Is there any chance of solving this issue or is rfc1991 considered > abandoned? Right. I does not make any sense to try to be compatible to PGP 2. It is nice that you can decrypt PGP2 files but everything else is useless. Face it: PGP 2 signatures are broken and a good signature status does not mean anything. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Sat Aug 9 10:49:54 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2014 10:49:54 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: (Pete Stephenson's message of "Sat, 9 Aug 2014 01:24:09 +0200") References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> Message-ID: <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 9 Aug 2014 01:24, pete at heypete.com said: >> The GPG4Win folks are gearing up for a new release this August. > > Excellent. I look forward to it. The problem with gpg4win is that it is hard to build in particular the KDE stuff can't be easily cross compiled. It is quite some work to maintain this software and donations are very low. My tentative plan is now to separate GnuPG proper from the other stuff and provide it as a separate installer (for gnupg 2.1) Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Sat Aug 9 12:03:28 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2014 12:03:28 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail v1.7 available In-Reply-To: <53CA72C8.406@enigmail.net> References: <53C16068.4010900@enigmail.net> <53CA72C8.406@enigmail.net> Message-ID: <53E5F1F0.1060700@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 19-07-2014 15:29, John Clizbe wrote: > As there are many Enigmail users who read this list, but not [Enigmail], I'm > forwarding the announcement of the newest release of Enigmail, v1.7. > There are quite a few changes in this release. Not compatible with Thunderbird 3.1.20. And considering the way Mozilla is currently adding bloat to all its programs (Hi Netscape 4.0), I don't see any reason to upgrade. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From cai.0407 at gmail.com Sat Aug 9 12:23:33 2014 From: cai.0407 at gmail.com (Kosuke Kaizuka) Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2014 19:23:33 +0900 Subject: Fwd: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail v1.7 available In-Reply-To: <53E5F1F0.1060700@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <53C16068.4010900@enigmail.net> <53CA72C8.406@enigmail.net> <53E5F1F0.1060700@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53E5F6A5.9040207@gmail.com> On Sat, 09 Aug 2014 12:03:28 +0200, Johan Wevers wrote: > On 19-07-2014 15:29, John Clizbe wrote: > >> As there are many Enigmail users who read this list, but not [Enigmail], I'm >> forwarding the announcement of the newest release of Enigmail, v1.7. >> There are quite a few changes in this release. > > Not compatible with Thunderbird 3.1.20. And considering the way Mozilla > is currently adding bloat to all its programs (Hi Netscape 4.0), I don't > see any reason to upgrade. Thunderbird 3.1.20 was released in March 2012. There are more than 200 security vulnerabilities fixed after release of 3.1.20... The last version compatible with Thunderbird 3.1.20 is Enigmail 1.1.2, released in June 2010. Current Enigmail 1.7 supports only Thunderbird 31 and 24. I strongly recommend you to upgrade at least to Thunderbird 24.7.0 and Enigmail 1.7. -- Kosuke Kaizuka -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 899 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From samir at samirnassar.com Sat Aug 9 12:45:58 2014 From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar) Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2014 12:45:58 +0200 Subject: Fwd: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail v1.7 available In-Reply-To: <53E5F1F0.1060700@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <53C16068.4010900@enigmail.net> <53CA72C8.406@enigmail.net> <53E5F1F0.1060700@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <1554536.uYMM1ii82r@forge> On Saturday, 2014-08-09 12:03:28 Johan Wevers wrote: > Not compatible with Thunderbird 3.1.20. And considering the way Mozilla > is currently adding bloat to all its programs (Hi Netscape 4.0), I don't > see any reason to upgrade. I had to read the Thunderbird version string twice before understanding what you are saying. If you believe you found a defect you should file a proper bug report. Given that the Enigmail page on addons.mozilla.org says "Works with Thunderbird 24.0 - 34.0", it looks like your version of Thunderbird is not supported. Samir -- Samir Nassar samir at samirnassar.com https://samirnassar.com PGP Fingerprint: EE76 B39E 0778 8F95 F796 B044 FE67 9A90 8E99 7AB2 Public Key: https://samirnassar.com/files/key.asc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From pete at heypete.com Sat Aug 9 21:01:32 2014 From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson) Date: Sat, 9 Aug 2014 21:01:32 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Sat, Aug 9, 2014 at 10:49 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 9 Aug 2014 01:24, pete at heypete.com said: > >>> The GPG4Win folks are gearing up for a new release this August. >> >> Excellent. I look forward to it. > > The problem with gpg4win is that it is hard to build in particular the > KDE stuff can't be easily cross compiled. It is quite some work to > maintain this software and donations are very low. My tentative plan is > now to separate GnuPG proper from the other stuff and provide it as a > separate installer (for gnupg 2.1) I'll bet. Fortunately, there are decent Windows front-ends for mail-related tasks like Enigmail. Not much for file-related tasks, though. I would definitely be happy if the GPG binary was packaged separately: I almost never use GPA or other GUI tools that come with the package. Thanks for the reminder regarding donations: I really should chip in a bit more this year. Cheers! -Pete -- Pete Stephenson From branko at majic.rs Sat Aug 9 22:52:57 2014 From: branko at majic.rs (Branko Majic) Date: Sat, 9 Aug 2014 22:52:57 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20140809225257.129e7843@zetkin.primekey.se> On Fri, 08 Aug 2014 12:17:06 +0200 Werner Koch wrote: > Hi! > > While evaluating the "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop" [1] paper I missed > to describe [2] a software combination which has not been fixed and is > thus vulnerable to the attack described by the paper. If you are using > a GnuPG version with a *Libgcrypt version < 1.6.0*, it is possible to > mount the described side-channel attack on Elgamal encryption subkeys. > To check whether you are using a vulnerable Libgcrypt version, enter > > gpg2 --version > > on the command line; the second line of the output gives the Libgcrypt > version: > > gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.25 > libgcrypt 1.5.3 > > In this example Libgcrypt is vulnerable. If you see 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 you > are fine. GnuPG versions since 1.4.16 are not affected because they do > not use Libgcrypt. > > The recommendation is to update any Libgcrypt version below 1.6.0 to at > least the latest version from the 1.5 series which is 1.5.4. Updating > to 1.6.1 is also possible but that requires to rebuild GnuPG. > > Libgcrypt 1.5.4 has been released yesterday [3]; for convenience I > include the download instructions below. A CVE-id has not yet been > assigned. > > Many thanks to Daniel Genkin for pointing out this problem. > > > Shalom-Salam, > > Werner > > > [1] http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/handsoff > [2] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q3/000349.html > [3] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q3/000351.html > > Download > ======== > > Libgcrypt source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors > as listed at https://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the > primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 (1478k) > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig > > That file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is here: > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz (1763k) > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz.sig > > Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 (17k) > > In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build > is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following > ways: > > * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the > signature of the file libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 you would use this > command: > > gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig > > This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You > should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made > by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well > known key 1E42B367. To retrieve the keys you may use the command > "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com". > > * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 > checksum: > > sha1sum libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 > > and check that the output matches the first line from the > following list: > > bdf4b04a0d2aabc04ab3564fbe38fd094135aa7a libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 > 71e432e0ae8792076a40c6059667997250abbb9d libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz > 8876ae002751e6ec26c76e510d17fc3e0eccb3ed libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 > > > Watching out for possible security problems and working with researches > to fix them takes a lot of time. g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned > and headed by me, is bearing these costs. To help us carry on this > work, we need your support; please see https://gnupg.org/donate/ . > Skimming through the description, does it mean that users with OpenPGP cards should be impervious to this attack? Can the attack be used to leak symmetric keys during the GnuPG operation? Best regards -- Branko Majic Jabber: branko at majic.rs Please use only Free formats when sending attachments to me. ?????? ????? ?????: branko at majic.rs ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ????????? ? ????????? ?????????. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: From david at gbenet.com Sun Aug 10 09:13:12 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 08:13:12 +0100 Subject: Error - bad passphrase Message-ID: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> Hi All, Am at a loss now. I've Thunderbird 31 and Enigmail 1.7 Since this upgrade I've had various issues - unable to sign unable to encrypt - I get an error message from Enigmail "Error - bad passphrase" - when I've not even entered it at the time. Also KGpg comes up with the following error Gnupg failed to start - "gpg: option file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf': No such file or directory." Kleopatra - Check that gpg-agent is running and that the GPG_AGENT_INFO variable is set and up-to-date. david at laptop1:~$ gpg-agent gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session when I type david at laptop1:~$ gpg gpg: Go ahead and type your message ... and david at laptop1:~$ gpg2 gpg: Go ahead and type your message ... But sometimes gpg-agent is running............... Am at a loss what to do - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x8716853A.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 1926 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sun Aug 10 16:44:45 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 16:44:45 +0200 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <1729385.VFVPRkisav@inno> Hello, Am So 10.08.2014, 08:13:12 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > Since this upgrade I have no idea why the upgrade may have caused this. > Also KGpg comes up with the following error Gnupg failed to start - > "gpg: option file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf': No such file or > directory." Does the file exist? > But sometimes gpg-agent is running............... I don't know what the reason for the change is but I have a suggestion for a work-around: You can put use-standard-socket in the config file gpg-agent.conf. If you do that and gpg-agent is not running (which you may check every few minutes via cron) then you can simply restart it: gpg-agent --daemon Due to the config file setting the applications will connect to the new gpg-agent as they would have connected to the old one. Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sun Aug 10 16:49:01 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 16:49:01 +0200 Subject: Why is the gpg-agent PID part of GPG_AGENT_INFO? Message-ID: <4458975.hmHpz9zDvZ@inno> Hello, echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO /home/hl/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent:22684:1 why is the gpg-agent PID part of GPG_AGENT_INFO? I just made a test: I killed gpg-agent and started it again. The applications still connect to it though the PID is obviously wrong then. The only effect I can see is that you can (relatively certainly) determine whether gpg-agent has been restarted. But is that of any use? Or what is the "official" reason? Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sun Aug 10 18:05:24 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 18:05:24 +0200 Subject: Error in ASSUAN description: GET_PASSPHRASE Message-ID: <2362219.9DmCoREUoU@inno> Hello, I think there is an error in the description of GET_PASSPHRASE on https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Agent-GET_005fPASSPHRASE.html The synopsis is: GET_PASSPHRASE [--data] [--check] [--no-ask] [--repeat[=N]] [-- qualitybar] cache_id [error_message prompt description] which would mean that "cache_id" is the only mandatory parameter which is consistent with the description: "cache_id is expected to be a string used to identify a cached passphrase. Use a X to bypass the cache. With no other arguments the agent returns a cached passphrase or an error." But with gpg-connect-agent I get: > GET_PASSPHRASE 03C7C358A842126450C104BA486B17AB3F96AD8E ERR 67109144 IPC Parameterfehler - no description given > GET_PASSPHRASE 03C7C358A842126450C104BA486B17AB3F96AD8E a b c OK XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX start cmd:> gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.22 libgcrypt 1.5.3 Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sun Aug 10 19:19:20 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 19:19:20 +0200 Subject: Why is the gpg-agent PID part of GPG_AGENT_INFO? In-Reply-To: <4458975.hmHpz9zDvZ@inno> (Hauke Laging's message of "Sun, 10 Aug 2014 16:49:01 +0200") References: <4458975.hmHpz9zDvZ@inno> Message-ID: <8738d4tg87.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 10 Aug 2014 16:49, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said: > why is the gpg-agent PID part of GPG_AGENT_INFO? I just made a test: I It sounded like a good idea back then. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From david at gbenet.com Sun Aug 10 21:39:26 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 20:39:26 +0100 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <1729385.VFVPRkisav@inno> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> <1729385.VFVPRkisav@inno> Message-ID: <53E7CA6E.9050100@gbenet.com> On 10/08/14 15:44, Hauke Laging wrote: > Hello, > > Am So 10.08.2014, 08:13:12 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > >> Since this upgrade > > I have no idea why the upgrade may have caused this. > > >> Also KGpg comes up with the following error Gnupg failed to start - >> "gpg: option file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf': No such file or >> directory." > > Does the file exist? > > >> But sometimes gpg-agent is running............... > > I don't know what the reason for the change is but I have a suggestion > for a work-around: > > You can put > use-standard-socket > in the config file gpg-agent.conf. If you do that and gpg-agent is not > running (which you may check every few minutes via cron) then you can > simply restart it: > gpg-agent --daemon > > Due to the config file setting the applications will connect to the new > gpg-agent as they would have connected to the old one. > > > Hauke > Hi Hauke, david at laptop1:~$ gpg-agent --daemon GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/gpg-6uIYXp/S.gpg-agent:1874:1; export GPG_AGENT_INFO; david at laptop1:~$ gpg-agent gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session david at laptop1:~$ and I have no gpg.conf David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x8716853A.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 1926 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sun Aug 10 21:48:38 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 21:48:38 +0200 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <53E7CA6E.9050100@gbenet.com> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> <1729385.VFVPRkisav@inno> <53E7CA6E.9050100@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <2491387.pdq0eG1mnk@inno> Am So 10.08.2014, 20:39:26 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > david at laptop1:~$ gpg-agent --daemon > GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/gpg-6uIYXp/S.gpg-agent:1874:1; export You obviously have not set use-standard-socket in the config file gpg-agent.conf Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 11 08:49:32 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 02:49:32 -0400 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_shoul?= =?windows-1252?Q?d_be_mandatory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> Message-ID: <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> (Since this has taken a turn for the GnuPG-specific, I have migrated this thread to GnuPG-Users. It was originally found on the IETF OpenPGP working group page.) >> even though it's not default, you can change your gpg.conf(5) to >> use a specific hashing algorithm > > In particular, set the following preferences in GnuPG: > > digest-algo SHA512 cipher-algo AES256 > > The man page incorrectly warns against using them, and advises that > you use the 'personal-' variants instead. These effectively do > nothing. The man page is correct. Please don't use these options. Please don't encourage people to use these options. It's very easy to misuse these options in ways that will destroy interoperability with other OpenPGP applications. > If any downstream package maintainers are reading this, email me, > and I'll be delighted to open an issue to include a modern gpg.conf > skeleton in your package. I would be happy to look at your suggestions for inclusion in the FAQ; however, I'll tell you in advance the FAQ will not recommend using digest-algo or cipher-algo. > Does *anyone* on this list use an OpenPGP implementation that does > not support SHA-2 and AES? (And, if so, can you estimate how many > users are in a similar position?) Given the OpenPGP mailing list is comprised mostly of people who implement OpenPGP for a living, it is unlikely there will be many people there who use old versions of software. Try looking here on GnuPG-Users. You'll have to hunt a little bit, but it's pretty easy to find people seeking help with GnuPG 1.2, which is well over a decade old. On Enigmail, I recently had a frustrating experience helping a user who was trying to use GnuPG to exchange traffic with a PGP *2.6* user... a codebase which is about 20 years old now. So, short answer: yes, there are implementations that do not support SHA-2 and/or AES. Yes, they are still in use. Yes, we really wish they'd all just vanish or else upgrade to the latest, but no, they have no plans of doing that. From david at gbenet.com Mon Aug 11 10:10:23 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 09:10:23 +0100 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <2491387.pdq0eG1mnk@inno> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> <1729385.VFVPRkisav@inno> <53E7CA6E.9050100@gbenet.com> <2491387.pdq0eG1mnk@inno> Message-ID: <53E87A6F.1040202@gbenet.com> On 10/08/14 20:48, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am So 10.08.2014, 20:39:26 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > >> david at laptop1:~$ gpg-agent --daemon >> GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/gpg-6uIYXp/S.gpg-agent:1874:1; export > > You obviously have not set > use-standard-socket > in the config file gpg-agent.conf > > > Hauke > Hauke, Am getting the following msg now Error - key extraction command failed /usr/bin/gpg --charset utf-8 --display-charset utf-8 --batch --no-tty --status-fd 2 -a --export 0x8716853A gpg: WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on configuration file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf' gpg: /home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf:6: argument not expected David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com From wk at gnupg.org Mon Aug 11 10:21:55 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 10:21:55 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <20140809225257.129e7843@zetkin.primekey.se> (Branko Majic's message of "Sat, 9 Aug 2014 22:52:57 +0200") References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20140809225257.129e7843@zetkin.primekey.se> Message-ID: <8761hzsafw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi, [94 lines of full quote deleted - pretty please strip quote to what is needed. I nearly missed your question] On Sat, 9 Aug 2014 22:52, branko at majic.rs said: > Skimming through the description, does it mean that users with OpenPGP > cards should be impervious to this attack? Can the attack be used to > leak symmetric keys during the GnuPG operation? It is unlikely that this particular attack can be used against smart cards. They are quite different from a general purpose PC. Modern cards are designed to mitigate many classes of side-channel attacks since cards started to be targeted more than 25 years ago. The private keys are only on the card and not accessible from the PC. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mac3iii at gmail.com Mon Aug 11 06:56:26 2014 From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 00:56:26 -0400 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install Message-ID: <53E84CFA.40607@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 For some of us relatively new Ubuntu Linux users installing the latest gnupg can be a challenge. I usually end up putting Ubuntu into some strange state before everything works. I propose a method to help us newbies. Successful installation steps on a brand new Oracle VM VirtualBox installation of Ubuntu 14.04 should be published. A new install has no non-standard libraries etc and so should be reproducible for everyone starting from scratch. Working in a virtual environment doesn't mess up your normal installation and you can save various stages to try something new. As an example here is what is required on a new Ubuntu install for Gnupg 2.0.25: 1. Download, unpack, and verify: libgpg-error-1.13, libgcrypt-1.6.1, libassuan-2.1.1, libksba-1.3.0, pth-2.0.7 2. cd new directory, ./configure, make, sudo make install, make check; each of above in order 3. sudo apt-get install gtk+-2.0 4. Download, unpack, verify: pinentry-0.8.3, do the steps in 2 for pinentry only 5. Download, unpack, verify: Gnupg-2.0.25 6. Do step 2 for Gnupg-2.0.25 only 6. This is garaunteed to pass all 28 tests on a virgin install of Ubuntu 14.04 and should work on your actual working Ubuntu install with other versions of Gnupg present. Now I ask the help of the group. I have been unsuccessful in doing the same for the beta version of Gnupg-2.1. Simply installing npth, libpg-error, libgcrypt, libksba, and libassuan does not even come close to succeeding. npth requires LDAP that requires something called BerkelyDB that seems to be satisfied by sudo apt-get install libdb-dev, libdb++-dev (I think). Even then the compile limps along and fails 27/29 tests. If anyone has succeeded in doing this reproducibly on a virgin Ubuntu install I would appreciate seeing the detailed steps (and I'm sure others would too). Hopefully yours, Sandy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iJwEAQECAAYFAlPoTPoACgkQUVKxkWZz2Q1YrgP/ZYW/N9FwspI47k7b2K3XfjeG vhp5yS6GJygUGPNkhl849yjMQ65dIRmGBMiHJE8Eb8+B9VSm7UbpgLRDz/GeTERm OhStGvxGsS7Xh4YHN9Zwu0l2UbR2F1DzK3UFI1U8ZFcuxFAFxwjhNYQWU7DlTRes CXpQbIa8ovn7Fd4V5b8= =PgmO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Mon Aug 11 12:50:16 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 12:50:16 +0200 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <53E89FE8.5020103@nordnet.fr> On 10/08/14 09:13, david at gbenet.com wrote: > Hi All, > > Am at a loss now. I've Thunderbird 31 and Enigmail 1.7 > > Since this upgrade I've had various issues - unable to sign unable to encrypt - I get an > error message from Enigmail "Error - bad passphrase" - when I've not even entered it at the > time. > > Also KGpg comes up with the following error Gnupg failed to start - "gpg: option file > `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf': No such file or directory." > > Kleopatra - Check that gpg-agent is running and that the GPG_AGENT_INFO variable is set and > up-to-date. > These are the same errors I got but they had nothing to do with either Thunderbird 31 or enigmail (which was on version 1.6 at the time). I had recently abandoned Windows 7 for linux UbuntuStudio 14.04 and everything worked fine but the standard gpg issue in the distribution was (and is) 1.4.16. I decided to install the gnupg 2.0.22 (Ubuntu flavour) and that's when I had the same errors you have even though I hadn't entered any passphrase (nor even been asked to provide it). I removed 2.0.22 and all the errors disappeared. I'm still trying to pluck up courage to have another go at gnupg2 and then into smart cards. Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon Aug 11 17:13:31 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 17:13:31 +0200 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install In-Reply-To: <53E84CFA.40607@gmail.com> (Murphy's message of "Mon, 11 Aug 2014 00:56:26 -0400") References: <53E84CFA.40607@gmail.com> Message-ID: <877g2fqctg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 11 Aug 2014 06:56, mac3iii at gmail.com said: > close to succeeding. npth requires LDAP that requires something > called BerkelyDB that seems to be satisfied by sudo apt-get install npth has no dependencies except for the system's native thread library (i.e pthread). Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 11 19:18:33 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 13:18:33 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft Message-ID: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> A few weeks ago on -devel I made a proposal for a FAQ change. So far I've received feedback from three people, all of it fairly positive, all suggesting mild changes. The following represents a final draft, which I'm now presenting on -users to get the most visibility/feedback. If the community approves, I'll be submitting this to Werner for inclusion into the FAQ. ===== Q: Why does GnuPG default to 2048-bit RSA? A: At the time the decision was made, 2048-bit RSA was thought to provide reasonable security for the next decade or more while still being compatible with the overwhelming majority of the OpenPGP ecosystem. Q: Is that still the case? A: Largely, yes. According to NIST Special Publication 800-57, published in July 2012, 2048-bit RSA is believed safe until 2030. At present, no reputable cryptographer or research group has cast doubt on the safety of RSA-2048. That said, many are suggesting shifting to larger keys, and GnuPG will be making such a shift in the near future. Q: What do other groups have to say about 2048-bit RSA? A: In 2014, the German Bundesnetzagentur fuer Elektrizitaet, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen recommended using RSA-2048 for long-term security in electronic signatures. In 2012, ECRYPT-II published their "Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes" wherein they expressed their belief RSA-1776 will suffice until at least 2020, and RSA-2432 until 2030. In 2010, France's Agence Nationale de la Securite des Systems d'Information stated they had confidence in RSA-2048 until at least 2020. Q: Is there a general recommendation that 3072-bit keys be used for new applications? A: No, although some respected people and groups within the cryptographic community have made such recommendations. Some even recommend 4096-bit keys. Q: Will GnuPG ever support RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 by default? A: Probably not. The future is elliptical-curve cryptography, which will bring a level of safety comparable to RSA-16384. Every minute we spend arguing about whether we should change the defaults to RSA-3072 or more is one minute the shift to ECC is delayed. Frankly, we think ECC is a really good idea and we'd like to see it deployed as soon as humanly possible. Q: I think I need larger key sizes. A: By all means, feel free to generate certificates with larger keys. GnuPG supports up to 4096-bit keys. From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Mon Aug 11 19:31:05 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:31:05 +0200 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_shoul?= =?windows-1252?Q?d_be_mandatory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 11-08-2014 8:49, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On Enigmail, I recently had a frustrating > experience helping a user who was trying to use GnuPG to exchange > traffic with a PGP *2.6* user... a codebase which is about 20 years old now. Fixing the packet order when --pgp2 or --rfc1991 are used would help a lot. And now I assume that pgp 2 will not pass away before the generation that was on the internet in the 1990's lies in the grave. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 11 21:05:40 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 15:05:40 -0400 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install In-Reply-To: <53E84CFA.40607@gmail.com> References: <53E84CFA.40607@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53E91404.1050202@sixdemonbag.org> > For some of us relatively new Ubuntu Linux users installing the > latest gnupg can be a challenge. The latest GnuPG is in the Ubuntu repositories, last I checked. Ubuntu's normally pretty good about keeping current. With respect to GnuPG 2.1, it's still in progress and hasn't yet been released. As such, that means it's really not in a state where users are expected to be able to compile it from scratch. Once we get close to an official 2.1 release I'm pretty sure the compilation process will get easier. :) > various stages to try something new. As an example here is what is > required on a new Ubuntu install for Gnupg 2.0.25: Have you considered turning this into a bash or Perl script? Some people on the list might find that very useful. From free10pro at gmail.com Mon Aug 11 21:53:54 2014 From: free10pro at gmail.com (Paul R. Ramer) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 12:53:54 -0700 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On August 11, 2014 10:18:33 AM PDT, "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: >A few weeks ago on -devel I made a proposal for a FAQ change. So far >I've received feedback from three people, all of it fairly positive, >all >suggesting mild changes. The following represents a final draft, which > >I'm now presenting on -users to get the most visibility/feedback. If >the community approves, I'll be submitting this to Werner for inclusion > >into the FAQ. I think it is well written and that it effectively answers the bulk of the longer key length questions that are often posted to this mailing list. Good work, Robert. Cheers, -Paul -- PGP: 3DB6D884 From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Mon Aug 11 22:15:37 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 22:15:37 +0200 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install In-Reply-To: <53E91404.1050202@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E84CFA.40607@gmail.com> <53E91404.1050202@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53E92469.4060407@nordnet.fr> On 11/08/14 21:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> For some of us relatively new Ubuntu Linux users installing the >> latest gnupg can be a challenge. > > The latest GnuPG is in the Ubuntu repositories, last I checked. > Ubuntu's normally pretty good about keeping current. I'm also a new Ubuntu user (UbuntuStudio 14.04) and I find it difficult to find my way around. I'm not yet up to doing it myself from source code so I look to the resources in the distribution : Ubuntu Software Centre, and Synaptic Package Manager. The latest Gnupg's in the Software Centre are : gnupg 1.4.16-1ubuntu2.1 gnupg2 2.0.22-3ubuntu1.1 and this info is confirmed by Synaptic Package Manager which I update at least once every week (and all the repositories are checked in the package manager's settings.) Gnupg 1.4.16 is what I'm using. I tried installing the gnupg2 package but all that it did for me was to stop enigmail/thunderbird from signing or encrypting emails. So I removed it pending more courage and/or a later version and/or understanding more about do-it-yourself. Maybe you could tell me if there are other places to check the Ubuntu repositories ? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From edv at kommunalkredit.at Mon Aug 11 13:21:32 2014 From: edv at kommunalkredit.at (KA IT User) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 11:21:32 +0000 Subject: AW: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524A272@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> Hi, please remove us from the mailing list. We are not longer using GnuPG in our company. Mit freundlichen Gr??en / Kind regards __________________________ Ing. Roman H?ller, MSc Informationstechnologie Information Technology Kommunalkredit Austria AG 1092 Wien, T?rkenstra?e 9 Tel.: +43 (0) 1/31631 519, Fax: -99519 Mobil: +43 (0) 664/80 31631 519 r.hoeller at kommunalkredit.at www.kommunalkredit.at -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: Gnupg-announce [mailto:gnupg-announce-bounces at gnupg.org] Im Auftrag von Werner Koch Gesendet: Freitag, 08. August 2014 12:28 An: gnupg-announce at gnupg.org; info-gnu at gnu.org Betreff: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG Hi! While evaluating the "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop" [1] paper I missed to describe [2] a software combination which has not been fixed and is thus vulnerable to the attack described by the paper. If you are using a GnuPG version with a *Libgcrypt version < 1.6.0*, it is possible to mount the described side-channel attack on Elgamal encryption subkeys. To check whether you are using a vulnerable Libgcrypt version, enter gpg2 --version on the command line; the second line of the output gives the Libgcrypt version: gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.25 libgcrypt 1.5.3 In this example Libgcrypt is vulnerable. If you see 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 you are fine. GnuPG versions since 1.4.16 are not affected because they do not use Libgcrypt. The recommendation is to update any Libgcrypt version below 1.6.0 to at least the latest version from the 1.5 series which is 1.5.4. Updating to 1.6.1 is also possible but that requires to rebuild GnuPG. Libgcrypt 1.5.4 has been released yesterday [3]; for convenience I include the download instructions below. A CVE-id has not yet been assigned. Many thanks to Daniel Genkin for pointing out this problem. Shalom-Salam, Werner [1] http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/handsoff [2] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q3/000349.html [3] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q3/000351.html Download ======== Libgcrypt source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at https://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 (1478k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig That file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz (1763k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 (17k) In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the signature of the file libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well known key 1E42B367. To retrieve the keys you may use the command "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com". * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum: sha1sum libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: bdf4b04a0d2aabc04ab3564fbe38fd094135aa7a libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 71e432e0ae8792076a40c6059667997250abbb9d libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz 8876ae002751e6ec26c76e510d17fc3e0eccb3ed libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2 Watching out for possible security problems and working with researches to fix them takes a lot of time. g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by me, is bearing these costs. To help us carry on this work, we need your support; please see https://gnupg.org/donate/ . -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. Company Disclaimer / Legal Notices http://www.kommunalkredit.at/disclaimer/ Kommunalkredit Austria AG, T?rkenstrasse 9, 1092 Wien - FN 45776 v, Handelsgericht Wien SAVE PAPER - THINK BEFORE YOU PRINT From mac3iii at gmail.com Mon Aug 11 20:26:41 2014 From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install Message-ID: <53E90AE1.4060207@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Thank you Werner, you are right about npth. The dependency call came when ./configure of Gnupg-2.1 was attempted. Then comes the message *** You need a LDAP library to build this program. I am getting closer! After sudo apt-get install libdb-dev and sudo apt-get install libdb++-dev, Openldap-2.4.39 installs without error, provided I use the four commands: ./configure, make dependencies, make, sudo make install. Then after sudo apt-get install gtk+-2.0, install pinentry, and installing Gnupg-2.1, all tests pass until it hangs on whatever follows the test: detachm.test. It also seems to hang on --gen-key once the proposed password is accepted. But I am hot on the trail. Unless someone beats me in revealing a successful gnupg 2.1 install on a new Ubuntu 14.04 environment I will keep trying. Getting there, Sandy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iJwEAQECAAYFAlPpCuEACgkQUVKxkWZz2Q1u5QP/cL/xnGeKepvDmk9FW7AnIPxQ rpfr8OJqK+dh7/QvvMo/Y9C++rVC88/1gqdEdJE+qd5SfawOEBd+6WNUJVvYpS6s yABkk6dfxtf6OMGgB62cP/4HKdqVl392A9vJA11m1mXDyUzyKjunmQgjt9YG8Tz7 wV0i4JK17I0OcDe9yRw= =NrXZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Mon Aug 11 23:58:07 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 23:58:07 +0200 Subject: [openpgp] SHA-2 support should be mandatory =?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=93?= change defaults In-Reply-To: <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of "Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:31:05 +0200") References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <87sil2pu34.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:31, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said: > Fixing the packet order when --pgp2 or --rfc1991 are used would help a Too complicated and breaks too much. > lot. And now I assume that pgp 2 will not pass away before the It is quite funny that some people here demand a ban of SHA-1 while some still believe MD5 (pgp 2) is a safe choice. MD5 has been broken; it is easy to compute collisions and there are theoretical pre-image attack. SHA-1 has for now only a theoretical collision attack. Please get rid of your old pgp 2 stuff - you can't trust the signature anymore. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 12 00:00:19 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 00:00:19 +0200 Subject: AW: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524A272@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> (KA IT User's message of "Mon, 11 Aug 2014 11:21:32 +0000") References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524A272@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> Message-ID: <87oavqptzg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 11 Aug 2014 13:21, edv at kommunalkredit.at said: > please remove us from the mailing list. We are not longer using GnuPG in our company. What about visiting the URL shown as last line of each mail send through this mailing list? Or looking into the list mail headers? Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Aug 12 00:08:35 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 18:08:35 -0400 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_should_be_man?= =?windows-1252?Q?datory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: On Aug 11, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Johan Wevers wrote: > On 11-08-2014 8:49, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >> On Enigmail, I recently had a frustrating >> experience helping a user who was trying to use GnuPG to exchange >> traffic with a PGP *2.6* user... a codebase which is about 20 years old now. > > Fixing the packet order when --pgp2 or --rfc1991 are used would help a > lot. And now I assume that pgp 2 will not pass away before the > generation that was on the internet in the 1990's lies in the grave. Rather than fixing RFC-1991 support, why not go in the other direction and make it clear that it isn't supported, and won't work? I did a bunch of work to make --pgp2 work well and interoperate with PGP 2.x over a decade ago. Even then it was intended as a stopgap measure until people finally stopped using PGP 2.x. Over 10 years later, it's well past time to kill it. David From jerry at seibercom.net Mon Aug 11 23:40:18 2014 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 17:40:18 -0400 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524A272@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524A272@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> Message-ID: <20140811174018.20596107@scorpio> On Mon, 11 Aug 2014 11:21:32 +0000, KA IT User stated: > please remove us from the mailing list. We are not longer using GnuPG in > our company. Please try and follow the directions. List-Unsubscribe: , -- Jerry From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 12 01:45:37 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:45:37 -0400 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_shoul?= =?windows-1252?Q?d_be_mandatory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53E955A1.4050601@sixdemonbag.org> > Rather than fixing RFC-1991 support, why not go in the other > direction and make it clear that it isn't supported, and won't work? Sounds like an excellent plan to me. From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue Aug 12 09:17:52 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 09:17:52 +0200 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <53E87A6F.1040202@gbenet.com> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> <2491387.pdq0eG1mnk@inno> <53E87A6F.1040202@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <1629952.6DlYTAcUsf@inno> Am Mo 11.08.2014, 09:10:23 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > Am getting the following msg now > Error - key extraction command failed > /usr/bin/gpg --charset utf-8 --display-charset utf-8 --batch --no-tty > --status-fd 2 -a --export 0x8716853A > gpg: WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on configuration > file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf' > gpg: /home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf:6: argument not expected Interesting. What happens if you try this command in the shell? What is in line 6 of gpg.conf? debug-level basic? Can you avoid the error by commenting out the line which causes the problem and fixing the permissions for ~/.gnupg/? Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 12 09:33:00 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 09:33:00 +0200 Subject: [openpgp] SHA-2 support should be mandatory =?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=93?= change defaults In-Reply-To: (David Shaw's message of "Mon, 11 Aug 2014 18:08:35 -0400") References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 00:08, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > Rather than fixing RFC-1991 support, why not go in the other direction > and make it clear that it isn't supported, and won't work? I did a > bunch of work to make --pgp2 work well and interoperate with PGP 2.x > over a decade ago. Even then it was intended as a stopgap measure > until people finally stopped using PGP 2.x. Over 10 years later, it's > well past time to kill it. I fully agree. Do you mean to document it or to remove the function and change the options to print a warning message that they don't do anything? For 2.1. What about --compress-keys and --compress-sigs? These are GnuPG only features which predate OpenPGP and have been introduced only to allow that old accidental behaviour of GnuPG. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mac3iii at gmail.com Tue Aug 12 05:15:42 2014 From: mac3iii at gmail.com (Murphy) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 23:15:42 -0400 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install Message-ID: <53E986DE.6090606@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Success! I finally got a consistent install of beta version gnupg-2.1.0 on a fresh version of Ubuntu 14.04 inside VirtualBox. These steps work: 1. Download, verify and unpack npth, libgpg-error, libgcrypt, libksba, libassuan. 2. Install each in order using the commands: ./configure, make, sudo make install, make check. 3. sudo mv /usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon /usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon.bak (this is a hack to prevent gnome from hijacking gnupg) 4. sudo apt-get install libdb-dev 5. sudo apt-get install libdb++-dev 6. Install Openldap 2.4.39 using commands: ./configure, make depend, make, sudo make install (dont bother with the check, it is too long and weird) 7. sudo apt-get install gtk+-2.0 8. Install pinentry-0.8.3 using step 2 9. Download, verify and unpack gnupg-2.1.0, install using step 2 10. The make check seems to hang on genkey1024.test (right after detachm.test) but don't give up. It actually took 20 minutes by my watch on my HP Envy i5 3 GHz machine to complete this step, then completed all tests successfully. Now we Ubuntu users can play with elliptical curve crypto, google's end-to-end encryption scheme, and also help Werner evaluate this beta version. Keeping it on VirtualBox is the ideal way to evaluate this. Thanks for all the help and comments - Sandy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iJwEAQECAAYFAlPpht4ACgkQUVKxkWZz2Q13OwP+Pv6TWaCgo076vdFu24iG0bAZ UAhyZjuKOuHtMuNt3AnagP3Lsg0o9olWJyNAJtEt4EqMTlgoqRIvYLB0zGEsDO99 22WM1W4s6aJdnXhR35SU1k1UfGFjk7u/eP4s7tMqifuJD9Oh98mZrlvrvGmEHVbI vFPbuTM625cJTj/HWEs= =c1SD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Tue Aug 12 10:24:08 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 09:24:08 +0100 Subject: can any one send me.... Message-ID: <53E9CF28.9050103@gbenet.com> Hi All, I am stuck, I need a working copy of gpg-agent.conf and a working copy of gpg.conf - for a Linux system. Am still failing to sign and encrypt. Thanks David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com From david at gbenet.com Tue Aug 12 10:33:22 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 09:33:22 +0100 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <1629952.6DlYTAcUsf@inno> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> <2491387.pdq0eG1mnk@inno> <53E87A6F.1040202@gbenet.com> <1629952.6DlYTAcUsf@inno> Message-ID: <53E9D152.3070600@gbenet.com> On 12/08/14 08:17, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Mo 11.08.2014, 09:10:23 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > >> Am getting the following msg now >> Error - key extraction command failed >> /usr/bin/gpg --charset utf-8 --display-charset utf-8 --batch --no-tty >> --status-fd 2 -a --export 0x8716853A >> gpg: WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on configuration >> file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf' >> gpg: /home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf:6: argument not expected > > Interesting. > > What happens if you try this command in the shell? > > What is in line 6 of gpg.conf? debug-level basic? > > Can you avoid the error by commenting out the line which causes the > problem and fixing the permissions for ~/.gnupg/? > > > Hauke > Hauke, I have tried all this - but I still get the same errors even after restarting my laptop. KGpg fails to start Kleopatra keeps warming me of errors and enigmail refuses to send mail unless I force no signing force no encryption. If I try to use gpg2 in enigmail it shuts down completely refusing to do anything. The more I do the more it seems that I do not fix this problem. All I get is the same error message from enigmail: Error - key extraction command failed /usr/bin/gpg --charset utf-8 --display-charset utf-8 --batch --no-tty --status-fd 2 -a --export 0x8716853A gpg: WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on configuration file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf' gpg: /home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf:6: argument not expected I'm getting brain ache!! Ha! David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Aug 12 11:53:30 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 11:53:30 +0200 Subject: can any one send me.... In-Reply-To: <53E9CF28.9050103@gbenet.com> References: <53E9CF28.9050103@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <53E9E41A.8030709@digitalbrains.com> > Hi All, Hello David, > I need a working copy of gpg-agent.conf and a working copy of gpg.conf - for a Linux system. > Am still failing to sign and encrypt. I'm pretty sure you don't need anything in those files to have it working. The options I have in there are not related to it working. Can you do a step-by-step analysis of what you're trying to do and what is the exact content of the error messages? Also, if you have anything in those .conf files, please post their contents as well. Peter. PS: Anyway, here are the contents of my .conf's on this machine: gpg-agent.conf: enable-ssh-support default-cache-ttl 0 max-cache-ttl 0 default-cache-ttl-ssh 86400 max-cache-ttl-ssh 86400 gpg.conf: keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net list-options show-uid-validity verify-options show-uid-validity The ttl's for OpenPGP keys aren't very useful anyway as I use a smartcard. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 12 17:04:01 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 17:04:01 +0200 Subject: gnupg-2.1 Install In-Reply-To: <53E986DE.6090606@gmail.com> (Murphy's message of "Mon, 11 Aug 2014 23:15:42 -0400") References: <53E986DE.6090606@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87sil1oila.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 05:15, mac3iii at gmail.com said: > 3. sudo mv /usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon > /usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon.bak (this is a hack to prevent gnome > from hijacking gnupg) You should start gnome-keyring-daemon with --components=pkcs11,secrets In case you do not use GnuPG ssh agent support, add "ssh" to the above list. Never ever add "gpg" to the list. > 10. The make check seems to hang on genkey1024.test (right after > detachm.test) but don't give up. It actually took 20 minutes by my > watch on my HP Envy i5 3 GHz machine to complete this step, then > completed all tests successfully. On a test machine you may want to run rngd -fr /dev/urandom which basically truns /dev/random into /dev/urandom. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From psusi at ubuntu.com Tue Aug 12 19:50:42 2014 From: psusi at ubuntu.com (Phillip Susi) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 13:50:42 -0400 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys Message-ID: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 We used to use different keys for signing and encrypting ( DSA & El Gammel ), but these days just seem to use a single RSA key by default. Is it still possible and/or beneficial to use two separate subkeys for signing and encrypting? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJT6lPyAAoJEI5FoCIzSKrwMPQH/RXU3ab1KRPKa3OIrd8wcJDM zJAAnj0lWj6bCM/CZgOtpG2KCpUhVYigpBu6LqwNrxJUmIAa3+05fex29hlkVUxS I2jKFhMQbn/DdxlZrIDw4yrjUobz5gmhAjraJMlRA7G+5FolL/Vd9x4DeU5Yk3bF lS/fq84d9YIQGNHTPHiN8ZeuO11eMdZ9631csAvBRTthx9u7RDRyg/icmWZeQ5LG 4oSPd2RRCTyFC6+xg8RuaHmwY+6KjEUg0CW0IB9EtKv3YzOe/Tl161Y5fddgI8AN /hhSNpudWH5f4zj6oj09dF+3kYu2JiKO1qqvvdHP6fB9XXVNKv3JJgB81R5kY3k= =Afh7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 12 20:51:03 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 20:51:03 +0200 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.26 released Message-ID: <87iolxo82w.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2 release: Version 2.0.26. This is a maintenance release to fix a regression introduced with the 2.0.24 release. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is the most commonly used tool for OpenPGP mail and data encryption. It can be used to encrypt data, create digital signatures, help authenticating using Secure Shell and to provide a framework for public key cryptography. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards. GnuPG-2 has a different architecture than GnuPG-1 (e.g. 1.4.18) in that it splits up functionality into several modules. However, both versions may be installed alongside without any conflict. In fact, the gpg version from GnuPG-1 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as included in GnuPG-2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching. The advantage of GnuPG-1 is its smaller size and the lack of dependency on other modules at run and build time. We keep maintaining GnuPG-1 versions because they are useful on very old platforms and for server based applications requiring only OpenPGP support. GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPLv3+). GnuPG-2 works best on GNU/Linux and *BSD systems but is also available for other Unices, Microsoft Windows, VMS, and Mac OS X. What's New in 2.0.26 ==================== * gpg: Fix a regression in 2.0.24 if a subkey id is given to --recv-keys et al. * gpg: Cap attribute packets at 16MB. * gpgsm: Auto-create the ".gnupg" home directory in the same way gpg does. * scdaemon: Allow for certificates > 1024 when using PC/SC. Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at https://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on: GnuPG 2.0.26 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ . The list of mirrors can be found at https://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html . Note that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. On ftp.gnupg.org and on its mirrors you should find the following new files in the gnupg/ directory: - The GnuPG-2 source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature: gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2 (4203k) gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2.sig - A patch file to upgrade a 2.0.25 GnuPG source tree. This patch does not include updates of the language files. gnupg-2.0.25-2.0.26.diff.bz2 (10k) Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2. A Windows version will soon be released at https://gpg4win.org . Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can simply check the supplied signature. For example to check the signature of the file gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by that signing key. Make sure that you have the right key, either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key. Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command finger wk ,at' g10code.com or using a keyserver like gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6 The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key 1E42B367. NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION! * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: 3ff5b38152c919724fd09cf2f17df704272ba192 gnupg-2.0.26.tar.bz2 9e5727384b163722b05a8bb5f0e4c7987a5cbbb6 gnupg-2.0.25-2.0.26.diff.bz2 Documentation ============= The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the details available in the manual. It is also possible to read the complete manual online in HTML format at https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ or in Portable Document Format at https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf . The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how to set up the whole thing. You may also want search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on how to solve problems. Many of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available. Support ======= Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug . We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at . We also have a dedicated service directory at: https://www.gnupg.org/service.html The driving force behind the development of GnuPG is the company of its principal author, Werner Koch. Maintenance and improvement of GnuPG and related software takes up most of their resources. To allow him to continue this work he kindly asks to either purchase a support contract, engage g10 Code for custom enhancements, or to donate money: https://gnupg.org/donate/ Thanks ====== We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing lists. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Aug 12 21:04:56 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 21:04:56 +0200 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> Message-ID: <53EA6558.3030102@digitalbrains.com> On 12/08/14 19:50, Phillip Susi wrote: > but these days just seem to use a single RSA key by default. The default is an RSA-2048 primary key with certify[1] and sign abilities, and an RSA-2048 subkey with encryption capability. I think you're mistaken. > Is it still possible and/or beneficial to use two separate subkeys > for signing and encrypting? It's even recommended /not/ to use the /same/ key material for signing and encryption. In other words, yes, it is definitely beneficial to use a separate subkey for encryption. Whether you want to split certification and data signatures is up to you. I think the only benefit for splitting is that you can keep your certification-capable key on an offline system and still issue signatures from your online system[2]. Even if that's the only benefit, it's still quite a benefit depending on your needs and wishes. HTH, Peter. [1] /Every/ primary key has certify by necessity [2] I can think of theoretical attacks under special circumstances and with bad practices. I wouldn't worry about them. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From mlisten at hammernoch.net Tue Aug 12 20:13:52 2014 From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?UTF-8?B?THVkd2lnIEjDvGdlbHNjaMOkZmVy?=) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 20:13:52 +0200 Subject: Error - bad passphrase In-Reply-To: <53E9D152.3070600@gbenet.com> References: <53E71B88.3000809@gbenet.com> <2491387.pdq0eG1mnk@inno> <53E87A6F.1040202@gbenet.com> <1629952.6DlYTAcUsf@inno> <53E9D152.3070600@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <53EA5960.20406@hammernoch.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 12.08.14 10:33, david at gbenet.com wrote: > gpg: WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on > configuration file `/home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf' Check the access permissions of .gnupg directory! It should only be read and writable for you, no rights for group and world. > gpg: /home/david/.gnupg/gpg.conf:6: argument not expected There's a syntax error in line 6 of your gpg.conf. Ludwig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJT6llbAAoJEA52XAUJWdLjlIkH/1t6e2QwOBWXMVdk+bq6khWK xiBbCzzglxS8sljbIx/1AzKODB3/MKZ2v655Vo/xIMphfWK4sTXBMQJ/djFixIff Xr3liJqm6L3ppF7WXIoNGwEKg7wHdBrD/HTBnqUHqREzZcoKHAjgB+2zPzF3ynFO a9LsSijaT/uXXvbM9mtxi1sTd0KtabbLSofMq5yidROIzvgI19DvXjBHh+uLQaLU tI/qwceQCNB/swaFEa1U0asLeNYODVTNoHh7VRM9f2lUTm2qpAUYcjMA39dH+Sci ks+SjDp6xXET3eXElMpObG+HPuKZJEQxpmKGXG1KRm4BZVpd3JcUwoWLn6/BM0c= =DM9j -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 12 21:05:07 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 21:05:07 +0200 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> (Phillip Susi's message of "Tue, 12 Aug 2014 13:50:42 -0400") References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> Message-ID: <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:50, psusi at ubuntu.com said: > We used to use different keys for signing and encrypting ( DSA & El > Gammel ), but these days just seem to use a single RSA key by default. That is not the case. GnuPG creates an RSA signing key and an RSA encryption subkey by default. These are different keys because the common wisdom is to use one key for one purpose. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Tue Aug 12 21:36:58 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 20:36:58 +0100 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 11 August 2014 at 6:18:33 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > That said, many are suggesting shifting to larger > keys, and GnuPG will be making such a shift in the > near future. This and the answer below seem slightly contradictory. Or do you mean that a switch to ECC is equivalent to using much bigger keys? > Q: Will GnuPG ever support RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 by > default? A: Probably not. The future is > elliptical-curve cryptography, which will bring a > level of safety comparable to RSA-16384. Every > minute we spend arguing about whether we should change > the defaults to RSA-3072 or more is one minute the > shift to ECC is delayed. Frankly, we think ECC is > a really good idea and we'd like to see it deployed > as soon as humanly possible. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Editing is a rewording activity -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPqbPtXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pBU4D/1n4jGF6ZyWrgulG7+LhiaHh0QuoiKXK2Or1 ZT1bxL/Jfn9h6ximkCkFF4Gyt4qhiPUt8v+cHSlYw/QFQgc69AurS6gv/awW5OqR 4UbotMX5IEPR2nyzeIAlE5qT95Jp0UZ3yhHSB3uovIHdPo0mJ/jYeCZt64luNCTF WoFkEi48 =ZQA2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Aug 12 21:49:20 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 21:49:20 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53EA6FC0.4040100@digitalbrains.com> On 12/08/14 21:36, MFPA wrote: > This and the answer below seem slightly contradictory. Or do you mean > that a switch to ECC is equivalent to using much bigger keys? A comparatively slight increase in ECC key length is equivalent to a large increase in RSA key length, particularly since RSA key length scales only logarithmically in key strength. So yes, a switch to ECC would be equivalent to much larger RSA keys. I'm not sure, but didn't discrete-logarithm keys scale roughly equivalently to RSA? I think so, but I'm not sure... HTH, Peter. PS: For RSA, it's not that difficult to see the truth in the logarithmic scaling. Primes get exponentially more sparse the larger the prime is, so the keyspace scales logarithmically; the possible key components are spaced exponentially wide from eachother. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 12 21:58:03 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 15:58:03 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53EA71CB.70105@sixdemonbag.org> > This and the answer below seem slightly contradictory. Or do you mean > that a switch to ECC is equivalent to using much bigger keys? The guidance from NIST is: [1] shannons of entropy needed [2] bits of symmetric key [3] bits of RSA/DSA/ELG [4] bits of ECDSA/ECetc. [1] [2] [3] [4] 80 80 1024 160 112 112 2048 224 128 128 3072 256 256 256 ~15k 512 The entropy of symmetric and ECDSA/ECetc. keys scales linearly with key length; the entropy of RSA/DSA/ELG keys scales logarithmically with key length. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 12 22:02:21 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 16:02:21 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53EA6FC0.4040100@digitalbrains.com> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> <53EA6FC0.4040100@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EA72CD.1080209@sixdemonbag.org> > logarithmically in key strength. So yes, a switch to ECC would be equivalent to > much larger RSA keys. I'm not sure, but didn't discrete-logarithm keys scale > roughly equivalently to RSA? I think so, but I'm not sure... Yes. The general consensus is that the discrete logarithm problem is harder than integer factorization, so ELG/DSA will provide more strength than RSA for a given length. However, I've also been cautioned by some big names in crypto that I shouldn't put too much stock in this: we know DLP must be at least as hard as integer factorization, but we don't have precise numbers for how much harder it has to be, and the tendency over the years has been for the two to slowly converge in difficulty. As of now the best guidance is to think DLP is at least as hard as IFP, but to be skeptical about how much harder. From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue Aug 12 22:12:50 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 13:12:50 -0700 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53EA71CB.70105@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <353197700.20140812203658@my_localhost> <53EA71CB.70105@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53EA7542.5000806@dougbarton.us> On 08/12/2014 12:58 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> This and the answer below seem slightly contradictory. Or do you mean >> that a switch to ECC is equivalent to using much bigger keys? > > The guidance from NIST is: > > [1] shannons of entropy needed > [2] bits of symmetric key > [3] bits of RSA/DSA/ELG > [4] bits of ECDSA/ECetc. > > > [1] [2] [3] [4] > 80 80 1024 160 > 112 112 2048 224 > 128 128 3072 256 > 256 256 ~15k 512 > > The entropy of symmetric and ECDSA/ECetc. keys scales linearly with key > length; the entropy of RSA/DSA/ELG keys scales logarithmically with key > length. I really like the new FAQ text, especially the point about moving to ECC is the way to go forward, not larger RSA keys, and that sooner is better than later. Personally I think that the table above would be worthwhile to include in the FAQ (with a reference of course) too, since it bolsters the argument so well. FWIW, Doug From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue Aug 12 22:23:46 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 13:23:46 -0700 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53EA77D2.3060803@dougbarton.us> On 08/09/2014 01:49 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 9 Aug 2014 01:24, pete at heypete.com said: > >>> The GPG4Win folks are gearing up for a new release this August. >> >> Excellent. I look forward to it. > > The problem with gpg4win is that it is hard to build in particular the > KDE stuff can't be easily cross compiled. Werner, FWIW, I never use anything other than gnupg out of the installer. The file system tools have never worked for me, and some of them don't even work on 64 bit systems. That's not a criticism, I know how open source works. :) My point is simply that if you have limited resources in my opinion the highest value target is gnupg itself. hth, Doug From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 12 22:42:48 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 16:42:48 -0400 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <53EA77D2.3060803@dougbarton.us> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53EA77D2.3060803@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <53EA7C48.3020704@sixdemonbag.org> > FWIW, I never use anything other than gnupg out of the installer. The > file system tools have never worked for me, and some of them don't > even work on 64 bit systems. That's not a criticism, I know how open > source works. :) My point is simply that if you have limited > resources in my opinion the highest value target is gnupg itself. I would also add the Qt pinentry plugin to this. The native Win32 one looks completely awful. If someone could point me at an API, I'd give serious thought to doing a modern one with WPF to replace the existing native Win32. From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 12 23:22:24 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 23:22:24 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <53EA7C48.3020704@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 12 Aug 2014 16:42:48 -0400") References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4080724.6hvpIrWXHE@forge> <87fvh6t5cd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53EA77D2.3060803@dougbarton.us> <53EA7C48.3020704@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87wqadmmi7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 22:42, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > I would also add the Qt pinentry plugin to this. The native Win32 one > looks completely awful. If someone could point me at an API, I'd give Actually this was hack to use GnuPG on WindowsCE while we are waiting for the Qt guys to finish their migration of the Qt pinentry. It allowed us to enter the PIN on that HTC Touch Pro2 to test and milestone the crypto engine. > serious thought to doing a modern one with WPF to replace the existing > native Win32. That would be nice. We need to be able to cross-compile it, though. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Wed Aug 13 04:03:13 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 04:03:13 +0200 Subject: automatically add the passphrase for other (sub)keys of the same certificate Message-ID: <1423534.NhC6FnzB34@inno> Hello, I just got more familiar with gpg-agent and had the idea that it might be nice (i.e. in this case: I should be capable of doing that myself) to have a background process which notices that gpg-agent has a new passphrase in it's cache. This process could determine the certificate to which this passphrase belongs and check whether it has more keys. If so (and they are not blacklisted in the configuration of this helper program) then the passphrase could be added for these other keys. That should not be a problem at least as long as GnuPG does not allow to set different passphrases for different certificate components. Most users I see don't accept that they have to enter the passphrase twice for "the same" key. My question: Is this maybe a bad idea for reasons I don't see? I noticed one problem: This process would have to take precautions so that the caching time is not affected (if the user gives the passphrase for key A and the process adds it for key B then it may not add it for key A, too, if it has expired but not yet expired for B). Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From psusi at ubuntu.com Wed Aug 13 04:13:38 2014 From: psusi at ubuntu.com (Phillip Susi) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 22:13:38 -0400 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53EAC9D2.2070201@ubuntu.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/12/2014 03:05 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:50, psusi at ubuntu.com said: >> We used to use different keys for signing and encrypting ( DSA & >> El Gammel ), but these days just seem to use a single RSA key by >> default. > > That is not the case. GnuPG creates an RSA signing key and an RSA > encryption subkey by default. These are different keys because > the common wisdom is to use one key for one purpose. How do you tell which one is which? It used to be that the 'D' prefix meant DSA, which was signing only, and 'g' or 'G' was for el gammel signing or encryption, but now they all just show 'R'. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJT6snIAAoJEI5FoCIzSKrwWWAH/1la7+90/TlY+FwRdAHNoZG4 9Kk+ZjLfL8twbL2jOvD7f7AjhCyA5DI+ywCzCCVzIMJMfVsxM5ljn9GrZJPY9bZd FR72YUvNMQroJwmWWPm0U69hIl10YLkwjBNvaHp8XJLOILnqXv2+kvbGO/dQpsR5 f7NSjAMz2vhtXY+LvNTzKOcNoW24NwUKxebayE9EwKzwNkXyAuR4A6ECYpMZhjeH LtySj9LxmuOpA3nVGnOAmUK5EUnVuHUi6UGoufyMNnifpeiwlxIIy5TchJkzB9to CK0tUOxYNFUwm+A3xXBRonaurkE1DKGYQT4w4nsbFbjinV/jfH5KA9U/AF8KnwM= =hcaf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Aug 13 05:41:19 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 23:41:19 -0400 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_should_be_man?= =?windows-1252?Q?datory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> On Aug 12, 2014, at 3:33 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 00:08, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > >> Rather than fixing RFC-1991 support, why not go in the other direction >> and make it clear that it isn't supported, and won't work? I did a >> bunch of work to make --pgp2 work well and interoperate with PGP 2.x >> over a decade ago. Even then it was intended as a stopgap measure >> until people finally stopped using PGP 2.x. Over 10 years later, it's >> well past time to kill it. > > I fully agree. Do you mean to document it or to remove the function and > change the options to print a warning message that they don't do > anything? For 2.1. How about remove the functions in 2.1, and add a warning (in the docs, and perhaps upon use in the code) that the functions will be going away in 2.0? That might be aggressive, but then, 2.1 isn't officially released yet, so it's not unreasonable to make a larger change there. What do you think? I need to look at the code and see if there are any places where removal of --pgp2 (or --pgpX in general) will leave things in a messy state. One place that comes to mind is in --gen-revoke. GPG can import a bare revocation certificate. No version of PGP can, so there is code to push out a minimal public key before the revocation certificate. We'd need to add some sort of flag to indicate to include the minimal public key, and that's sort of reinventing --pgp again. Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages specifically, and leave the other stuff? That feels a bit messy. > What about --compress-keys and --compress-sigs? These are GnuPG only > features which predate OpenPGP and have been introduced only to allow > that old accidental behaviour of GnuPG. I'd remove them as well. They're much easier to remove than --pgp2 as they only affect very specific (and few) places in the code. David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 13 06:29:03 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 00:29:03 -0400 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <53EAC9D2.2070201@ubuntu.com> References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53EAC9D2.2070201@ubuntu.com> Message-ID: <53EAE98F.70102@sixdemonbag.org> > How do you tell which one is which? It used to be that the 'D' prefix > meant DSA, which was signing only, and 'g' or 'G' was for el gammel > signing or encryption, but now they all just show 'R'. gpg --edit-key [keyID] Look at the right hand side. For each subkey (including the main signing key) there will be an entry for "usage". This field can contain the letters S, C, A, or E. S = Sign C = Certify A = Authenticate E = Encrypt From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Wed Aug 13 07:52:23 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 07:52:23 +0200 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_shoul?= =?windows-1252?Q?d_be_mandatory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53EAFD17.6050709@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 12-08-2014 0:08, David Shaw wrote: > Rather than fixing RFC-1991 support, why not go in the other direction > and make it clear that it isn't supported, and won't work? Why? It would make checking old mail archives more complicated. Further, since a fix only requires a reordering of the sequence in which packets are saved, is it really so difficult to fix it? I'll have a look at it myself when I can find some time. > I did a bunch of work to make --pgp2 work well and interoperate > with PGP 2.x over a decade ago. Even then it was intended as a > stopgap measure until people finally stopped using PGP 2.x. Most people, inclusing me, have stopped using it. However, I still have a lot of mail archives from those days. Removing support would mean I have to start using pgp 2 again to access them. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Wed Aug 13 06:24:45 2014 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 06:24:45 +0200 Subject: Requesting public key with GnuPG 1.4.18 Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hello ! Is this behaviour correct with 1.4.18 ? When I request the public key on a signed message, GPG cannot find it and I get this message: === Begin Windows Clipboard === gpg: Signature made 02/20/14 14:11:43 gpg: using RSA key 0x05E136A0 gpg: requesting key 0x05E136A0 from hkp server keyserver.kjsl.com gpgkeys: key FC3B17DE05E136A0 can't be retrieved gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 gpg: Can't check signature: public key not found === End Windows Clipboard === I see key 0x05E136A0 is about to be requested from server, but what's that secundary number "FC3B17DE05E136A0"? - -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iHEEAREDADEFAlPq6icqGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9pbnRkZWNoYXQubmV0LzB4Q0ZB RjcwNEMuYXNjAAoJEPUdbaDPr3BMcQ8AoNe42bHVYQizpRPNUUCLqW+cFGRmAJ0S nPS7NOee8RtgcZubohdMWRsZIQ== =Z8RH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From vedaal at nym.hush.com Wed Aug 13 08:09:21 2014 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 02:09:21 -0400 Subject: =?UTF-8?B?UmU6IFtvcGVucGdwXSBTSEEtMiBzdXBwb3J0IHNob3VsZCBiZSBtYW5kYXRvcnkg4oCTIGNoYW5nZSBkZWZhdWx0cw==?= In-Reply-To: <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <20140813060922.126F8601EF@smtp.hushmail.com> On 8/12/2014 at 11:46 PM, "David Shaw" wrote: >>> Rather than fixing RFC-1991 support, why not go in the other >direction >>> and make it clear that it isn't supported, and won't work? ===== As a pgp 2 user, I agree with all the above, and taking whatever steps are felt to be easier to maintain and move GnuPG forward. Those who insist on using pgp2.x for whatever things (actually very very few) they feel cannot be accomplished with GnuPG, will do so anyway. I ask only, that acceptance of V3 keys be maintained, as many of us have used our V3 keys in GnuPG, (with SHA 2 and 64 bit algorithms), Otherwise, all our encrypted messages will not be able to be decrypted in later versions of GnuPG, and if the encrypted messages were signed, they would no longer be able to be verified, (as even Disastry's version, while able to decrypt everything except Camellia, cannot verify a V4 key signature). vedaal From shmick at riseup.net Wed Aug 13 08:27:29 2014 From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 16:27:29 +1000 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? Message-ID: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> i've seen a multitude of ways people input data into this pref for example, some people put a link to their public key .asc or .txt file some others put a link to an actual keyserver from the name of the actual pref, it states a keyserver, so shouldn't users input a link to their Preferred keyserver and not a link to download a public key or txt file ? From shmick at riseup.net Wed Aug 13 09:01:19 2014 From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 17:01:19 +1000 Subject: [2] cipher when viewing key prefs Message-ID: <53EB0D3F.1060204@riseup.net> i recently saw [2] listed as the last cipher in somebody's public key the key didn't specify 3DES neither - that goes against the RFC but how is that possible ? From shmick at riseup.net Wed Aug 13 09:24:59 2014 From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 17:24:59 +1000 Subject: gpg --verify email.eml Message-ID: <53EB12CB.6080609@riseup.net> lately some recipients have not been able to decrypt some emails ie. some can decrypt them; some can't every time i send a signed+encrypted email, enigmail reports signature verification failed but the status bar is green ! but when i send just signed emails, no problem with sig verification (status bar is still green) if thunderbird and enigmail were used to construct emails, and enigmail debug output reports everything ok: [GNUPG:] GOODSIG [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG [GNUPG:] TRUST_ULTIMATE [GNUPG:] DECRYPTION_OKAY [GNUPG:] GOODMDC [GNUPG:] END_DECRYPTION but gpg --verify -vv email.eml gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP MESSAGE gpg: armor header: Charset: utf-8 :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid 0000000000000000 data: [4093 bits] gpg: verify signatures failed: unexpected data how should i proceed to debug this ? i downgraded enigmail to enigmail 1.6 because i couldn't sign or encrypt at all with the recent update From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 13 09:37:40 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:37:40 +0200 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <53EAE98F.70102@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 13 Aug 2014 00:29:03 -0400") References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53EAC9D2.2070201@ubuntu.com> <53EAE98F.70102@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87mwb8n8l7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 06:29, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Look at the right hand side. For each subkey (including the main > signing key) there will be an entry for "usage". This field can contain > the letters S, C, A, or E. Using --edit-key is a bit cumbersome and --with-colons is hard to read. Thus what about this new option: $ gpg2 -k --list-options show-usage 1e42b367 pub dsa2048/1E42B367 2007-12-31 [SC ] [expires: 2018-12-31] uid [ unknown] Werner Koch uid [ unknown] Werner Koch uid [ unknown] Werner Koch sub dsa1024/77F95F95 2011-11-02 [S ] sub rsa2048/664D7444 2014-01-02 [E ] [expires: 2016-12-31] However, it might be better to use a variable length field because the column position depends on the algorithm anyway: pub dsa2048/1E42B367 2007-12-31 [SC] [expires: 2018-12-31] uid [ unknown] Werner Koch uid [ unknown] Werner Koch uid [ unknown] Werner Koch sub dsa1024/77F95F95 2011-11-02 [S] sub rsa2048/664D7444 2014-01-02 [E] [expires: 2016-12-31] Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 13 09:45:07 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:45:07 +0200 Subject: [openpgp] SHA-2 support should be mandatory =?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=93?= change defaults In-Reply-To: <20140813060922.126F8601EF@smtp.hushmail.com> (vedaal@nym.hush.com's message of "Wed, 13 Aug 2014 02:09:21 -0400") References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> <20140813060922.126F8601EF@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <87iolwn88s.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 08:09, vedaal at nym.hush.com said: > Otherwise, all our encrypted messages will not be able to be decrypted in later versions of GnuPG, and if the encrypted messages were signed, they would no longer be able to be verified, Being abke to decrypt is important and thus this will not be removed. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 13 09:47:34 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:47:34 +0200 Subject: Requesting public key with GnuPG 1.4.18 In-Reply-To: (Laurent Jumet's message of "Wed, 13 Aug 2014 06:24:45 +0200") References: Message-ID: <87egwkn84p.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 06:24, laurent.jumet at skynet.be said: > I see key 0x05E136A0 is about to be requested from server, but what's that > secundary number "FC3B17DE05E136A0"? That is the same key. The first is the short and the second the long key id: 05E136A0 FC3B17DE05E136A0 Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 13 09:56:33 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:56:33 +0200 Subject: [openpgp] SHA-2 support should be mandatory =?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=93?= change defaults In-Reply-To: <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> (David Shaw's message of "Tue, 12 Aug 2014 23:41:19 -0400") References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <87a978n7pq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 05:41, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > How about remove the functions in 2.1, and add a warning (in the docs, > and perhaps upon use in the code) that the functions will be going > away in 2.0? That might be aggressive, but then, 2.1 isn't officially > released yet, so it's not unreasonable to make a larger change there. > What do you think? Fine with me. > state. One place that comes to mind is in --gen-revoke. GPG can > import a bare revocation certificate. No version of PGP can, so there > is code to push out a minimal public key before the revocation > certificate. We'd need to add some sort of flag to indicate to > include the minimal public key, and that's sort of reinventing --pgp That is if (keyblock && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8)) { /* Use a minimal pk for PGPx mode, since PGP can't import bare revocation certificates. */ rc = export_minimal_pk (out, keyblock, sig, NULL); Thus removing PGP2 won't harm. > Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages > specifically, and leave the other stuff? That feels a bit messy. Actualluy this was my idea. However, signature verification has some kludges for PGP2 and we could consider to remove that too. IIRC, this is not even controlled by an option. > I'd remove them as well. They're much easier to remove than --pgp2 as they only affect very specific (and few) places in the code. okay. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 13 10:16:50 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 10:16:50 +0200 Subject: [2] cipher when viewing key prefs In-Reply-To: <53EB0D3F.1060204@riseup.net> (shmick@riseup.net's message of "Wed, 13 Aug 2014 17:01:19 +1000") References: <53EB0D3F.1060204@riseup.net> Message-ID: <8761hwn6rx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:01, shmick at riseup.net said: > i recently saw [2] listed as the last cipher in somebody's public key > > the key didn't specify 3DES neither - that goes against the RFC but how > is that possible ? 2 actually is 3DES. However it is not required because OpenPGP always uses 3DES as last resort algorithm. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Wed Aug 13 10:56:25 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 10:56:25 +0200 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53EB2839.2030109@nordnet.fr> On 12/08/14 21:05, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:50, psusi at ubuntu.com said: >> We used to use different keys for signing and encrypting ( DSA & El >> Gammel ), but these days just seem to use a single RSA key by default. > > That is not the case. GnuPG creates an RSA signing key and an RSA > encryption subkey by default. These are different keys because the > common wisdom is to use one key for one purpose. > The important here must be 'by default'. Last year, I followed a thread on the gpg4win forum and created an 8192 key using gpg --batch command. The key produced was a single RSA8192 key for encrypt, sign, certify, authenticate, probably because I did not specify any sub-key. (I still have it but have never used it nor released it to the world). I don't recall having been prompted by gpg to specify a sub-key so I could say that gpg produced a single key 'by default'. It was a year ago so I could be mistaken. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Wed Aug 13 11:02:12 2014 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 11:02:12 +0200 Subject: Requesting public key with GnuPG 1.4.18 In-Reply-To: <87egwkn84p.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: Hello Werner ! Werner Koch wrote: >> I see key 0x05E136A0 is about to be requested from server, but what's >> that secundary number "FC3B17DE05E136A0"? > That is the same key. The first is the short and the second the long > key id: > 05E136A0 > FC3B17DE05E136A0 I had a doubt, as I didn't notice before that the long KeyID has the same last 8 digits than the short. Did always GPG get the key from a server with the long KeyID? I was thinking it used the 0x8 -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From micha137 at gmx.de Wed Aug 13 10:38:26 2014 From: micha137 at gmx.de (Michael Anders) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 10:38:26 +0200 Subject: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 131, Issue 15 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1407919106.4159.33.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740> > I'm not sure, but didn't discrete-logarithm keys scale > roughly equivalently to RSA? I think so, but I'm not sure... and > The guidance from NIST is: > > [1] shannons of entropy needed > [2] bits of symmetric key > [3] bits of RSA/DSA/ELG > [4] bits of ECDSA/ECetc. > > > [1] [2] [3] [4] > 80 80 1024 160 > 112 112 2048 224 > 128 128 3072 256 > 256 256 ~15k 512 > > The entropy of symmetric and ECDSA/ECetc. keys scales linearly with key > length; the entropy of RSA/DSA/ELG keys scales logarithmically with key > length. > and > However, I've also been cautioned by some big names in crypto that I > shouldn't put too much stock in this: we know DLP must be at least as > hard as integer factorization, but we don't have precise numbers for how > much harder it has to be, and the tendency over the years has been for > the two to slowly converge in difficulty. > > As of now the best guidance is to think DLP is at least as hard as IFP, > but to be skeptical about how much harder. No witchcraft, just some simple math. Baltimore published: (http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml) symm. RSA ECC 80 1024 160 112 2048 224 128 3072 256 192 7680 384 256 15360 521 The generalized number field sieve(->RSA factoring) scales with bitlength to the 1/3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_number_field_sieve), new improvements by Joux et al (http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/400.pdf) set it to 1/4 but this so far seems limited to smaller numbers. ECC security scales with bitlength to the 1/2 (General DLP methods) If you set the scale to 160 bit ECC being at the same security level as 1024 bit RSA (presently considered marginal security) you arrive at the formula for the generalized number field sieve: n(RSA) = ((n(ECC)^1/2)/1.25)^3 The resulting table would look like this ECC(bitlength) RSA/elGamal 160 1024 256 2072 384 3807 512 5862 768 10769 1024 16579 If you presume Joux's results would apply to RSA factoring, the formula would look like: n(RSA) = ((n(ECC)^1/2)/15.9)^4 Now the resulting table would look like this ECC(bitlength) RSA/elGamal 160 1024 256 2621 384 5898 512 10486 768 23593 1024 41943 Interestingly "NIST" arrives at an estimate even in excess of the second table! So we might speculate that they either know of some improvement compared to the publicly known methods to factor RSA moduli, expect such improvement from other sources or else just want to push ECC. (I like ECC -> google "open source elliptic curve cryptography".)) Cheers Michael Anders From green at mm.st Tue Aug 12 12:44:10 2014 From: green at mm.st (green at mm.st) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 11:44:10 +0100 Subject: gpg: checking created signature failed: Bad signature In-Reply-To: <53E14707.7090405@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140731084236.GA3261@arch_revo> <87a97je1p8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <1407236371.3684622.149291437.4519889F@webmail.messagingengine.com> <53E14707.7090405@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1407840250.3014754.151793305.58536A96@webmail.messagingengine.com> The plot thickens. I have just generated a new keypair on the Arch Linux box where I'm having the problem and I can use this new key (repeatedly) to "gpg2 --clearsign doc" and it works every time. So, it seems that the 'Bad signature' issue is related solely to my 'primary' key, which would suggest that hardware is not to blame? As another test, I have also deleted the primary keypair, exported it from the (working) Windows machine and re-imported it on the Linux machine but I still get the intermittent 'Bad signature' error. Any additional thoughts? From OmegaPhil00 at startmail.com Tue Aug 12 21:21:32 2014 From: OmegaPhil00 at startmail.com (OmegaPhil) Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 20:21:32 +0100 Subject: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in Enigmail, some servers down? Message-ID: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> Please CC me in etc, I'm not subscribed to the list. Haven't been able to 'refresh all public keys' on keys.gnupg.net in Enigmail for a while now (only have two keys), so I had a look at the servers responsible (host keys.gnupg.net) - the following appear to be bad for me accessing from the UK: 131.155.141.70: No response to pings 63.230.134.161: Destination Host Unreachable 173.175.198.28: No response to pings I'm guessing Enigmail/Icedove is consistently using a bad server. -- Libre software on Github: https://github.com/OmegaPhil FSF member #9442 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 880 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From pzeudo at hushmail.com Wed Aug 13 11:57:12 2014 From: pzeudo at hushmail.com (pzeudo at hushmail.com) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 11:57:12 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts Message-ID: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> Hello, I'm new to GPG, and after having read the documentation, I still have a few questions: Suppose Alice generates a new master signing key, and along with it the UID "Alice ". Then, she issues adduid to add "Alice ", her company mailing address. After some time, she leaves the company, invalidating her email address. Consequently, she revokes her UID uid2 at company.com and sends her updated public key to everyone she's in contact with. Then, for some reason, Alice joins aforementioned company again, re-gaining control of her mail address uid2 at company.com. Can she add a new UID of the same name "Alice " to her gpg key again? I understand that she would not be able to re-use signatures she collected on her "old" UID on her "new" one, but would have to start building trust from scratch. But still, is it possible to do so, or would the revocation of the "old" uid2 also immediately apply to the "new" uid2? In another scenario, Alice not only has a master key, but also subordinate keys, say for her notebook and mobile phone. First, can she say that the mobile phone should be able to sign/decrypt only for uid1 at alice.com? How so? Second, if her notebook subordinate key can sign/decrypt for both UIDs, and someone sends a mail to uid1 at alice.com, which pubic key does he encrypt the message with? I assume the sender, by default, would simulatenously use all encryption keys (master or subordinate) he knows of, so that the message can be decrypted with any one private key. Is that the case? Can the sender choose to only encrypt using one of the keys, e.g. to make sure Alice doesn't read the message on her phone, but waits until she gets home to her notebook (in case the sender considers it more trustworthy, and the sender knows how the keys are associated with Alice's machines)? What happens if a subordinate key of mine expires? Can I just generate a new one and let people know? Or would I also have lost trust/signatures of my identities gathered in the past? Phrased differently, if Bob signes Alice's UID X, what does he sign exactly? Just that he trusts UID X belongs to the name and address given in UID X, and that UID X is associated with Alice's master key, or does Bob's signature also say something about subordinate keys of Alice's gpg key and/or other UIDs of Alice which Bob did not intend to verify? Finally, I am wondering how I should organise my UIDs. I could either have one gpg key and add each UID to that one, or I could have multiple seperate gpg keys, one for each UID. The latter approach seems more flexible to me, in terms of choosing how much information I want to disclose to recipients of my gpg keys, and, depending on the answers to the questions above, also in terms of control I have over how my keys are used. Does having all UIDs in one gpg key have any advantages, except for being easier to organise for me and for people who want to sign my identities? Would it be considered strange, or even rude of some sort, if I asked someone to sign a number of identities of mine scattered across multiple gpg keys, instead of just handing them one gpg key and asking them to sign UIDs x, y and z? I know these are a lot of questions, but I honestly couldn't find satisfactory answers in the documentation or using search engines. I would be very grateful if you could attempt to enlighten me. :) Thank you very much in advance! P.S.: It seems like my previous attempt to post this message failed. I hope the mail won't come through twice now. I'm sorry if it does. From pzeudo at hushmail.com Wed Aug 13 10:44:59 2014 From: pzeudo at hushmail.com (pzeudo at hushmail.com) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 10:44:59 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts Message-ID: <20140813084459.90FB42073E@smtp.hushmail.com> Hello, I'm new to GPG, and after having read the documentation, I still have a few questions: Suppose Alice generates a new master signing key, and along with it the UID "Alice ". Then, she issues adduid to add "Alice ", her company mailing address. After some time, she leaves the company, invalidating her email address. Consequently, she revokes her UID uid2 at company.com and sends her updated public key to everyone she's in contact with. Then, for some reason, Alice joins aforementioned company again, re-gaining control of her mail address uid2 at company.com. Can she add a new UID of the same name "Alice " to her gpg key again? I understand that she would not be able to re-use signatures she collected on her "old" UID on her "new" one, but would have to start building trust from scratch. But still, is it possible to do so, or would the revocation of the "old" uid2 also immediately apply to the "new" uid2? In another scenario, Alice not only has a master key, but also subordinate keys, say for her notebook and mobile phone. First, can she say that the mobile phone should be able to sign/decrypt only for uid1 at alice.com? How so? Second, if her notebook subordinate key can sign/decrypt for both UIDs, and someone sends a mail to uid1 at alice.com, which pubic key does he encrypt the message with? I assume the sender, by default, would simulatenously use all encryption keys (master or subordinate) he knows of, so that the message can be decrypted with any one private key. Is that the case? Can the sender choose to only encrypt using one of the keys, e.g. to make sure Alice doesn't read the message on her phone, but waits until she gets home to her notebook (in case the sender considers it more trustworthy, and the sender knows how the keys are associated with Alice's machines)? What happens if a subordinate key of mine expires? Can I just generate a new one and let people know? Or would I also have lost trust/signatures of my identities gathered in the past? Phrased differently, if Bob signes Alice's UID X, what does he sign exactly? Just that he trusts UID X belongs to the name and address given in UID X, and that UID X is associated with Alice's master key, or does Bob's signature also say something about subordinate keys of Alice's gpg key and/or other UIDs of Alice which Bob did not intend to verify? Finally, I am wondering how I should organise my UIDs. I could either have one gpg key and add each UID to that one, or I could have multiple seperate gpg keys, one for each UID. The latter approach seems more flexible to me, in terms of choosing how much information I want to disclose to recipients of my gpg keys, and, depending on the answers to the questions above, also in terms of control I have over how my keys are used. Does having all UIDs in one gpg key have any advantages, except for being easier to organise for me and for people who want to sign my identities? Would it be considered strange, or even rude of some sort, if I asked someone to sign a number of identities of mine scattered across multiple gpg keys, instead of just handing them one gpg key and asking them to sign UIDs x, y and z? I know these are a lot of questions, but I honestly couldn't find satisfactory answers in the documentation or using search engines. I would be very grateful if you could attempt to enlighten me. :) Thank you very much in advance! From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 12:01:45 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 12:01:45 +0200 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <53EB2839.2030109@nordnet.fr> References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53EB2839.2030109@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53EB3789.6090204@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 10:56, Philip Jackson wrote: > I don't recall having been prompted by gpg to specify a sub-key so I could say > that gpg produced a single key 'by default'. You say you generated it with the --batch command, and go on to say you weren't prompted. Since --batch, unattended key generation, is for non-interactive use, you will not be prompted because you are expected not to interact. If I look at the docs for unattended key generation, it seems that indeed not specifying a Key-Usage: implies all usages are enabled. Unattended key generation is not normally a user-facing interface. Many people will probably not even know it's there. I don't think it helps to call it what GnuPG works like by default. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 12:04:16 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 12:04:16 +0200 Subject: Different signing & encryption keys In-Reply-To: <87mwb8n8l7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53EA53F2.2010606@ubuntu.com> <87egwlo7fg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53EAC9D2.2070201@ubuntu.com> <53EAE98F.70102@sixdemonbag.org> <87mwb8n8l7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53EB3820.3020801@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 09:37, Werner Koch wrote: > Thus what about this new option: That sounds like a nice thing to have. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 12:23:24 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 12:23:24 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> Hello, > Can she add a new UID of the same name "Alice " to > her gpg key again? I'm pretty sure that, yes, you can. > In another scenario, Alice not only has a master key, but also > subordinate keys, say for her notebook and mobile phone. First, can > she say that the mobile phone should be able to sign/decrypt only for > uid1 at alice.com? For decryption: No. UID's are always bound to the primary key. If someone encrypts data to you, they are free to choose whatever non-expired encryption-capable subkey or master key they want. In practice, you'll usually see that it will be encrypted to the last created non-expired key. You choose which key you use to sign with; your peers will accept signatures from any non-expired signing-capable key. There is no proper way to say to your peers "encrypt to this subkey if you want me to read it on the move and encrypt to that subkey if you want I can only read it on my super-secure computer". > What happens if a subordinate key of mine expires? Can I just > generate a new one and let people know? Or would I also have lost > trust/signatures of my identities gathered in the past? You can simply generate a new one. Certifications are done on the pair of an UID and your master key. Subkeys don't play a role in certifications. > Just that he trusts UID X belongs to the name and address given in > UID X, and that UID X is associated with Alice's master key Precisely. Although you are actually a bit too specific. A certification means what the signing party wants it to mean. Some people will not verify the e-mail address. Some will decline to sign a key with a comment they can't properly verify or otherwise object to. Some will have their signature mean "I've seen multiple e-mails from this person signed with this key", others will want to hire a private investigator and interrogate your parents (obviously only after a DNA test). > Finally, I am wondering how I should organise my UIDs. There is no single best way. Both all UIDs on one key and separate keys per UID are done. Both have their pros and cons. > Would it be considered strange, or even rude of some sort, if I > asked someone to sign a number of identities of mine scattered > across multiple gpg keys No, I wouldn't think so. But obviously someone might say "I'm sorry, that's too much effort for me" :). > P.S.: It seems like my previous attempt to post this message failed. > I hope the mail won't come through twice now. I'm sorry if it does. It did come through twice; the time it takes for your message to be circulated to all the members can vary quite a bit. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Wed Aug 13 12:30:00 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 12:30 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <1548063.zPPlaFDMEL@inno> Am Mi 13.08.2014, 11:57:12 schrieb pzeudo at hushmail.com: > updated public key to everyone she's in contact with. Then, for some > reason, Alice joins aforementioned company again, re-gaining control > of her mail address uid2 at company.com. Can she add a new UID of the > same name "Alice " to her gpg key again? I > understand that she would not be able to re-use signatures she > collected on her "old" UID on her "new" one, but would have to start > building trust from scratch. But still, is it possible to do so, or > would the revocation of the "old" uid2 also immediately apply to the > "new" uid2? "The UID" is not the packet data in the OpenPGP certificate but the string "Alice " i.e. the same string is the same UID and cannot be created twice in a certificate. You can create a different UID by changing a single char though (e.g. add a comment). But it is possible to reactivate the old UID. You can delete the signature (i.e. the revocation) and create a new one. The signature is newer than the revocation thus the UID is valid again. Unfortunately you cannot rely on this as the RfC does not enforce using the newest signature but GnuPG behaves this way. If you reactivate a UID then you have the old third party signatures again (if they haven't expired yet). > subordinate keys, say for her notebook and mobile phone. That does not make sense, at least not with the current version of OpenPGP. > she say that the mobile phone should be able to sign/decrypt only for > uid1 at alice.com? Signing and decrypting are key operations not UID operations. Subkeys belong to a certificate as UIDs do. You cannot enforce an association with a certain UID. It is a bad idea to mix e.g. private and business addresses in the same certificate anyway. That should be done with "equal" addresses only to (also) avoid such problems. > which pubic key does he encrypt the message with? Usually the valid subkey (if there is one) with the newest self- signature. But the RfC does not enforce this. > assume the sender, by default, would simulatenously use all > encryption keys (master or subordinate) he knows of, so that the > message can be decrypted with any one private key. Is that the case? No. Though ? again ? I think it would not violate the standard. But usually there is only one valid subkey at a time anyway. You can enforce the usage of certain (sub)keys but this is not going to work with current mail clients: gpg --armor -r 0x12345678! -r 0x87654321! --encrypt > Can the sender choose to only encrypt using one of the keys, e.g. to > make sure Alice doesn't read the message on her phone, This is IMHO an urgently needed feature but not possible (i.e. there is no standard for it) today. I have written a German article about that: http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/ > What happens if a subordinate key of mine expires? Can I just generate > a new one and let people know? Or would I also have lost > trust/signatures of my identities gathered in the past? You can replace subkeys or extend their validity period. Subkeys and third party signatures are not related (today ? one more problem). The signatures are made over the combination of public mainkey and one of the UIDs. Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Wed Aug 13 12:37:38 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 12:37:38 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> Am Mi 13.08.2014, 12:23:24 schrieb Peter Lebbing: > > Can she add a new UID of the same name "Alice " to > > her gpg key again? > > I'm pretty sure that, yes, you can. Give it a try... > practice, you'll usually see that it will be encrypted to the last > created non-expired key. Not the last created but the last self-signed one (may differ e.g. after expiration). Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From pzeudo at hushmail.com Wed Aug 13 13:30:42 2014 From: pzeudo at hushmail.com (pzeudo at hushmail.com) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 13:30:42 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> Message-ID: <20140813113043.171DC2073E@smtp.hushmail.com> Thanks for your helpful answers, Hauke and Peter! I have a followup question, if you don't mind: How much history is saved in a gpg key? Say, for example, I have a gpg key with uid1 associated, and I publish that. Then, I add uid2, but before handing out my updated gpg key to anybody, I decide to do things differently, e.g. change the comment or email in uid2, or remove uid2 altogether. Maybe I add a subordinate key only to remove it afterwards, say, because I consider it to be too weak after all. After these operations, I publish my key again. Can other people see the full history of what I did in the meantime, or do they just see what I ended up with? If parts of the history can be retrieved, what would I have to do to see what's saved? Thanks again! On 8/13/2014 at 1:19 PM, "Hauke Laging" wrote: > >Am Mi 13.08.2014, 12:23:24 schrieb Peter Lebbing: > >> > Can she add a new UID of the same name "Alice >" to >> > her gpg key again? >> >> I'm pretty sure that, yes, you can. > >Give it a try... > > >> practice, you'll usually see that it will be encrypted to the >last >> created non-expired key. > >Not the last created but the last self-signed one (may differ e.g. >after >expiration). > > >Hauke >-- >Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp- >schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ >http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread >OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 13:42:26 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 13:42:26 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <1548063.zPPlaFDMEL@inno> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <1548063.zPPlaFDMEL@inno> Message-ID: <53EB4F22.1060406@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 12:30, Hauke Laging wrote: > the same string is the same UID The signature is newer than the > revocation thus the UID is valid again. Unfortunately you cannot rely > on this as the RfC does not enforce using the newest signature but > GnuPG behaves this way. The RFC says very little on a lot of important things. What is the use of not being able to double back on a UID revocation? For key revocations, it's obvious: compromise means an attacker is able to re-enable your key. I don't think there is an analogous "UID compromise". So why would an OpenPGP implementation choose to treat a UID revocation as final? Are there any that do? By the way, small correction: > "The UID" is not the packet data in the OpenPGP certificate but the > string "Alice " I take it you refer to the precise form of the data that is signed. In fact, what is signed does have a header, it's not just the bytes from the UID string. The header is somewhat unusual. It is an old-style packet header for packet tag 13 (User ID packet) with a length-of-length 0. It is followed by a 4-octect scalar length and then the UID string. The unusual thing is that length-of-length 0 means a 2-octet length, but in actuality it is a 4-octet length. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 14:22:29 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 14:22:29 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> Message-ID: <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 12:37, Hauke Laging wrote: > Give it a try... OK. $ gpg2 --homedir gpgtest -k DCDFDFA4 pub 1024R/DCDFDFA4 2012-03-17 [expires: 2014-08-15] uid [ full ] Test Teststra uid [ full ] Test Teststra (Koning van Wezel) sub 1024R/77A3395A 2012-03-17 Revoking the work UID... ~$ gpg2 --homedir gpgtest --list-options show-unusable-uids -k DCDFDFA4 pub 1024R/DCDFDFA4 2012-03-17 [expires: 2014-08-15] uid [ full ] Test Teststra (Koning van Wezel) uid [ revoked] Test Teststra sub 1024R/77A3395A 2012-03-17 Had to add a list-options flag to show it. Re-adding the UID... ---------------------8<-------------->8--------------------- $ gpg2 --edit-key DCDFDFA4 [...] gpg> adduid [...] Real name: Test Teststra Email address: test at work.invalid Comment: You selected this USER-ID: "Test Teststra " Such a user ID already exists on this key! Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (Q)uit? q ---------------------8<-------------->8--------------------- Okay, the UI doesn't let us do it that easily. Delete that old one. ---------------------8<-------------->8--------------------- gpg> uid 2 [...] gpg> deluid [...] gpg> adduid Real name: Test Teststra Email address: test at work.invalid Comment: You selected this USER-ID: "Test Teststra " Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? o ---------------------8<-------------->8--------------------- So far so good. I'm redistributing the key to my peer. ---------------------8<-------------->8--------------------- $ gpg2 --export DCDFDFA4|gpg2 --homedir gpgtest --import gpg: key DCDFDFA4: "Test Teststra " 1 new signature gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: new signatures: 1 $ gpg2 --homedir gpgtest --list-options show-unusable-uids -k DCDFDFA4 pub 1024R/DCDFDFA4 2012-03-17 [expires: 2014-08-15] uid [ full ] Test Teststra uid [ full ] Test Teststra (Koning van Wezel) sub 1024R/77A3395A 2012-03-17 ---------------------8<-------------->8--------------------- And look, it's back in action. It is precisely as you said, GnuPG does allow reinstigating a revoked UID. However, there is a slight hitch in the UI that means you can't do it completely straight-forwardly. You need to delete the offending UID before re-adding it, but other than that, it works, and the certifications are even carried over. > Not the last created but the last self-signed one (may differ e.g. after > expiration). Ah, right, thanks for the correction! Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 14:29:49 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 14:29:49 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <20140813113043.171DC2073E@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <20140813113043.171DC2073E@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <53EB5A3D.8010006@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 13:30, pzeudo at hushmail.com wrote: > How much history is saved in a gpg key? Pretty much everything. You can edit what you give others to your heart's content, but old data will still linger in a lot of places and can recombine with your new data. Keyservers in particular never throw any data out (I think), but only add new data to the existing data. Similarly, unless explicitly instructed, GnuPG will keep old signatures and uid's and stuff around. > Can other people see the full history of what I did in the meantime They usually can, especially if the key is on the keyserver network. > what would I have to do to see what's saved? The most information is given by a command like: $ gpg2 --export KEYID | gpg2 --list-packets There might be switches to be even more verbose, but this already shows all old signatures and stuff. You might want to import your own key from the keyserver to see anything you have deleted locally. But in general, assume that anything you send out will be uploaded by someone to the keyserver, and stay there indefinitely. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 14:45:20 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 14:45:20 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EB5DE0.20508@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 14:22, Peter Lebbing wrote: > Okay, the UI doesn't let us do it that easily. Delete that old one. Alternatively, delete only the revocation signature and the self-signature using "delsig" and resign using "sign". That way, you keep certifications in your local copy. The "delsig" interface can be a pain with many signatures, so more straightforward is to do an --export before you delete and re-add the UID, and an --import afterwards. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From pzeudo at hushmail.com Wed Aug 13 14:54:40 2014 From: pzeudo at hushmail.com (pzeudo at hushmail.com) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 14:54:40 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EB5A3D.8010006@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <20140813113043.171DC2073E@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB5A3D.8010006@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <20140813125441.61F9B2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> Hi, and thanks again for your answer. I have the feeling I may have formulated my question badly. I do know that data that has been out in the open cannot be made forgotten. What I wanted to ask was this, basically: Assume I generate a completely new gpg key and play around with it. Say I add some UIDs and some subordinate keys, and then remove a subset of those. Only after having done all this, I upload this key's public info, for the first time, to a keyserver and tell you about it. Could you now, from this one snapshot, tell which UIDs and subkeys I added and then deleted again? I tried playing with list-packets and pgpdump, and to me it looks like no such information is available, but then again, I'm not familiar with the inner workings of gpg. Thanks! On 8/13/2014 at 2:30 PM, "Peter Lebbing" wrote: > >On 13/08/14 13:30, pzeudo at hushmail.com wrote: >> How much history is saved in a gpg key? > >Pretty much everything. You can edit what you give others to your >heart's content, but old data will still linger in a lot of places >and >can recombine with your new data. Keyservers in particular never >throw >any data out (I think), but only add new data to the existing data. > >Similarly, unless explicitly instructed, GnuPG will keep old >signatures >and uid's and stuff around. > >> Can other people see the full history of what I did in the >meantime > >They usually can, especially if the key is on the keyserver >network. > >> what would I have to do to see what's saved? > >The most information is given by a command like: >$ gpg2 --export KEYID | gpg2 --list-packets > >There might be switches to be even more verbose, but this already >shows >all old signatures and stuff. > >You might want to import your own key from the keyserver to see >anything >you have deleted locally. > >But in general, assume that anything you send out will be uploaded >by >someone to the keyserver, and stay there indefinitely. > >HTH, > >Peter. > >-- >I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. >You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. >My key is available at peter> From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 13 15:07:36 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:07:36 -0400 Subject: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 131, Issue 15 In-Reply-To: <1407919106.4159.33.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740> References: <1407919106.4159.33.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740> Message-ID: <53EB6318.80102@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/13/2014 4:38 AM, Michael Anders wrote: > Baltimore published: Fort Meade is actually closer to Laurel than it is to Baltimore. > (http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml) > > symm. RSA ECC > 80 1024 160 > 112 2048 224 > 128 3072 256 > 192 7680 384 > 256 15360 521 Which shouldn't be any surprise, since NIST collaborates with them on determining these numbers. You'll notice that they exactly match NIST's recommendations, except that NIST doesn't list a 192-bit entry. Also, I think your 521 is actually 512. :) > The generalized number field sieve(->RSA factoring) scales with > bitlength to the 1/3 Nope. That's the computational complexity in a computational-theory sense, not the complexity in a cryptanalytic sense. Be real careful about thinking the two of them are connected; they're probably not. If it scaled with bit length to the 1/3 power, and if a 3072-bit RSA key corresponds to 128 shannons of entropy, a 15360-bit RSA key would only have 211 shannons -- not 256. Coming up with these tables is black magic at the best of times. For that reason, I hope you'll understand if I choose to rely on NIST rather than your numbers. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Wed Aug 13 15:21:58 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 15:21:58 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <20140813125441.61F9B2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB5A3D.8010006@digitalbrains.com> <20140813125441.61F9B2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <5870685.HxQXSLsPnb@inno> Am Mi 13.08.2014, 14:54:40 schrieb pzeudo at hushmail.com: > Say I add > some UIDs and some subordinate keys, and then remove a subset of > those. Only after having done all this, I upload this key's public > info, for the first time, to a keyserver and tell you about it. Could > you now, from this one snapshot, tell which UIDs and subkeys I added > and then deleted again? No. -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Aug 13 15:29:38 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 15:29:38 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <20140813125441.61F9B2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <20140813113043.171DC2073E@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB5A3D.8010006@digitalbrains.com> <20140813125441.61F9B2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <53EB6842.1000403@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 14:54, pzeudo at hushmail.com wrote: > Could you now, from this one snapshot, tell which UIDs and subkeys I > added and then deleted again? Ah, right. It depends a bit. Especially self-signatures, which include key preferences, do normally accumulate. But if you use export-minimal or the "minimize" command, I don't think anything historic is emitted. And the del* commands indeed really throw stuff out, as far as I have seen. So any UID or subkey deleted with deluid and delkey are really deleted. > I tried playing with list-packets and pgpdump, and to me it looks > like no such information is available, but then again, I'm not > familiar with the inner workings of gpg. Some of those subpackets can be rather cryptic as well as cryptographic ;). HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 13 17:05:19 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 11:05:19 -0400 Subject: James Mickens on security Message-ID: <53EB7EAF.3010209@sixdemonbag.org> Microsoft Research's James Mickens wrote several humorous columns for USENIX in which he interspersed brilliant insights with side-splitting humor. I just found his "This World We Live In," which has a good bit about PGP in it. You can find his original at: http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/people/mickens/thisworldofours.pdf "[C]onstructing a public-key infrastructure is incredibly difficult in practice. When someone says 'assume that a public-key cryptosystem exists,' this is roughly equivalent to saying 'assume that you could clone dinosaurs, and that you could fill a park with these dinosaurs, and that you could get a ticket to this "Jurassic Park," and that you could stroll throughout this park without getting eaten, clawed, or otherwise quantum entangled with a macroscopic dinosaur particle.' With public-key cryptography there's a horrible, fundamental challenge of finding somebody, *anybody*, to establish and maintain the infrastructure. For example, you could enlist a well-known technology company to do it, but this would offend the refined aesthetics of the vaguely Marxist but comfortably bourgeoisie hacker community who wants everything to be decentralized and who non-ironically believes that Tor is used for things besides drug deals and kidnapping plots. Alternatively, the public-key infrastructure could use a decentralized 'web of trust' model; in this architecture, individuals make their own keys and certify the keys of trusted associated, creating chains of attestation. 'Chains of Attestation' is a great name for a heavy metal band, but it is less practical in the real, non-Ozzy Osbourne-based world, since I don't just need a chain of attestation between me and some unknown, filthy stranger -- I also need a chain of attestation *for each link in that chain*. This recursive attestation eventually leads to fractals and H.P. Lovecraft-style madness. Web-of-trust cryptosystems also result in the generation of emails with incredibly short bodies (e.g., 'R U gonna be at the gym 2nite?!?!?!?') and multi-kilobyte PGP key attachments, leading to a packet framing overhead of 98.5%. PGP enthusiasts are like your friend with the ethno-literature degree whose multi-paragraph email signature has fourteen Buddhist quotes about wisdom and mankind's relationship to trees. It's like, I GET IT. You care deeply about the things that you care about. Please leave me alone so that I can ponder the inevitability of death." From robertc at broadcom.com Wed Aug 13 19:46:24 2014 From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 17:46:24 +0000 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> Hi Robert, This looks great. One very minor point (possibly not germane, please comment): Are you discussing the reliability of the NIST P curves for ECC? What is GPG planning as the default curves? NIST, Brainpool or ? Thanks, Bob Cavanaugh -----Original Message----- From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Robert J. Hansen Sent: Monday, August 11, 2014 10:19 AM To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: FAQ change, final draft A few weeks ago on -devel I made a proposal for a FAQ change. So far I've received feedback from three people, all of it fairly positive, all suggesting mild changes. The following represents a final draft, which I'm now presenting on -users to get the most visibility/feedback. If the community approves, I'll be submitting this to Werner for inclusion into the FAQ. ===== Q: Why does GnuPG default to 2048-bit RSA? A: At the time the decision was made, 2048-bit RSA was thought to provide reasonable security for the next decade or more while still being compatible with the overwhelming majority of the OpenPGP ecosystem. Q: Is that still the case? A: Largely, yes. According to NIST Special Publication 800-57, published in July 2012, 2048-bit RSA is believed safe until 2030. At present, no reputable cryptographer or research group has cast doubt on the safety of RSA-2048. That said, many are suggesting shifting to larger keys, and GnuPG will be making such a shift in the near future. Q: What do other groups have to say about 2048-bit RSA? A: In 2014, the German Bundesnetzagentur fuer Elektrizitaet, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen recommended using RSA-2048 for long-term security in electronic signatures. In 2012, ECRYPT-II published their "Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes" wherein they expressed their belief RSA-1776 will suffice until at least 2020, and RSA-2432 until 2030. In 2010, France's Agence Nationale de la Securite des Systems d'Information stated they had confidence in RSA-2048 until at least 2020. Q: Is there a general recommendation that 3072-bit keys be used for new applications? A: No, although some respected people and groups within the cryptographic community have made such recommendations. Some even recommend 4096-bit keys. Q: Will GnuPG ever support RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 by default? A: Probably not. The future is elliptical-curve cryptography, which will bring a level of safety comparable to RSA-16384. Every minute we spend arguing about whether we should change the defaults to RSA-3072 or more is one minute the shift to ECC is delayed. Frankly, we think ECC is a really good idea and we'd like to see it deployed as soon as humanly possible. Q: I think I need larger key sizes. A: By all means, feel free to generate certificates with larger keys. GnuPG supports up to 4096-bit keys. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From robertc at broadcom.com Wed Aug 13 20:16:01 2014 From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 18:16:01 +0000 Subject: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 131, Issue 15 In-Reply-To: <53EB6318.80102@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1407919106.4159.33.camel@micha137-myAMD-CM1740> <53EB6318.80102@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A264@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> Hi Robert, You are both correct. The hash strength=512 curve is called P-521. Thanks, Bob Cavanaugh -----Original Message----- From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Robert J. Hansen Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2014 6:08 AM To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 131, Issue 15 On 8/13/2014 4:38 AM, Michael Anders wrote: > Baltimore published: Fort Meade is actually closer to Laurel than it is to Baltimore. > (http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml) > > symm. RSA ECC > 80 1024 160 > 112 2048 224 > 128 3072 256 > 192 7680 384 > 256 15360 521 Which shouldn't be any surprise, since NIST collaborates with them on determining these numbers. You'll notice that they exactly match NIST's recommendations, except that NIST doesn't list a 192-bit entry. Also, I think your 521 is actually 512. :) > The generalized number field sieve(->RSA factoring) scales with > bitlength to the 1/3 Nope. That's the computational complexity in a computational-theory sense, not the complexity in a cryptanalytic sense. Be real careful about thinking the two of them are connected; they're probably not. If it scaled with bit length to the 1/3 power, and if a 3072-bit RSA key corresponds to 128 shannons of entropy, a 15360-bit RSA key would only have 211 shannons -- not 256. Coming up with these tables is black magic at the best of times. For that reason, I hope you'll understand if I choose to rely on NIST rather than your numbers. :) From david at gbenet.com Wed Aug 13 20:14:11 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 19:14:11 +0100 Subject: Back to normal now Message-ID: <53EBAAF3.3040000@gbenet.com> Hauke, Yesterday whilst figuring out what to do, I found that I was logged out - my Linux box refused to accept my password. Anyway having copied the contents of my home directory - I reinstalled LXDE. Then slowly configured. I installed gpg2 - created the directory and associated files and then copied over my files. All works perfectly now - thanks to being locked out!! David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x8716853A.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 1926 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 13 20:43:32 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 14:43:32 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> Message-ID: <53EBB1D4.50109@sixdemonbag.org> > Hi Robert, This looks great. One very minor point (possibly not > germane, please comment): Are you discussing the reliability of the > NIST P curves for ECC? No, because that's the first time anyone's asked that question on the list -- so it's not a frequently asked question. :) > What is GPG planning as the default curves? NIST, Brainpool or ? Beats me, you'd have to ask Werner, I have no involvement with the code, and I can't even tell you which curves I'd personally recommend. Due to my father being a U.S. federal judge, I think a lot of the GnuPG community would react very badly to me ever touching the GnuPG code. In deference to their wishes, I limit myself to maintaining the FAQ and answering routine questions. "Which curves will we use and why?" is not within my remit. :) From aarcane at aarcane.org Wed Aug 13 20:45:25 2014 From: aarcane at aarcane.org (Schlacta, Christ) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 11:45:25 -0700 Subject: Back to normal now In-Reply-To: <53EBAAF3.3040000@gbenet.com> References: <53EBAAF3.3040000@gbenet.com> Message-ID: You could have just booted in from the lxde DVD and reset your password... On Aug 13, 2014 11:22 AM, "david at gbenet.com" wrote: > Hauke, > > Yesterday whilst figuring out what to do, I found that I was logged out - > my Linux box > refused to accept my password. > > Anyway having copied the contents of my home directory - I reinstalled > LXDE. Then slowly > configured. I installed gpg2 - created the directory and associated files > and then copied > over my files. > > All works perfectly now - thanks to being locked out!! > > David > > -- > ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. > Nothing of the > kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment > of death. No > delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 13 21:06:15 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 21:06:15 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> (Bob Cavanaugh's message of "Wed, 13 Aug 2014 17:46:24 +0000") References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> Message-ID: <871tski508.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 19:46, robertc at broadcom.com said: > This looks great. One very minor point (possibly not germane, please > comment): Are you discussing the reliability of the NIST P curves for > ECC? What is GPG planning as the default curves? NIST, Brainpool or ? For signing Ed25519 which used the EdDSA algorithm (a Schnorr signature variant). For encryption most likely plain Curve25519. But it is not yet defined by OpenPGP. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 13 23:09:03 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:09:03 +0100 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <20140813084459.90FB42073E@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20140813084459.90FB42073E@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <1147745925.20140813220903@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 13 August 2014 at 9:44:59 AM, in , pzeudo at hushmail.com wrote: > she issues adduid to add "Alice ", > her company mailing address. After some time, she > leaves the company, invalidating her email address. > Consequently, she revokes her UID uid2 at company.com and > sends her updated public key to everyone she's in > contact with. Then, for some reason, Alice joins > aforementioned company again, re-gaining control of her > mail address uid2 at company.com. Can she add a new UID of > the same name "Alice " to her gpg key > again? Yes, she can. > I understand that she would not be able to > re-use signatures she collected on her "old" UID on her > "new" one, but would have to start building trust from > scratch. But still, is it possible to do so, or would > the revocation of the "old" uid2 also immediately apply > to the "new" uid2? The revocation is a signature over the specific uid (or uids) that were selected when the "revuid" command was issued. And, as you say, she would not be able to re-use signatures she collected on her "old" UID2 on her "new" one. > Second, if her notebook subordinate key can > sign/decrypt for both UIDs, and someone sends a mail to > uid1 at alice.com, which pubic key does he encrypt the > message with? I assume the sender, by default, would > simulatenously use all encryption keys (master or > subordinate) he knows of, so that the message can be > decrypted with any one private key. Is that the case? > Can the sender choose to only encrypt using one of the > keys, e.g. to make sure Alice doesn't read the message > on her phone, but waits until she gets home to her > notebook (in case the sender considers it more > trustworthy, and the sender knows how the keys are > associated with Alice's machines)? Alice would need to come to a specific arrangement with the sender for that to be possible. In general, if Alice has shared multiple encryption keys with the same email address in the uids, the sender might encrypt to any one of them (or any subset). > What happens if a subordinate key of mine expires? Can > I just generate a new one and let people know? Or would > I also have lost trust/signatures of my identities > gathered in the past? What do you mean by a "subordinate key?" A subkey? Or another, completely unrelated key? In either case, one option is to simply edit the expiry date and keep the existing key. In the case of a subkey, allowing it to expire and creating a new one makes no difference to the existing signatures. If you just mean another, unrelated key, switch to a new key and the new one starts without a collection of signatures. > Phrased differently, if Bob > signes Alice's UID X, what does he sign exactly? Are you asking just the meaning, or what the signature is calculated over? > Just > that he trusts UID X belongs to the name and address > given in UID X, and that UID X is associated with > Alice's master key, or does Bob's signature also say > something about subordinate keys of Alice's gpg key > and/or other UIDs of Alice which Bob did not intend to > verify? The trite answer is Bob's signature means whatever Bob wants it to mean. He might even publish a key signing policy to tell people what he means. Put "key signing policy" (without the quotes) into your favourite search engine to see some examples. Typically, Bob's signature might mean Bob asserts:- (1) that Alice is known by the name she claims in the UID (or has documentation that Bob trusts that supports her claim to that name) (2) that Alice has control of (or at least access to) any email address contained in that uid (3) that Alice has control of the corresponding private key (can read a message encrypted to that key and can produce a signature using that key). Bob's signature says nothing about any UIDs other that the one(s) that Bob has signed. As to "subordinate keys." If you mean subkeys, they are part of Alice's key. See (3) above. > Finally, I am wondering how I should organise my UIDs. > I could either have one gpg key and add each UID to > that one, or I could have multiple seperate gpg keys, > one for each UID. Or some identities on one key together, plus some other identities on their own keys. > The latter approach seems more > flexible to me, in terms of choosing how much > information I want to disclose to recipients of my gpg > keys, Yes. But also more effort for you. And if people know more than one of your identities, slightly more effort for them. > and, depending on the answers to the questions > above, also in terms of control I have over how my keys > are used. Once you have given somebody else a copy of your public key, do you have *any* control over how they use it? > Does having all UIDs in one gpg key have any > advantages, except for being easier to organise for me > and for people who want to sign my identities? Not that I am aware of. > Would it > be considered strange, or even rude of some sort, if I > asked someone to sign a number of identities of mine > scattered across multiple gpg keys, instead of just > handing them one gpg key and asking them to sign UIDs > x, y and z? I'll leave that one to somebody who has chosen to participate in the web of trust. There are several such people who contribute to this list. (-; > I know these are a lot of questions, but I honestly > couldn't find satisfactory answers in the documentation > or using search engines. I would be very grateful if > you could attempt to enlighten me. :) I have attempted to help. I'm sure somebody more knowledgeable will be along shortly. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net I don't suffer from insanity I enjoy every minute of it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPr0/1XFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pD+oD/RPr5b3ySOD4OlN9GG3HKTM7/vAY6aNVevv7 ONp2v9FtN0eyraFj5lV+5IBhFVjmASgLZKOBqT+tlC59KN9sRNEum8cnQnaZLd+q uV248/SRCmMvARU971BzZuSck2sUgI5JYe65eihP8CTh5cHRX+BDoJPeo2ooncUQ a2ul39JY =NDWI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 13 23:33:19 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:33:19 +0100 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EB5DE0.20508@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> <53EB5DE0.20508@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1025337853.20140813223319@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 13 August 2014 at 1:45:20 PM, in , Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 13/08/14 14:22, Peter Lebbing wrote: >> Okay, the UI doesn't let us do it that easily. Delete that old one. > Alternatively, delete only the revocation signature and > the self-signature using "delsig" and resign using > "sign". That way, you keep certifications in your local > copy. The "delsig" interface can be a pain with many > signatures, so more straightforward is to do an > --export before you delete and re-add the UID, and an > --import afterwards. Won't a simple "setpref" do the trick? - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Can you imagine a world with no hypothetical situations? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPr2aVXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5px08EAKVlpSQUo6/WcZ19GEvkh+S0D/KIk5OatbTR lxGWYtX/Oqsk9yHPkQjre6qHkAjVxnEchI4Cnio2oh6zuvDx/PTo7JjN4TGDuKws VK6SjIs3vHpf+Ly/y7A/qDCHVSIy9UW4NBOCBTtI7OYoNs0YgTcoxPJ1KFTyHLaY LHkcQJQK =uLeU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Wed Aug 13 23:13:18 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 23:13:18 +0200 Subject: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in Enigmail, some servers down? In-Reply-To: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> Message-ID: <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/12/2014 09:21 PM, OmegaPhil wrote: > Please CC me in etc, I'm not subscribed to the list. > > Haven't been able to 'refresh all public keys' on keys.gnupg.net > in Enigmail for a while now (only have two keys), so I had a look > at the servers responsible (host keys.gnupg.net) - the following > appear to be bad for me accessing from the UK: > > 131.155.141.70: No response to pings 63.230.134.161: Destination > Host Unreachable 173.175.198.28: No response to pings Using ping is not a reliable way to check availability, the icmp protocol is often blocked by the firewall, you should do a HTTP get request. As for your issues, try using --keyserver hkp://p80.pool.sks-keyservers.net:80 to rule out any firewall blocking 11371 etc. - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- "The best way to predict the future is to invent it" (Alan Kay) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT69TnAAoJEPw7F94F4TagkhsQAIziYE9wRai+hAB92eDBAQPQ I1JQYOK5UB/4UWHRp30/nZUBo2u5c8sm8YTe3GrH5Xqxsuw7IUmFv3QADmP0Kz7O PkRgjKm/g1/6svpQxDX1ujVJHqZpUS54FcZKldUiUAdjletJlFF38GZ9KyQPc2Mo RSK++85tyt+eWv/8SzCLPhC7TLEpucFCTDK/o0QAGRAPX5U+PSxG46wSWJYIh7Jy 7vrIvYsjilDjVRpw4ic4+R/pWtlg70Y8P5mhQ8sYcU8tbVrFePCphhLrn1qxi/Em C/gLfbEHdtuzreMumHUCEFhSB0hRcEy3aNQ+S2iNtNLVUrpvF2SxNyIcTWZCi9yb XmoforaqQmxEPOIgTxgV0TXcsJmbLIaOR4pEvDa7jstLWzcEG6ES2d1KlDiZrW5o BoGi3dIzYWH4ngO1fRR2Cd6Gg5yB/2kVIRgNtB/MBSGR8nqehbszqmswNamU/tr/ rJq2o9it2g7EzK2i84zlUxZMA1WQuPR2pJ5fiWGHNayw7h2GfL8p7/oZyI4JuS8L drNYisat4x88Jf9jXdI/+/+0Dm+vB8y3fSFyBM0EtqTO1Bn/6WUoHcd+uFVhysTw rQM956RuwOIMwBnzXGvZA2AnD/Q3YKIHs1rCMwWwj2EgRmrMur/L4TflEW7d6dyb rez0qCQRoO6LyS6uN/y6 =6cLs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 13 23:43:41 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:43:41 +0100 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <1548063.zPPlaFDMEL@inno> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <1548063.zPPlaFDMEL@inno> Message-ID: <1135312182.20140813224341@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 13 August 2014 at 11:30:00 AM, in , Hauke Laging wrote: > i.e. the same string is the same UID and cannot be > created twice in a certificate. Interesting. When I tested, GnuPG allowed me to add another UID with exactly the same string. When viewed in a GUI key manager or via "gpg - -listkeys 0xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", I could see two UIDs with the same string, but only until I edited the key again. > Subkeys and third party signatures are not related > (today ? one more problem). Why is that a problem? - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net During an eruption - move away from the volcano - not towards it -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPr3BNXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pHd8EAK8SEyqxplRG2t+7W7ycMtDZTKRfX14MKJSB g3430NUEvjoaGYl72jo22hmPZzGpJx0SFln2onxPSsE7JEmadaK0Qigu5Wtaou0t MiA4P6TtqoLYqRFUUgRogB8HR/2R60P9gmRSdaUejavwFErgpMIAFU/V3q2UuEwn EVpachpC =r31a -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Aug 13 23:51:19 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 17:51:19 -0400 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: On Aug 13, 2014, at 8:22 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > It is precisely as you said, GnuPG does allow reinstigating a revoked > UID. However, there is a slight hitch in the UI that means you can't do > it completely straight-forwardly. You need to delete the offending UID > before re-adding it, but other than that, it works, and the > certifications are even carried over. Try this: gpg2 --expert -u (thekey) --edit-key (thekey) Select the uid you want to un-revoke sign You'll get a prompt like "XXXX was already signed by key YYYYY. Do you want to sign it again anyway?". Say "yes". David From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Thu Aug 14 00:17:10 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 00:17:10 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <1135312182.20140813224341@my_localhost> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <1548063.zPPlaFDMEL@inno> <1135312182.20140813224341@my_localhost> Message-ID: <8435232.Wso5X8YtgE@inno> Am Mi 13.08.2014, 22:43:41 schrieb MFPA: > > Subkeys and third party signatures are not related > > (today ? one more problem). > > Why is that a problem? Because of that OpenPGP (at least in a useful form) is not compatible with (probably not only) German signature law. I know that this will be replaced by new EU law in a few years but I don't know whether that makes any change to the current requirement that the key which has a "qualified certificate" must be stored on a smartcard (i.e. inaccessible even to the key owner). This problem could be solved by adding a critical signature notation which contains the fingerprint(s) of the key(s) which the CA has created on a smartcard. That way the key owner could create new subkeys which would not be recognized as part of a "qualified certificate". If you want to use OpenPGP today then the CA would have to create the private mainkey for you and throw it away after signing the subkeys. That would render OpenPGP quite useless. Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From htbillb at gmail.com Wed Aug 13 22:20:41 2014 From: htbillb at gmail.com (Bill HT) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 15:20:41 -0500 Subject: HP-UX and GnuPG Message-ID: We are on HP-UX ver 11.11 U 9000/800. GnuPG 2 was installed at /usr/local/bin, we have to call it with the at path to do anything with it: /usr/local/bin/gpg2. I can list keys and import keys. However, when trying to generate keys or encrypt, we get this error: "no entropy gathering module detected?. I was under the impression that EGD is part of GPG, is there some reason why it isn?t seeing it? Or is it just not there? ~ Bill -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de Wed Aug 13 23:22:26 2014 From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 23:22:26 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53EBB1D4.50109@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> <53EBB1D4.50109@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53EBD712.1040908@dkyb.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Am 13.08.2014 um 20:43 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: >> Hi Robert, This looks great. One very minor point (possibly not >> germane, please comment): Are you discussing the reliability of >> the NIST P curves for ECC? > > No, because that's the first time anyone's asked that question on > the list -- so it's not a frequently asked question. :) > To bad, I was about to suggest to adept some of these questions* to the elliptic curve cryptography and answer them if possible or at least state that an answer is not possible at this time. Because they probably will become frequently asked questions in the future**. ;) But I can understand if that is going to be dealt with, when we are at that point in time. regards Martin * What will be a good default key length and why e.g. ** maybe true for some of the other questions already in the FAQ as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEAREKAAYFAlPr1xEACgkQ/6vdZgk46sj0xwCgutbhFXSHpZZg3uu6yFQ5EV4j L/4AnjYmvhzbCv4mqTB7IuLU8mqy9gRH =SsU4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 14 04:32:05 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:32:05 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53EBD712.1040908@dkyb.de> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> <53EBB1D4.50109@sixdemonbag.org> <53EBD712.1040908@dkyb.de> Message-ID: <53EC1FA5.60004@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/13/2014 5:22 PM, Martin Behrendt wrote: > Because they probably will become frequently asked questions in the > future. The questions experts think will be frequently asked are usually rarely asked. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From dougb at dougbarton.us Thu Aug 14 07:08:42 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:08:42 -0700 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? In-Reply-To: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> References: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> Message-ID: <53EC445A.7020506@dougbarton.us> On 08/12/2014 11:27 PM, shmick at riseup.net wrote: > i've seen a multitude of ways people input data into this pref > > for example, some people put a link to their public key .asc or .txt file > > some others put a link to an actual keyserver > > from the name of the actual pref, it states a keyserver, so shouldn't > users input a link to their Preferred keyserver and not a link to > download a public key or txt file ? Please don't use this option, or encourage its use. It leads to the trap described here: https://dougbarton.us/PGP/stale-keyserver-url.html which most users (even those few who update their keyrings) cannot figure out how to escape. There is no good reason to use this option, and the public key servers are vastly preferable in any case. Doug From dougb at dougbarton.us Thu Aug 14 07:20:05 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 22:20:05 -0700 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_shoul?= =?windows-1252?Q?d_be_mandatory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <53EC4705.2080405@dougbarton.us> On 08/12/2014 08:41 PM, David Shaw wrote: > Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages specifically, and leave the other stuff? Yes please. :) Not being able to encrypt/sign with PGP 2 at this point is totally reasonable. Not being able to decrypt/verify leads to toolchain complications down the road for people with such archives, and sends a dangerous message that we're not serious about backwards compatibility. Doug From ineiev at gnu.org Thu Aug 14 07:13:37 2014 From: ineiev at gnu.org (Ineiev) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 01:13:37 -0400 Subject: gpg --recv-key rejects a key Message-ID: <20140814051337.GA3107@gnu.org> Hello, $ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18 (&c.) $ gpg --recv-key 0x3DBDDC68 gpg: requesting key 3DBDDC68 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net gpg: key 35853032: rejected by import filter gpg: Total number processed: 1 When I get the key from keys.gnupg.net using a web browser, $ gpg --import 3DBDDC68 .key gpg: key 35853032: public key "Brendan Cully " imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found I wonder why the behavior may differ? From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 14 09:32:34 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:32:34 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Mon, 11 Aug 2014 13:18:33 -0400") References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87lhqrh6gd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:18, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > visibility/feedback. If the community approves, I'll be submitting > this to Werner for inclusion into the FAQ. Okay, to update the FAQ ? Shalom-Salam, Werner ===== Q: Why does GnuPG default to 2048-bit RSA? A: At the time the decision was made, 2048-bit RSA was thought to provide reasonable security for the next decade or more while still being compatible with the overwhelming majority of the OpenPGP ecosystem. Q: Is that still the case? A: Largely, yes. According to NIST Special Publication 800-57, published in July 2012, 2048-bit RSA is believed safe until 2030. At present, no reputable cryptographer or research group has cast doubt on the safety of RSA-2048. That said, many are suggesting shifting to larger keys, and GnuPG will be making such a shift in the near future. Q: What do other groups have to say about 2048-bit RSA? A: In 2014, the German Bundesnetzagentur fuer Elektrizitaet, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen recommended using RSA-2048 for long-term security in electronic signatures. In 2012, ECRYPT-II published their "Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes" wherein they expressed their belief RSA-1776 will suffice until at least 2020, and RSA-2432 until 2030. In 2010, France's Agence Nationale de la Securite des Systems d'Information stated they had confidence in RSA-2048 until at least 2020. Q: Is there a general recommendation that 3072-bit keys be used for new applications? A: No, although some respected people and groups within the cryptographic community have made such recommendations. Some even recommend 4096-bit keys. Q: Will GnuPG ever support RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 by default? A: Probably not. The future is elliptical-curve cryptography, which will bring a level of safety comparable to RSA-16384. Every minute we spend arguing about whether we should change the defaults to RSA-3072 or more is one minute the shift to ECC is delayed. Frankly, we think ECC is a really good idea and we'd like to see it deployed as soon as humanly possible. Q: I think I need larger key sizes. A: By all means, feel free to generate certificates with larger keys. GnuPG supports up to 4096-bit keys. -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 14 09:35:03 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:35:03 +0200 Subject: gpg --recv-key rejects a key In-Reply-To: <20140814051337.GA3107@gnu.org> (ineiev@gnu.org's message of "Thu, 14 Aug 2014 01:13:37 -0400") References: <20140814051337.GA3107@gnu.org> Message-ID: <87fvgzh6c8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 14 Aug 2014 07:13, ineiev at gnu.org said: > gpg: requesting key 3DBDDC68 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net > gpg: key 35853032: rejected by import filter There is a regression in 1.4.18 where the new import filter kicks in if you specify the the keyid of a subkey. For GnuPG-2 this has been fixed with 2.0.26 but a fix for 1.4.18 has not yet been released. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de Thu Aug 14 10:00:52 2014 From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 10:00:52 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53EC1FA5.60004@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> <53EBB1D4.50109@sixdemonbag.org> <53EBD712.1040908@dkyb.de> <53EC1FA5.60004@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53EC6CB4.2040703@dkyb.de> Am 14.08.2014 um 04:32 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > On 8/13/2014 5:22 PM, Martin Behrendt wrote: >> Because they probably will become frequently asked questions in the >> future. > > The questions experts think will be frequently asked are usually rarely > asked. :) > > But I don't qualify as an expert. :) And two other things I noted while reading the FAQ (under what can be improved perspective). 1. On the starting page for the FAQ[0] I tried to view all formats and the txt format link [1] uses ftp instead of https and leaves me with the following message: > 300: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/GnuPG-FAQ.txt/ 200: filename > content-length last-modified file-type 2. Assuming that sooner or later stuff about ECC will find its way into the FAQ. I think an overview (maybe in a table) which connects the questions "7.6 What's RSA" to "7.12 What's Camellia" would help a beginner/intermediate. I'm thinking of something like: Name | Can be used for | Type | ... Elgamal | encryption | asymmetric What you think? [0] https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/faqs.html [1] ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/GnuPG-FAQ.txt/ From htd+ml at fritha.org Thu Aug 14 09:33:35 2014 From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:33:35 +0200 Subject: [openpgp] SHA-2 support =?utf-8?Q?shou?= =?utf-8?Q?ld_be_mandatory_=E2=80=93?= change defaults In-Reply-To: <53EAFD17.6050709@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53EAFD17.6050709@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <20140814073335.GA19409@fritha.org> On 13.08.2014, Johan Wevers wrote: > Most people, inclusing me, have stopped using it. However, I still have > a lot of mail archives from those days. Removing support would mean I > have to start using pgp 2 again to access them. Or the most recent version of gnupg with support for those mail archives.. From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 14 11:43:28 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 11:43:28 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <1025337853.20140813223319@my_localhost> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> <53EB5DE0.20508@digitalbrains.com> <1025337853.20140813223319@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53EC84C0.2000801@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 23:33, MFPA wrote: > Won't a simple "setpref" do the trick? No, that does not appear to be the case. I tried it; it just falls through without doing anything. I think this is a feature: you could accidentally unrevoke a revoked UID with setpref otherwise. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 14 11:46:17 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 11:46:17 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EC8569.1080805@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 23:51, David Shaw wrote: > Try this: > > gpg2 --expert -u (thekey) --edit-key (thekey) Ah! I never thought of trying good old --expert. Thanks! Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 14 11:42:21 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 11:42:21 +0200 Subject: [openpgp] SHA-2 support should be mandatory =?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=93?= change defaults In-Reply-To: <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> (David Shaw's message of "Tue, 12 Aug 2014 23:41:19 -0400") References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <87k36be7b6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 13 Aug 2014 05:41, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages > specifically, and leave the other stuff? That feels a bit messy. Did this for 2.1. The options --pgp2 and --rfc1991 are completely gone. Unless --allow-weak-digest-algos is used some signature verification hacks are also not anymore used - actually the signature verification would have been skipped at a later point but this safes us a useless double hashing of the message > I'd remove them as well. They're much easier to remove than --pgp2 as they only affect very specific (and few) places in the code. These options are no dummy options for 2.1. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 14 11:57:51 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 11:57:51 +0200 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <1147745925.20140813220903@my_localhost> References: <20140813084459.90FB42073E@smtp.hushmail.com> <1147745925.20140813220903@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53EC881F.2090007@digitalbrains.com> On 13/08/14 23:09, MFPA wrote: > And, as you say, she would not be able to re-use signatures she > collected on her "old" UID2 on her "new" one. Actually, interestingly, you can. There is no timestamp or anything in a UID; two UIDs with identical text are completely identical[1]. That means that old certifications in this case do carry over (if they're not expired). HTH, Peter. [1] Well; except for the fact that it is the UTF-8 encoded text that is signed, and it is possible for two different UTF-8 texts to come out exactly the same. In that case two UIDs look the same but are different. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Aug 14 13:23:06 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 07:23:06 -0400 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_should_be_man?= =?windows-1252?Q?datory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: <87a978n7pq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> <87a978n7pq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <78A0340A-8722-45AB-89FD-1BA26B4A2BA7@jabberwocky.com> On Aug 13, 2014, at 3:56 AM, Werner Koch wrote: >> state. One place that comes to mind is in --gen-revoke. GPG can >> import a bare revocation certificate. No version of PGP can, so there >> is code to push out a minimal public key before the revocation >> certificate. We'd need to add some sort of flag to indicate to >> include the minimal public key, and that's sort of reinventing --pgp > > That is > > if (keyblock && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8)) > { > /* Use a minimal pk for PGPx mode, since PGP can't import bare > revocation certificates. */ > rc = export_minimal_pk (out, keyblock, sig, NULL); > > Thus removing PGP2 won't harm. > >> Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages >> specifically, and leave the other stuff? That feels a bit messy. > > Actualluy this was my idea. However, signature verification has some > kludges for PGP2 and we could consider to remove that too. IIRC, this > is not even controlled by an option. I agree. But I wasn't clear enough - the "other stuff" I'm referring to above is the (PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8). That is, removing --pgp2 and leaving the others. On second consideration, though, the --pgpX options are at least theoretically OpenPGPish (some more than others!), so having those options stay is reasonable. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Aug 14 13:23:20 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 07:23:20 -0400 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_should_be_man?= =?windows-1252?Q?datory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: <53EC4705.2080405@dougbarton.us> References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> <53EC4705.2080405@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: On Aug 14, 2014, at 1:20 AM, Doug Barton wrote: > On 08/12/2014 08:41 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages specifically, and leave the other stuff? > > Yes please. :) > > Not being able to encrypt/sign with PGP 2 at this point is totally reasonable. Not being able to decrypt/verify leads to toolchain complications down the road for people with such archives, and sends a dangerous message that we're not serious about backwards compatibility. I think the context has been lost in that sentence. The "other stuff" I was referring to was --pgp6, --pgp7, etc. The --pgpX options in general. There was never a question of removing the ability to decrypt PGP 2 messages. As you say, that would destroy the ability to decrypt old messages. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Aug 14 13:26:13 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 07:26:13 -0400 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EC8569.1080805@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> <53EC8569.1080805@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: On Aug 14, 2014, at 5:46 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 13/08/14 23:51, David Shaw wrote: >> Try this: >> >> gpg2 --expert -u (thekey) --edit-key (thekey) > > Ah! I never thought of trying good old --expert. Thanks! It may be appropriate to not need --expert for this specific case of re-signing a revoked user ID. --expert is odd corner cases and "don't try this at home" sort of stuff, and re-signing a UID is perhaps uncommon, but certainly a straightforward operation in OpenPGP. I'll take a look. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Aug 14 13:33:17 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 07:33:17 -0400 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? In-Reply-To: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> References: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> Message-ID: <854AE5F5-413C-4610-B8EF-53649544DCBA@jabberwocky.com> On Aug 13, 2014, at 2:27 AM, shmick at riseup.net wrote: > i've seen a multitude of ways people input data into this pref > > for example, some people put a link to their public key .asc or .txt file > > some others put a link to an actual keyserver > > from the name of the actual pref, it states a keyserver, so shouldn't > users input a link to their Preferred keyserver and not a link to > download a public key or txt file ? It can be either. The definition of that option in the protocol is: This is a URI of a key server that the key holder prefers be used for updates. Note that keys with multiple User IDs can have a preferred key server for each User ID. Note also that since this is a URI, the key server can actually be a copy of the key retrieved by ftp, http, finger, etc. GnuPG supports both the keyserver, and link-to-key cases. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Aug 14 13:47:36 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 07:47:36 -0400 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? In-Reply-To: <53EC445A.7020506@dougbarton.us> References: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> <53EC445A.7020506@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <74FB88DA-AF87-42AD-9529-D0D936EF59D9@jabberwocky.com> On Aug 14, 2014, at 1:08 AM, Doug Barton wrote: > On 08/12/2014 11:27 PM, shmick at riseup.net wrote: >> i've seen a multitude of ways people input data into this pref >> >> for example, some people put a link to their public key .asc or .txt file >> >> some others put a link to an actual keyserver >> >> from the name of the actual pref, it states a keyserver, so shouldn't >> users input a link to their Preferred keyserver and not a link to >> download a public key or txt file ? > > Please don't use this option, or encourage its use. It leads to the trap described here: > > https://dougbarton.us/PGP/stale-keyserver-url.html > > which most users (even those few who update their keyrings) cannot figure out how to escape. Perhaps the problem here is not the option, but the behavior on failure. If querying the preferred keyserver does not return a response during a refresh (for whatever reason), maybe GPG should continue on and try to get the key from the standard --keyserver location. After all, it's a "preferred" keyserver. Not an "exclusive" keyserver. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Aug 14 15:18:25 2014 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:18:25 -0400 Subject: HP-UX and GnuPG In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Aug 13, 2014, at 4:20 PM, Bill HT wrote: > We are on HP-UX ver 11.11 U 9000/800. GnuPG 2 was installed at /usr/local/bin, we have to call it with the at path to do anything with it: /usr/local/bin/gpg2. I can list keys and import keys. However, when trying to generate keys or encrypt, we get this error: "no entropy gathering module detected?. I was under the impression that EGD is part of GPG, is there some reason why it isn?t seeing it? Or is it just not there? While GPG can make use of an EGD, EGD is not part of GPG. That said, I'm not very familiar with HP-UX, but I was under the impression that 11.11 either had, or could download a package from HP, that gives you a true /dev/random (which GPG can then use). Have you read http://newfdawg.com/SSHpart5.htm ? David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 14 15:50:33 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:50:33 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53EC6CB4.2040703@dkyb.de> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D33A1FE@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com> <53EBB1D4.50109@sixdemonbag.org> <53EBD712.1040908@dkyb.de> <53EC1FA5.60004@sixdemonbag.org> <53EC6CB4.2040703@dkyb.de> Message-ID: <53ECBEA9.2020206@sixdemonbag.org> > What you think? So far nobody's asked that question, either on the mailing list or to me personally, so ... Weird as this may be to hear, I actually want to keep the FAQ small. The point of a FAQ is not to be a comprehensive resource: it's to answer *frequently* *asked* *questions*. For comprehensive resources, people should read the manual... From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 14 15:59:02 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:59:02 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <87lhqrh6gd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <87lhqrh6gd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53ECC0A6.4040403@sixdemonbag.org> > Okay, to update the FAQ ? I haven't heard any big objections, so I think it's good for inclusion, yes. I'd suggest removing 11.1 and replacing it with that content. From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 14 16:20:08 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 16:20:08 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53ECC0A6.4040403@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <87lhqrh6gd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53ECC0A6.4040403@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53ECC598.4060704@digitalbrains.com> On 14/08/14 15:59, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I haven't heard any big objections, so I think it's good for inclusion, > yes. It looks good to me[1], thanks for writing it! Peter. [1] That feels a bit odd, who cares how it looks to me. On the other hand, it never feels odd to object to something that looks wrong to me! ;) -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 14 17:57:06 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 17:57:06 +0200 Subject: [Announce] The sixth Beta for GnuPG 2.1 is now available for testing Message-ID: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! I just released the sixth *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*. It has been released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to help fixing bugs. If you need a stable and fully maintained version of GnuPG, you should use version 2.0.26 or 1.4.18. This versions is marked as BETA and as such it should in general not be used for real work. However, the core functionality is solid enough for a long time and I am using this code base for a couple of years now. What's new in 2.1.0-beta783 since beta751 ========================================= * gpg: Add command --quick-gen-key. * gpg: Make --quick-sign-key promote local key signatures. * gpg: Added "show-usage" sub-option to --list-options. * gpg: Screen keyserver responses to avoid importing unwanted keys from rogue servers. * gpg: Removed the option --pgp2 and --rfc1991 and the ability to create PGP-2 compatible messages. * gpg: Removed options --compress-keys and --compress-sigs. * gpg: Cap attribute packets at 16MB. * gpg: Improved output of --list-packets. * gpg: Make with-colons output of --search-keys work again. * gpgsm: Auto-create the ".gnupg" directory like gpg does. * agent: Fold new passphrase warning prompts into one. * scdaemon: Add support for the Smartcard-HSM card. * scdaemon: Remove the use of the pcsc-wrapper. Getting the Software ==================== GnuPG 2.1.0-beta783 is available at ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2.sig and soon on all mirrors . Please read the README file ! Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can simply check the supplied signature. For example to check the signature of the file gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2.sig Depending on your installation you may use "gpg2" instead of "gpg". This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by that signing key. Make sure that you have the right key, either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key. Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command finger wk ,at' g10code.com or using a keyserver like gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6 The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key 1E42B367. NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION! Documentation ============= The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the details available in the manual. It is also possible to read the complete manual online in HTML format at https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/ The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how to set up the whole thing. You may also want search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on how to solve problems. Many of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available. Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2. Mutt users may want to use the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the reworked OpenPGP support. Support ======= Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug . We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at . We also have a dedicated service directory at: https://www.gnupg.org/service.html Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly. For more than a decade, g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs. To help them carry on this work, they need your support. See https://gnupg.org/donate/ For reasons why donating to free software projects is beneficial for everyone, please read Poul-Henning Kamp's "Quality Software Costs Money - Heartbleed Was Free" at https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2636165 . Thanks ====== We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing lists. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Thu Aug 14 20:19:19 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 20:19:19 +0200 Subject: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in Enigmail, some servers down? In-Reply-To: <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> Message-ID: <53ECFDA7.9000203@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/14/2014 06:13 PM, OmegaPhil wrote: > On 13/08/14 22:13, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: >> On 08/12/2014 09:21 PM, OmegaPhil wrote: >>> Please CC me in etc, I'm not subscribed to the list. >> >> ... > gpgkeys: key 7977070A723C6CCB696C0B0227A5AC5A01937621 gpgkeys: key > E76095ECDACD5DEC7653A99617D23C7DFDC2F38F > > Cant be retrieved hosts: > > hkp://144.76.120.109:80 hkp://194.97.110.154:80 > hkp://213.206.252.51:80 > > Not found on keyserver hosts: > > hkp://46.38.236.74:80 pgpkey.org is not listed with port 80 support and part of that pool, so it is only included in the main pool on port 11371 https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/pgpkey.org > hkp://178.63.21.4:80 curl --resolve "p80.pool.sks-keyservers.net:178.63.21.4:80" "http://p80.pool.sks-keyservers.net:80/pks/lookup?op=get&options=mr&search=0x7977070A723C6CCB696C0B0227A5AC5A01937621" Key is found, but server has not configured the reverse proxy to respond on IP only on port 80, but needs to be part of the pool as Host header > hkp://109.239.48.152:80 Not part of p80 subpool: https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/pgp.freiwuppertal.de same as 1st one - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- "A government that robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul." (George Bernard Shaw) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT7P2lAAoJEPw7F94F4TagIdgP/j/ylYnEYujMkLjzTWPCsF5m uURmlrT7pRXNRWWb6I8jjwkaBrLrl2KVfMOX/dpZH4AGPJvkvrTqazq8L+5ad6N6 9/q7ea3QFzefm/qCrTfWGvvLU8RhupXo63ljvqP8mlfjZu4kD5Q4bgwsi1WSCjy4 /eOcvAU1R0UBjRF+cFSobIRzyNriXIR03W18kqTHuc0WsC5V2fp8CHlzqP+3Q7WA cSQ3mZkM6jURpTsqs4sgTwDl5j2DF8bgKDM2N8hO7MwtnJwDAI8zhe4nh5MYbAPu W4Zci+19y71ul+mNVmwtr4NyBmidifMpriUB/6wV5B6fPuRHLWaTDlZbSWxHmHuN AB8kfku73El9XhczpgCu2hjkki6u5nZmVbBwFMz3Zz6PbT2NdAmOs+N6b/rompOJ IE5jzc2pD2P5bCwsq6RMJ1xBNXorNhIX2ZSxtm3io2rQuNAmx9HsWMb3EYHSI++D W49X7WWCHP+liq94UDYiI6wCA7JQNTAMdRHw+18+apl3+UUKyoe6zVPYAMqmUYFO R/HqhMi2lENngDexldnVpPg53X6L5QB09wIecUY+PsqiuYgiuuoBLK6yBetXfHy+ vXFYLPCmW0NdBMVsRfZ15Ouepd2IgpznekVrLyc+u+YFdXSwSGG/5YYYQNyFly17 OZJgAJVOO/DwCWmkGVzz =La3Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 14 21:04:42 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 21:04:42 +0200 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <53ECC0A6.4040403@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Thu, 14 Aug 2014 09:59:02 -0400") References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <87lhqrh6gd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53ECC0A6.4040403@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87y4uqc2ph.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 14 Aug 2014 15:59, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > inclusion, yes. I'd suggest removing 11.1 and replacing it with that > content. Okay, I replaced 11.1 by the text using sub-questions. Is that what you meant? https://gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#default_rsa2048 Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 14 21:34:20 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 15:34:20 -0400 Subject: FAQ change, final draft In-Reply-To: <87y4uqc2ph.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53E8FAE9.6070709@sixdemonbag.org> <87lhqrh6gd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53ECC0A6.4040403@sixdemonbag.org> <87y4uqc2ph.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53ED0F3C.5010907@sixdemonbag.org> > Okay, I replaced 11.1 by the text using sub-questions. Is that what > you meant? Looks good to me. :) From dougb at dougbarton.us Thu Aug 14 22:31:34 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 13:31:34 -0700 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? In-Reply-To: <74FB88DA-AF87-42AD-9529-D0D936EF59D9@jabberwocky.com> References: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> <53EC445A.7020506@dougbarton.us> <74FB88DA-AF87-42AD-9529-D0D936EF59D9@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <4C78CB04-63E6-4A79-93F9-7392A46FFE3B@dougbarton.us> On Aug 14, 2014, at 4:47 AM, David Shaw wrote: > > Perhaps the problem here is not the option, but the behavior on failure. If querying the preferred keyserver does not return a response during a refresh (for whatever reason), maybe GPG should continue on and try to get the key from the standard --keyserver location. > > After all, it's a "preferred" keyserver. Not an "exclusive" key server. Yes! That would be awesome. :) A warning message in there somewhere of course, but being able to automatically recover from that condition would make the whole system a lot more robust. Doug From dougb at dougbarton.us Thu Aug 14 22:32:23 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 13:32:23 -0700 Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?Re=3A_=5Bopenpgp=5D_SHA-2_support_should_be_man?= =?windows-1252?Q?datory_=96_change_defaults?= In-Reply-To: References: <1407693468.1416.36.camel@chstpc-2.fritz.box> <20140811004012.GN4006@irc.ae7.st> <53E8677C.7010500@sixdemonbag.org> <53E8FDD9.4080505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <87iolyp3gz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <706CBF1C-D5B1-4ED8-A8F9-52EC024A6EF0@jabberwocky.com> <53EC4705.2080405@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <12CA78F2-1A5B-4CE4-8056-F9D389445E91@dougbarton.us> On Aug 14, 2014, at 4:23 AM, David Shaw wrote: > On Aug 14, 2014, at 1:20 AM, Doug Barton wrote: > >> On 08/12/2014 08:41 PM, David Shaw wrote: >>> Maybe the answer is to remove the things to generate PGP 2 messages specifically, and leave the other stuff? >> >> Yes please. :) >> >> Not being able to encrypt/sign with PGP 2 at this point is totally reasonable. Not being able to decrypt/verify leads to toolchain complications down the road for people with such archives, and sends a dangerous message that we're not serious about backwards compatibility. > > I think the context has been lost in that sentence. The "other stuff" I was referring to was --pgp6, --pgp7, etc. The --pgpX options in general. There was never a question of removing the ability to decrypt PGP 2 messages. As you say, that would destroy the ability to decrypt old messages. You are correct, I did not understand your context there. Thank you for clarifying. Doug From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Thu Aug 14 23:48:40 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 22:48:40 +0100 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EC84C0.2000801@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813095712.841FF2073F@smtp.hushmail.com> <53EB3C9C.9090405@digitalbrains.com> <2440143.nbaInAFz7Y@inno> <53EB5885.404@digitalbrains.com> <53EB5DE0.20508@digitalbrains.com> <1025337853.20140813223319@my_localhost> <53EC84C0.2000801@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1764402186.20140814224840@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 14 August 2014 at 10:43:28 AM, in , Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 13/08/14 23:33, MFPA wrote: >> Won't a simple "setpref" do the trick? > No, that does not appear to be the case. I tried it; it > just falls through without doing anything. Strange. When I tried last night, I thought it worked. I just tried and it didn't. Then remembered what I had done just before I thought it worked last night. I had created a new UID with exactly the same UID string as the revoked one. That seems to be enough to unrevoke the UID, once the second run through edit-key merges the new UID with the old one that had the same string. It wasn't the SETPREF that unrevoked it, it was the previous step. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Change is inevitable except from a vending machine -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPtLsJXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pIDcD/A1lxJ6qjMaxDwYeOqmcRcXwuQFdsR2vtdWM W/aqvUWIqs2F7vCVf17GDPWFMYbicCd6+ckf9zTULhBR5WTciBLaj16e3j4h1GWg sliZXt7+FKzZWN5AMLOvJkvKuXFV44VTQSD6Qd1r+EwMOHoG7EbTn+WFuCP7YXYb uOLby5oI =qK0r -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Thu Aug 14 23:55:16 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 22:55:16 +0100 Subject: Seeking clarification with a few GPG concepts In-Reply-To: <53EC881F.2090007@digitalbrains.com> References: <20140813084459.90FB42073E@smtp.hushmail.com> <1147745925.20140813220903@my_localhost> <53EC881F.2090007@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1928331513.20140814225516@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 14 August 2014 at 10:57:51 AM, in , Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 13/08/14 23:09, MFPA wrote: >> And, as you say, she would not be able to re-use signatures she >> collected on her "old" UID2 on her "new" one. > Actually, interestingly, you can. There is no timestamp > or anything in a UID; two UIDs with identical text are > completely identical[1]. That means that old > certifications in this case do carry over (if they're > not expired). Yes, I stand corrected. The subsequent run through the edit-key dialogue merges the display of the two identical UIDs into one with the new self-cert and all the pre-existing sigs. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net James, while John had had 'had', had had 'had had'. 'Had had' had had a better effect on the teacher. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPtMElXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pPzYD/1OZHSMoXVSd1zSrKkklHZ3wvdNn9/knpFyX q21XtgEhaEarYQa8rwKOHKJXKmCi5ERf8+2VBqs5zuED9M03OIwmcEJOgL9ePAvk vbeY/upaI8mAAMCC+sRUer9aJgKl88NLmQL2p181jb3QG7jE3PMmF2HsEy1YEujr Nn2Z8wwV =ZpCh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Fri Aug 15 00:19:34 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 23:19:34 +0100 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? In-Reply-To: <4C78CB04-63E6-4A79-93F9-7392A46FFE3B@dougbarton.us> References: <53EB0551.2010704@riseup.net> <53EC445A.7020506@dougbarton.us> <74FB88DA-AF87-42AD-9529-D0D936EF59D9@jabberwocky.com> <4C78CB04-63E6-4A79-93F9-7392A46FFE3B@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <1392031629.20140814231934@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 14 August 2014 at 9:31:34 PM, in , Doug Barton wrote: > Yes! That would be awesome. :) A warning message in > there somewhere of course, but being able to > automatically recover from that condition would make > the whole system a lot more robust. Automatically recovering from failure would be good. There is still the risk of pointing Preferred keyserver to a key-file or stand-alone server but later uploading a revocation to the gossiping keyserver network and forgetting about the Preferred keyserver url. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Does anybody really read these things? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPtNg5XFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pUogD/0hcjLbL3Jh/ihn2hMPQYOwXc3exa51qrclJ NqYLc1hngC2CmGEeO9ctzeKlWvGtkbdbzahbrv+i4ClZSWTgPwuz90uKdKaPB3jL 7bKTHqMRecBEMO+rtGiMOdk3+jNEsLFobVoSPley/cO6lr1Fno+YAFDCl4zfHZUc fx/DvsV7 =ezdt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Fri Aug 15 02:18:26 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 02:18:26 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible Message-ID: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> Hello, I was thinking about subkey expiration when using OpenPGP smartcards. Expiring a data signing subkey is no problem. Expiring a primary key has no bearing to the issue I'm raising. It has rather large implications, though. The problem is expiring a encryption-capable subkey on an OpenPGP smartcard, replacing it with a new one. Currently, the OpenPGP smartcard only allows a single en-/decryption-capable key. Suppose after some time I decide an old key has seen it's useful lifetime. I'd like to create a new encryption-capable key. However, I definitely need to keep the old key, or I won't be able to see anything encrypted to me in the past. The current OpenPGP smart card restricts me to a single key for encryption, a single key for signatures, and a single key for authentication. If it were possible to tell the card, on uploading the key, what that key's usage will be, I would be able to have a separate smartcard that decrypted the 3 OpenPGP subkeys I used for encryption previously. This instead of being forced to use 3 separate smartcards. I get the impression this is a relatively small change to the firmware of the smartcard, but a larger change to the software running on the PC. The current roles of RSA keys were clearly chosen to cover the 3 cases of signing, encryption and authentication. Maybe the card still has enough room for a fourth key, once the purpose isn't fixed anymore? Or even a fifth... Cheers, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com Fri Aug 15 09:57:54 2014 From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 09:57:54 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> Il 15/08/2014 02:18, Peter Lebbing ha scritto: > The problem is expiring a encryption-capable subkey on an OpenPGP > smartcard, replacing it with a new one. > Currently, the OpenPGP smartcard only allows a single > en-/decryption-capable key. That's exactly why I started MyPGPid project. Too bad I've had no time to develop it further :( Hope I'll be able to return on it soon... Unless another (paid) project steps in... > Suppose after some time I decide an old key has seen it's useful > lifetime. I'd like to create a new encryption-capable key. However, I > definitely need to keep the old key, or I won't be able to see anything > encrypted to me in the past. Currently you have to generate your encryption key on the PC and copy it to the card. So you have a copy to reuse. Or just use multiple cards > The current OpenPGP smart card restricts me to a single key for > encryption, a single key for signatures, and a single key for > authentication. If it were possible to tell the card, on uploading the > key, what that key's usage will be, I would be able to have a separate > smartcard that decrypted the 3 OpenPGP subkeys I used for encryption > previously. This instead of being forced to use 3 separate smartcards. I > get the impression this is a relatively small change to the firmware of > the smartcard, but a larger change to the software running on the PC. On a 144K javacard, IIRC, I've been able to store 13 RSA-2048 encryption keys. Plus master, signature and two auth keys (one reserved for contactless auth). BYtE, Diego From andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de Fri Aug 15 11:42:01 2014 From: andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de (Andreas Schwier) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 11:42:01 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53EDD5E9.2000500@cardcontact.de> The SmartCard-HSM allows you to store as many RSA/ECC keys as memory can hold. And we are splitting management of keys from application data, so that you can store keys for any application on the same device. So far this works for gpgsm / PKCS#11 / Minidriver / Java / Android, however you can't have your gnupg keys on a SmartCard-HSM yet. We'd love to implement that support, however currently the code in gnupg supports only cards conforming to the OpenPGP card spec (which we feel is too restrictive for a general key storing device). Andreas On 08/15/2014 09:57 AM, NdK wrote: > Il 15/08/2014 02:18, Peter Lebbing ha scritto: > >> The problem is expiring a encryption-capable subkey on an OpenPGP >> smartcard, replacing it with a new one. >> Currently, the OpenPGP smartcard only allows a single >> en-/decryption-capable key. > That's exactly why I started MyPGPid project. Too bad I've had no time > to develop it further :( > Hope I'll be able to return on it soon... Unless another (paid) project > steps in... > >> Suppose after some time I decide an old key has seen it's useful >> lifetime. I'd like to create a new encryption-capable key. However, I >> definitely need to keep the old key, or I won't be able to see anything >> encrypted to me in the past. > Currently you have to generate your encryption key on the PC and copy it > to the card. So you have a copy to reuse. > Or just use multiple cards > >> The current OpenPGP smart card restricts me to a single key for >> encryption, a single key for signatures, and a single key for >> authentication. If it were possible to tell the card, on uploading the >> key, what that key's usage will be, I would be able to have a separate >> smartcard that decrypted the 3 OpenPGP subkeys I used for encryption >> previously. This instead of being forced to use 3 separate smartcards. I >> get the impression this is a relatively small change to the firmware of >> the smartcard, but a larger change to the software running on the PC. > On a 144K javacard, IIRC, I've been able to store 13 RSA-2048 encryption > keys. Plus master, signature and two auth keys (one reserved for > contactless auth). > > BYtE, > Diego > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > From OmegaPhil00 at startmail.com Thu Aug 14 18:13:08 2014 From: OmegaPhil00 at startmail.com (OmegaPhil) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 17:13:08 +0100 Subject: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in Enigmail, some servers down? In-Reply-To: <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> On 13/08/14 22:13, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > On 08/12/2014 09:21 PM, OmegaPhil wrote: >> Please CC me in etc, I'm not subscribed to the list. > >> Haven't been able to 'refresh all public keys' on keys.gnupg.net >> in Enigmail for a while now (only have two keys), so I had a look >> at the servers responsible (host keys.gnupg.net) - the following >> appear to be bad for me accessing from the UK: > >> 131.155.141.70: No response to pings 63.230.134.161: Destination >> Host Unreachable 173.175.198.28: No response to pings > > Using ping is not a reliable way to check availability, the icmp > protocol is often blocked by the firewall, you should do a HTTP get > request. > > As for your issues, try using --keyserver > hkp://p80.pool.sks-keyservers.net:80 to rule out any firewall blocking > 11371 etc. Fair point, although that would be a network misconfiguration as ping/ICMP is required for network troubleshooting, packet fragmentation stuff etc (for reference I'm testing from a dedicated line that I control). I can confirm that all hosts at least appear to respond (i.e. not stall gpg), when queried direct, but a number don't seem to be maintaining the same pool of keys: gpgkeys: key 7977070A723C6CCB696C0B0227A5AC5A01937621 gpgkeys: key E76095ECDACD5DEC7653A99617D23C7DFDC2F38F Cant be retrieved hosts: hkp://144.76.120.109:80 hkp://194.97.110.154:80 hkp://213.206.252.51:80 Not found on keyserver hosts: hkp://46.38.236.74:80 hkp://178.63.21.4:80 hkp://109.239.48.152:80 hkp://109.239.48.152:80 was particularly bad: ================================================= gpg: refreshing 2 keys from hkp://109.239.48.152:80 gpg: requesting key 01937621 from hkp server 109.239.48.152 gpg: requesting key FDC2F38F from hkp server 109.239.48.152 gpg: packet(2) with unknown version 71 gpg: read_block: read error: invalid packet gpg: Total number processed: 0 gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpgkeys: key 7977070A723C6CCB696C0B0227A5AC5A01937621 not found on keyserver gpgkeys: key E76095ECDACD5DEC7653A99617D23C7DFDC2F38F not found on keyserver ================================================= The stalling I guess is an Enigmail screwup (more commandline experience for me is fine ;)) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 880 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From OmegaPhil00 at startmail.com Thu Aug 14 20:53:05 2014 From: OmegaPhil00 at startmail.com (OmegaPhil) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 19:53:05 +0100 Subject: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in Enigmail, some servers down? In-Reply-To: <53ECFDA7.9000203@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <53ECFDA7.9000203@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <53ED0591.8020205@startmail.com> On 14/08/14 19:19, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > On 08/14/2014 06:13 PM, OmegaPhil wrote: >> On 13/08/14 22:13, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: >>> On 08/12/2014 09:21 PM, OmegaPhil wrote: >>>> Please CC me in etc, I'm not subscribed to the list. >>> >>> > > ... > > >> gpgkeys: key 7977070A723C6CCB696C0B0227A5AC5A01937621 gpgkeys: key >> E76095ECDACD5DEC7653A99617D23C7DFDC2F38F > >> Cant be retrieved hosts: > >> hkp://144.76.120.109:80 hkp://194.97.110.154:80 >> hkp://213.206.252.51:80 > >> Not found on keyserver hosts: > >> hkp://46.38.236.74:80 > > pgpkey.org is not listed with port 80 support and part of that pool, > so it is only included in the main pool on port 11371 > > https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/pgpkey.org > >> hkp://178.63.21.4:80 > > curl --resolve "p80.pool.sks-keyservers.net:178.63.21.4:80" > "http://p80.pool.sks-keyservers.net:80/pks/lookup?op=get&options=mr&search=0x7977070A723C6CCB696C0B0227A5AC5A01937621" > > Key is found, but server has not configured the reverse proxy to > respond on IP only on port 80, but needs to be part of the pool as > Host header > >> hkp://109.239.48.152:80 > > Not part of p80 subpool: > https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/pgp.freiwuppertal.de same as > 1st one Thanks for all your help - sounds overly complicated so clearly I'm not going to be able to go further here. Assuming the servers work, I ran the gpg query and then triggered the same thing in Enigmail while running wireshark listening for HTTP traffic - gpg clearly showed up, whilst Enigmail did nothing!!! So it was Enigmail all along... I will post a bug now. Thanks again. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 880 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Fri Aug 15 12:31:44 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 12:31:44 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> On 15/08/14 09:57, NdK wrote: > Currently you have to generate your encryption key on the PC and copy it > to the card. So you have a copy to reuse. I don't think you *have* to, but it is certainly something I'd recommend. If the only existing copy is on one smartcard[1], and that smartcard breaks... for signature keys, not a problem at all. For primary keys pretty inconvenient. For encryption keys... data loss of all your encrypted data: huge. But you choose a smartcard for the properties that make it different than an on-disk key. If you then start keeping all your previous, expired encryption subkeys as on-disk keys, you defeat the purpose to a large extent. So if you had a smartcard with a lot of storage, you could copy the key material of your old keys, taken from your secure backup, to the card and keep on using a card to work with the keys. Hope that clarifies it, Peter. [1] Additionally, for on-card generated keys, the built-in hardware random number generator is used as the only source of randomness. I've understood that the quality of that RNG isn't up to par with GnuPG on a PC. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de Fri Aug 15 13:10:14 2014 From: andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de (Andreas Schwier) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:10:14 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EDEA96.8070209@cardcontact.de> On 08/15/2014 12:31 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 15/08/14 09:57, NdK wrote: >> Currently you have to generate your encryption key on the PC and copy it >> to the card. So you have a copy to reuse. > > I don't think you *have* to, but it is certainly something I'd > recommend. If the only existing copy is on one smartcard[1], and that > smartcard breaks... for signature keys, not a problem at all. For > primary keys pretty inconvenient. For encryption keys... data loss of > all your encrypted data: huge. > > But you choose a smartcard for the properties that make it different > than an on-disk key. If you then start keeping all your previous, > expired encryption subkeys as on-disk keys, you defeat the purpose to a > large extent. > > So if you had a smartcard with a lot of storage, you could copy the key > material of your old keys, taken from your secure backup, to the card > and keep on using a card to work with the keys. I'd recommend it the other way around: Generate your keys on a smart card and have it securely exported into your backup. We do that with the SmartCard-HSM using the Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) for export and import of sensitive material. Because there is a key management procedure around the DKEK (key shares, n-of-m threshold scheme) you can backup the encrypted keys wherever you find convenient. Restoring your keys starts with establishing a new smart card with the same DKEK and then import required key material into it. > > Hope that clarifies it, > > Peter. > > [1] Additionally, for on-card generated keys, the built-in hardware > random number generator is used as the only source of randomness. I've > understood that the quality of that RNG isn't up to par with GnuPG on a PC. So what is that assumption based on ? If you are using a hardware device that is certified as Secure Signature Creation Device under the Common Criteria scheme, then the quality of the random number generation is an important criteria in the evaluation (see for example AIS31 under the German CC scheme on the BSI website). > From peter at digitalbrains.com Fri Aug 15 13:48:09 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:48:09 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53EDEA96.8070209@cardcontact.de> References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> <53EDEA96.8070209@cardcontact.de> Message-ID: <53EDF379.3070400@digitalbrains.com> On 15/08/14 13:10, Andreas Schwier wrote: > I'd recommend it the other way around: Generate your keys on a smart > card and have it securely exported into your backup. > [...] > So what is that assumption based on ? If you are using a hardware device > that is certified as Secure Signature Creation Device under the Common > Criteria scheme, then the quality of the random number generation is an > important criteria in the evaluation (see for example AIS31 under the > German CC scheme on the BSI website). Please note I was specifically talking about the OpenPGP card as it is now, not about smartcards or HSMs in general. Obviously an HSM *can* have a really great hardware RNG. But they are complex devices. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org Fri Aug 15 13:56:17 2014 From: MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org (MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 07:56:17 -0400 Subject: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: "Gnupg-users" wrote on 08/14/2014 02:19:20 PM: > ----- Message from David Shaw on Thu, 14 Aug > 2014 07:47:36 -0400 ----- > > > Subject: > > Re: what is "correct" for users' Preferred keyserver ? > . . . . . . . . . > > Perhaps the problem here is not the option, but the behavior on > failure. If querying the preferred keyserver does not return a > response during a refresh (for whatever reason), maybe GPG should > continue on and try to get the key from the standard --keyserver location. > > After all, it's a "preferred" keyserver. Not an "exclusive" keyserver. > > David > How about triggering a prompt to ask the user if they want to try the standard --keyserver location? Just a thought . . . -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mirwatcher at hotmail.com Fri Aug 15 17:47:51 2014 From: mirwatcher at hotmail.com (J. Tinsby) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 11:47:51 -0400 Subject: Why does Enigmail keep asking for a passphrase for a secret key? Message-ID: Hello, I hope the group gets this message/question I am not used to using email groups, so correct me if I am making a mistake please. I have GPG4 Win installed on Win 7 with Thunderbird and Enigmail. Lately I get a message asking for " a passphrase to unlock a secret key" ( not to decrypt a message ) when I type in the phrase for the secret key it tells me it's not correct. I have no phrase other than the one I use for that key since it was created 12 years ago. I'm not sure what phrase it's looking for, repeated attempts fail and I had to remove and reinstall GPG4Win to solve the message problem but I'm sure it will return. What phrase is the program asking for? I have used PGP for years and it never asked me for another phrase other than the one that I use to decrypt a message, so this is confusing to me. Thank you, J T -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Fri Aug 15 17:46:41 2014 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 09:46:41 -0600 Subject: ICMP (was: Re: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in) Enigmail, some servers down? In-Reply-To: <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> Message-ID: <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> On Thu, Aug 14, 2014 at 05:13:08PM +0100, OmegaPhil wrote: > Fair point, although that would be a network misconfiguration as > ping/ICMP is required for network troubleshooting, packet fragmentation > stuff etc (for reference I'm testing from a dedicated line that I control). Blocking ICMP is not a network misconfiguration at all. ICMP echo requests are intentionally blocked to prevent a number of ICMP-related attacks: * ICMP floods * ICMP nukes * ICMP smurfs * ICMP "ping of death" Also, most Cisco routers do not put priority on ICMP packets. It's very common for Cisco to drop ICMP while processing other protocols on very busy networks. The best way to troubleshoot a problem to a network server, is to use the protocol you're having issues with, check BGP routes, ARP entries, DNS, etc. While ping(1) is certainly a great tool to have, it should be only one of the many tools in your network troubleshooting toolbox. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 502 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 15 18:54:29 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 12:54:29 -0400 Subject: ICMP In-Reply-To: <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> Message-ID: <53EE3B45.5070908@sixdemonbag.org> > Blocking ICMP is not a network misconfiguration at all. Whether it's a misconfiguration depends entirely on whether the administrator intends this behavior. It *is*, however, non-RFC-compliant. Not that I think this matters much. From dougb at dougbarton.us Fri Aug 15 19:06:23 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 10:06:23 -0700 Subject: ICMP (was: Re: keys.gnupg.net - Refresh all public keys never completes in) Enigmail, some servers down? In-Reply-To: <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> Message-ID: <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> On Aug 15, 2014, at 8:46 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > On Thu, Aug 14, 2014 at 05:13:08PM +0100, OmegaPhil wrote: >> Fair point, although that would be a network misconfiguration as >> ping/ICMP is required for network troubleshooting, packet fragmentation >> stuff etc (for reference I'm testing from a dedicated line that I control). > > Blocking ICMP is not a network misconfiguration at all. ICMP echo requests are > intentionally blocked to prevent a number of ICMP-related attacks: > > * ICMP floods > * ICMP nukes > * ICMP smurfs > * ICMP "ping of death" > > Also, most Cisco routers do not put priority on ICMP packets. It's very common > for Cisco to drop ICMP while processing other protocols on very busy networks. > > The best way to troubleshoot a problem to a network server, is to use the > protocol you're having issues with, check BGP routes, ARP entries, DNS, etc. > While ping(1) is certainly a great tool to have, it should be only one of the > many tools in your network troubleshooting toolbox. Blocking all ICMP has always been a misconfiguration. As ?OmegaPhil? pointed out there are several types of ICMPv4 that are required for the proper operation of the network. The most important is PMTUD, but there are others that are also important, and are not DOS vectors (and never have been). In IPv6 ICMP is required, period. There is no RFC-compliant configuration with ICMP disabled, and disabling it will severely break your network. Of course a lot more thought has gone into not building the DOS vectors into the protocol design in the first place, so it?s a very different animal. :) Of course this is wildly off-topic, and I apologize if anyone is unappreciative of my little rant. But the whole ?we must block ICMP, for the security!? thing has been a sore point for me going on 20 years now. Doug From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com Fri Aug 15 19:25:18 2014 From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 19:25:18 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EE427E.7040400@gmail.com> Il 15/08/2014 12:31, Peter Lebbing ha scritto: > So if you had a smartcard with a lot of storage, you could copy the key > material of your old keys, taken from your secure backup, to the card > and keep on using a card to work with the keys. That's what I was doing with MyPGPid: a 144k Javacard can host the applet and many keys. The "trick" is that it accepts the standard OpenPGPCard commands, plus some extended commands to handle extra keys (like selecting current enc/dec key, or safely export keys only towards user-certified devices). This way you only need the standard GnuPG plus an helper program (can be a simple script using opensc) if/when you need the extra functions. BYtE, Diego. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 15 19:27:29 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:27:29 -0400 Subject: ICMP In-Reply-To: <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> > Blocking all ICMP has always been a misconfiguration. I agree with everything Doug wrote except this. I may be insisting on usual semantics for "misconfiguration," though. I am generally of the opinion that when someone deliberately configures something in a foolish way, well -- that's folly, not a misconfiguration. From peter at digitalbrains.com Fri Aug 15 21:14:49 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 21:14:49 +0200 Subject: (OT) Re: ICMP In-Reply-To: <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53EE5C29.4060305@digitalbrains.com> On 15/08/14 19:27, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I may be insisting on usual semantics for "misconfiguration," > though. Okay. So an administrator willingly creates a PMTU blackhole? He *wants* the people trying to communicate through his firewall to fail on connections where the PMTU is smaller than the MTU of the networks at the endpoint? That is, only failing as soon as they send big packets. So for instance, an SMTP session will correctly authenticate. Both peers are completely happy. Then, when it's time for the mail to pass, all suddenly inexplicably falls silent. Hard to debug if you don't know about PMTU blackholes! The iptables man page calls it this (TCP MSS clamping target): > This target is used to overcome criminally braindead ISPs or > servers which block "ICMP Fragmentation Needed" or "ICMPv6 Packet > Too Big" packets. That is a direct quote, not my words. But I most bloody emphatically agree. Criminally braindead. Should not be allowed to touch network equipment. You don't let your the brakes in your sometimes mentioned sweet car be serviced by the cleaning lady, do you? In a similar vein, I wished network administration were left to people who are not criminally braindead. > I am generally of the opinion that when someone deliberately > configures something in a foolish way, well -- that's folly, not a > misconfiguration. I would only agree when the one doing the configuration actually thought through the consequences. At least the big consequences. Blocking all ICMP is incredibly stupid. You might have noticed I feel very strongly about this. I hate meddling with packets at routers that shouldn't be touching them and completely violating the layering of the network to deal with f***ing idiots. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 15 22:33:47 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 16:33:47 -0400 Subject: (OT) Re: ICMP In-Reply-To: <53EE5C29.4060305@digitalbrains.com> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> <53EE5C29.4060305@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53EE6EAB.6080603@sixdemonbag.org> > Okay. So an administrator willingly creates a PMTU blackhole?... You'll notice I'm not disagreeing with you on anything. :) From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 15 22:35:51 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 16:35:51 -0400 Subject: ICMP In-Reply-To: <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53EE6F27.50409@sixdemonbag.org> > I agree with everything Doug wrote except this. I may be insisting on > usual semantics... Yow, did I actually write that? Time to go drink coffee directly from the pot. s/usual/unusual/ From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Fri Aug 15 23:17:18 2014 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 15:17:18 -0600 Subject: ICMP In-Reply-To: <53EE3B45.5070908@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <53EE3B45.5070908@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20140815211717.GJ16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 12:54:29PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >Blocking ICMP is not a network misconfiguration at all. > > Whether it's a misconfiguration depends entirely on whether the > administrator intends this behavior. I meant "Blocking ICMP" is a deliberate act by the administrator, not a misconfiguration. Anyway, sorry for going OT. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 502 bytes Desc: not available URL: From outer at interlog.com Fri Aug 15 19:54:35 2014 From: outer at interlog.com (Richard Outerbridge) Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:54:35 -0400 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> Still waiting for my email address, yet my blackphone is already in my hands. Keep up the good work. I?m not going to bother with 2.1 until the Mac guyz come to their senses about not forking the crypto. Could be a long wait. On 2014-08-14 (226), at 11:57:06, Werner Koch wrote: __outer > Hello! > > I just released the sixth *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*. It has been > released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to > help fixing bugs. From wk at gnupg.org Sat Aug 16 11:09:28 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 11:09:28 +0200 Subject: OpenPGP card feature request: as many encryption-capable keys as technically possible In-Reply-To: <53EDEA96.8070209@cardcontact.de> (Andreas Schwier's message of "Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:10:14 +0200") References: <53ED51D2.2030708@digitalbrains.com> <53EDBD82.7080409@gmail.com> <53EDE190.30101@digitalbrains.com> <53EDEA96.8070209@cardcontact.de> Message-ID: <87oavkby2f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:10, andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de said: > So what is that assumption based on ? If you are using a hardware device > that is certified as Secure Signature Creation Device under the Common > Criteria scheme, then the quality of the random number generation is an > important criteria in the evaluation (see for example AIS31 under the The evaluation demands that the generated random is reproducible so that the generator can be tested. The way the seed is set is not part of the evaluation (at least not for FIPS). BSI people who analyzed the Libgcrypt RNG once demanded that the quite complicated pool based design should be replaced by X9.31 - they didn't care about the seed ("it should be unpredictable, but we can't evaluate this"). The design of the seed generators on the EAL 4 evaulated cards is almost always a trade secret and we don't know how and when it breaks. A PC is horrible bad at collecting good entropy but at least we have a lot of failsafe modes and thus you won't end up with a stuck RNG. There is also the option to add an open hardware entropy source in addition to RDRAND/Padlock and the other ways of collecting data for the seed. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Aug 16 18:01:27 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 18:01:27 +0200 Subject: (OT) Re: ICMP In-Reply-To: <53EE6EAB.6080603@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EA693C.5010809@startmail.com> <53EBD4EE.9060009@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ECE014.8020403@startmail.com> <20140815154640.GD16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <87FCBE56-D90D-4998-9717-88F9712DB63A@dougbarton.us> <53EE4301.8000807@sixdemonbag.org> <53EE5C29.4060305@digitalbrains.com> <53EE6EAB.6080603@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53EF8057.5010905@digitalbrains.com> On 15/08/14 22:33, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > You'll notice I'm not disagreeing with you on anything. :) Hehe :). I do regret the swearing in the last paragraph though. That wasn't necessary. My apologies to anyone who didn't appreciate that. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From K.Chambers at openmailbox.org Sat Aug 16 19:14:13 2014 From: K.Chambers at openmailbox.org (Kristy Chambers) Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 17:14:13 +0000 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. Message-ID: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/whats-matter-with-pgp.html Regards, Chambers From galex-713 at galex-713.eu Sun Aug 17 00:48:24 2014 From: galex-713 at galex-713.eu (Garreau, Alexandre) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 00:48:24 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> (Kristy Chambers's message of "Sat, 16 Aug 2014 17:14:13 +0000") References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: On 2014-08-16 at 19:14, Kristy Chambers wrote: > Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this. > http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/whats-matter-with-pgp.html Yeah, PGP?s what I?d call something coming with and for the ?old? Internet, the slow, federated, cleartext, client?server, monocast and sedentary one. Another critique: . But if you really want to fix all these issues, what you need is not improving PGP/GnuPG, but rebuilding the whole Internet. That?s not the goal of GnuPG, you?d better give a look at GNUnet. To fix these issues, it doesn?t only plan to replace GnuPG, but also mail, IRC, jabber, web forums, web itself, HTTP(S), newsgroups, FTP, bittorrent, TLS, DNS(SEC), TCP?UDP/IP, BGP, and quite everything that you could imagine in Internet, which is all fundamentally completely broken, obsolete and way excessively complicated, if you try to see things from this point of view. Yet PGP hides some information in a more secure way than cleartext, is usable by the people who need it the most and is part of our internet tech culture. So waiting during we try to rebuild and revolution the world again, it stays fine to keep using it, but we need to know its deficiencies, and to take care of who, how, when, where and why to teach it. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 948 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Aug 17 01:08:29 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 19:08:29 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/16/2014 1:14 PM, Kristy Chambers wrote: > Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this. Meh. Color me unimpressed. * "PGP keys suck." No, asymmetric key infrastructure sucks in general. OpenPGP provides no infrastructure, only tools with which to build infrastructure. If your organization doesn't build its infrastructure, that's not OpenPGP's fault. * "PGP key management sucks." Sigh. Ditto. * "No forward secrecy." Not everyone needs PFS, and frankly, obsession with PFS is one of those things I really wish people would grow out of. Before complaining about what OpenPGP needs or where it's lacking, try looking at where OpenPGP has been broken in the real world. Hint: PFS ain't a panacea. * "The OpenPGP format and defaults suck." Good Lord, no. As Jon Callas pointed out recently on the OpenPGP working group list, there's a big difference between what the standard *requires* and what implementations are encouraged to *use*. Most implementations have moved far beyond minimal conformance with the standard. The standard exists so that there is a common minimal core that all clients can conform to: the reality is the two biggest players (PGP and GnuPG) both go *far* beyond the defaults. * "Terrible mail client implementations." Again, unimpressed. Consider his criticism that most OpenPGP-enabled mail clients store passphrases in memory for longer than he'd like. Well, one, this is easily configurable via gpg-agent, and two, *so what*? If an attacker is in a position where he or she can read arbitrary memory locations on your PC, you're completely screwed anyway and there's nothing OpenPGP can do to help you. * "So what should we be doing?" I'd start by ignoring the recommendations. Do your own homework on where OpenPGP fails and how, and start thinking about how to fix those. The author falls into the trap of knowing how to fix A, B, and C, and so he wants to fix A, B, and C, without realizing the real problems are X, Y and Z. OpenPGP's biggest problem, BTW, which goes *completely unmentioned* in this blogpost: OpenPGP can't protect your metadata, and that turns out to often be higher-value content than your emails themselves are. Further, exposed metadata is inherent to SMTP, which means this problem is going to be absolutely devilish to fix. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From nicholas.cole at gmail.com Sun Aug 17 01:41:52 2014 From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 00:41:52 +0100 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 12:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 8/16/2014 1:14 PM, Kristy Chambers wrote: >> Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this. > > Meh. Color me unimpressed. This was a terrific post. Thank you, Robert. [snip] > * "No forward secrecy." Not everyone needs PFS, and frankly, obsession > with PFS is one of those things I really wish people would grow out of. > Before complaining about what OpenPGP needs or where it's lacking, try > looking at where OpenPGP has been broken in the real world. Hint: PFS > ain't a panacea. I agree people are obsessed with this, and it is unhealthy. I think the name doesn't help. I've seen various definitions. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy "This means that the compromise of one message cannot lead to the compromise of others". In the case of PGP, of course, it is true that the compromise of the Public key would compromise all messages, but in other ways PGP does help. It is possible, for example, to surrender just the session key, in the case that it is necessary to do so to comply with a legitimate law-enforcement request. But I don't see how PFS could really apply to something like email, as opposed to something like an http request. > * "So what should we be doing?" There are 25 years invested in making PGP work. Many subtle bugs and security errors in the protocol and the gnupg implementation have been worked out. Throwing out PGP would be a bit like making this mistake: http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/fog0000000069.html > OpenPGP's biggest problem, BTW, which goes *completely unmentioned* in > this blogpost: OpenPGP can't protect your metadata, and that turns out > to often be higher-value content than your emails themselves are. > Further, exposed metadata is inherent to SMTP, which means this problem > is going to be absolutely devilish to fix. That is true. But perhaps it would be a start if email clients actually put the actual email (with subject and references headers etc.) as an attachment to a bare email that contained only the minimal headers for delivery. It wouldn't be a perfect solution, but it would at least fix a certain amount of metadata analysis. From galex-713 at galex-713.eu Sun Aug 17 03:05:56 2014 From: galex-713 at galex-713.eu (Garreau, Alexandre) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 03:05:56 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: (Nicholas Cole's message of "Sun, 17 Aug 2014 00:41:52 +0100") References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On 2014-08-17 at 01:41, Nicholas Cole wrote: > On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 12:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> OpenPGP's biggest problem, BTW, which goes *completely unmentioned* in >> this blogpost: OpenPGP can't protect your metadata, and that turns out >> to often be higher-value content than your emails themselves are. >> Further, exposed metadata is inherent to SMTP, which means this problem >> is going to be absolutely devilish to fix. > > That is true. But perhaps it would be a start if email clients > actually put the actual email (with subject and references headers > etc.) as an attachment to a bare email that contained only the minimal > headers for delivery. It wouldn't be a perfect solution, but it would > at least fix a certain amount of metadata analysis. Well, afaik, there?s *no* MIME header which is required for delivery (maybe RFC says there is, but currently mail servers accepts mails with no headers at all). The headers that are needed for delivery are not MIME ones (the ones like ?From:?, ?To:?, ?Date:?, ?Message-Id:?, ?Subject:?, etc.) but the SMTP one (the ?MAIL FROM:? and ?RCPT TO:?) which are separated. So I think mail clients could just send a void mail with just as much MIME informations to says its content is a MIME message (?message/rfc822? MIME type I think). Then things like the subject, the date, the message-id, the list of attached things, etc. would be protected. That makes less metadata, but it still leaks the more important: recipient and receiver. So the only way is to build an asynchronous communication system based on anonymity, like GNUnet?s doing. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 948 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Aug 17 07:05:52 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 01:05:52 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F03830.8070202@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/16/2014 7:41 PM, Nicholas Cole wrote: > There are 25 years invested in making PGP work. Many subtle bugs and > security errors in the protocol and the gnupg implementation have been > worked out. Throwing out PGP would be a bit like making this > mistake: More or less, yeah. Someday I'm going to wind up getting frustrated to the point where I write an angry, bitter, ranty screed on how the biggest headache with OpenPGP is unrealistic expectations and demands on the part of people who claim to know better, but obviously don't... -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From htd+ml at fritha.org Sun Aug 17 09:57:08 2014 From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 09:57:08 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> On 16.08.2014, Kristy Chambers wrote: > Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this. [....] The use of PGP/GPG depends entirely on the respective needs and and context. For me, it has been working perfectly in many years, and thus, what's described in this article is a good example for theory which doesn't affect practice. At least in my case. From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Aug 17 11:41:15 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 11:41:15 +0200 Subject: Mail header encryption (was Re: It's time for PGP to die.) In-Reply-To: References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F078BB.1080804@digitalbrains.com> On 17/08/14 03:05, Garreau, Alexandre wrote: > Well, afaik, there?s *no* MIME header which is required for delivery However, in practice, MTA's, and specific configurations of MTA's, might depend on headers in the mail: - Spam filtering setups. Enough said. - Microsoft Exchange[1] is not an RFC2822-based messaging system. When interfacing through SMTP, POP3 or IMAP, messages are converted to and from X.400. And then there is the problem of RFC 6409, Message Submission for Mail, which specifies that the SMTP server receiving the message from the user (in other terms, the MSA receiving the message from the MUA) /is/ allowed to alter the message. I see a very nice example in the RFC which could be a problem with your proposal: > 8.1. Add 'Sender' > > > The MSA MAY add or replace the 'Sender' field, if the identity of the sender > is known and this is not given in the 'From' field. > > The MSA MUST ensure that any address it places in a 'Sender' field is, in > fact, a valid mail address. And as a very specific example, I can't get my Exim server to interface to Spamassassin without acting as an MSA to Spamassassin. This means it will invariably add missing 'Date' and 'Message-ID' headers to any mail delivered to me. This would not be a problem for what you're proposing; I'm just pointing out that in practice, some unexpected issues might crop up. > (maybe RFC says there is, but currently mail servers accepts mails with no > headers at all) The ones acting as MSA's will usually add them, though. > Then things like the subject, the date, the message-id, the list of attached > things, etc. would be protected. The date is usually the same as the moment it is passing through the internet. A monitoring adversary doesn't learn anything worthwhile. The Message-ID by itself doesn't seem interesting to me. However, when combined with the In-Reply-To and References headers, it can be very interesting. > That makes less metadata, but it still leaks the more important: recipient > and receiver. Yes, it only solves minor issues but leaves the major one untouched. Peter. [1] I'm unsure if there are versions that are pure RFC2822. AFAIK, all Exchange servers are prone to mangling your message, whether that's caused by X.400 conversions or not. Of course, Microsoft often knows better than RFC's, and treats "MUST NOT" as purely optional. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From david at gbenet.com Sun Aug 17 11:41:27 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 10:41:27 +0100 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> Message-ID: <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> On 17/08/14 08:57, Heinz Diehl wrote: > On 16.08.2014, Kristy Chambers wrote: > >> Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this. > [....] > > The use of PGP/GPG depends entirely on the respective needs and > and context. For me, it has been working perfectly in many years, and > thus, what's described in this article is a good example for theory > which doesn't affect practice. At least in my case. > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > I've been using gnupg for many many years. I have 199 users in my key ring and 99.99 per cent are "untrusted." A fact that I for one do not mind. You don't trust my key is from me - right? Trust is relative - you have all been here for many many years - but I will not sign keys from you as "trusted." Leaving aside the issue of how popular encryption of mail is - we are faced with the fact that 98 per cent of computer users are completely ignorant about software and hardware. They just go into PC World and buy what they like. There is No Microsoft pre-loaded security features built-in and so end users have no idea about encrypting their emails - and no easy way to instantly share keys between users. There is no automatic key generation at the point of switching the computer on for the very first time and then sharing your key with millions of other people. Same with so-called smart phones and tablets - there is no automatic "simple" key creation and automatic posting to a secure key server. We make an effort - but I have very very few friends that I have had to install gnupg on their computers - every one I know knows nothing about computers. While we are concerned with our "rights" to private communication - concerned with NSA GCHQ 99.99 per cent of the world's population while having a general or non-existent idea of "security" have no idea of what they should do. We fiddle while Rome burns. After 20 odd years while there has been advances in cryptography and GUIs there has been an almost zero growth in take up. No wonder Yahoo and Google (who can not be trusted) are providing solutions to end users who are completely ignorant. Can you imagine the horror of Microsoft entering the "market?" That thought scares me to death. But we have to face the fact that Microsoft has a hold on hard drive manufacturers - in that they are all sold with a version of "Windows" on them. What is required is that at first boot up of a computer an Iphone or an Itablet whatever a programme needs to run that will install and create a set of keys automatically. Your public key will automatically be sent to key servers. If there are any "bugs" security holes - then updates should be automatic. Time to die? Well after 20 years I think it is all very academic - professors sit in class rooms the world over - not much common sense comes out of their mouths. The real issues are: (a) do we want to implement our own security on our own devices as a "geek" or (b) have some automated pre-installed software that will create all that's necessary at first boot or (c) rely on some large corporation to handle the encryption and decryption for us Will global encryption and de-cryption of all emails and there attachments be fully automatic? The implications for security and intelligence services are a real head ache but who cares!! Some countries do not allow encryption by law and those that do will change their laws to have access to All private keys or face long term jail sentences. All governments are against the people. GNUpg would have a great future if the developers had greater vision. We are in a very very tiny minority of people. So small we are insignificant. The use of gpg will die out because we are ALL getting a bit long in the tooth. Service providers will make their own solutions available simply as an added "end-user benefit" but without any legal binding on their own security. We know that the NSA and GCHQ would be horrified by the thought of every one in the entire world encrypting their emails. They have a vested interest of keeping it under their control. The fact is 99.99 per cent of the world's population does not know gnupg exists. Or GPG4WIN. Perhaps when we are all in our 90's we will say "Oh gpg was a good idea, pity it did not catch on." David -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0xAAD8C47D.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 3909 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sun Aug 17 11:57:26 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 11:57:26 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Sat, 16 Aug 2014 19:08:29 -0400") References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <877g27bfqx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 17 Aug 2014 01:08, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > this blogpost: OpenPGP can't protect your metadata, and that turns out > to often be higher-value content than your emails themselves are. > Further, exposed metadata is inherent to SMTP, which means this problem > is going to be absolutely devilish to fix. Right; this is an SMTP thing (RFC-821). However SMTP is only for transport and the content format RFC-822 defines a simple way to encapsulate messages in other messages: "Content-Type: message/rfc822". Using this feature it is possible to keep the entire RFC-822 based mail infrastructure while using a different transport mechanism. This can be done mostly transparent for existing applications using a private or corporate gateways. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Aug 17 12:17:11 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 12:17:11 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <877g27bfqx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <877g27bfqx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53F08127.5010602@digitalbrains.com> On 17/08/14 11:57, Werner Koch wrote: > Using this feature it is possible to keep the entire RFC-822 based mail > infrastructure while using a different transport mechanism. This can be > done mostly transparent for existing applications using a private or > corporate gateways. So basically what you're suggesting is: - MUA's still work with RFC-822 based mail, with a sort of "dummy" envelope that holds an encrypted MIME message/rfc822 inside with the real metadata. These MUA's still talk IMAP and SMTP. - We define a new transport; the message the MUA hands via SMTP is not sent on with SMTP, but with a different transport that's not quite as leaky with metadata. This transport ultimately delivers the message to a mailbox server allowing access over IMAP for the MUA. Did I interpret it correctly? Regards, Peter. BTW: I still think hop-by-hop encryption with TLS, with the certificates authenticated through something different than the CA system, goes a long way in thwarting mass surveilance. For massive, passive data trawling surveilance, even the CA system combined with ephemeral TLS keying might be enough, since it requires a MITM to intercept TLS with a fake certificate. Ephemeral keys just to be on the safe side :). -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From htd+ml at fritha.org Sun Aug 17 13:14:05 2014 From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 13:14:05 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20140817111405.GB3720@fritha.org> On 17.08.2014, david at gbenet.com wrote: > Leaving aside the issue of how popular encryption of mail is - we are faced with the fact > that 98 per cent of computer users are completely ignorant about software and hardware. They > just go into PC World and buy what they like. Looking around where I live and work, nearly nobody is even able to install Windows itself, and software installation is mainly done by "IT specialists". I agree that this phenomenon is caused at least halfways by ignorance. How would these people ever be able to use GPG? The anwer is: they would if they would care - but they don't. "I've got nothing to hide, so why bother?" (*). These people won't use GPG, even if they were capable to do so. Even in the light of the recent spying on the privacy of the general public. "I've got nothing to hide, so I can be sure that they didn't that to me". You won't change those peoples attitudes and perception - ever. > We make an effort - but I have very very few friends that I have had to install gnupg on > their computers - every one I know knows nothing about computers. While we are concerned > with our "rights" to private communication - concerned with NSA GCHQ 99.99 per cent of the > world's population while having a general or non-existent idea of "security" have no idea of > what they should do. We fiddle while Rome burns. I'm afraid this won't change. > After 20 odd years while there has been advances in cryptography and GUIs there has been an > almost zero growth in take up. This is a global phenomenon wrt the information society. Knowledge as a capacity for action has never worked. The "know-do gap", failing in getting evidence into action, is well documented (**). > No wonder Yahoo and Google (who can not be trusted) are > providing solutions to end users who are completely ignorant. "Giving the people what they want" is a common marketing strategy. This is not about security, it's all about binding the customers. > Time to die? Not for me. Never. I appreciate to be able to have at least a little bit of privacy when communication via the Internet. Even if the use of GPG encrypted email is limited to 4-5 persons. It's worth every word written, in every email. > The implications for security and intelligence services are a real head ache but who cares!! I also care about the personnel working for my uplink who is tempted to snook in other peoples email. > Some countries do not allow encryption by law and those that do will change their laws to > have access to All private keys or face long term jail sentences. They fear their own population, because they lie and misbehave. Unfortunately, this is nothing new either. > GNUpg would have a great future if the developers had greater vision. We are in a very very > tiny minority of people. So small we are insignificant. The use of gpg will die out because > we are ALL getting a bit long in the tooth. It won't. At least not for me. We (= the people using it) have never been more. I'm quite sure this won't change. > Service providers will make their own solutions available simply as an added "end-user > benefit" but without any legal binding on their own security. We know that the NSA and GCHQ > would be horrified by the thought of every one in the entire world encrypting their emails. Provider encryption is useless if you don't trust your provider. It's like letting your private key get handled by somebody else who does the decryption for you. > The fact is 99.99 per cent of the world's population does not know gnupg exists. Or GPG4WIN. > Perhaps when we are all in our 90's we will say "Oh gpg was a good idea, pity it did not > catch on." And that's where the big providers like Go*gle and Yah*o step in. Wonder why they exactly came on with that after Snowden (and others) blowed the whistle? Now, at least some are frightened they could be a target for spying and surveillance, and the big providers give them what they need... Just my 5?. (*) http://tinyurl.com/45xpmjr (**) http://www.inco.hu/inco3/kozpont/cikk0h.htm From wk at gnupg.org Sun Aug 17 14:10:34 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 14:10:34 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F08127.5010602@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Sun, 17 Aug 2014 12:17:11 +0200") References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <877g27bfqx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53F08127.5010602@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87zjf39v0l.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 17 Aug 2014 12:17, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > - MUA's still work with RFC-822 based mail, with a sort of "dummy" envelope that > holds an encrypted MIME message/rfc822 inside with the real metadata. These > MUA's still talk IMAP and SMTP. Exactly. Pprobably some MUAs need some fixes to work properly with such mails. It would be intresting to ge an overview on how the common MUAs handle message/rfc822 and encryption. Gnus works well. > - We define a new transport; the message the MUA hands via SMTP is not sent on > with SMTP, but with a different transport that's not quite as leaky with > metadata. This transport ultimately delivers the message to a mailbox server > allowing access over IMAP for the MUA. (GNUNET would be a nice transport provider here). > Did I interpret it correctly? Yes. > BTW: I still think hop-by-hop encryption with TLS, with the Actually we don't have this hop-by-hop anymore. Except for the internal MUAs we don't use relays anymore. In many cases the first hop is gmail and the last hop is gmail (CompuServe 2.0 ;-). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Sun Aug 17 14:15:54 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 14:15:54 +0200 Subject: Mail header encryption In-Reply-To: <53F078BB.1080804@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Sun, 17 Aug 2014 11:41:15 +0200") References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <53F078BB.1080804@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87vbpr9urp.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 17 Aug 2014 11:41, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > - Microsoft Exchange[1] is not an RFC2822-based messaging system. When > interfacing through SMTP, POP3 or IMAP, messages are converted to and from X.400. Fortunately they are on the way to replace that gradually by RFC-x82[12]. Modern Exchange and Outlook versions (2010) can handle plain RFC mail much better than older ones. There is also an API to access the raw mail which can be used to replace all hacks to send and receive OpenPGP signed mails. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From micha137 at gmx.de Sun Aug 17 17:08:58 2014 From: micha137 at gmx.de (Michael Anders) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 17:08:58 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> I share most of Greene's arguments agaist PGP to a limited extent, however, he seems strongly biased against it. There are two points, in which I strongly disagree with Greene: A) For me forward secrecy is not of utmost importance for asymmetric end to end mail encryption. Your private key is compromized if your system has been hacked(if you don't live in a police state where authorities can force you to reveal it). Most likely the important private messages will still reside on your system then, so they are leaked anyways in this case. So there is limited gain by implementing forward secrecy. So the complaint about lacking forward secrecy is exaggerated in my eyes. Nevertheless, there do exist solutions for asynchronous message exchange with forward secrecy and we need to have an eye on them and watch out for new publications on these. At present IMHO they are awkwardly difficult to implement and maintain and just keeping a watchful eye on them seems perfectly reasonable today. Once a crisp and nicely implementable asynchronous protocol with forward secrecy comes up, however, we should have it implemented immediately.(The synchronous ones are easy, of course.) B) A minor point. Greene complains, that in PGP securing ciphers with a MAC is not enforced in the standard. For an asymmetrically enciphered message IMHO it does not make any sense whatsoever, to secure message authenticity with a MAC. A correct MAC is proof that the message has not been altered by someone not knowing the symmetric key. But knowledge of the symmetric key doesn't prove anything since it is essentially a random number selected by the unauthenticated sender. So a correct MAC in a RSA cipher just proves that the sender is the sender - so what? (I know that many people disagree with me on this point, yet I have never heard a convincing argument for the MAC in an asymmetric cipher.) If you want authenticity, you have to have the message or cipher be digitally signed by the sender. For me the critcism of PGP is clearly unfair regarding this second aspect. Regards, Michael Anders From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Sun Aug 17 18:43:32 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 18:43:32 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> Message-ID: <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 17-08-2014 17:08, Michael Anders wrote: > Your private key is compromized if your system > has been hacked(if you don't live in a police state where authorities > can force you to reveal it). Unfortunately most of us do. Including the US, UK and the Dutch are aklso pushing for such laws. > Once a crisp and nicely implementable asynchronous protocol with forward > secrecy comes up, however, we should have it implemented > immediately.(The synchronous ones are easy, of course.) Whispersystems has done a good job with Textsecure as ar as I read the opinions about it. In practice their application is very usable too, except that MMS does not work in some circumstances (but who uses that anyway in 2014?) -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sun Aug 17 22:08:26 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 21:08:26 +0100 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <1717444368.20140817210826@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Sunday 17 August 2014 at 10:41:27 AM, in , david at gbenet.com wrote: > I've been using gnupg for many many years. I have 199 > users in my key ring and 99.99 per cent are > "untrusted." A fact that I for one do not mind. You > don't trust my key is from me - right? Trust is > relative - you have all been here for many many years - > but I will not sign keys from you as "trusted." I suspect that percentage is only slightly over-stated. (-; For most of my communications, if the person has told me their email address and it works, that's good enough for me. Use of GnuPG adds encryption, and signing if we should want it. The Web of Trust adds nothing in this usage case. > Leaving aside the issue of how popular encryption of > mail is - we are faced with the fact that 98 per cent > of computer users are completely ignorant about > software and hardware. They just go into PC World and > buy what they like. There is No Microsoft pre-loaded > security features built-in and so end users have no > idea about encrypting their emails - and no easy way to > instantly share keys between users. There is no > automatic key generation at the point of switching the > computer on for the very first time and then sharing > your key with millions of other people. Why would you want to automatically share your key with millions? You would hope not to receive email from millions, and at first boot your computer does not know your email address. > Same with so-called smart phones and tablets - there is > no automatic "simple" key creation and automatic > posting to a secure key server. If that did happen, whose control would the server be under? Would it provide security or an illusion of security? > After 20 odd years while there has been advances in > cryptography and GUIs there has been an almost zero > growth in take up. No wonder Yahoo and Google (who can > not be trusted) are providing solutions to end users > who are completely ignorant. Is this mainly advertising hype, and there will still be limited take-up? > Can you imagine the horror > of Microsoft entering the "market?" That thought scares > me to death. Wasn't that what you were advocating with "automatic key generation at the point of switching the computer on for the very first time?" > But we have to face the fact that Microsoft has a hold > on hard drive manufacturers - in that they are all sold > with a version of "Windows" on them. What is required > is that at first boot up of a computer an Iphone or an > Itablet whatever a programme needs to run that will > install and create a set of keys automatically. Your > public key will automatically be sent to key servers. Why on earth would we want that? > (a) do we want to implement our own security on our own > devices as a "geek" or > (b) have some automated pre-installed software that will > create all that's necessary at first boot or > (c) rely on some large corporation to handle the > encryption and decryption for us What's the difference between (b) and (c) for a Windows or Mac user? - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Learning without thought is naught; thought without learning is dangerous. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPxC8pXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pUAoD/2BxQsjaN2/+HAHsCI+XNLLuWLSOzVivOF5Q G+Xr55o3puBmzoT7NkAPYQSPe/brVtcqQ+4cH+ofjAhbcXyp8OeMhlBSJGm1zkjT m8quXFxvXVAqBjUeitXmt0/GX9Mm9JK+Bojyv1jhdfpLAHYvF23UkkTM3+pVWu/z E+SfcNNL =7b6U -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Aug 17 22:42:52 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 16:42:52 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> > Unfortunately most of us do. Including the US, UK and the Dutch are > aklso pushing for such laws. Speaking only for the U.S., this is not the case. The United States Constitution protects an individual's right not to testify against themselves. If the production of a passphrase would have any kind of testimonial value, then such production cannot be ordered. The only time production of a passphrase is permitted is when it lacks any testimonial value. Many people look at one particular case and say, "hey, production was required in that case, clearly the U.S. can compel you to produce!", or "production wasn't required in that case, clearly the U.S. can't compel you to produce!" The reality is different. You need to look at the role the production serves. Testimonial in nature? Nope, forbidden. Non-testimonial? Yep, permitted. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Aug 17 23:14:51 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 17:14:51 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> > Leaving aside the issue of how popular encryption of mail is - we are > faced with the fact that 98 per cent of computer users are completely > ignorant about software and hardware. "Completely ignorant" is an overstatement. Few people today are completely ignorant about software and hardware. Most people do not have the sort of knowledge about computers that I'd like, but... you know what I realized a few weeks ago? I was watching a janitor mop a floor... without leaving footprints in anything. It struck me because I mopped my kitchen floor recently and wound up with soapy water all over my shoes and tracked it through some of my apartment before I realized what I was doing. I mean to go back to that janitor sometime soon and ask him, "hey, man, you look like you know how to mop a floor correctly: what am I doing wrong?" The janitor probably doesn't know the minimum voltage to flip a transistor (200mV, usually) and couldn't build an adder out of NAND gates if his life depended on it. I can't mop a floor without tracking soapy water throughout my place. Kind of puts in perspective which one of us is the ignorant one, you know? Saying "most people today know very little about computers" is true, and it deserves to be said. But let's be real careful about thinking we are in any way better than other people. We're not. > There is No Microsoft pre-loaded security features built-in Microsoft has a *ton* of security features built into their operating systems. Post-XP, Microsoft radically overhauled their kernel and started enabling a ton of useful features. DEP, ASLR, enabling some of the cool security features of the x64 architecture... In the XP and Win2K days, yes, Microsoft's security was a joke and it deserved to be mocked. It has not been that way for several years now. > After 20 odd years while there has been advances in cryptography and > GUIs there has been an almost zero growth in take up. Considered reading any of the available peer-reviewed papers that have explored why this is the case? > But we have to face the fact that Microsoft has a hold on hard drive > manufacturers - in that they are all sold with a version of "Windows" > on them. No, Microsoft doesn't. Walk into a Best Buy, a Fry's Electronics, or whatever store you choose, and it's *easy* to find hard drives that aren't pre-loaded with Windows. > GNUpg would have a great future if the developers had greater > vision. Then fork the source code and code up your own vision. > The use of gpg will die out because we are ALL getting a bit long in > the tooth. So what? If a new email cryptography standard comes out that's significantly better than GnuPG, do you think Werner is going to sit around drinking Tanqueray straight out of the bottle because nobody's using GnuPG anymore? I don't. I think he'll cheerfully send GnuPG off into maintenance, applaud the new standard, and volunteer to help with a free implementation of the new standard. If GnuPG dies out because nobody cares about privacy, I'm not going to mourn the loss of GnuPG. I'm going to mourn how nobody cares about privacy any more. GnuPG is useful and good only to the extent that it is a useful and good thing for human beings. *People* are the important thing. The authors hope GnuPG will help people. But, by itself, GnuPG is ... really rather pointless. When (not if) GnuPG dies out, the only question will be, "is this on balance good for people?" If so, then let's be thankful GnuPG existed, celebrate its passing, and cheerfully move on. > Perhaps when we are all in our 90's we will say "Oh gpg was a good > idea, pity it did not catch on." The good ideas in computer science are overwhelmingly rejected. The ones that endure are usually really bad ones. Compare the Intel 80x86 architecture against *any* of its competitors, for instance. x86 Assembler makes me bleed through my eyeballs and beg for the sweet sweet release of death. It isn't MIPS or PA-RISC or PowerPC or any of the literally *dozens* of superior architectures I've worked with over the years. And yet, x86 won in the marketplace. I think everyone on this list who has more than ten or so years of experience in the industry will have their own tales of technological woe. Good technologies get rejected, and then ten years later they get rediscovered and renewed. Look at VMS and UNIX. UNIX won the server wars of the '80s and early '90s and completely crushed VMS... up until VMS came back as Windows NT. Now, VMS has won the desktop, where UNIX is completely dead... except for how UNIX got re-resurrected a few years ago as OS X, and as the Mac desktop it's making a strong showing. Good technologies rarely win, but they almost always get re-adopted later. It's a cycle. :) (No, I'm not kidding regarding Windows NT/VMS. The parallels between them are *profound*. The same guy, Cutler, designed both, and the Windows desktops that most people use nowadays are direct descendants of VMS!) From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Sun Aug 17 23:42:11 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 22:42:11 +0100 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <3010403253.20140817224211@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Sunday 17 August 2014 at 10:14:51 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I was watching a janitor mop a floor... without leaving > footprints in anything. It struck me because I mopped > my kitchen floor recently and wound up with soapy water > all over my shoes and tracked it through some of my > apartment before I realized what I was doing. I mean > to go back to that janitor sometime soon and ask him, > "hey, man, you look like you know how to mop a floor > correctly: what am I doing wrong?" To mop a floor (or, indeed, to concrete a floor) you start at the opposite end to the door you will leave through and you work towards the door, keeping off the bit you have already done. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net It is easy to propose impossible remedies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPxIb5XFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5p7wgD/RWd4o+hxCKgRTs1kZwU2lF6Ky3+oU6I9Yw/ luXgAFzuFbLo84MEDLByAxuDvtViIr9JY7ScGTcWGbWqtU9/npm/MMEaqp0UeUqJ uC9Zg6eAB4qeTlimxDQWf2i+Y1yyws09Nq2/sIaHEqXM5E4dwBLYPOtFnEWjkHhL 9p33zSUu =Fk1y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Aug 17 23:55:13 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 17:55:13 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <3010403253.20140817224211@my_localhost> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> <3010403253.20140817224211@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53F124C1.2050401@sixdemonbag.org> > To mop a floor (or, indeed, to concrete a floor) you start at the > opposite end to the door you will leave through and you work towards > the door, keeping off the bit you have already done. Yes. And somehow, I keep on getting soapy water on my shoes. From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Mon Aug 18 08:01:46 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 08:01:46 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 17-08-2014 22:42, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > The only time production of a passphrase is permitted is when > it lacks any testimonial value. And who determines wether it has any "testimonial value"? That sounds like a fine legal loophole to pressure someone into telling the passphrase. In those cases where the US government is actually interested in paying lip service that it will obey the law that is - they could just as easily declare you an "illegal combattant" or something like that and just torture it out of you. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From nicholas.cole at gmail.com Mon Aug 18 11:13:12 2014 From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 10:13:12 +0100 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 10:14 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> Leaving aside the issue of how popular encryption of mail is - we are >> faced with the fact that 98 per cent of computer users are completely >> ignorant about software and hardware. But even if they weren't, the problem is that OpenPGP protects such a small part of the problem that it is hard to justify the additional time and effort to users. If the revelations of the last year have proved anything, it is that most computer systems are vulnerable at a very deep level to all kinds of sophisticated attacks. In that context, where the underlying operating systems themselves are so vulnerable, OpenPGP really doesn't solve very much for most users. Supposing the following threat model (which I think corresponds to how must people use email): - physical security of hardware. - the need for secure communication contents (but the fact of the communication is not secret). - connection of the computers to the internet. - attackers who are interested in the content of the communication and who are willing to launch electronic attacks to get it. OpenPGP would be an ideal solution for the actual transmission in this scenario -- except that there is simply no operating system that can be trusted to be a secure platform upon which to run OpenPGP. There will always be a weaker link than the encryption, and so the right solution for most users is not to send confidential information by email at all. Now, there are still plenty of uses for OpenPGP, but they tend to be niche ones with particular threat models and especially motivated users. To expect mass-adoption of a tool with only niche uses is not reasonable. It doesn't mean that the project is a failure. N. From rob at aspman.info Mon Aug 18 11:04:54 2014 From: rob at aspman.info (Rob Ambidge) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 10:04:54 +0100 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> I read an article or something a while back stating the legal theory that if your passphrase is an admittance to a past crime, to hand over said passphrase would constitute as having said "testimonial value" and you could get away with not disclosing the passphrase. But it is just legal theory, and I am no expert in law, american law, or even cryptography. So what happens in practice is anyone's guess really. On 18 August 2014 07:01:46 BST, Johan Wevers wrote: >On 17-08-2014 22:42, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >> The only time production of a passphrase is permitted is when >> it lacks any testimonial value. > >And who determines wether it has any "testimonial value"? > >That sounds like a fine legal loophole to pressure someone into telling >the passphrase. In those cases where the US government is actually >interested in paying lip service that it will obey the law that is - >they could just as easily declare you an "illegal combattant" or >something like that and just torture it out of you. > >-- >ir. J.C.A. Wevers >PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html > > >_______________________________________________ >Gnupg-users mailing list >Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From edv at kommunalkredit.at Mon Aug 18 09:14:53 2014 From: edv at kommunalkredit.at (KA IT User) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 07:14:53 +0000 Subject: AW: [Announce] The sixth Beta for GnuPG 2.1 is now available for testing In-Reply-To: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524CD0F@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> Again, we request to remove us from the mailing list. Mit freundlichen Gr??en / Kind regards __________________________ Ing. Roman H?ller, MSc Informationstechnologie Information Technology Kommunalkredit Austria AG 1092 Wien, T?rkenstra?e 9 Tel.: +43 (0) 1/31631 519, Fax: -99519 Mobil: +43 (0) 664/80 31631 519 r.hoeller at kommunalkredit.at www.kommunalkredit.at -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: Gnupg-announce [mailto:gnupg-announce-bounces at gnupg.org] Im Auftrag von Werner Koch Gesendet: Donnerstag, 14. August 2014 18:07 An: gnupg-announce at gnupg.org Betreff: [Announce] The sixth Beta for GnuPG 2.1 is now available for testing Hello! I just released the sixth *beta* version of GnuPG *2.1*. It has been released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and to help fixing bugs. If you need a stable and fully maintained version of GnuPG, you should use version 2.0.26 or 1.4.18. This versions is marked as BETA and as such it should in general not be used for real work. However, the core functionality is solid enough for a long time and I am using this code base for a couple of years now. What's new in 2.1.0-beta783 since beta751 ========================================= * gpg: Add command --quick-gen-key. * gpg: Make --quick-sign-key promote local key signatures. * gpg: Added "show-usage" sub-option to --list-options. * gpg: Screen keyserver responses to avoid importing unwanted keys from rogue servers. * gpg: Removed the option --pgp2 and --rfc1991 and the ability to create PGP-2 compatible messages. * gpg: Removed options --compress-keys and --compress-sigs. * gpg: Cap attribute packets at 16MB. * gpg: Improved output of --list-packets. * gpg: Make with-colons output of --search-keys work again. * gpgsm: Auto-create the ".gnupg" directory like gpg does. * agent: Fold new passphrase warning prompts into one. * scdaemon: Add support for the Smartcard-HSM card. * scdaemon: Remove the use of the pcsc-wrapper. Getting the Software ==================== GnuPG 2.1.0-beta783 is available at ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2.sig and soon on all mirrors . Please read the README file ! Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can simply check the supplied signature. For example to check the signature of the file gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.0-beta783.tar.bz2.sig Depending on your installation you may use "gpg2" instead of "gpg". This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by that signing key. Make sure that you have the right key, either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key. Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command finger wk ,at' g10code.com or using a keyserver like gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6 The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key 1E42B367. NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION! Documentation ============= The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the details available in the manual. It is also possible to read the complete manual online in HTML format at https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/ The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how to set up the whole thing. You may also want search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on how to solve problems. Many of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available. Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2. Mutt users may want to use the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the reworked OpenPGP support. Support ======= Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug . We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at . We also have a dedicated service directory at: https://www.gnupg.org/service.html Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly. For more than a decade, g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs. To help them carry on this work, they need your support. See https://gnupg.org/donate/ For reasons why donating to free software projects is beneficial for everyone, please read Poul-Henning Kamp's "Quality Software Costs Money - Heartbleed Was Free" at https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2636165 . Thanks ====== We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing lists. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. Company Disclaimer / Legal Notices http://www.kommunalkredit.at/disclaimer/ Kommunalkredit Austria AG, T?rkenstrasse 9, 1092 Wien - FN 45776 v, Handelsgericht Wien SAVE PAPER - THINK BEFORE YOU PRINT From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Mon Aug 18 13:41:25 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 13:41:25 +0200 Subject: AW: [Announce] The sixth Beta for GnuPG 2.1 is now available for testing In-Reply-To: <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524CD0F@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524CD0F@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> Message-ID: <53F1E665.2080102@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/18/2014 09:14 AM, KA IT User wrote: > Again, we request to remove us from the mailing list. See the list-unsubscribe header or the bottom of every mail for how to unsubscribe. - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Ne nuntium necare Don't kill the messenger -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT8eZkAAoJEPw7F94F4TagAPAP/3ypT8ZCPPv2XtM3RrktYXvZ RWCARkzuatIA68PWh7pK0s8q85IqUT3a36V6OIwB57SL00AuL5uHs7kEKxRAXyKy 31A8TlziA9C7/TT3d3bQqaKESNmGjklsHKrcSRdmz+BYZMEg4Bt26u0yfxE0SRfk WQ3nd94o6cFBytzriYwO1wRuGX5rfYtdzQ/yW9s/6Gk+HCrkVQyb/XIlwm2goXH9 ZZ1XgOa8fRgD8bKetgRG6UrQZ3SqHySZOaFtxsMJOE9sAoiTL9cAlzIKk4XgpukU J+DpwSE6Mty9Q6/r452IlNI8LauX3wvXm1VwRDRHzKfJzeX3QA6KB1ButWueM+96 RlsNhgo/dDyGp/UlQDyvGhuCSCEQrL9/V5UkCAPQ8UZWunwtx6+hKnpSoxqx6EdW VdWGRdvp2yMbIIcflL8yHbfBv9NCwnghsVRBvA1DXIpvo6fu2xZjPY9lqzSzxtdl gMsA67zfqwcb34CDmj5hLSs+nmVLeJPhycZygiYpQcbQ7p/Ywx3kXTpuuYZhQenu VTwZ/tLst7NCxCLGqJZ9oV16wa4TCIolVOoKjHSNsy2hMTyrWVmQilWV1QLyfAQL 93lx3QsgO+HbErzy7vLfkYFCJpEygz8q1UlnJhwqHbdZ+0MkHUBFAWp2vfigiIru cjITkvBwPVLQrw7HYa/O =Ld9y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 14:25:41 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 08:25:41 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> Message-ID: <53F1F0C5.7000509@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/18/2014 5:04 AM, Rob Ambidge wrote: > I read an article or something a while back stating the legal theory > that if your passphrase is an admittance to a past crime, to hand > over said passphrase would constitute as having said "testimonial > value" and you could get away with not disclosing the passphrase. That's one of the exceptions, yes. Basically, if the fact you know something would tend to implicate you in the commission of a crime, then you can't be compelled to reveal that you know it. Whether it's a passphrase or a safe combination makes no difference. There are a lot of nuances and exceptions here. This isn't legal advice. If you need legal advice, ask a real lawyer, not an internet mailing list... -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 14:31:40 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 08:31:40 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/18/2014 2:01 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: > And who determines wether it has any "testimonial value"? Johan, we're entering paranoid fantasy here. If you truly believe the whole of the USG is corrupt, and that our independent judiciary is in cahoots with a corrupt Executive and Legislature in order to systematically violate people's rights, well... then I think I'm going to need to stop talking with you, which I regret. :( -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From jerry at seibercom.net Mon Aug 18 14:46:14 2014 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 08:46:14 -0400 Subject: [Announce] The sixth Beta for GnuPG 2.1 is now available for testing In-Reply-To: <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524CD0F@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <0C39E0E86B37AB42BDB05B782357995BF524CD0F@vwp-ex01.kommunalkredit.at> Message-ID: <20140818084614.5071ef26@scorpio> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014 07:14:53 +0000, KA IT User stated: > Again, we request to remove us from the mailing list. And again, have you checked the email headers? List-Unsubscribe: , -- Jerry From jerry at seibercom.net Mon Aug 18 13:13:21 2014 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 07:13:21 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> Message-ID: <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014 10:04:54 +0100, Rob Ambidge stated: > I read an article or something a while back stating the legal theory that > if your passphrase is an admittance to a past crime, to hand over said > passphrase would constitute as having said "testimonial value" and you > could get away with not disclosing the passphrase. But it is just legal > theory, and I am no expert in law, american law, or even cryptography. So > what happens in practice is anyone's guess really. > > On 18 August 2014 07:01:46 BST, Johan Wevers > wrote: > >On 17-08-2014 22:42, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > > >> The only time production of a passphrase is permitted is when > >> it lacks any testimonial value. > > > >And who determines wether it has any "testimonial value"? > > > >That sounds like a fine legal loophole to pressure someone into telling > >the passphrase. In those cases where the US government is actually > >interested in paying lip service that it will obey the law that is - > >they could just as easily declare you an "illegal combattant" or > >something like that and just torture it out of you. Much of the discussion has been about what analogy comes closest. Prosecutors tend to view PGP passphrases as akin to someone possessing a key to a safe filled with incriminating documents. That person can, in general, be legally compelled to hand over the key. Other examples include the U.S. Supreme Court saying that defendants can be forced to provide fingerprints, blood samples, or voice recordings. The entire article is available here: -- Jerry From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 15:51:40 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 09:51:40 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> Message-ID: <53F204EC.9030304@sixdemonbag.org> > Much of the discussion has been about what analogy comes closest. Prosecutors > tend to view PGP passphrases as akin to someone possessing a key to a safe > filled with incriminating documents. s/Prosecutors/Judges Nobody really cares what prosecutors view it as: the question is what they can get a judge to rule it as. That said, the analogy is pretty much exact. If the documents in the safe would incriminate you, and the government knows they exist and roughly what their contents are, then yes, you can be subpoenaed to provide them. (If the government doesn't know they exist or generally what their contents are, the subpoena gets rejected as an illegal fishing expedition.) If knowing the combination *by itself* would incriminate you, then you can't be compelled to provide. For instance, let's say that a safe has been robbed. There's no signs of forced entry or safecracking. The government demands you cough up the combination, in order to prove that you had the means to commit the crime. You object on grounds that proving you had the means to commit the crime would tend to implicate you in the crime. The judge refuses the government's motion to compel you to produce the combination in court. From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de Mon Aug 18 15:54:29 2014 From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 15:54:29 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F20595.4060103@dkyb.de> Am 18.08.2014 um 14:31 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > On 8/18/2014 2:01 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: >> And who determines wether it has any "testimonial value"? > > Johan, we're entering paranoid fantasy here. If you truly believe the > whole of the USG is corrupt, and that our independent judiciary is in > cahoots with a corrupt Executive and Legislature in order to > systematically violate people's rights, well... then I think I'm going > to need to stop talking with you, which I regret. :( > I think his question is not only good, it is necessary and important to ask. Especially when it comes to laws. Or if you want a more visible example just look at all the misinterpretation of "laws" in religions. And furthermore you don't need to assume a conspiracy or corruptness. People make mistakes. People are willing to bypass the law because they think they serve a greater good "in this one special case". People don't think about the greater consequences of their actions. People are ambitious. People are stupid. People ... But anyhow, how about you choose your password to be a confession about a crime you committed. Would this be enough testimonial value? :) From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Mon Aug 18 15:59:33 2014 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 09:59:33 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20140818135933.GB25232@IUPUI.Edu> On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 12:41:52AM +0100, Nicholas Cole wrote: > On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 12:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: [snip] > > OpenPGP's biggest problem, BTW, which goes *completely unmentioned* in > > this blogpost: OpenPGP can't protect your metadata, and that turns out > > to often be higher-value content than your emails themselves are. > > Further, exposed metadata is inherent to SMTP, which means this problem > > is going to be absolutely devilish to fix. > > That is true. But perhaps it would be a start if email clients > actually put the actual email (with subject and references headers > etc.) as an attachment to a bare email that contained only the minimal > headers for delivery. It wouldn't be a perfect solution, but it would > at least fix a certain amount of metadata analysis. Perhaps it would be a start if sites providing SMTP would turn on STARTTLS. -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Mon Aug 18 16:15:49 2014 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 08:15:49 -0600 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140818135933.GB25232@IUPUI.Edu> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <20140818135933.GB25232@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <20140818141548.GM15847@irc.ae7.st> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 09:59:33AM -0400, Mark H. Wood wrote: > Perhaps it would be a start if sites providing SMTP would turn on > STARTTLS. STARTTLS does not encrypt mail. It only provides safe passage over the network. It is also client/server encrypted and decrypted. Thus, an administrator with root at an SMTP server can view the mail once the mail transfer is decrypted. Also, many big mail vendors have already enabled SSL/TLS/STARTTLS, such as Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 502 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Mon Aug 18 18:24:43 2014 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 12:24:43 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140818141548.GM15847@irc.ae7.st> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <20140818135933.GB25232@IUPUI.Edu> <20140818141548.GM15847@irc.ae7.st> Message-ID: <20140818162443.GC25232@IUPUI.Edu> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 08:15:49AM -0600, Aaron Toponce wrote: > On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 09:59:33AM -0400, Mark H. Wood wrote: > > Perhaps it would be a start if sites providing SMTP would turn on > > STARTTLS. > > STARTTLS does not encrypt mail. It only provides safe passage over the network. Sure, it does encrypt mail. My SMTP has mail from me to deliver. It contacts an SMTP that it thinks can get the mail closer to its addressee. My SMTP sends STARTTLS, the receiving SMTP agrees, they handshake, and the rest of the session, including MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, and my mailgram following the DATA, is encrypted over the wire. > It is also client/server encrypted and decrypted. Thus, an administrator with > root at an SMTP server can view the mail once the mail transfer is decrypted. As is often said here, "what's your threat model?" Keeping nonprivileged people out of the transaction is worthwhile, if I am worried about mail being spied on in transit. STARTTLS greatly reduces the number of parties who could just read email metadata if they have access to the wire. Sysadmin.s take a risk if they are prying into the mail spool -- they could be discovered. Governments, too, may judge that the cost of exposure of such activity is worth more than the advantage of doing it. But I wouldn't depend solely on STARTTLS for securing email any more than I am satisfied to depend solely on encrypting the message body with OpenPGP or similar means. I believe in making the bad guys take as much time, create as much mess, and make as much noise as I can compel. It costs almost nothing to make as much trouble as possible for snoopers, and it's interesting work, so why not do it? > Also, many big mail vendors have already enabled SSL/TLS/STARTTLS, such as > Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. You mean those webmail thingies that I never use? There's so much we don't know about their security practices that I wasn't even thinking about such services. My remark was focused on the scenario above: there is a local MUA, a local MTA and a remote MTA. -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Mon Aug 18 18:34:06 2014 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 12:34:06 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20140818163406.GD25232@IUPUI.Edu> On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 10:41:27AM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: > Time to die? Well after 20 years I think it is all very academic - professors sit in class > rooms the world over - not much common sense comes out of their mouths. The real issues are: > > (a) do we want to implement our own security on our own devices as a "geek" or Yes. I know what tools I used and how I used them. > (b) have some automated pre-installed software that will create all that's necessary at > first boot or No. I have no idea what it actually did. > (c) rely on some large corporation to handle the encryption and decryption for us Same answer as (b). -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Mon Aug 18 18:51:36 2014 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 10:51:36 -0600 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140818162443.GC25232@IUPUI.Edu> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <20140818135933.GB25232@IUPUI.Edu> <20140818141548.GM15847@irc.ae7.st> <20140818162443.GC25232@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <20140818165133.GN15847@irc.ae7.st> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 12:24:43PM -0400, Mark H. Wood wrote: > Sure, it does encrypt mail. My SMTP has mail from me to deliver. It > contacts an SMTP that it thinks can get the mail closer to its > addressee. My SMTP sends STARTTLS, the receiving SMTP agrees, they > handshake, and the rest of the session, including MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, > and my mailgram following the DATA, is encrypted over the wire. The connection is encrypted, not the mail itelf. SSL/TLS behave like a tunnel. The end result is the same, but the details are different. Much like on OpenSSH tunnel, where SSH does not know anything of the data moving through the tunnel, STARTTLS knows nothing about the data going through its tunnel. > You mean those webmail thingies that I never use? There's so much we > don't know about their security practices that I wasn't even thinking > about such services. My remark was focused on the scenario above: > there is a local MUA, a local MTA and a remote MTA. No, I mean the POP3S/IMAPS/SMTPS/MAPIS protocols your MUA, and other SMTP MTAs connects to. Not HTTPS. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 502 bytes Desc: not available URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Aug 18 19:23:01 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 19:23:01 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140818141548.GM15847@irc.ae7.st> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <53EFE46D.5080905@sixdemonbag.org> <20140818135933.GB25232@IUPUI.Edu> <20140818141548.GM15847@irc.ae7.st> Message-ID: <53F23675.1080301@digitalbrains.com> On 18/08/14 16:15, Aaron Toponce wrote: > Also, many big mail vendors have already enabled SSL/TLS/STARTTLS, such as > Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. Unfortunately, so long as TLS is not demanded, a downgrade attack can easily disable it. My 2c Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Mon Aug 18 19:28:51 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 19:28:51 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> Message-ID: <53F237D3.3060609@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 18-08-2014 11:04, Rob Ambidge wrote: > But it is just legal theory, and I am no expert in law, american law, or > even cryptography. So what happens in practice is anyone's guess really. I've seen what happens in practice: some group of people was accused of organized growing of hennep. They arrested a lot of people, then dropped the charges against some minor members of the gang. And then they became "witnesses" and had to testify. Considering what could happen to them if they talked they suddenly all had amnesia... -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Mon Aug 18 19:35:32 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 19:35:32 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F23964.1030508@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 18-08-2014 14:31, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> And who determines wether it has any "testimonial value"? > Johan, we're entering paranoid fantasy here. If you truly believe the > whole of the USG is corrupt, Well, I see some ridiculous sentences of US judges published here, but I realize that only the most stupid ones reach the press here. However, since US law has something called "subphoena", which I consider a grave violation of the right to remain silent, I have not much trust in US law. And as I described in another reply, I've seen in practice what they do to make someone testify: drop charges against person 1 so he can be declared "witness" against person 2. > and that our independent judiciary is in > cahoots with a corrupt Executive and Legislature in order to > systematically violate people's rights, That seems to be what Snowden showd. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Aug 18 19:45:27 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 19:45:27 +0200 Subject: (OT) It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F237D3.3060609@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <53F237D3.3060609@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53F23BB7.6090003@digitalbrains.com> On 18/08/14 19:28, Johan Wevers wrote: > And then they became "witnesses" and had to testify. Considering what > could happen to them if they talked they suddenly all had amnesia... Classic prisoners dillemma! You know, they should arrest a whole lot of these groups, and in a controlled setting try this many times. For science! ;P Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Aug 18 19:48:12 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 19:48:12 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F23C5C.8050607@digitalbrains.com> On 17/08/14 23:14, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > But let's be real careful about thinking we are in any way better > than other people. We're not. I completely agree with that statement but never read any disrespect in the mail you are replying to. It /can/ be read that way, I agree. So it might be good to point it out, as you did. > If a new email cryptography standard comes out that's significantly > better than GnuPG, do you think Werner is going to sit around > drinking Tanqueray straight out of the bottle because nobody's using > GnuPG anymore? I don't. I think he'll cheerfully send GnuPG off > into maintenance, applaud the new standard, and volunteer to help > with a free implementation of the new standard. > > [...] > > When (not if) GnuPG dies out, the only question will be, "is this on > balance good for people?" If so, then let's be thankful GnuPG > existed, celebrate its passing, and cheerfully move on. Thank you for that! It was something that bothered me about the blog post. If the writer then and there came with a great new successor to OpenPGP and put the title "OpenPGP needs to die" above his article that then goes on "... because here is my killer application", then I would congratulate him. Now it's nothing but hot air. OpenPGP doesn't need to die; who is it bothering by merely existing? What has OpenPGP ever done to him? Present large blocks of base64 at the bottom of a mail? :) Something better needs to live. That's the opposite of what he is saying. What a negative Nancy. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 20:11:57 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:11:57 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F23964.1030508@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> <53F23964.1030508@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53F241ED.4050806@sixdemonbag.org> > Well, I see some ridiculous sentences of US judges published here, > but I realize that only the most stupid ones reach the press here. > However, since US law has something called "subphoena", which I > consider a grave violation of the right to remain silent, I have not > much trust in US law. Err -- *what* right to remain silent? No country has a universal right to remain silent. If you're a witness to a crime, you can be compelled to testify about what you see. If you're in possession of documents that are relevant to a police investigation, you can be ordered to produce them, and so on and so on. That's the subpoena duces tecum in a nutshell, right there. Keep in mind that the idea of a subpoena duces tecum is so uncontroversial that it's been formalized in *two* separate Hague conventions: the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention. If you don't have trust in U.S. law because we have the subpoena duces tecum, you should have no more faith in Dutch law... > That seems to be what Snowden showd. Been nice talking to you, Johan. From james.platt at yale.edu Mon Aug 18 19:19:05 2014 From: james.platt at yale.edu (James Platt) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 13:19:05 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> Message-ID: <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> On Aug 18, 2014, at 7:13 AM, Jerry wrote: > The entire article is available here: > As the article says, the question of whether the 5th Amendment applies to passphrases remains unclear. There have been conflicting rulings in various other cases. The article also mentions the issue of inspections at border crossings which are not criminal investigations. I discussed this a while back with an ACLU lawyer and his take was that the border crossing is more like civil law than criminal law. In a civil case, you can assert a 5th Amendment right but then still be compelled to testify (including disclosure of passphrases) if they grant you immunity from criminal prosecution for anything revealed by the testimony. In this way, the 5th amendment can not protect you from civil liability. So, if the ACLU lawyer is correct, then you can assert a 5th amendment right at a border crossing to not decrypt your laptop, they could then compel decryption of the laptop on condition of giving you immunity from prosecution. We use PGP whole disk encryption for laptops which have HIPAA regulated data on them. Doctors here have raised questions about whether it?s right for border agents to get access to this data. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 20:55:49 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:55:49 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F23C5C.8050607@digitalbrains.com> References: <53EF9165.6040007@openmailbox.org> <20140817075708.GB1657@fritha.org> <53F078C7.2060107@gbenet.com> <53F11B4B.1040604@sixdemonbag.org> <53F23C5C.8050607@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53F24C35.1040804@sixdemonbag.org> > Something better needs to live. That's the opposite of what he is > saying. What a negative Nancy. (Long anecdote, but I promise, it's relevant.) ===== I live maybe ten miles away from the world's largest firearms museum. When I first moved to this area a couple of years ago I figured I'd take a look around and see what it was like. While there, I got the chance to see an original M-16 rifle from *1959* -- before it had even been accepted for military service. The museum curator explained to me that the original rifle from 1959 was the product of extremely strict requirements. The strictest was, it couldn't mass more than 2.7 kilograms. The rifle was built to meet this seemingly-impossible weight target, and many of the worst defects of the rifle were in reality triumphs of engineering that let them reach this goal. For instance: the M-16 feeds hot gases directly from the barrel back into the action in order to tap some of that energy to cycle the action and chamber a new round. The AK-47 has the hot gases operate on a piston, and the piston in turn works the action. This has the effect of the AK-47 being much more reliable than the M-16, since it isn't channeling hot gas and gunpowder residue directly back into the weapon. For the last 50-odd years, people have called the M16's direct gas impingement operation "Eugene Stoner's biggest blunder." The reality was, the AK-47's piston-style arrangement is *heavy*, and they had a 2.7-kg weight limit... so by doing it this way, they saved about 200 grams of weight. That's a big deal when your total allowed mass is 2.7 kilos. That it had an unpleasant effect on the reliability, everyone knew... but everyone also knew that if they hadn't done it, there's no way they would've hit 2.7kg. Today, when the basic M-16 model weighs in at 3.8kg (they waived the 2.7kg limit in the 1980s), it's easy to look at the defects and start criticizing Eugene Stoner's biggest mistake. When you've got a 3.8kg rifle there's no excuse for direct gas impingement. When your rifle is 3.8kg, the direct gas impingement can only be thought of as a terrible blunder. But it didn't start out that way. ===== There's a big difference between saying, "this needs to die," and "something better needs to live," I agree. I find myself wishing, though, that before people said either of them they would give more thought to why *this particular thing* came to live in the first place. Because I keep on thinking about that walk through the National Firearms Museum, and seeing that old M-16, and hearing the curator explain that everything people hated about it were actually features demanded by the government, and it would have never been adopted -- much less been so successful -- without those defects. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 21:03:39 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 15:03:39 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> Message-ID: <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> > The article also mentions the issue of inspections at border crossings > which are not criminal investigations. A U.S. appellate court recently ruled that inspections of laptop contents at border crossings violated the Fourth Amendment. It's currently being appealed, but so far the tea leaves are the Supreme Court won't touch it and will instead simply let the appellate decision stand. Just FYI. :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Mon Aug 18 21:05:23 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 21:05:23 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/18/2014 09:03 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> The article also mentions the issue of inspections at border >> crossings which are not criminal investigations. > > A U.S. appellate court recently ruled that inspections of laptop > contents at border crossings violated the Fourth Amendment. It's > currently being appealed, but so far the tea leaves are the > Supreme Court won't touch it and will instead simply let the > appellate decision stand. Just FYI. :) At least for US persons, iirc the protection doesn't extend beyond that? - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Potius sero quam numquam Better late then never -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT8k5sAAoJEPw7F94F4TaguwkP/j2m6HBdFskiyQtcriEfMOus +uaOCoSQOXyoF1G/PZILne66o1PkrMgjd4K7I1Mzg5CvI061V0YAjlskwMo5/y3J 92hZivc14GMdusk6ozhLtnd+lP2V6XUUfuxoPOJJ+jwlpnMMfb5iliCg6GmVm2FI iQN1UY7+VpJVHebnT2vkYPAmIBrzFkJ3F7lJKo0uNygPwa0LK4EWq7oOWCRLAiOC sDOQYM3L4RDt1bx2VWQcH9Sp/O6gNJMJb1/E0o/0i25owtiO77F7IM8AWMA3H69Y G2FJTfs32sCcIG93OQftdZIGjLKa9+LiqrMVvcZvMmbubtkB37DSScZJNDrVKGik fhBV3wUL7XfJ3SRoaHN9oAX8wb+B/2tyB0eGy9Fmt6A2InO5KRDC5Su+qld/f1xi CqbuICZ0b/EDzSVewanRVPWj7uNHg61Cn+3UdnFE0QT4iMGX9wKq+P5abEyenG6p u+hwD62g8QsWtBtALe+SIObwXTXJtK/9HvKZT7sUm4ygzB+rjy7W3Lwi2pFOCMR0 E0IZST/Kh7g7acbhrkrvWlWgSChNFfHQErL64IHckeATVudgHVw1346oQZoNBtvq cn3vgU+4x84Oh/K1n8T1/k2nUejVy2InMqwTcuHFEJpxV5D2Agw2yF3XUJBT9HaU Nrok4Vu1aNVRB2aWMOsl =0WAA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Mon Aug 18 21:15:23 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 21:15:23 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F241ED.4050806@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> <53F23964.1030508@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F241ED.4050806@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F250CB.5030505@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 18-08-2014 20:11, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Err -- *what* right to remain silent? No country has a universal right > to remain silent. If you're a witness to a crime, you can be compelled > to testify about what you see. Yes, unfortunately. > If you're in possession of documents > that are relevant to a police investigation, you can be ordered to > produce them, and so on and so on. No, not here. When the police thinks I have such documents they can get a search order, but if they can't find them and I remain silent it's too bad for them. I am not in violation of any law when I don't give them, not even when they later find out I did have them. Same for when I would destroy or encrypt said documents after I found out the police was looking for them. > Keep in mind that the idea of a subpoena duces tecum is so > uncontroversial that it's been formalized in *two* separate Hague > conventions: the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence > Convention. Perhaps, but the Dutch law doesn't wortk like that. > If you don't have trust in U.S. law because we have the > subpoena duces tecum, Not ONLY because of that. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Aug 18 21:21:06 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 15:21:06 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> > At least for US persons, iirc the protection doesn't extend beyond > that? No, the Fourth Amendment protects all people within U.S. borders equally. Americans get no special protections over visitors to the country. From micha137 at gmx.de Mon Aug 18 16:21:21 2014 From: micha137 at gmx.de (Michael Anders) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 16:21:21 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From holtzm at cox.net Tue Aug 19 03:32:34 2014 From: holtzm at cox.net (Bob Holtzman) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 18:32:34 -0700 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 04:42:52PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > Unfortunately most of us do. Including the US, UK and the Dutch are > > aklso pushing for such laws. > > Speaking only for the U.S., this is not the case. Dream on. > The United States Constitution protects an individual's right not to > testify against themselves. If the production of a passphrase would > have any kind of testimonial value, then such production cannot be > ordered. The only time production of a passphrase is permitted is when > it lacks any testimonial value. There are quite a few ways police and prosecutors can coerce a suspect to hand over his encryption key(s). Dangling the prospect of a lighter sentence under the poor bugger's nose, or conversely, threatening to come down hard, perhaps going for a death penalty. The surrender of a suspect's keys would be "voluntary" and therefore constitutional. Even if the role production serves is testimonial, if it's voluntary, and the statement the poor sod is required to sign will so state, it's constitutional (I think). Don't forget, even non-testimonial key surrender can be used to build a body of evidence. DISCLAIMER: I'm not a lawyer and the above is opinion only. > Many people look at one particular case and say, "hey, production was > required in that case, clearly the U.S. can compel you to produce!", or > "production wasn't required in that case, clearly the U.S. can't compel > you to produce!" The reality is different. You need to look at the > role the production serves. Testimonial in nature? Nope, forbidden. > Non-testimonial? Yep, permitted. -- Bob Holtzman Giant intergalactic brain-sucking hyperbacteria came to Earth to rape our women and create a race of mindless zombies. Look! It's working! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 19 04:43:49 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 22:43:49 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> Message-ID: <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/18/2014 9:32 PM, Bob Holtzman wrote: > There are quite a few ways police and prosecutors can coerce a > suspect to hand over his encryption key(s). Your examples which involve coercion are illegal, and the ones that are legal do not involve coercion. > Dangling the prospect of a lighter sentence under the poor bugger's > nose Not coercion. Prosecutor: "We know you have an encrypted drive partition with a lot of child porn on it. Give up your passphrase and we'll reduce it to ten counts of possession and drop the intent to distribute, and we won't object to sentences running concurrently." Defendant: "... that sounds really good." Or, alternately, imagine the defendant is innocent of the charge: Defendant: "I can't accept that deal. I'm innocent of that." (True: if you're innocent of the charge, you're not allowed to plead guilty to it. You might be able to talk the judge into accepting an Alford, but it'd be an uphill battle.) Or, alternately, imagine the defendant is guilty, but only of eight counts of possession: Defendant: "No deal. I'll take my risks in court. Good luck producing these 'thousands of images' you're talking about." > or conversely, threatening to come down hard, perhaps going for a > death penalty. Grossly illegal, in violation of the canons of legal ethics, and will get an attorney disbarred. Don't confuse "Law & Order" re-runs with real life. The DA is allowed to threaten prosecution of only those crimes the DA reasonably believes a person violated, and the DA is expressly forbidden from using the threat of the death penalty to persuade someone to taking a lesser sentence. > The surrender of a suspect's keys would be "voluntary" and therefore > constitutional. In your first example yes, in your second example no. Don't get me wrong: prosecutors have a lot of power, and I personally believe they have too much power with too little accountability. However, it's not a de-facto state of tyranny, either. As always, my best advice for people facing legal problems is "shut up and get a lawyer." -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From nicholas.cole at gmail.com Tue Aug 19 11:14:39 2014 From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 10:14:39 +0100 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> Message-ID: On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 6:54 PM, Richard Outerbridge wrote: > Still waiting for my email address, yet my blackphone is already in > my hands. Keep up the good work. > > I?m not going to bother with 2.1 until the Mac guyz come to their > senses about not forking the crypto. Could be a long wait. They've made a fork? I hadn't realised that. Why on earth? From vmaatta at gmail.com Tue Aug 19 12:56:55 2014 From: vmaatta at gmail.com (=?utf-8?Q?Ville_M=C3=A4=C3=A4tt=C3=A4?=) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 13:56:55 +0300 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> Message-ID: Quite. Who are the "Mac guys" and what did they fork? -- Ville > On 19.8.2014, at 12.14, Nicholas Cole wrote: > >> On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 6:54 PM, Richard Outerbridge wrote: >> Still waiting for my email address, yet my blackphone is already in >> my hands. Keep up the good work. >> >> I?m not going to bother with 2.1 until the Mac guyz come to their >> senses about not forking the crypto. Could be a long wait. > > > They've made a fork? I hadn't realised that. Why on earth? > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 19 13:01:25 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 13:01:25 +0200 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: (Nicholas Cole's message of "Tue, 19 Aug 2014 10:14:39 +0100") References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> Message-ID: <87mwb0920q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:14, nicholas.cole at gmail.com said: > They've made a fork? I hadn't realised that. Why on earth? I don't know. However they use a set of patches (e.g. allowing 8k keys) and thus the Mac version diverts from the gnupg.org version. Actually Gpg4win does the same but I take care that those patches get back to upstream. In fact all but one patch are regular commits done after a release to fix Windows problems. The remaining patch extends the GnuPG version with the Gpg4win version. I would appreciate if the Mac folks would decide to use gnupg-devel for development. It would also be desirable if the new speedo build system from 2.1 could also be used for Mac OS. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From K.Chambers at openmailbox.org Tue Aug 19 11:53:14 2014 From: K.Chambers at openmailbox.org (Kristy Chambers) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 09:53:14 +0000 Subject: ftp.gnupg.org blocking Tor IP's? Message-ID: <53F31E8A.7090407@openmailbox.org> Hello, i just wanted to download gnupg via ftp from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2 and got the following warning: "425 Error accepting connection; connection from invalid IP." My IP was: 46.4.46.66 Kind regards, Chambers From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 19 14:35:14 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 14:35:14 +0200 Subject: ftp.gnupg.org blocking Tor IP's? In-Reply-To: <53F31E8A.7090407@openmailbox.org> (Kristy Chambers's message of "Tue, 19 Aug 2014 09:53:14 +0000") References: <53F31E8A.7090407@openmailbox.org> Message-ID: <87d2bw8xod.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:53, K.Chambers at openmailbox.org said: > following warning: "425 Error accepting connection; connection from > invalid IP." > > My IP was: 46.4.46.66 Sorry, I can't find your IP in the logs. I can ping that address from the server, traceroute shows not strangeness, and that subnet is not blocked (one is blocked due to a DoS). Tor exit nodes are of course not blocked. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 19 15:48:01 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 09:48:01 -0400 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> Message-ID: <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> > They've made a fork? I hadn't realised that. Why on earth? They emphatically disagree with some of the key size limits. To be blunt, it's made me lose a lot of faith in the developers. In the grand scheme of things, it's hard to find *anything* less significant than whether someone uses RSA-2048 or RSA-8192. From james.platt at yale.edu Tue Aug 19 17:10:53 2014 From: james.platt at yale.edu (James Platt) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:10:53 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> On Aug 18, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> At least for US persons, iirc the protection doesn't extend beyond >> that? > > No, the Fourth Amendment protects all people within U.S. borders > equally. Americans get no special protections over visitors to the country. The Fourteenth Amendment makes this clear. It was added to The Constitution after the American Civil War because southerners who were opposing reconstruction claimed that the former slaves did not have constitutional rights because they were not citizens. To be more precise, constitutional rights apply to ??all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.? In a more recent event, the Supreme Court ruled that Guantanamo Bay is in the jurisdiction of the United States and, therefore, the detainees moved there gained the protection of The Constitution. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 842 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue Aug 19 20:41:50 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:41:50 -0700 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <87mwb0920q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <87mwb0920q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53F39A6E.7040105@dougbarton.us> On 8/19/14 4:01 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:14, nicholas.cole at gmail.com said: > >> They've made a fork? I hadn't realised that. Why on earth? > > I don't know. However they use a set of patches (e.g. allowing 8k keys) > and thus the Mac version diverts from the gnupg.org version. Actually > Gpg4win does the same but I take care that those patches get back to > upstream. In fact all but one patch are regular commits done after a > release to fix Windows problems. The remaining patch extends the GnuPG > version with the Gpg4win version. > > I would appreciate if the Mac folks would decide to use gnupg-devel for > development. It would also be desirable if the new speedo build system > from 2.1 could also be used for Mac OS. So, which "mac guys" are you referring to? I recently got a Macbook for work and have been busy trying to recreate my environment/tools. I found the "GPG Suite" from this web site: https://gpgtools.org/index.html which seemed legit enough ... are those the developers you're referring to? Is there any concern over using their stuff? I got to their site from the link on https://www.gnupg.org/download/index.html so I had assumed it was Ok. :-/ Doug From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 19 20:49:37 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 14:49:37 -0400 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53F39C41.2020106@sixdemonbag.org> > 2. They have a default skeleton gpg.conf with incompatible digest > algo etc. (as discussed many times on the list). Use of cert-digest-algo isn't really a problem unless you're needing people running old PGP or GnuPG to be able to verify your signatures. That's less of a problem than using digest-algo, which can easily produce message traffic your correspondents can't read. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Tue Aug 19 20:52:41 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 19:52:41 +0100 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F241ED.4050806@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F1F22C.9070909@sixdemonbag.org> <53F23964.1030508@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F241ED.4050806@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <438632190.20140819195241@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 18 August 2014 at 7:11:57 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > If you're a witness > to a crime, you can be compelled to testify about what > you see. Yes, but they can't make you remember accurately what you saw, or tell you what to say. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Amateurs built the ark. Professionals built the Titanic. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPznQhXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pTuoD/RAU5zkY+d60HJlTpLtQAW4NS4FB2KhlNGzP srzm8iRsfPDH1K9jabFaxq/llGrlBK7DOPmGddMwe9ty4FXvW0Mep5YOo/0ubnUk 6pX3822P7pFCKCMNcGAuV+SKIUr/EBxrEUM2NNV00efqiyiukqKtVppMFDc1qEdG Ljoz7ig6 =9q7P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Tue Aug 19 21:03:35 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:03:35 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> Message-ID: <53F39F87.3070808@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 19-08-2014 17:10, James Platt wrote: > In a more recent event, the Supreme Court ruled that Guantanamo Bay > is in the jurisdiction of the United States and, therefore, the > detainees moved there gained the protection of The Constitution. And do they get it or will the government just ignore the supreme court? -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Tue Aug 19 21:03:40 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:03:40 +0200 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F39F8C.3040603@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 19-08-2014 4:43, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > real life. The DA is allowed to threaten prosecution of only those > crimes the DA reasonably believes a person violated, But that is a very vague criterium. "You liked Wikileaks on Facebook so I'm going to sue you for terrorism and treason". > Don't get me wrong: prosecutors have a lot of power, and I personally > believe they have too much power with too little accountability. > However, it's not a de-facto state of tyranny, either. The executive branch seems to be more in the spirit of Robespierre than that of Montesquieu. A trend in the entire western world, trias politica exists more often than not in name only. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Tue Aug 19 21:12:31 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 20:12:31 +0100 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F1F0C5.7000509@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <53F1F0C5.7000509@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1689047021.20140819201231@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 18 August 2014 at 1:25:41 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Basically, if the fact you know something would tend to > implicate you in the commission of a crime, then you > can't be compelled to reveal that you know it. Whether > it's a passphrase or a safe combination makes no > difference. So why couldn't somebody just claim that to be the case when it wasn't? - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Ultimate consistency lies in being consistently inconsistent -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPzoaRXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pQX8D/0qgcRq+CLXWxsfh+X5b/gNr1mSqGrT+LrBx /O7kEeZVlIdMjbh+1XWHTQfnQ/E4aIBp3Uv/lr37SOTS0KbmMJzEI7KV6CwLTfbO 1SJGYp2KlF16kPzc4P3TBp0abh+YrANaQYpPbWoy6n8krerpd0LHS9GjvVMTiu4G R++Am4yR =Zcv+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Tue Aug 19 21:16:36 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 20:16:36 +0100 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1544517177.20140819201636@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Monday 18 August 2014 at 8:21:06 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > No, the Fourth Amendment protects all people within > U.S. borders equally. Americans get no special > protections over visitors to the country. Do people at a border crossing point count as being "within" the borders? - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Puns are bad but poetry is verse. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPzoplXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pCeID/1mH059v5L/9psR+zFB1tdJVK05sceROanmo 7PK43SJ98/d4uYD6mMZryGSwYpNhMzCqUOJrmxex6pTJZ2InINYt9ZvyQxYDysiM IWMbhuFyYzetxO2FWtkjnWowNQ1th4Tx4F034kAV2NrwBJMSDXhc03eIYGSDKysK Av0I3acr =Pdnf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From vmaatta at gmail.com Tue Aug 19 20:17:04 2014 From: vmaatta at gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:17:04 +0300 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> Yeah. Ok. Assuming the Mac guys / fork referred to here are GPGTools / MacGPG2 I can see a couple bigger issues there than just patching in support for bigger keys. 1. The package and gnupg2 version used has not been updated since October 2013 (2013.10.22). If I?m not completely mistaken the version is still 2.0.22. As discussed on the list, one of the more important things would be timely updates. [1] 2. They have a default skeleton gpg.conf with incompatible digest algo etc. (as discussed many times on the list). I don?t think they patch an existing gpg.conf but they are meant to be the easy-to-use packaged installer for first-time users use case. [2] [1] https://gpgtools.org [2] https://github.com/GPGTools/MacGPG2/blob/dev/Formula/Patches/gnupg2/options.skel.patch -- Ville On 19 Aug 2014, at 16:48, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> They've made a fork? I hadn't realised that. Why on earth? > > They emphatically disagree with some of the key size limits. > > To be blunt, it's made me lose a lot of faith in the developers. In the grand scheme of things, it's hard to find *anything* less significant than whether someone uses RSA-2048 or RSA-8192. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue Aug 19 21:33:37 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 12:33:37 -0700 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53F3A691.1000508@dougbarton.us> On 8/19/14 11:17 AM, Ville M??tt? wrote: > 1. The package and gnupg2 version used has not been updated since October 2013 (2013.10.22). If I?m not completely mistaken the version is still 2.0.22. Yes, that was my biggest concern as well (and you're correct on the version). Is there a better solution? I'm comfortable on the command line, and wouldn't mind compiling my own if there was a suitable step-by-step guide available. I've compiled lots of stuff for FreeBSD and Linux, but while I've used Macs in the past I'm new to being a Mac "owner." If "compile your own" is the right answer, I'd also be appreciative of a guide for getting gpg-agent running on a Mac. I see the GPG Suite version running in the ps list, and I know how to get .app stuff started at login time, but I haven't gotten to the part of the manual where it talks about autostart for command line stuff yet. :) Thanks, Doug From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de Tue Aug 19 21:33:31 2014 From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:33:31 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <1544517177.20140819201636@my_localhost> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> <1544517177.20140819201636@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53F3A68B.1020609@dkyb.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Am 19.08.2014 um 21:16 schrieb MFPA: > Hi > > > On Monday 18 August 2014 at 8:21:06 PM, in > , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > > >> No, the Fourth Amendment protects all people within U.S. borders >> equally. Americans get no special protections over visitors to >> the country. > > Do people at a border crossing point count as being "within" the > borders? > As far as I know, at (international) airports the answer is "no". There is a zone (that can be extended at will*), where you are basically in no mans land. I think that relates to the word "transit zone"[0] A search for "airport transit zone" might get you some better information. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_zone * see also Snowden and his whereabouts during the phase were he applied for asylum -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEARECAAYFAlPzpooACgkQ/6vdZgk46shoFgCfc2qWkoQDDkCAH2cy/FtEH3e6 cpQAnjoh/s+VWS3wzNpbPwx9Yhb1LQBY =7VNg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue Aug 19 21:40:59 2014 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:40:59 +0200 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F39C41.2020106@sixdemonbag.org> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F39C41.2020106@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <5947227.vJz2GLXb38@inno> Am Di 19.08.2014, 14:49:37 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > > 2. They have a default skeleton gpg.conf with incompatible digest > > algo etc. (as discussed many times on the list). > > Use of cert-digest-algo isn't really a problem unless you're needing > people running old PGP or GnuPG to be able to verify your signatures. > That's less of a problem than using digest-algo, which can easily > produce message traffic your correspondents can't read. Without additional assumptions this is wrong for the simple reason that cert-digest-algo renders the self-signatures unreadable, too. A certificate with (valid) self-signatures using an incompatible digest is completely useless to the other party. Hauke -- Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mlisten at hammernoch.net Tue Aug 19 21:52:48 2014 From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ludwig_H=FCgelsch=E4fer?=) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:52:48 +0200 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53F3AB10.2050904@hammernoch.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 19.08.14 20:17, Ville M??tt? wrote: > Yeah. Ok. Assuming the Mac guys / fork referred to here are > GPGTools / MacGPG2 I can see a couple bigger issues there than just > patching in support for bigger keys. Ack. Nevertheless, I don't like some of the other patches. > 1. The package and gnupg2 version used has not been updated since > October 2013 (2013.10.22). If I?m not completely mistaken the > version is still 2.0.22. As discussed on the list, one of the more > important things would be timely updates. [1] Ack. They use the build system from homebrew. They update recipes from time to time, but their releases normally go only with major Mac OS X updates (e.g. 10.8 -> 10.9), as in last october with 2.0.22. Their main target is the gpg-plugin for Apple mail, I think. I have cloned their build system, modify their recipe (mostly take out some patches) and can keep my gpg2 very recent with minimum effort from my side. The supplied pinentry is highly integrated in Mac OS X look and feel and works reliable - no background/foreground issues like the one from gpg4win. But I assume, thats windows' fault, mostly. There is no visible work towards an adoption of gupg 2.1 in their repository. Ludwig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJT86sOAAoJEA52XAUJWdLjcX8IAKfXKT9OUtvA648kiYSc+vyE Pk160V3NO6C0Tb68wPuaswHUlNtd1ummjqPzhOYlEn99VwYdttODH58RqhwF46CZ A737H7iU3fRL3HRC97dZ+ZbmDvEloYRha0+HRlrUJ2cUm1zbsO3ExulPK8Nhhn1F 4az6GFEZOs2C3lwpBaY7hDeuH+JB+epqpjvBk1DAX452oaMhja1r39s0ja24w9wI mp+k0orZoUEDtlO9LX7YjRzVqkoY/VsFGVTp8wNP/LxmfV75ZaRWG7lir+uWw9x1 1IDfPGrKu9D3birQf1NeJpBLE3vpkC21QoUSdNxgHJqtebGpKZ9OOkSbPI4Eze4= =8ArK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From vmaatta at gmail.com Tue Aug 19 22:02:02 2014 From: vmaatta at gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 23:02:02 +0300 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F3A691.1000508@dougbarton.us> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3A691.1000508@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <08037740-E447-44E7-A1A4-6F129C834008@gmail.com> I just went through the process of switching to brew provided gpg2. Anyone not interested in the particular Mac workflow can skip this one. So, removing GPG Suite, installed gnupg2 via brew, re-installing GPG Suite without MacGPG2 (i.e. the Mail.app helpers etc.). There is a bit of work involved in making a launchd script for gpg-agent and getting a working pinentry-mac but if gpg-agent is not a requirement, one can just go with the brew version. Here?s a quick-n-dirty walk-through: 1. Remove GPG Suite using the uninstalled provided with the installer. 2. brew install gnupg2 (installs gpg-agent as a dependency). 3. Install GPG Suite, choose Customize ?> Leave out MacGPG2 4. Install pinentry-mac, either binary [1] or source [2]. The pinentry with brew didn?t work for me. I went for the binary seeing as the build started requiring a bit too much dependencies I didn?t want to install right now. Latest binary worked for me. 5. Add pinentry-mac location to gpg-agent.conf, e.g. /usr/local/MacGPG2/libexec/pinentry-mac.app/Contents/MacOS/pinentry-mac (I just copied the binary to where MacGPG2 installs it.) 6. Add a ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.ruriat.gpgagent.plist [3] Label com.ruriat.gpgagent ProgramArguments /usr/local/bin/gpg-agent --daemon --scdaemon-program /usr/local/Cellar/gnupg2/2.0.26/libexec/scdaemon --write-env-file --use-standard-socket --default-cache-ttl 43200 --enable-ssh-support --default-cache-ttl-ssh 43200 RunAtLoad StandardErrorPath /dev/null StandardOutPath /dev/null ServiceDescription Run gpg-agent at login. ** END [3] com.ruriat.gpgagent.plist ** [4] START (file ~/.bash_profile) GPG_TTY=$(tty) export GPG_TTY # GPG Agent for SSH support if [ -f "${HOME}/.gpg-agent-info" ]; then . "${HOME}/.gpg-agent-info" export GPG_AGENT_INFO export SSH_AUTH_SOCK export SSH_AGENT_PID fi [4] END -- Ville On 19 Aug 2014, at 22:33, Doug Barton wrote: > On 8/19/14 11:17 AM, Ville M??tt? wrote: >> 1. The package and gnupg2 version used has not been updated since October 2013 (2013.10.22). If I?m not completely mistaken the version is still 2.0.22. > > Yes, that was my biggest concern as well (and you're correct on the version). > > Is there a better solution? I'm comfortable on the command line, and wouldn't mind compiling my own if there was a suitable step-by-step guide available. I've compiled lots of stuff for FreeBSD and Linux, but while I've used Macs in the past I'm new to being a Mac "owner." > > If "compile your own" is the right answer, I'd also be appreciative of a guide for getting gpg-agent running on a Mac. I see the GPG Suite version running in the ps list, and I know how to get .app stuff started at login time, but I haven't gotten to the part of the manual where it talks about autostart for command line stuff yet. :) > > Thanks, > > Doug > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 19 22:14:37 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 22:14:37 +0200 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F39A6E.7040105@dougbarton.us> (Doug Barton's message of "Tue, 19 Aug 2014 11:41:50 -0700") References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <87mwb0920q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53F39A6E.7040105@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <87zjf06xua.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 19 Aug 2014 20:41, dougb at dougbarton.us said: > I got to their site from the link on > https://www.gnupg.org/download/index.html so I had assumed it was > Ok. :-/ Me too. I do not have access to a Mac, thus I am not able to test the stuff myself. After they fixed some license related things and talking an hour to one of the contributors, I once added gpgtools.org to gnupg.org. Regarding timely updates we have the same problem on Windows: The Gpg4win package is huge and thus I can't easily build it along with a new GnuPG release. My tentative plan is to split off the GnuPG core and provide an Windows installer just for the GnuPG code. That installer should be able to operate in silent mode, so that it can be used as sub-installer from other packages. And it would allow to update just GnuPG. I am currently looking in Side-by-Side assemblies (Manifest files) to reduce problems with multiple versions of certain DLLs installed on Windows. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Aug 19 22:27:04 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 22:27:04 +0200 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F3AB10.2050904@hammernoch.net> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3AB10.2050904@hammernoch.net> Message-ID: <53F3B318.4090909@digitalbrains.com> On 19/08/14 21:52, Ludwig H?gelsch?fer wrote: > Ack. They use the build system from homebrew. They update recipes from > time to time, but their releases normally go only with major Mac OS X > updates (e.g. 10.8 -> 10.9), as in last october with 2.0.22. Their > main target is the gpg-plugin for Apple mail, I think. So apparently they're not too worried about the DoS fixed in 2.0.24. And libgcrypt 1.6.0, which succeeds a version vulnerable to "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop" if I'm not mistaken, was released in December. I'd hazard a guess that they ship a vulnerable 1.5.x version. So everybody: hands off the Mac! ;) I think that you should only build or fork software[1] when you're willing to provide the service of security fixes to your users, or clearly indicate this is out of your scope. Do they provide security support? I think the libgcrypt one might warrant a fix. A DoS is just annoying. Peter. [1] Especially security software -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From holtzm at cox.net Tue Aug 19 22:32:46 2014 From: holtzm at cox.net (Bob Holtzman) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 13:32:46 -0700 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20140819203246.GA2990@cox.net> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 10:43:49PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 8/18/2014 9:32 PM, Bob Holtzman wrote: > > There are quite a few ways police and prosecutors can coerce a > > suspect to hand over his encryption key(s). > > Your examples which involve coercion are illegal, and the ones that are > legal do not involve coercion. > > > Dangling the prospect of a lighter sentence under the poor bugger's > > nose > > Not coercion. > > Prosecutor: "We know you have an encrypted drive partition with a lot of > child porn on it. Give up your passphrase and we'll reduce it to ten > counts of possession and drop the intent to distribute, and we won't > object to sentences running concurrently." Which, of course, carries the implied threat of not reducing it to ten counts and objecting to concurrency if he doesn't come across with the keys. Not coercion? > > Defendant: "... that sounds really good." > > Or, alternately, imagine the defendant is innocent of the charge: > > Defendant: "I can't accept that deal. I'm innocent of that." (True: if > you're innocent of the charge, you're not allowed to plead guilty to it. > You might be able to talk the judge into accepting an Alford, but it'd > be an uphill battle.) ...and if the prosecutor is hungry for another conviction to aid in his political ambitions it's Katy bar the door and the hell with the truth. BTW what's an Alford? > > Or, alternately, imagine the defendant is guilty, but only of eight > counts of possession: > > Defendant: "No deal. I'll take my risks in court. Good luck producing > these 'thousands of images' you're talking about." > > > or conversely, threatening to come down hard, perhaps going for a > > death penalty. > > Grossly illegal, in violation of the canons of legal ethics, So is hiding exculpatory evidence. Of course prosecutors would never do such a thing, right?....right? > and wil get an attorney disbarred. If caught. Some were caught and are still practicing. It made the papers. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-09-22-federal-prosecutors-reform_N.htm http://reason.com/archives/2009/08/17/innocent-man-freed-but-shabby There are a bunch more. > Don't confuse "Law & Order" re-runs with > real life. Give me some credit, pal. The DA is allowed to threaten prosecution of only those > crimes the DA reasonably believes a person violated, and the DA is > expressly forbidden from using the threat of the death penalty to > persuade someone to taking a lesser sentence. What should be and what is isn't always the same. > > > The surrender of a suspect's keys would be "voluntary" and therefore > > constitutional. > > In your first example yes, in your second example no. > > Don't get me wrong: prosecutors have a lot of power, and I personally > believe they have too much power with too little accountability. > However, it's not a de-facto state of tyranny, either. Of course not. Some prosecutors are real, live, human beings with consciences. Others....... > As always, my best advice for people facing legal problems is "shut up > and get a lawyer." > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- Bob Holtzman Giant intergalactic brain-sucking hyperbacteria came to Earth to rape our women and create a race of mindless zombies. Look! It's working! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 19 22:49:42 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 16:49:42 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F39F87.3070808@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> <53F39F87.3070808@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53F3B866.4060601@sixdemonbag.org> > And do they get it or will the government just ignore the supreme > court? This is the last I will be contributing to this misbegotten thread. The Supreme Court gets involved only rarely, but when they do, they settle the argument with the finality of a nuclear strike. Consider the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which Congress passed with enthusiastic support from the Bush Administration. This law claimed that it had the right to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear any challenges to the Act. The Court was not amused and in a 5-3 decision threw the entire Guantanamo Bay military commissions structure out on its ear -- to hell with what Congress and the President wanted! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamdan_v._Rumsfeld I could literally list *dozens* of cases where the Supreme Court told Congress and the President "no" on subjects where Congress and the President insisted they would only take "yes" for an answer. In each case that I'm aware of, the Supreme Court won the argument handily. From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue Aug 19 22:54:38 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 13:54:38 -0700 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <08037740-E447-44E7-A1A4-6F129C834008@gmail.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3A691.1000508@dougbarton.us> <08037740-E447-44E7-A1A4-6F129C834008@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53F3B98E.9000203@dougbarton.us> Ville, Thank you for your detailed response, it was very helpful. :) I'm curious about one thing, and sorry if this is off-topic but since we're discussing how to keep GnuPG up to date on Mac perhaps it is close enough to on-topic. I notice you suggested (home)brew as the source of the gpg2 package. Can you say a little about the relative value of that project vs. MacPorts, Fink, or Rudix? I'm very slightly familiar with the first, and not really familiar with the others except by name, so I'm looking for pros, cons, advice, etc. Thanks again, Doug From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Aug 19 22:56:15 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 22:56:15 +0200 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F3B318.4090909@digitalbrains.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3AB10.2050904@hammernoch.net> <53F3B318.4090909@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <53F3B9EF.6030905@digitalbrains.com> On 19/08/14 22:27, Peter Lebbing wrote: > I think that you should only build or fork software[1] when you're willing to > provide the service of security fixes to your users, or clearly indicate this is > out of your scope. Do they provide security support? I'm starting to regret my from-the-sideline know-it-better comments. They aren't charging any money for it, and it's all open source. They don't owe anybody anything for as far as I can see. My apologies. I was out of line. It's fair to bring up the matter of security updates, but not in the manner I did. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Aug 19 23:05:23 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 17:05:23 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <20140819203246.GA2990@cox.net> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819203246.GA2990@cox.net> Message-ID: <53F3BC13.8040201@sixdemonbag.org> > Not coercion? Nope. That's a trade. Passphrase coercion is like so: "you will produce the passphrase, or you will sit in jail until you decide to produce the passphrase, and we're just fine if you sit in there the rest of your natural life, and once we get the passphrase then we'll decide whether we want to prosecute you further, and if we do then your time sitting in jail while deciding to cough up the passphrase won't count against whatever prison term you ultimately get." What the prosecutor is offering there is, "you will plead guilty to lesser charges, but I'm only willing to do this if you're willing to show me the full extent of your illegal activities, so cough up the passphrase so I can verify it for myself." When you're facing coercion, you're not getting anything out of the trade. When you agree to something as part of a plea agreement, you do. Or maybe you think that you should be allowed to get a plea deal just by showing up, without cooperating with the State in any way? > BTW what's an Alford? http://lmgtfy.com/?q=alford+plea > So is hiding exculpatory evidence. Of course prosecutors would never > do such a thing, right?....right? The vast majority of prosecutors would not. Some would, and in such cases I think the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity should be waived. Snark is not serious argument. > There are a bunch more. So what? There are a bunch of prosecutors. If even 1% of prosecutors are corrupt -- which would make them on balance a bunch of saints by the standards of the rest of society -- that's still a large number. The fact there are a large number of abuses is kind of unsurprising given a country with over 300 million people. It's the law of large numbers: one-in-a-million events literally happen thousands of times a day. >> Don't confuse "Law & Order" re-runs with real life. > > Give me some credit, pal. You're the one who didn't know what an Alford plea was. Just sayin'. Please note: I'm not saying prosecutorial abuse doesn't happen, that it's not a problem, or that we haven't vastly overcriminalized our civil life. But this paranoid fantasy some people have going, where they believe *every* prosecutor is corrupt... that's just childish. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Tue Aug 19 23:39:51 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 22:39:51 +0100 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F3BC13.8040201@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819203246.GA2990@cox.net> <53F3BC13.8040201@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <529207005.20140819223951@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Tuesday 19 August 2014 at 10:05:23 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > What the prosecutor is offering there is, "you will plead guilty to > lesser charges, but I'm only willing to do this if you're willing to > show me the full extent of your illegal activities, so cough up the > passphrase so I can verify it for myself." > > When you're facing coercion, you're not getting anything out of the > trade. In my opinion that is pure semantics. The situation you described can be characterised as the prosecutor telling the accused that they will suffer X regardless, plus the threat that they will additionally suffer Y if they refuse to co-operate. That seems to resemble the definition of Coercion [0]:- "The action or practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats." [0] - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net No matter what a man's past may have been, his future is spotless. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPzxDJXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5ph5kD/0q4ZWtNYVLRdgmtcCv877H8fV+o0yaoC2Ud h4nkA/K9kEC8ILA9QLhYOnLB7cpXwwATWAsLCgDTOHmK7R+raQANQKfAXnxaDKaR 9k/CfoSyUsB7+eXinVrIjRq7ELMhnRbMsBsPhS8mEKcz2p8wCafC3HkW5CuHYRvx RewEIzom =9Mhf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 20 00:48:29 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 18:48:29 -0400 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <529207005.20140819223951@my_localhost> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819203246.GA2990@cox.net> <53F3BC13.8040201@sixdemonbag.org> <529207005.20140819223951@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53F3D43D.2030300@sixdemonbag.org> > In my opinion that is pure semantics. In other news, water is wet, bricks are heavy, and politicians lie. Yes, it's pure semantics. It's *law*. What, were you expecting something else? Wake up and realize the essential nature of what you're talking about: law is *all about* formalism, syntax, semantics. If you think law is other than this, then -- well -- this conversation just ceased being worth my time. Discussing law with people who complain about "semantics" is like discussing biology with Creationists. > The situation you described can be characterised... The great thing about liberty is everyone has the right to an opinion. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 20 01:19:19 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 00:19:19 +0100 Subject: Fwd: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F3D43D.2030300@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819013233.GA27080@cox.net> <53F2B9E5.10304@sixdemonbag.org> <20140819203246.GA2990@cox.net> <53F3BC13.8040201@sixdemonbag.org> <529207005.20140819223951@my_localhost> <53F3D43D.2030300@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1521424974.20140820001919@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Tuesday 19 August 2014 at 11:48:29 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Yes, it's pure semantics. It's *law*. What, were you > expecting something else? Fair comment, but what has been described as "bargaining" is still coercion. > The great thing about liberty is everyone has the right > to an opinion. It had to be good for something. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net To know what we know, and know what we do not know, is wisdom. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlPz24RXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pshsEAI5Zg1+T2KqDdeVsAOx63fsYukAi4hCDOsj1 REqcD0ChkBXRxTo0o2He2WQKo5Ojst5jPSlbGRqnkJz5DC9jkS9JwvTyTLye7r/W Fn+t4r9pgO7yH/fJl2KEhvlq/hxI1iMQTHbIZXHczONrVwUUUFZsEG3jxuLku7dt uNiTe+TU =FtsL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Wed Aug 20 08:04:23 2014 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 08:04:23 +0200 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F3B866.4060601@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> <53F39F87.3070808@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F3B866.4060601@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F43A67.1030605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 19-08-2014 22:49, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> And do they get it or will the government just ignore the supreme >> court? > I could literally list *dozens* of cases where the Supreme Court told > Congress and the President "no" on subjects where Congress and the > President insisted they would only take "yes" for an answer. In each > case that I'm aware of, the Supreme Court won the argument handily. Ah yes, the supreme court has had its say. Now the question is, do the prisoners at Guantanomo Bay notice anything of it? Or will they still be tortured, have no access to lawyers and get still no fair trial and the right to sue for damages if they win after many years of imp[risonment without any formal case? -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 20 08:32:41 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 07:32:41 +0100 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F43A67.1030605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> <53F39F87.3070808@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F3B866.4060601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F43A67.1030605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <1862904603.20140820073241@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 20 August 2014 at 7:04:23 AM, in , Johan Wevers wrote: > Now the > question is, do the prisoners at Guantanomo Bay notice > anything of it? Or will they still be tortured, have no > access to lawyers and get still no fair trial and the > right to sue for damages if they win after many years > of imp[risonment without any formal case? Not to mention having first been abducted and forcibly transported halfway round the world. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net A closed mouth gathers no foot -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlP0QSdXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pdLcEAJlXSLYUxcm1QeZ+439MFZoZAyb5phu1hB5P vlwNDT7F5rmUdK+7lmgkBH4ySBwjimW5I7dflQjwP4BwNJo07SoiPBoJXWdZcJSx qqq5zEfowfxXkDw+FQwITgiLaeL0+05woa9VR2pHSYdBH0Rl5XjXNz4cBxRa2Na5 iKs/T0Z4 =Vb6j -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 20 14:53:50 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 08:53:50 -0400 Subject: It's time for PGP to die. In-Reply-To: <53F43A67.1030605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <1408288138.2836.7.camel@micha137-samsung-ubuntu> <53F0DBB4.6090804@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F113CC.4090309@sixdemonbag.org> <53F196CA.9050504@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <01cd7d20-edbe-4728-9430-e5e49e902806@email.android.com> <20140818071321.6a022eb2@scorpio> <5037EED5-07F3-43C2-B048-7265D4CC9BE4@yale.edu> <53F24E0B.4070601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F24E73.5000603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53F25222.1040109@sixdemonbag.org> <8EBBEE6A-6992-418A-B19E-A0D37E635C3F@yale.edu> <53F39F87.3070808@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <53F3B866.4060601@sixdemonbag.org> <53F43A67.1030605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <53F49A5E.9050500@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/20/2014 2:04 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: > Ah yes, the supreme court has had its say. Now the question is, do the > prisoners at Guantanomo Bay notice anything of it? Yes, as you could discover by checking interviews with their lawyers. > ... have no access to lawyers ... Of course, checking interviews with their lawyers might disturb your narrative. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From vmaatta at gmail.com Wed Aug 20 15:21:01 2014 From: vmaatta at gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 16:21:01 +0300 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F3B98E.9000203@dougbarton.us> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3A691.1000508@dougbarton.us> <08037740-E447-44E7-A1A4-6F129C834008@gmail.com> <53F3B98E.9000203@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <40E0A653-BA44-4AFA-A559-8C118CB7F798@gmail.com> Maybe a little off topic, but then again we are talking about keeping gnupg up to date. TL;DR: I think either MacPorts or Homebrew can be used and one or the other is quite necessary. I do most of my work on the command line / Vim, etc. and using either is just as convenient as apt-get / yum etc. in Linux. Current gnupg2 versions as of 20.8.2014: Homebrew: 2.0.26, also 1.4.18 (gnupg) MacPorts: 2.0.25, also 1.4.18 (gnupg) and 1.2.8 (gnupg12) Rudix: none (only 1.4.18) And the rest is way off topic :). I first looked into Mac package managers in 2006 when Fink was the incumbent and MacPorts more of a challenger. It?s been called a successor to Fink, has the unofficial support of Apple and became pretty much the de-facto package manager around that time. I went with MacPorts then and was quite happy for a few years. Then came along Homebrew as the challenger and I?ve been using it for a few years now. I?ll probably give MacPorts a try again on the next new system. They?re both similar and I think either is good. They have differences which might be important case-by-case but nothing worth some of the heated blogs and forums posts there are. - Neither one replaces any system binaries and both are quite easy to get rid off. And they could co-exists if necessary. - Homebrew tries to avoid duplicates of things included in not only OS X, but also anything that available from language-specific package managers like 'pip', ?gem', ?clan?. Installs via MacPorts easily pull in stuff that could be provided by the system. This can be good or bad either way. I rarely have any trouble finding what I need from Homebrew but then I also do use virtualenv and pip, RVM and gem etc. depending on the project. - If one is interested in developing / maintaining a port / brew: MacPorts is modeled on BSD Ports and uses SVN. Homebrew formulas are Ruby scripts in Git, usually in Github I suppose. I didn?t know Fink was still going strong. Good for them. I?ve never used Fink and can?t comment but it is the venerable grey beard project in this bunch. This was the first time I heard about Rudix. I don?t know anything of it and don?t really feel the need to find out :). -- Ville On 19 Aug 2014, at 23:54, Doug Barton wrote: > I notice you suggested (home)brew as the source of the gpg2 package. Can you say a little about the relative value of that project vs. MacPorts, Fink, or Rudix? From vmaatta at gmail.com Wed Aug 20 15:59:40 2014 From: vmaatta at gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 16:59:40 +0300 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <53F3AB10.2050904@hammernoch.net> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3AB10.2050904@hammernoch.net> Message-ID: <34623B57-2265-46E3-9FDB-94FCBB1F5ED2@gmail.com> I?d actually like to know why the pinentry / pinentry-curses that come from homebrew don?t seem to work at all. I am now using pinentry-mac but I wouldn?t mind getting the normal pinentry working. All I get is "Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.? without any PIN queries. I can see the card is read but it?s not querying for PIN. Pointing gpg-agent to pinentry-mac resolves this for now. -- Ville On 19 Aug 2014, at 22:52, Ludwig H?gelsch?fer wrote: > The supplied pinentry is highly integrated in Mac OS X look and feel > and works reliable - no background/foreground issues like the one from > gpg4win. But I assume, thats windows' fault, mostly. From dougb at dougbarton.us Wed Aug 20 18:36:23 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 09:36:23 -0700 Subject: So on & so forth In-Reply-To: <40E0A653-BA44-4AFA-A559-8C118CB7F798@gmail.com> References: <871tsjdpyl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5A29EB2C-3FD5-49DC-B5EC-9C45C1D95F97@interlog.com> <53F35591.1070400@sixdemonbag.org> <760EE795-0B45-4D03-BD93-ECEDDBCC8B3C@gmail.com> <53F3A691.1000508@dougbarton.us> <08037740-E447-44E7-A1A4-6F129C834008@gmail.com> <53F3B98E.9000203@dougbarton.us> <40E0A653-BA44-4AFA-A559-8C118CB7F798@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53F4CE87.2000603@dougbarton.us> Your valuable insights on this topic are greatly appreciated, Ville. :) Doug From david at gbenet.com Thu Aug 21 15:19:46 2014 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 14:19:46 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -------- Original Message -------- Subject: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 18:02:21 -0400 From: Free Software Foundation Reply-To: Free Software Foundation To: david cooper Dear david, GNU community members and collaborators have discovered threatening details about a five-country government surveillance program codenamed HACIENDA. The good news? Those same hackers have already worked out a free software countermeasure to thwart the program. According to Heise newspaper , the intelligence agencies of the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, have used HACIENDA to map every server in twenty-seven countries, employing a technique known as port scanning. The agencies have shared this map and use it to plan intrusions into the servers. Disturbingly, the HACIENDA system actually hijacks civilian computers to do some of its dirty work, allowing it to leach computing resources and cover its tracks. But this was not enough to stop the team of GNU hackers and their collaborators. After making key discoveries about the details of HACIENDA, Julian Kirsch, Christian Grothoff, Jacob Appelbaum, and Holger Kenn designed the TCP Stealth system to protect unadvertised servers from port scanning. They revealed their work at the recent annual GNU Hackers' Meeting in Germany. You can view a video announcing the discovery on fsf.org. Please be sure to share this with everyone you know who cares about bulk surveillance. We must fight the political battle for an end to mass surveillance and reduce the amount of data collected about people in the first place . On an individual level we have to do everything we can to thwart the surveillance programs that are already in place. *No matter your skill level, you can get involved at the FSF's surveillance page .* Ethical developers inside and outside GNU have been working for years on free software that does not keep secrets from users, and programs that anyone can review to remove potential vulnerabilities. These capabilities give free software users a fighting chance against surveillance. Now, our community is turning its attention to uncovering and undermining insidious programs like HACIENDA. Free software and its ideals are crucial to putting an end to government bulk surveillance. *Share this news with your friends, to help make people aware of the importance of free software in fighting bulk surveillance.* /Jacob Appelbaum of the TCP Stealth team gave a remote keynote address at the FSF's LibrePlanet conference this year. Watch the recording of "Free Software for freedom: Surveillance and you." / Libby Reinish and Zak Rogoff Campaigns Managers /You can view this post online ./ Follow us on GNU social | Subscribe to our blogs via RSS | Join us as an associate member Sent from the Free Software Foundation, 51 Franklin Street Floor 5 Boston, Massachusetts 02110-1301 United States Unsubscribe from this mailing list. Stop all email from the Free Software Foundation, including Defective by Design, and the Free Software Supporter newsletter. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT9fHvAAoJENIbRAX92h7yw2gP/jKM6E+MJ/60m5Hh9Pd5Po/U 86429oQ6oxBhrPbYvGmvhBKEMpVy6ueoHE21cDrsD555JxLecLbwLk1izDLovgbX HLe5utkRsH+t7L5BcvBDMsKfgmmPMxxrG9PxIZHYE5R07taMvs0Wx3+MJytziNrG +UorpWHynOKT4LSbnFXxT0psq+sk6D2bZXXmEcbpr6Rv5+Uf1KF0EukxVi54qtsN 5R4HVZkCmr/fVUIxMEjQpdZTcuNXQHZni2b5LHXXLII72/Rw6bR9Frp1pU29bWl2 4zKeD2D7o7l1tsMiKuLrM0aWPzrdfXbqmZTrqxNew1DFNdr0CdTZhAz/eP76SVj8 4av9WxlN9EEdMQmN1yA6C96pKs6ZDOVfajRmx6O5/aFQjOA8PY8b4AcBtyfbKWK9 n6O3op2xvR6vfPJletqffFuCkCWCmkhU7155gBc3M6rLoxTj9jreCjB4duAnQi23 e6Wt3Kwvq+GH8jUJt30QpzCkeRcPz4wOrPaiO4dMdi1xV3G5/5BB2si+qmWHecuu dKO7dwFo0k0m29z3HINiaXgSw3rggJistm55uG413BN2riM9rU36JqPEyZkbEsBL xRga50tHkykxAk1+6I4lOH2spGz61hyXKc8WpCGbqs3mNqtL7Tmf2ZUyMkn9e9xC 7IEw8w9iWokuvO0NXxnV =w/pn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0xAAD8C47D.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 3909 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 21 15:39:26 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 15:39:26 +0200 Subject: [Announce] Libgcrypt 1.6.2 released Message-ID: <87oave3qsx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hello! The GNU project is pleased to announce the availability of Libgcrypt version 1.6.2. This is a maintenance release to fix problems found in the recently released versions. Libgcrypt is a general purpose library of cryptographic building blocks. It does not provide any implementation of OpenPGP or other protocols. Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required for proper use Libgcrypt. Noteworthy changes in version 1.6.2 (2014-08-21) ================================================ * Map deprecated RSA algo number to the RSA algo number for better backward compatibility. * Support a 0x40 compression prefix for EdDSA. * Improve ARM hardware feature detection and building. * Fix powerpc-apple-darwin detection * Fix building for the x32 ABI platform. * Support building using the latest mingw-w64 toolchain. * Fix some possible NULL deref bugs. Download ======== Source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 (2418k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2.sig That file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.gz (2874k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.1-1.6.2.diff.bz2 (17k) In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the signature of the file libgcrypt-1.6.3.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.6.3.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well known key 1E42B367. To retrieve the keys you may use the command "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com". * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum: sha1sum libgcrypt-1.6.3.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: cc31aca87e4a3769cb86884a3f5982b2cc8eb7ec libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 cdaf2bdd5f34b20f4f9d926536673c15b857d2e6 libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.gz 302592ec4183b727ad07bdd47fc4d50d717f42e2 libgcrypt-1.6.1-1.6.2.diff.bz2 Copying ======= Libgcrypt is distributed under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPLv2.1+). The helper programs as well as the documentation are distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPLv2+). The file LICENSES has notices about contributions that require these additional notices are distributed. Support ======= For help on developing with Libgcrypt you should read the included manual and optional ask on the gcrypt-devel mailing list [1]. A listing with commercial support offers for Libgcrypt and related software is available at the GnuPG web site [2]. The driving force behind the development of Libgcrypt is my company g10 Code. Maintenance and improvement of Libgcrypt and related software takes up most of our resources. To allow us to continue our work on free software, we ask to either purchase a support contract, engage us for custom enhancements, or to donate money: https://gnupg.org/donate/ Thanks ====== Many thanks to all who contributed to Libgcrypt development, be it bug fixes, code, documentation, testing or helping users. Happy hacking, Werner [1] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gcrypt-devel [2] https://www.gnupg.org/service.html -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 21 15:54:17 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 09:54:17 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> > GNU community members and collaborators have discovered threatening > details about a five-country government surveillance program > codenamed HACIENDA. The good news? Those same hackers have already > worked out a free software countermeasure to thwart the program. A little late to the party. This sort of thing's gone on in the private sector for at least six years -- that's when I first encountered a business that continually portscanned the entire IPv4 address space, service identification, and identification of known vulnerabilities against those services. Last I checked there were at least four businesses doing this, and selling their results to anyone who could cough up $10K a year for a subscription. Also note that, contrary to the FSF's press release, this isn't government surveillance. It isn't even surveillance in the usual sense of the word. If you run a public service like HTTP, how is it "surveillance" for someone, anyone, to say "the server sixdemonbag.org, located at IP address 111.222.333.444, is running FooHTTPD 3.17"? That's like driving down the street and reporting on what colors people's houses are and whether they have their garage door open. Distasteful, sure. But "surveillance" seems to mean something more: someone listening in on things that you have good reason to believe are private. From flapflap at riseup.net Thu Aug 21 17:17:42 2014 From: flapflap at riseup.net (flapflap) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 15:17:42 +0000 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> Robert J. Hansen: [snip] > Also note that, contrary to the FSF's press release, this isn't > government surveillance. It isn't even surveillance in the usual sense > of the word. If you run a public service like HTTP, how is it > "surveillance" for someone, anyone, to say "the server sixdemonbag.org, > located at IP address 111.222.333.444, is running FooHTTPD 3.17"? > That's like driving down the street and reporting on what colors > people's houses are and whether they have their garage door open. > > Distasteful, sure. But "surveillance" seems to mean something more: > someone listening in on things that you have good reason to believe are > private. I'm not happy with that definition/understanding of "surveillance". It's not just about "reporting on what colors people's houses are" - it's more about someone going to every door, trying to open it, and noting what kind of door and lock there is. Then, comes back with a key, opens the door, installs cameras and other things. Next, he continues with the next house, but if someone finds him, he says he's you. And then walks to the next house. HACIENDA itself may not be "surveillance", because it is an active attack/attempt to actively connect to a TCP socket and not just (passively) monitoring how other people connect to the server. However on a meta-level (=government), this is surveillace, because they look for "things that you have good reason to believe are private" (remember the slide that lists passwords as publicly available information...). From scrader at carrollu.edu Thu Aug 21 16:58:06 2014 From: scrader at carrollu.edu (Shannon Crader) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 09:58:06 -0500 Subject: [Announce] Libgcrypt 1.6.2 released In-Reply-To: <87oave3qsx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87oave3qsx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE68101D82AC08EEB@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> Hello, Can anyone tell me how to remove myself from this list? I tried sending an email to the email listed on the site, but I haven't gotten a response and still get the emails. Thanks, Shannon -----Original Message----- From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces+scrader=carrollu.edu at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Werner Koch Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 8:39 AM To: gnupg-announce at gnupg.org; info-gnu at gnu.org Cc: gcrypt-devel at gnupg.org Subject: [Announce] Libgcrypt 1.6.2 released Hello! The GNU project is pleased to announce the availability of Libgcrypt version 1.6.2. This is a maintenance release to fix problems found in the recently released versions. Libgcrypt is a general purpose library of cryptographic building blocks. It does not provide any implementation of OpenPGP or other protocols. Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required for proper use Libgcrypt. Noteworthy changes in version 1.6.2 (2014-08-21) ================================================ * Map deprecated RSA algo number to the RSA algo number for better backward compatibility. * Support a 0x40 compression prefix for EdDSA. * Improve ARM hardware feature detection and building. * Fix powerpc-apple-darwin detection * Fix building for the x32 ABI platform. * Support building using the latest mingw-w64 toolchain. * Fix some possible NULL deref bugs. Download ======== Source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 (2418k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2.sig That file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is here: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.gz (2874k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.1-1.6.2.diff.bz2 (17k) In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature. For example to check the signature of the file libgcrypt-1.6.3.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.6.3.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well known key 1E42B367. To retrieve the keys you may use the command "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com". * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum: sha1sum libgcrypt-1.6.3.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: cc31aca87e4a3769cb86884a3f5982b2cc8eb7ec libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 cdaf2bdd5f34b20f4f9d926536673c15b857d2e6 libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.gz 302592ec4183b727ad07bdd47fc4d50d717f42e2 libgcrypt-1.6.1-1.6.2.diff.bz2 Copying ======= Libgcrypt is distributed under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPLv2.1+). The helper programs as well as the documentation are distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPLv2+). The file LICENSES has notices about contributions that require these additional notices are distributed. Support ======= For help on developing with Libgcrypt you should read the included manual and optional ask on the gcrypt-devel mailing list [1]. A listing with commercial support offers for Libgcrypt and related software is available at the GnuPG web site [2]. The driving force behind the development of Libgcrypt is my company g10 Code. Maintenance and improvement of Libgcrypt and related software takes up most of our resources. To allow us to continue our work on free software, we ask to either purchase a support contract, engage us for custom enhancements, or to donate money: https://gnupg.org/donate/ Thanks ====== Many thanks to all who contributed to Libgcrypt development, be it bug fixes, code, documentation, testing or helping users. Happy hacking, Werner [1] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gcrypt-devel [2] https://www.gnupg.org/service.html -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 21 17:41:40 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 11:41:40 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> Message-ID: <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> > I'm not happy with that definition/understanding of "surveillance". It's > not just about "reporting on what colors people's houses are" - it's > more about someone going to every door, trying to open it, and noting > what kind of door and lock there is. Then, comes back with a key, opens > the door, installs cameras and other things. Next, he continues with the > next house, but if someone finds him, he says he's you. And then walks > to the next house. If it escalates to an intrusion, then yes, that's definitely surveillance in my book. Compiling a collection of publicly available information is not. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 21 17:43:26 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 11:43:26 -0400 Subject: [Announce] Libgcrypt 1.6.2 released In-Reply-To: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE68101D82AC08EEB@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> References: <87oave3qsx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE68101D82AC08EEB@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> Message-ID: <53F6139E.2000902@sixdemonbag.org> > Can anyone tell me how to remove myself from this list? Sure. Read any of the emails that get posted to this list. Particularly, please note: > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Go to that URL, scroll down to the bottom where you'll see "To unsubscribe from GnuPG-Users...", enter your email address, click "Unsubscribe," and you're done. It's not hard. From johannes at zarl.at Thu Aug 21 21:35:16 2014 From: johannes at zarl.at (Johannes Zarl) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 21:35:16 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> On Thursday 21 August 2014 11:41:40 Robert J. Hansen wrote: > If it escalates to an intrusion, then yes, that's definitely > surveillance in my book. Compiling a collection of publicly available > information is not. "Compiling a collection of publicly available information" is an almost perfect description of the term "surveillance". E.g. a surveillance camera does exactly that: it collects publicly available information. Your initial example, > That's like driving down the street and reporting on what colors > people's houses are and whether they have their garage door open. , is also a nice example of surveillance. The information is not by definition harmful to anyone, yet has the potential to be used against someone. "Mr. and Mrs. Smith always leave the garage door open in summer, except for one week a year, when they also close the bathroom window." is trivial, maybe even boring information to most people. To someone with bad intent this information might be a lot more interesting. Johannes From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 22 01:16:15 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 19:16:15 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> Message-ID: <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> On 8/21/2014 3:35 PM, Johannes Zarl wrote: > "Compiling a collection of publicly available information" is an > almost perfect description of the term "surveillance". E.g. a > surveillance camera does exactly that: it collects publicly available > information. So does the phone book, Wikipedia, and IMDB. We don't call them surveillance. > The information is not by definition harmful to anyone, yet has the > potential to be used against someone. Name me any piece of non-trivial information which doesn't have the potential to be used against someone. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 3744 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From gabriel.niebler at gmail.com Fri Aug 22 00:46:38 2014 From: gabriel.niebler at gmail.com (Gabriel Niebler) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 00:46:38 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I'm sorry, I know this is OT for the list, but... Am 21.08.2014 um 15:54 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: >> GNU community members and collaborators have discovered >> threatening details about a five-country government surveillance >> program codenamed HACIENDA. (...) (...) > Also note that, contrary to the FSF's press release, this isn't > government surveillance. It isn't even surveillance in the usual > sense of the word. (...) On the contrary, IMO this sort of thing is fully encompassed by the word surveillance, at least as far as I have always understood it. Otherwise any surveillance camera installed in a public or publicly accessible place would not be one, by definition, since it is only gathering publicly available information. After all, when I go out of the house I cannot reasonably expect to have all my actions and whereabouts remain private. I might meet someone I know who would then know where and when they saw me. And yet, if I was being either (a) systematically tracked through cameras and face recognition software, or (b) followed by people/drones (or (c), both) so my every step (in public, mind) would be recorded, then I would absolutely call that surveillance. What else could it possibly be? And if a system was put in place that would simply track everyone as in (a), then what else could we call it but mass surveillance? And yet, it's only gathering publicly available information. Of course, surveillance, _can_ mean a lot more than that: > (...) But "surveillance" seems to mean something more: someone > listening in on things that you have good reason to believe are > private. I would call that espionage, snooping, spying etc., but yes, this also absolutely falls under the heading of surveillance. It's just one facet, though. Cheers gabe -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJT9nbHAAoJEO7XEikU4kSzPb0IALtekGE2FrH2p/J2mTcBq73o 5yIzc3g3pVzRUbFE01JXYluZGxVgSmJabF9dcnjhZyeGIlN5GxncLln9Bo0CdJKo rjMjpysWYQFiKFTrN4TVWkpfTDN/PhbnCrNYQiHjk07QbFCG8YOvO0p4bwDxAED7 8Wnmq5UyHqCRvv55UerXbvEuYky36EoF5JHtDidv/6ioO9l66+7a0jgoWuD1ovWq kGAPy53NheLlDqqx0MDdb4t70YTrImZma0/Cvd4ucD0L2oBygSmIFnFeYyl3lNaS 9cVd/91yRQ+QEuKwdSLbtgkcybpcY8t9G1uzKqF5Bv9PeDv3xjNCpnC/ZN2TsRs= =zyGr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Fri Aug 22 02:05:41 2014 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 18:05:41 -0600 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20140822000539.GO16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 12:46:38AM +0200, Gabriel Niebler wrote: > On the contrary, IMO this sort of thing is fully encompassed by the > word surveillance, at least as far as I have always understood it. > Otherwise any surveillance camera installed in a public or publicly > accessible place would not be one, by definition, since it is only > gathering publicly available information. Just to get pedantic, according to Wikipedia [1]: Surveillance is the monitoring of the behavior, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing or protecting them. This can include observation from a distance by means of electronic equipment (such as CCTV cameras), or interception of electronically transmitted information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls); and it can include simple, relatively no- or low-technology methods such as human intelligence agents and postal interception. The word surveillance comes from a French phrase for "watching over" ("sur" means "from above" and "veiller" means "to watch"), and is in contrast to more recent developments such as sousveillance. 1- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance From that, I gather that surveillance is to gather information with the intent of "influencing, managing, directing, or protecting [people]". HACIENDA is gathering public information, with the intent to "plan intrusions into the servers". That seems pretty clear to me that HACIENDA is indeed a surveillance program. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 502 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gnupg at oneiroi.net Fri Aug 22 01:29:51 2014 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Filip M. Nowak) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 01:29:51 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F680EF.3090308@oneiroi.net> Hi, > Name me any piece of non-trivial information which doesn't have the > potential to be used against someone. What do you mean by non-trivial? Regards, Filip From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 22 04:17:30 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 22:17:30 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140822000539.GO16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> <20140822000539.GO16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> Message-ID: <53F6A83A.1050109@sixdemonbag.org> > Just to get pedantic, according to Wikipedia [1]: First, thank you for citing a definition rather than using a loose handle on a notion. I genuinely appreciate it! > That seems pretty clear to me that HACIENDA is indeed a surveillance program. It also means that a newspaper reporting on the outcome of a soccer match is a surveillance program, since it influences the outcome of gamblers who have twenty euros on the game. I respectfully submit that once the definition is broadened that far, the word ceases to have probative value. But if that's the definition people want to use, then I'll just shrug, register my objection, and move on. :) From galex-713 at galex-713.eu Fri Aug 22 11:38:18 2014 From: galex-713 at galex-713.eu (Garreau, Alexandre) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 11:38:18 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Thu, 21 Aug 2014 19:16:15 -0400") References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <8sjv35kziaio.07y.xxuns.g6.gal@galex-713.eu> On 2014-08-22 at 01:16, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 8/21/2014 3:35 PM, Johannes Zarl wrote: >> "Compiling a collection of publicly available information" is an >> almost perfect description of the term "surveillance". E.g. a >> surveillance camera does exactly that: it collects publicly available >> information. > > So does the phone book, Wikipedia, and IMDB. We don't call them > surveillance. The difference in the relation we have with information is who does it concern: when it concerns everybody (like Science, information about politics, events, Philosophy, Art, etc. what generally is what Wikipedia contains, aka ?encyclopedic informations?), it should be shared among everyone, and not doing so is taking part in some kind of oppression (like stopping people from sharing a software); when it concerns only some people (like private information, one-to-one communication, etc.) it should be keep secret amoung the few people it concerns, otherwise it is also taking part in some kind of oppression (like surveilling, spying, controlling). That?s why we ask for more transparency from the powerfull and more privacy to the weak. When someone watch the tweets of some friends of some person discussing with some others, while not knowing and not being interested of it, even if it doesn?t concerns her, just to spy the person, it *is* surveillance. Though Twitter haven?t sophisticated privacy features like circles or groups, so it?s possible even if it?s not always a good thing. The same applies to IP. In this case, it does concern only the person owning the house what color is it, what is the model of door, of lock, of key and how to open it. So even if it?s ?publicly available information? (like in Twitter, Facebook, or any potentially privacy-harmful social network) it shouldn?t be collected without hurting someone?s freedom, so here the usefulness of the GNU patch for it :) From nico.josuttis at t-online.de Fri Aug 22 18:13:54 2014 From: nico.josuttis at t-online.de (Nicolai Josuttis) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 18:13:54 +0200 Subject: email verification as casual checking? Message-ID: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> Hi, to deal with faked keys, some guys had the idea to use email verification and let then certification servers take that as "casual signing". For example: - Some guy might create a key using a mail client - That key is then automatically sent by the email client to a server, which can be used as key server - The key server sends a confirmation request to the email address(es) of the registered key - If the confirmation recipient confirms that he/she registered the key, the key server certifies this key as casual checked. THAT IS, the key server would automatically certify the correctness of the association between the key and the email address as casual signing. The big advantage would be to have a simple way to validate keys. The big disadvantage beside some details (such as registering additional email addresses) is probably that PGP signatures usually sign the owner, not his/her email address, if I understood it correctly. Although regarding signature types, we state in RFC4880: > Please note that the vagueness of these meanings is not a flaw, > but a feature of the system. But we could mark this kind of automatically certifying key server as special so that people (are able to) know what they do when they trust this key server and therefore its casual signed keys. What do you think about this idea? Was it ever discussed? -- Nicolai M. Josuttis www.josuttis.de PGP Fingerprint: EA25 EF48 BF20 01E4 1FAB 0C1C DEF9 FC80 8A1C 44D0 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Aug 22 20:03:04 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 14:03:04 -0400 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> Message-ID: <53F785D8.8040406@sixdemonbag.org> > to deal with faked keys, some guys had the idea to use email > verification and let then certification servers take that as "casual > signing". I think the first people to do this were at PGP Security (pre-PGP Corporation; this was when PGP Security was owned by Network Associates). The PGP Global Directory worked basically this way. > The big disadvantage beside some details (such as registering > additional email addresses) is probably that PGP signatures usually > sign the owner, not his/her email address, if I understood it > correctly. Not necessarily so. The RFCs define syntax for signatures, but not semantics. The semantics are left up to each individual user to determine. > What do you think about this idea? Was it ever discussed? Not only was it discussed, it was implemented and ran for years. The Global Directory may still be running, for all I know. However, the Global Directory didn't really solve any of PGP's usability problems. Was it worth doing? Yes. Did it live up to the hopes people had for it? Not really. From dougb at dougbarton.us Fri Aug 22 20:41:06 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 11:41:06 -0700 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F785D8.8040406@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> <53F785D8.8040406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F78EC2.6020705@dougbarton.us> On 8/22/14 11:03 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > The Global Directory may still be running, for all I know. It is. I have my primary key there if for no other reason than because it gives me an LDAP server to play with. :) Doug From branko at majic.rs Fri Aug 22 20:50:19 2014 From: branko at majic.rs (Branko Majic) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 20:50:19 +0200 Subject: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <8761hzsafw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87egwruvz1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20140809225257.129e7843@zetkin.primekey.se> <8761hzsafw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20140822205019.74892181@zetkin.primekey.se> On Mon, 11 Aug 2014 10:21:55 +0200 Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 9 Aug 2014 22:52, branko at majic.rs said: > > > Skimming through the description, does it mean that users with OpenPGP > > cards should be impervious to this attack? Can the attack be used to > > leak symmetric keys during the GnuPG operation? > > It is unlikely that this particular attack can be used against smart > cards. They are quite different from a general purpose PC. Modern > cards are designed to mitigate many classes of side-channel attacks > since cards started to be targeted more than 25 years ago. > > The private keys are only on the card and not accessible from the PC. > I should've been more specific with my question (or perhaps I misunderstood the answer a bit :) If I understand correctly (please do correct me if not), when encrypting/decrypting a file with GnuPG using an OpenPGP card, a symmetric key is created that will encrypt the file, and subsequently this symmetric key will be encrypted using the OpenPGP card, with the encrypted symmetric key becoming part of the encrypted file. This symmetric key is generated outside of the OpenPGP card (if I got it right), and encryption/decryption of a file itself is performed outside of the OpenPGP card (i.e. on host computer). Can the attack be used to obtain this symmetric key for encrypting the file during encryption/decryption operations performed by GnuPG? Best regards P.S. Sorry for the original lost quote, I'll try to keep 'em shorter :) -- Branko Majic Jabber: branko at majic.rs Please use only Free formats when sending attachments to me. ?????? ????? ?????: branko at majic.rs ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ????????? ? ????????? ?????????. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rejo at zenger.nl Fri Aug 22 21:13:33 2014 From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 21:13:33 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <8sjv35kziaio.07y.xxuns.g6.gal@galex-713.eu> References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> <8sjv35kziaio.07y.xxuns.g6.gal@galex-713.eu> Message-ID: <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> ++ 22/08/14 11:38 +0200 - Garreau, Alexandre: >The difference in the relation we have with information is who does it >concern: when it concerns everybody (like Science, information about >politics, events, Philosophy, Art, etc. what generally is what Wikipedia >contains, aka ?encyclopedic informations?), it should be shared among >everyone, and not doing so is taking part in some kind of oppression >(like stopping people from sharing a software); when it concerns only [...] That's an interesting point of view - or there is some misunderstanding on my end. Let's say the NSA does not only surveil all kinds of communications as it does right now, but it also publishes this information ("open data" in governmental speak), then there is no oppression according to you? -- Rejo Zenger E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl OpenPGP 1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532 A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4 XMPP OTR 271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF 4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 931 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dougb at dougbarton.us Fri Aug 22 21:39:23 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 12:39:23 -0700 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> <8sjv35kziaio.07y.xxuns.g6.gal@galex-713.eu> <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> Message-ID: <53F79C6B.9040109@dougbarton.us> Can I ask that the whole discussion of what is or is not "surveillance" be taken off line somewhere? It really doesn't matter what we call it, the interesting bit here is that we know all kinds of data are being collected by all kinds of folks. That leaves open the (IMO much more interesting) question of what we can DO to protect our communication channels. Doug From cspitzer at godaddy.com Fri Aug 22 21:30:58 2014 From: cspitzer at godaddy.com (Charles Spitzer) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:30:58 +0000 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> <8sjv35kziaio.07y.xxuns.g6.gal@galex-713.eu> <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> Message-ID: <90b8c2057d0645218b8cb8d16ed22845@BLUPR02MB066.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Or, to put it another way: security through obscurity is ok. as long as no one finds out, or goes looking for, public information, everything's hidden well enough. Regards, Charlie 602.420.4123 -----Original Message----- From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Rejo Zenger Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:14 PM To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back ++ 22/08/14 11:38 +0200 - Garreau, Alexandre: >The difference in the relation we have with information is who does it >concern: when it concerns everybody (like Science, information about >politics, events, Philosophy, Art, etc. what generally is what >Wikipedia contains, aka ?encyclopedic informations?), it should be >shared among everyone, and not doing so is taking part in some kind of >oppression (like stopping people from sharing a software); when it >concerns only [...] That's an interesting point of view - or there is some misunderstanding on my end. Let's say the NSA does not only surveil all kinds of communications as it does right now, but it also publishes this information ("open data" in governmental speak), then there is no oppression according to you? -- Rejo Zenger E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl OpenPGP 1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532 A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4 XMPP OTR 271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF 4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF From galex-713 at galex-713.eu Sat Aug 23 06:44:28 2014 From: galex-713 at galex-713.eu (Garreau, Alexandre) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 06:44:28 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> (Rejo Zenger's message of "Fri, 22 Aug 2014 21:13:33 +0200") References: <53F60D96.2060804@riseup.net> <53F61334.5050501@sixdemonbag.org> <1729782.oXvYbZ4YCK@mani> <53F67DBF.5030309@sixdemonbag.org> <8sjv35kziaio.07y.xxuns.g6.gal@galex-713.eu> <20140822191333.GA11949@ix.home> Message-ID: On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: > ++ 22/08/14 11:38 +0200 - Garreau, Alexandre: >> The difference in the relation we have with information is who does >> it concern: when it concerns everybody (like Science, information >> about politics, events, Philosophy, Art, etc. what generally is what >> Wikipedia contains, aka ?encyclopedic informations?), it should be >> shared among everyone, and not doing so is taking part in some kind >> of oppression (like stopping people from sharing a software); when it >> concerns only >> [?] > > That's an interesting point of view - or there is some misunderstanding > on my end. Let's say the NSA does not only surveil all kinds of > communications as it does right now, but it also publishes this > information ("open data" in governmental speak), then there is no > oppression according to you? I didn?t say it was related to what usage was made of information or to whom it was available but to *who it concerns*. Actually if you publish private information it changes nothing: it remains private information concerning only its initial possessor, and making other people acknowledge it is giving them power an harm to the freedom of one who has her privacy harmed. Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 948 bytes Desc: not available URL: From nico.josuttis at t-online.de Sat Aug 23 09:12:14 2014 From: nico.josuttis at t-online.de (Nicolai Josuttis) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 09:12:14 +0200 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F785D8.8040406@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> <53F785D8.8040406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <53F83ECE.3080203@josuttis.de> Hmm, if I try to use keyserver.pgp.com as enigmail key server it neither accepts public keys I want to upload nor gives responses to searches of emails I know they have. Am I missing something or does this key server only work on a manual copy&paste or upload/download base? My question was about a real key server supporting the usual key server protocol with the additional features to a) verify email addresses of keys b) serves as element in the WoT so that I can use the server a trusted address, so that all keys signed by this server count as trusted (if I like) Am 22.08.2014 20:03, Robert J. Hansen schrieb/wrote: >> to deal with faked keys, some guys had the idea to use email >> verification and let then certification servers take that as "casual >> signing". > > I think the first people to do this were at PGP Security (pre-PGP > Corporation; this was when PGP Security was owned by Network > Associates). The PGP Global Directory worked basically this way. > >> The big disadvantage beside some details (such as registering >> additional email addresses) is probably that PGP signatures usually >> sign the owner, not his/her email address, if I understood it >> correctly. > > Not necessarily so. The RFCs define syntax for signatures, but not > semantics. The semantics are left up to each individual user to determine. > >> What do you think about this idea? Was it ever discussed? > > Not only was it discussed, it was implemented and ran for years. The > Global Directory may still be running, for all I know. > > However, the Global Directory didn't really solve any of PGP's usability > problems. Was it worth doing? Yes. Did it live up to the hopes people > had for it? Not really. > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -- Nicolai M. Josuttis www.josuttis.de PGP Fingerprint: EA25 EF48 BF20 01E4 1FAB 0C1C DEF9 FC80 8A1C 44D0 From dougb at dougbarton.us Sat Aug 23 10:49:40 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 01:49:40 -0700 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F83ECE.3080203@josuttis.de> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> <53F785D8.8040406@sixdemonbag.org> <53F83ECE.3080203@josuttis.de> Message-ID: <53F855A4.6080006@dougbarton.us> On 8/23/14 12:12 AM, Nicolai Josuttis wrote: > if I try to use keyserver.pgp.com as enigmail key server > it neither accepts public keys I want to upload > nor gives responses to searches of emails I know they have. > > Am I missing something or does this key server only > work on a manual copy&paste or upload/download base? The keyserver interface is read-only, you cannot upload keys to it. You can only do that via the web page, and it will only accept your upload after you have verified your e-mail address. IMO that's a feature, and I wish the "regular" keyservers did not accept any key from any person. (And yes, I know this is a harder problem than it sounds, just sayin') :) The following commands both worked as expected for me: gpg --keyserver ldap://keyserver.pgp.com --recv-keys 1a1abc84 gpg: requesting key 1A1ABC84 from ldap server keyserver.pgp.com gpg: key 1A1ABC84: "Douglas Barton " 2 new signatures gpg: key 1A1ABC84: "Douglas Barton " 2 signatures cleaned gpg --keyserver ldap://keyserver.pgp.com --search-keys dougb at dougbarton.us gpg: searching for "dougb at dougbarton.us" from ldap server keyserver.pgp.com (1) Douglas Barton 2048 bit RSA key 1A1ABC84, created: 2010-03-23 Keys 1-1 of 1 for "dougb at dougbarton.us". Enter number(s), N)ext, or Q)uit > 1 gpg: requesting key 1A1ABC84 from ldap server keyserver.pgp.com gpg: key 1A1ABC84: "Douglas Barton " not changed gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: unchanged: 1 FYI, their server is LDAP-only, so if your install does not include that capability it might explain why your attempt failed. hth, Doug From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Sat Aug 23 12:18:18 2014 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 03:18:18 -0700 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> Message-ID: <53F86A6A.50201@fifthhorseman.net> On 08/22/2014 09:13 AM, Nicolai Josuttis wrote: > THAT IS, the key server would automatically certify the correctness > of the association between the key and the email address as casual signing. as others have noted in this thread, this behavior is what the "PGP Global Directory" does. I'm not convinced this service needs to be a keyserver itself: it could just be a keysigning e-mail service, which sends its certifications back to the requestor, who then gets to decide what to do with them (upload them to the public keyservers, keep them local, whatever). Such a service could of course remember recent certifications and avoid making new ones over a given period, so it could not be used to flood the keyservers. That is: this sounds like a certification service, not a keyserver service to me. I also don't think that such a service should mark its certifications as "casual signing" -- cert-levels aren't actually useful in today's environmet, as i've written before: https://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/98 if this particular service has a signing policy that just verifies the e-mail parts but not the full name, then people deciding whether to rely on its certifications can factor that signing policy into their considerations. fwiw, PGP Global Directory certifications are all "generic certifications" (i checked by looking at Doug Barton's keys on the public keyserver), which i think is reasonable. > The big advantage would be to have a simple way to validate > keys. well, it could provide some level of validation about *something* about the keys, for people willing to rely on a set of third-parties and networks. > The big disadvantage beside some details (such as registering > additional email addresses) is probably that PGP signatures > usually sign the owner, not his/her email address, > if I understood it correctly. Typical OpenPGP certifications cover a primary key and a User ID. Since the User ID is a UTF-8 string, which is (by convention) a human-readable name with an RFC 822 e-mail address (but can be anything). Such a service would clearly need to limit the types of User IDs it certifies (and never certify user attributes). I'm not sure i'd want to rely on this service myself, but it doesn't seem like it would be hard to implement (though some of the anti-DoS measures might be a bit tricky), and having a reasonably-implemented service like this in existence wouldn't cause me any heartburn. --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 949 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Sat Aug 23 12:56:11 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 12:56:11 +0200 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> Message-ID: <53F8734B.10404@nordnet.fr> On 22/08/14 18:13, Nicolai Josuttis wrote: > to deal with faked keys, some guys had the idea to use > email verification and let then certification servers > take that as "casual signing". I take it that a 'faked key' in this context is one associated with an unverified email address. If I send an encrypted message to that email address, two possible outcomes occur to me : - the email address belongs to some other person who does not control the key and he can't open it. Not much problem here. My secret remains hidden. - the email address belongs to a person who does control the key and he may or may not be the person named in the email address. I am risking my secrets with an unknown person. I had better take care of the nature of those secrets. It looks like this is the case covered by your original post. What extra security does a key server certification give in this case ? It just says that if you use this key with this email address, the email will be delivered to someone who controls both the address and the key. In any case, there is always the possibility that this 'certified' person or key is actually controlled by someone else. I have difficulty in seeing what additional security is provided by a casual signature, given by a key-server or by any other party. Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From dan at geer.org Sat Aug 23 12:16:53 2014 From: dan at geer.org (dan at geer.org) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 06:16:53 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sat, 23 Aug 2014 06:44:28 +0200." Message-ID: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> > On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: > > Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, > like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private information fade, per se? I believe it does. We Are All Intelligence Officers Now http://geer.tinho.net/geer.rsa.28ii14.txt --dan From mbauer at mailbox.org Sat Aug 23 17:06:42 2014 From: mbauer at mailbox.org (Mathias Bauer) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 17:06:42 +0200 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> Message-ID: <20140823150642.GA29476@mailbox.org> Hi, * Nicolai Josuttis wrote on Fri, 22 Aug 2014, at 18:13 (+0200): > to deal with faked keys, some guys had the idea to use email > verification and let then certification servers take that as > "casual signing". [...] What do you think about this idea? > Was it ever discussed? this has already been implemented and improved by CAcert: Fundamentally, CAcert is known for (a) issuing X.509 certificates to its members and for (b) building and operating a large Web of Trust. I think, (b) is more important. Also, CAcert offers the possibility to certify the user IDs of its members' OpenPGP keys. This basically works as follows: - First, you have to create a CAcert account. This requires an email address which is verified to be under your control. - Then you try to get your identity assured. You meet face-to-face with at least two assurers and present them at least one (two are preferred) photo IDs issued by a government. Depending on the assurers' experience you receive so called assurance points. - If you have collected 50+ assurance points, you could get your OpenPGP key's user ID(s) certified automatically. This certification expires after one year and is a generic one (0x10) instead of a casual one (0x12) (RFC 4880). See my key for details. - Of course, you can add additional verified(!) email addresses and also get them certified. I think, this process is far better than any mere email address validation service because OpenPGP certificates do cover the whole user ID. And it does *not* contain an email address only! Usually there is a name, too! The downside for this automatic process to work is, of course (but not really), that a user ID is forced to have a certain format. Have a look at http://www.cacert.org and http://wiki.cacert.org for further details. Regards, Mathias -- CAcert Assurer Do you want to encrypt your mail? Then join CAcert and get your SSL certificate from https://www.CAcert.org. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask. OpenPGP: ID 0x44C3983FA7629DE8 - http://www.sks-keyservers.net Fingerprint: B100 5DC4 9686 BE64 87E9 0E22 44C3 983F A762 9DE8 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: not available URL: From galex-713 at galex-713.eu Sat Aug 23 18:17:34 2014 From: galex-713 at galex-713.eu (Garreau, Alexandre) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 18:17:34 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> (dan@geer.org's message of "Sat, 23 Aug 2014 06:16:53 -0400") References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: On 2014-08-23 at 12:16, dan at geer.org wrote: >> On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: >> Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, >> like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. > > Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media > and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private > information fade, per se? I believe it does. It will be when any kind of authority (thus hierarchy) or intolerance (thus ignorance/inconsciousness) would have *perfectly disappeared*. Whenever it?s possible or not, we can still see that today it isn?t so, therefore privacy still has importance. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 948 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dan at geer.org Sun Aug 24 04:08:19 2014 From: dan at geer.org (dan at geer.org) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 22:08:19 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sat, 23 Aug 2014 18:17:34 +0200." Message-ID: <20140824020820.0BDB622808E@palinka.tinho.net> | On 2014-08-23 at 12:16, dan at geer.org wrote: | >> On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: | >> Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, | >> like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. | > | > Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media | > and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private | > information fade, per se? I believe it does. | | It will be when any kind of authority (thus hierarchy) or intolerance | (thus ignorance/inconsciousness) would have *perfectly disappeared*. | Whenever it's possible or not, we can still see that today it isn't so, | therefore privacy still has importance. Given that Philosophical and legal analysis has often identified privacy as a precondition for the development of a coherent self. -- Phil Agre, "The Architecture of Identity," 1998 one must conclude that it is a mortal peril to give up privacy, at least before, as you said, evil has disappeared from the face of the Earth. My point was and is simply that nearly everything is now observable IN PUBLIC. Technology makes this possible but it social media and sensor networks through which that technology brings observability of the heretofore unobservable to the attention of whomever wants it. That trend cannot be undone, ergo, I said in the speech, [W]e are becoming a society of informants. In short, I have nowhere to hide from you. This being the gnupg list, we are likely now in a rat hole, but if we are not yet there, then let me ask a question: Many's the member of this list who posts under a pseudonym. Is pseudonymous posting a privacy-preserving tactic or something else? --dan From mirimir at riseup.net Sun Aug 24 05:15:45 2014 From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir) Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 21:15:45 -0600 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140824020820.0BDB622808E@palinka.tinho.net> References: <20140824020820.0BDB622808E@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <53F958E1.6040603@riseup.net> On 08/23/2014 08:08 PM, dan at geer.org wrote: > > | On 2014-08-23 at 12:16, dan at geer.org wrote: > | >> On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: > | >> Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, > | >> like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. > | > > | > Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media > | > and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private > | > information fade, per se? I believe it does. > | > | It will be when any kind of authority (thus hierarchy) or intolerance > | (thus ignorance/inconsciousness) would have *perfectly disappeared*. > | Whenever it's possible or not, we can still see that today it isn't so, > | therefore privacy still has importance. > > > Given that > > Philosophical and legal analysis has often identified privacy > as a precondition for the development of a coherent self. > -- Phil Agre, "The Architecture of Identity," 1998 > > one must conclude that it is a mortal peril to give up privacy, > at least before, as you said, evil has disappeared from the face > of the Earth. > > My point was and is simply that nearly everything is now observable > IN PUBLIC. Technology makes this possible but it social media and > sensor networks through which that technology brings observability > of the heretofore unobservable to the attention of whomever wants > it. That trend cannot be undone, ergo, I said in the speech, > > [W]e are becoming a society of informants. In short, I have > nowhere to hide from you. > > This being the gnupg list, we are likely now in a rat hole, but if > we are not yet there, then let me ask a question: Many's the member > of this list who posts under a pseudonym. Is pseudonymous posting > a privacy-preserving tactic or something else? > > --dan Pseudonymous posting is (of course) a privacy-preserving tactic. I'm not sure what you mean by "or something else". Privacy is rather orthogonal to good vs evil, if that's what you're getting at. My response to the panopticon involves fragmenting my observable activity among multiple personae. Each persona has its unique set of interests and activities. Some, such as mirimir, are stable and very public. Others are very transient, and private. Each is appropriately isolated from my true identity, and from the other personae, through such technologies as virtual machines, VPN services, Tor and JonDonym. It's true that none of my personae use smartphones and other tracking devices. But that's just because relevant technologies for spoofing identity, location and so on are too immature. I have faith in the Guardian Project. From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Sun Aug 24 16:48:18 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 16:48:18 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 Message-ID: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> Hi, I'm looking for some help here please. I'm trying to install 2.0.26 using the ./configure, make, make install procedure. This is something completely unknown to me and this is a first time attempt at this sort of thing in linux. I downloaded the tar.bz2 file and checked its signature ok. I extracted it into /usr/local/src and then read the readme and install files. I noted the dependencies and the order to install them. So I downloaded the libgpg-error-1.9.tar.bz2 file and set about extracting, configure, make, make install. All seemed to go ok and it was rapid. Then I started on libgcrypt - - I downloaded libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 file from gnupg. When I ran ./configure on /usr/local/src/libgcrypt-1.6.2, the last few lines in the terminal are : last few lines ... ....whether NEON support is requested... yes checking whether a -O flag munging is requested... yes checking whether to enable AMD64 as(1) feature detection... yes checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no configure: error: libgpg-error is needed. See ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/ . Looks to me as though it thinks gpg-error cannot be found. Is this correct ? But I can see that the install I did of libgpg-error had created the following two files in /usr/local/bin : gpg-error-config and gpg-error (executable) How come they don't seem to be found when running ./configure on libgcrypt? What did I miss out ? All advice welcome - thanks. Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5617 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Sun Aug 24 18:23:22 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 18:23:22 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> On 24/08/14 17:29, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote: > On 08/24/2014 04:48 PM, Philip Jackson wrote: >> I noted the dependencies and the order to install them. So I >> downloaded the libgpg-error-1.9.tar.bz2 file and set about >> extracting, configure, make, make install. All seemed to go ok and >> it was rapid. > > Why download 1.9 when... > > >> Then I started on libgcrypt - - I downloaded >> libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 file from gnupg. > > >> checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config >> checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no configure: error: >> libgpg-error is needed. See >> ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/ . > > > .. 1.11 is required ? Download the latest version and try again > Wow, that's a pretty dumb mistake to make. I just assumed the latest version was at the bottom of the list on the ftp page. Sorry about that. Thanks, Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5617 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Sun Aug 24 17:29:33 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 17:29:33 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/24/2014 04:48 PM, Philip Jackson wrote: > Hi, > ... > > I noted the dependencies and the order to install them. So I > downloaded the libgpg-error-1.9.tar.bz2 file and set about > extracting, configure, make, make install. All seemed to go ok and > it was rapid. Why download 1.9 when... > > Then I started on libgcrypt - - I downloaded > libgcrypt-1.6.2.tar.bz2 file from gnupg. > ... > checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config > checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no configure: error: > libgpg-error is needed. See > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/ . > .. 1.11 is required ? Download the latest version and try again - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- "Expect the best. Prepare for the worst. Capitalize on what comes." (Zig Ziglar) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT+gTbAAoJEPw7F94F4TagwNsP/j6U8zoEKVSqQJ1Uc3Io6YA2 HlrFtLFZX4XlxNkQ52jSBCiw+K8UyH6OlBFAKSf0gdTbBDOcHcMXAEGZEaH51dRz dLCfETjh8pMwlbbP0GOsqvH2j3+M/tziyjQ+coAZQgO3/SPWK0Ys9SyThDKVL4Ix MsGb2jBUSdQoeVuRbcg1mqT2bydWJeRGth5eoYPbJ3jc+QDYH9YwOIEeCLBEdNq3 ieHQJu4Yp60wl8E8v/fGkJy5l7HqgxbBuWSjj1ppbuwD3BeIE5bQJ5mrJiu4Gfk0 b+xxJvzy9tqIcqkCib+9jw31cqs+KpH6Gjw3XibFVq7q+P8RUEyZIBG3ylSjsROn wJB7uZazJVxtU5Ux90JDHjbI29bIq/IroARonGvHGZruHwG6JeQMJ1oKd/4OY6Rj X7iCF45OtyfMFfksfUbw622Xqej+LjJKcYvYPJdlwbDJor6Utq8CgL0xfVdg27Dj ZhqHJ5gTjLYPpi6N8Ss0g5Am8d+SwipGZ0jCj3pGJtk2Dnxo6dZ001ZFQhbjqmXH 6s1hB2ROJ7csRw0iDj06BPjTnjdjwDOMWCCmFtsukloq5NK0Lt5BAFB91MCDWu0n iN8XSlKHi267Xf/08prEF65NjCigg8hgBK0m/Ikbl5eipRZkIcWmVti0d6z7iG0L Ff4O/KJA5K+NTy/uvnPn =dTmF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Aug 24 18:26:45 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 18:26:45 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53FA1245.4040500@digitalbrains.com> (Note that I don't build my own gnupg; Debian releases security updates for the distribution-provided binaries and there aren't any new features that I need, hence I'm satistfied using what my distro provides. I'm just giving general advice, never having done it myself) On 24/08/14 16:48, Philip Jackson wrote: > So I downloaded the > libgpg-error-1.9.tar.bz2 file > checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config > checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no > configure: error: libgpg-error is needed. > See ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/ . > > > Looks to me as though it thinks gpg-error cannot be found. Is this correct ? It looks like it could find it, but it is objecting that you installed version 1.9, needing at least version 1.11. So you need to install a later version. I would remove any files installed by the old version before you install the new one. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Aug 24 19:22:52 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 19:22:52 +0200 Subject: (OT) installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53FA1F6C.9060203@digitalbrains.com> On 24/08/14 18:23, Philip Jackson wrote: > Wow, that's a pretty dumb mistake to make. I just assumed the latest version > was at the bottom of the list on the ftp page. Doesn't sound very dumb to me; it's just a regular mistake even if you knew that directories are often sorted in this really basic sorting order. Your mind doesn't sort numbers according to ASCII representation. My graphical file manager, Thunar (XFCE), sorts such things as one would expect, comparing numerical substrings according to numerical value rather than ASCII representation[1]. It's a really useful little detail that helps in such cases. Alhtough I've often made the reverse mistake, looking for version 20 between 2 and 3 :D. I would welcome it if they ever put this into ls and bash completion, so it also worked like that on the command line. Peter. [1] At least, that's how I assume it works. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From olav at enigmail.net Sun Aug 24 23:08:32 2014 From: olav at enigmail.net (Olav Seyfarth) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 23:08:32 +0200 Subject: default encrypt to multiple keys Message-ID: <53FA5450.40906@enigmail.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 In gpg.conf I have set these two options default-key 2C8E43DAEBB23B3E668AF459A197DF6B6AE1EF56 default-recipient-self These worked fine for one key. I now want to use two, in other words: every message and file I encrypt shall also be encrypted to BOTH my private keys (one card based, one Smartphone). What would be the best way to achieve this? Olav -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Dies ist eine elektronische Signatur - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQGcBAEBAwAGBQJT+lRNAAoJEKGX32tq4e9WQPAL/0GBl+GiIleXch4wKrfMbdve 3/tBFchA56c++XaxF7BVYQRVtcNnx1rL4Bh+p5xOC36UJyaS5O5UKJLgoiJ8kYtl AfZGcCeBOrtaBY+SCfD+CGgBzM8kZffd0muW1wOBZh/1FoEGwRsMWG36zZH73G1U Q5fGeI8gq92+n9ouyzc4QCVQtn/lew2Pj962dAGJ/pHG4KiQ7FsgzVWshUP5hSZq SZkyJkEPv//FVNL2ruOMXTpqQ+uz1HrrtTVMWxDErYE3lzReH31VWT1CNacUie// 5/4AkxThYFTzotWLX0q1mJnObwDOcLng37pEECcdUbUXeMTKRTDLDRRFDoWNaS5o Zh2F8dC5eigilDLaRcoZ7wJKGDFgoG0s4la5eQfotIfBfv9x5GQmi6EEcI+ttBll QOKbaauiPLg/VVUz8i13n7qcOjQ7L8xUns03FsqS+tza8AqZ+Lp/RYyreMoasBYV p/d/6gzXqN67RWyF5Vb7yollEmu2W3ih87i9PX7Cjg== =dtJ3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Sun Aug 24 23:15:28 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 23:15:28 +0200 Subject: default encrypt to multiple keys In-Reply-To: <53FA5450.40906@enigmail.net> References: <53FA5450.40906@enigmail.net> Message-ID: <53FA55F0.8030304@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/24/2014 11:08 PM, Olav Seyfarth wrote: > In gpg.conf I have set these two options default-key > 2C8E43DAEBB23B3E668AF459A197DF6B6AE1EF56 default-recipient-self Look into the encrypt-to option - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- Fabricando fit faber Practice makes perfect -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT+lXrAAoJEPw7F94F4Tag8jcQAJrPvEMnT1bjiyDsi+9goyAj yF5WMC2ETcOwpP33BwwajfZN6SCQu0z+JFAbg1CYvr9mZ3zA9U+fxYDgK/eWHaj8 +1L66OcZaiouZuDnQ/p+9MzpzdlVGyke+LtizL3pbVqG9B6/n4rcN7xTva995ED+ OvCf6MvPMFAY8lPYxx4dr4Db8gI0XjjTNmE7J0Tne+xQa7ubBW8rvT5In5m/HgyD otot0qDuxy+vLtgqMbJJjQUNF03hEcmqTZaVaE3YcpjBQmsptGD4ceiqCj+rOX/o iUCB8bmp+02C7P59d+R0JdTErhKF5QcIc5Ul4Cjo7Z2CzSJHLUFp05Q2FLkslhcc dUd+YtXThcN01jsLEkEdYfI3EkszW5bQDIxCwWnLuDpKwgTYA08WqKZ1p8uD28m/ 918xngc5TUvRTSH2DsZzl36lyM65+pKi10NZFzbMhUBWCnuBf7qf6pDwszQV/O8u XEzfCjNkxFGLzhk8vWw6jEHja3U5kEOTUnh9cAP4gp3rbi4h64cYWQEV/c2rc1qX W7/J/hDp4Chq/twNWmdczxYap5PvNPB6gUndu1LFUMVrAe5be1tp/aMCoK3pDwRn 3k6R5hgCaWpGbHA6Y5JqCXgX0Rozk6Xgwxh2t+U2h4pLSatkd5VmbVJ4JLe9h9QC 0Q7roHCADji0NePEuGnh =+hBS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From olav at enigmail.net Sun Aug 24 23:33:00 2014 From: olav at enigmail.net (Olav Seyfarth) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2014 23:33:00 +0200 Subject: default encrypt to multiple keys In-Reply-To: <53FA55F0.8030304@sumptuouscapital.com> References: <53FA5450.40906@enigmail.net> <53FA55F0.8030304@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <53FA5A0C.7080105@enigmail.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hi Kristian, > Look into the encrypt-to option thanks a lot, didn't find it since it's in a different page on the web: gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/GPG-Key-related-Options.html gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/GPG-Configuration-Options.html Olav -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Dies ist eine elektronische Signatur - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQGbBAEBAwAGBQJT+loJAAoJEKGX32tq4e9Wcf4L+P4XCDKRV4oE/OQVtQkX7Lrd So8GzGqlgSTIzITBAjvqSINoat+2DJweB7EmXJdLM0Aa3GfN2Cv1l63p/VYHe5DJ rVNiui9rOScxkrRuiswP6Wj1MUeiNSi3Hb8aGgsuaLLA/xCSb+buevlmk0PKri26 vuqc/f7NgFcakHxnpt8IEhRN9uetGurvwzan4AnW2nQWvoyBwUD3IKf++DzNwifR ISJftfZW3yQWZjvtpVhoBai8GAEZqQogalv0Xk5uAN+HidiCx4BRZCrk/brC879R 2+zJqBVUZRzcfusXHW5WjrYMtw5n4qKmxhR0BDZfQKf9TFp6HB+yWomt6AtxBn/z A2H71VxGR3JynfTDlGF6GOc+RFzY8YfjkuV9x6Zr+T09mu3Wpohkb+zeohUBeKIk 6ougtAtvcf3QakQv7VTlRAmxYoZ9h0fSnS8J3hBwV/3jLXe3wLxCwDJLgPEHJ5A/ mIQBEMqJQftXtEdxcmNVYHax2vSbPQj08A02DXHq =bNV5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Mon Aug 25 09:10:53 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 09:10:53 +0200 Subject: (OT) installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FA1F6C.9060203@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Sun, 24 Aug 2014 19:22:52 +0200") References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FA1F6C.9060203@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87ha112gea.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 24 Aug 2014 19:22, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > Doesn't sound very dumb to me; it's just a regular mistake even if you > knew that directories are often sorted in this really basic sorting > order. Your mind doesn't sort numbers according to ASCII representation. Shall I change the notes in the configure script to point to the download page at gnupg.org instead? This has always the latest versions. BTW, there is now also a file https://gnupg.org/swdb.lst and (.sig) which lists version numbers and checksums for most gnupg software. It is the same information you find at the website but is is readable by a script (e.g. build-aux/getswdb.sh in the GnuPG master repo) Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Mon Aug 25 09:41:09 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian fiskerstrand) Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 09:41:09 +0200 Subject: (OT) installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <87ha112gea.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FA1F6C.9060203@digitalbrains.com> <87ha112gea.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: (no signature today, but shouldn't contain anything controversial) Sent from my iPad > On 25 Aug 2014, at 09:10, Werner Koch wrote: > > On Sun, 24 Aug 2014 19:22, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > >> Doesn't sound very dumb to me; it's just a regular mistake even if you >> knew that directories are often sorted in this really basic sorting >> order. Your mind doesn't sort numbers according to ASCII representation. > > Shall I change the notes in the configure script to point to the > download page at gnupg.org instead? This has always the latest > versions. I see a potential conflict here between stable versions and development versions, in situations where a development version require a non-released library version. That said, users on these versions will anyways be aware of the mirrors - so it generally sounds like a good idea for the potential user building gnupg for the first time. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Mon Aug 25 13:20:39 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 12:20:39 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F6A83A.1050109@sixdemonbag.org> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> <20140822000539.GO16858@eightyeight.xmission.com> <53F6A83A.1050109@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <732641558.20140825122039@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Friday 22 August 2014 at 3:17:30 AM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I respectfully submit that once the definition is > broadened that far, the word ceases to have probative > value. But if that's the definition people want to > use, then I'll just shrug, register my objection, and > move on. :) I prefer the far more succinct definition from Oxford Dictionaries [0] Close observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal Origin: early 19th century: from French, from sur- 'over' + veiller 'watch' (from Latin vigilare 'keep watch'). [0] - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net When duty calls...hang up immediately -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlP7HBVXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pGUMD/2Y+AOso9CM72Ft0JTY9+uXg0lPwBxaEOACs njnPWJKxb7FTVRwMhxdCS54ePcBg2NZVkVARm/hBX58aLI4L7kTUfJOtu3E612ku BeaGTy1SXWep+Rzh+UJ2ebi+KY3nHYBir0N5GHOIeFcur1025yh9yq3x9d2l6a6d HkEodcr2 =P7/M -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Aug 25 14:28:29 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 14:28:29 +0200 Subject: (OT) installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <87ha112gea.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FA1F6C.9060203@digitalbrains.com> <87ha112gea.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53FB2BED.2040405@digitalbrains.com> On 25/08/14 09:10, Werner Koch wrote: > Shall I change the notes in the configure script to point to the > download page at gnupg.org instead? This has always the latest > versions. I think that might preferable because it's easier to oversee. The ftp directories are really packed full of stuff. But either way, a simple mistake is easy to make. And the output from configure scripts is /really/ packed full of stuff :). Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Tue Aug 26 15:12:51 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:12:51 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> On 24/08/14 18:23, Philip Jackson wrote: > Wow, that's a pretty dumb mistake to make. I just assumed the latest version > was at the bottom of the list on the ftp page. Sorry about that. > I've now got the four dependencies noted in the gnupg-2.0.26 README installed under /usr/local/ at latest versions : libgpg-error-1.13 libgcrypt--1.6.2 libksba-1.3.0 libassuan-2.1.2 Running configure on gnupg-2.0.26 produced a demand for pth which I downloaded and installed (pth-2.0.7). Then 'configure' zapped thro rapidly without any further errors noted at the end so I ran 'make' which failed - last few lines in the terminal are : > local/include -g -O2 -Wall -Wno-pointer-sign -Wpointer-arith -Wno-psabi -MT compress.o -MD -MP -MF .deps/compress.Tpo -c -o compress.o compress.c > compress.c:34:18: fatal error: zlib.h: No such file or directory > #include > ^ > compilation terminated. > make[2]: *** [compress.o] Error 1 > make[2]: Leaving directory `/usr/local/src/gnupg-2.0.26/g10' > make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1 > make[1]: Leaving directory `/usr/local/src/gnupg-2.0.26' > make: *** [all] Error 2 from which it seems that failure to find a zlib.h was fatal. There seem to be 2 errors but I don't understand the second one. 'Configure' didn't point out the need for zlib.h but examination of its output indicates that it had noted its absence. I already have zlib (as I already had the other dependencies albeit at earlier versions except for libksba) but the ubuntu distribution seems to rename them and install in the /lib/ branch rather than the /usr/local/ branch. For example, I have the package zlib1g installed according to dpkg in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/. So I suppose I now have to find a source for zlib or find how to tell gnupg where to find it ? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5617 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Aug 26 15:55:24 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:55:24 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> (Philip Jackson's message of "Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:12:51 +0200") References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:12, philip.jackson at nordnet.fr said: >> compress.c:34:18: fatal error: zlib.h: No such file or directory >> #include Well you need to install zlib. I should really add a test for it. > For example, I have the package zlib1g installed according to dpkg in > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/. You need the zlib1g-dev package which contains the header file. > So I suppose I now have to find a source for zlib or find how to tell gnupg > where to find it ? If you want to build it yourself: # # zlib # server http://zlib.net # checked: 2014-06-20 ah file zlib-1.2.8.tar.gz chk a4d316c404ff54ca545ea71a27af7dbc29817088 but zlib usually does not change. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 180 bytes Desc: not available URL: From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Tue Aug 26 23:33:14 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 23:33:14 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> On 26/08/14 15:55, Werner Koch wrote: > > If you want to build it yourself: > > # > # zlib > # > server http://zlib.net > > # checked: 2014-06-20 ah > file zlib-1.2.8.tar.gz > chk a4d316c404ff54ca545ea71a27af7dbc29817088 > Thanks Werner. zlib now installed and gnupg 2.0.26 installed and seems to work but produces an error when asked to encrvypt or verfiy a file : gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string gpg: invalid default preferences When I compare the output of 'gpg --version' with the output of 'gpg2 --version' , the last line about compression shows that gpg2 does not have BZIP2. I suppose gnupg-1.4.16 and the new 2.0.26 share the same gpg.conf so I could remove BZIP2 from the gpg.conf file or perhaps better is to recompile 2.0.26 with BZIP2. What do you recommend ? Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x23543A63.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5617 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue Aug 26 23:59:44 2014 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 14:59:44 -0700 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53FD0350.80503@dougbarton.us> On 8/26/14 2:33 PM, Philip Jackson wrote: > On 26/08/14 15:55, Werner Koch wrote: >> >> If you want to build it yourself: >> >> # >> # zlib >> # >> server http://zlib.net >> >> # checked: 2014-06-20 ah >> file zlib-1.2.8.tar.gz >> chk a4d316c404ff54ca545ea71a27af7dbc29817088 >> > Thanks Werner. zlib now installed and gnupg 2.0.26 installed and seems to work > but produces an error when asked to encrvypt or verfiy a file : > > gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string > gpg: invalid default preferences > > When I compare the output of 'gpg --version' with the output of 'gpg2 --version' > , the last line about compression shows that gpg2 does not have BZIP2. > > I suppose gnupg-1.4.16 and the new 2.0.26 share the same gpg.conf so I could > remove BZIP2 from the gpg.conf file or perhaps better is to recompile 2.0.26 > with BZIP2. > > What do you recommend ? bzip2 is pretty popular with Unix folks, FWIW hope this helps, Doug (!Werner) :) From markr at signal100.com Wed Aug 27 07:02:23 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 06:02:23 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> On 23/08/2014 11:16, dan at geer.org wrote: > > > On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: > > > > Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, > > like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. > > Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media > and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private > information fade, per se? I believe it does. No. Taking part in social networks and other media is a choice. One can a) choose not to take part at all, or b) choose how one takes part and what information one shares. In short, privacy of information is still real, still relevant, and still (largely) within the control of the individual. Tools such as encryption help retain the reality of privacy of information. The question of privacy of information is of critical importance to liberty. By choosing to believe that privacy (or specifically privacy of information) is a concept that has "fade"ed you are playing into the hands of those who would wish to forcefully strip us all of privacy, whether we like or or not. That would be a mistake, I think. -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 27 09:57:42 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 09:57:42 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> (Philip Jackson's message of "Tue, 26 Aug 2014 23:33:14 +0200") References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <87egw2xt3d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 26 Aug 2014 23:33, philip.jackson at nordnet.fr said: > gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string BZIP2 support is optional. If the bzip2 package is not installed you won't have bzip2 support. You may want to "apt-get install libbz2-dev" or similar and rebuild gnupg. > I suppose gnupg-1.4.16 and the new 2.0.26 share the same gpg.conf so I could > remove BZIP2 from the gpg.conf file or perhaps better is to recompile 2.0.26 > with BZIP2. Yes. You may however use gpg.conf-1 (for 1.4) of gpg.conf-2 (for 2.0) which are first looked for. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From dan at geer.org Wed Aug 27 12:46:13 2014 From: dan at geer.org (dan at geer.org) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 06:46:13 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 27 Aug 2014 06:02:23 BST." <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> Message-ID: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> | > Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media | > and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private | > information fade, per se? I believe it does. | | No. Taking part in social networks and other media is a choice. One can | a) choose not to take part at all, or b) choose how one takes part and | what information one shares. | | In short, privacy of information is still real, still relevant, and | still (largely) within the control of the individual. Tools such as | encryption help retain the reality of privacy of information. | | The question of privacy of information is of critical importance to | liberty. By choosing to believe that privacy (or specifically privacy of | information) is a concept that has "fade"ed you are playing into the | hands of those who would wish to forcefully strip us all of privacy, | whether we like or or not. That would be a mistake, I think. I fully agree with you, which means that I see few ways to preserve the liberty that privacy represents than to withdraw from much of civil society while it shares ever more -- sharing ever more on the "I've got nothing to hide" premise. Technology makes what is observable by others daily grow wider; lip reading robots, electric grids that know the noise signature of every device you own, smart cameras on every street corner, MIT's "visual microphone," electronic health records that are and must be shared amongst providers plus the providers' paymasters, and on and on. That these are possible is worrisome; that they are widely built into services which promise "convenience" is the Pied Piper institutionalized. As I wrote elsewhere(*), we are becoming a society of informants -- I have nowhere to hide from you. --dan (*) We Are All Intelligence Officers Now http://geer.tinho.net/geer.rsa.28ii14.txt From alexanderino at gmail.com Wed Aug 27 12:16:24 2014 From: alexanderino at gmail.com (Jason Antony) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 20:16:24 +1000 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> Message-ID: <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 2014-08-27 15:02, Mark Rousell wrote: > No. Taking part in social networks and other media is a choice. One > can a) choose not to take part at all, or b) choose how one takes > part and what information one shares. What can't be controlled is when people who know you give out your personal details on social networks. It could happen because they may not see anything wrong with it, they may be tricked into it [games/surveys], or they wish to harm you. - -- Jason -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT/a/3AAoJED1Q2DsLuMaGVu0P/2aLIXzQ/FMy3OqoIS2J+J6q YaWrgutyQCuPbVBcMoCxvAV/IMRePEQr/LEApo+AC6n2rl3vnUpBsuvhp/Ehl5lR KzBviDhOYduz1jtaxA5dL2hk9Jof7ky5dMVlD0f2x4RNJKpNx+AYGgE+VN5QKSsV 0IRrf5c4qVWSgZnYpLVe6tATm67fz1FrVQ+lJjp1xtTKWzoH2Tmcaon3vWvSfDwJ 4HevrL+/daV+EgueqZuRQwnym0tAlysIm6YLDCe6NMkIwCWZR+wQjagKEqBnTkpx rtkoyxuk7PTtccDBzXleK1R9hbaokjpL1ygLpL33lwTkOEkkV1Oxi90QS5hM3pyX hA/s+NEpZbG9kj+UuHFygu/TdIpRBYgzN0i1r/tBulADYlVHsVSMHOwr+y0Tfuxk dkjJTy18R/gmD44WttmRNq7K3fnUzgsoenrz++fp9X/LDlSx0T9GWnBmUsUq3SzR 1WeBtE5bw5J7hJzAVT2DX/8f6fDtOk/Yit0eIxKu/odLaMekbFOEt3OTmmFlfYkT nHYRRU60Z6embBttTpRmdp9eU0jEjxuNNV2Tkec39fGLa6sOtltlUvz3dgjeYIt1 rpv4RaXAD4DUD60ODJwbBDUFTCo9qWBE3d3NZ67rna6ImBbrSzIMF2MqAil/qxnl wuPBrzrlW4xE4POZKXl/ =oyuC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Wed Aug 27 15:32:50 2014 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 09:32:50 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> References: <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <20140827133250.GA25678@IUPUI.Edu> On Wed, Aug 27, 2014 at 06:46:13AM -0400, dan at geer.org wrote: > > | > Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media > | > and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private > | > information fade, per se? I believe it does. > | > | No. Taking part in social networks and other media is a choice. One can > | a) choose not to take part at all, or b) choose how one takes part and > | what information one shares. > | > | In short, privacy of information is still real, still relevant, and > | still (largely) within the control of the individual. Tools such as > | encryption help retain the reality of privacy of information. > | > | The question of privacy of information is of critical importance to > | liberty. By choosing to believe that privacy (or specifically privacy of > | information) is a concept that has "fade"ed you are playing into the > | hands of those who would wish to forcefully strip us all of privacy, > | whether we like or or not. That would be a mistake, I think. > > > I fully agree with you, which means that I see few ways to preserve > the liberty that privacy represents than to withdraw from much of > civil society while it shares ever more -- sharing ever more on the > "I've got nothing to hide" premise. Technology makes what is > observable by others daily grow wider; lip reading robots, electric > grids that know the noise signature of every device you own, smart > cameras on every street corner, MIT's "visual microphone," electronic > health records that are and must be shared amongst providers plus > the providers' paymasters, and on and on. That these are possible > is worrisome; that they are widely built into services which promise > "convenience" is the Pied Piper institutionalized. As I wrote > elsewhere(*), we are becoming a society of informants -- I have > nowhere to hide from you. It was never possible to live in perfect anonymity. You can't participate in society and be invisible to it at the same time. One has to accept being known, to some extent. So, secrecy is only one part of privacy. Another part is effectively asserting what you believe is right. Just because someone knows something about you, doesn't mean he understands it or can argue properly. Challenge the idiots, the misinformed, the insufficiently educated, the malicious, and make their misuse of your personal information costly. Without that, you will indeed live in a bubble of privacy which steadily shrinks until it evaporates entirely. Lies, rumors, and faulty logic readily die of exposure. Expose them! If someone attacks your secrets...attack his! The falsity of a false argument is one of your opponent's centers of gravity, so strike it to keep him busy protecting it. Secrecy alone is defensive. The term for a purely defensive figher is "loser". -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 181 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Wed Aug 27 15:42:11 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 15:42:11 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <87egw2xt3d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> <87egw2xt3d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53FDE033.8030404@nordnet.fr> On 27/08/14 09:57, Werner Koch wrote: > > BZIP2 support is optional. If the bzip2 package is not installed you > won't have bzip2 support. You may want to "apt-get install libbz2-dev" > or similar and rebuild gnupg. > >> I suppose gnupg-1.4.16 and the new 2.0.26 share the same gpg.conf so I could >> remove BZIP2 from the gpg.conf file or perhaps better is to recompile 2.0.26 >> with BZIP2. > > Yes. You may however use gpg.conf-1 (for 1.4) of gpg.conf-2 (for 2.0) > which are first looked for. Thanks - I've used the gpg.conf-2 solution for a temporary fix and gpg2 seems to work so far and enigmail has picked it up and works with it ok. When I get a little more time, I'll track down the source code for libbz2-dev and build it in my gnupg-2.0.26 installation. My linux distribution already has libbz2-1.0 but it will be elsewhere in the file structure and I haven't yet found out how to make use of it for my installation of 2.0.26. For the moment, I'm more than happy that my first experience of compiling from source code has worked. Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From shmick at riseup.net Wed Aug 27 16:54:53 2014 From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 00:54:53 +1000 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> Message-ID: <53FDF13D.2060601@riseup.net> Mark Carousel wrote: > On 23/08/2014 11:16, dan at geer.org wrote: >> >> > On 2014-08-22 at 21:13, Rejo Zenger wrote: >> > >> > Open data and transparency should only be about what concerns everybody, >> > like government actions, trains schedule, etc. not private information. >> >> Is this not the core of the question? In a world of social media >> and sensor-driven everything, does not the very concept of private >> information fade, per se? I believe it does. > > No. Taking part in social networks and other media is a choice. One can > a) choose not to take part at all, or b) choose how one takes part and > what information one shares. actually you chose to step out of the front door today i assume ? you took the bus to work or maybe you drove ? i don't know, maybe a tractors more your thing, but you took it to the gas station and filled 'er up or you got breakfast at the deli before your meeting ? how many times were you photographed by the big bad social network before your first coffee break? how can you as an individual be in control of this ? how is it a choice ? do you honestly believe you're in control of what information you share? no prob, phone[sic] up FB or dr G and have a word to the secretary: "yes sir, we just had a looksy & can confirm all your bits are 100% accounted for, your datas are currently residing on 3,521 servers in 59 countries and if you like, we can press this red button and have it all removed straight away sir, no lawyer required, no warrant, no questions asked and a 100% satisfaction guarantee - this weeks promotion also includes free removal of your NSA vacuum trail, we can delete that too with the same red button because your data that we were forced to share can be accounted for exactly sir, we know where it went because we take pride in knowing we serve our customers best interests..." which privacy policy thesis have you read cover-to-cover ? have you read it each time it was updated ? did you prepare yourself for opt-out changes ? which CV of yours have you parted ways with to prospective employers is equipped with nice little java scripts phoning home to your elaborately setup web server all-the-while alerting you to all those, whose pdf reader allows outgoing comms, who open your file ? where is your CV from 15 years ago - you know precisely how many people have read it don't you ? used to be fun getting prints back from the lab of you and your partner having fun times; there was a certain nativity before high-speed data comms; and who prints photos now anyway, huh ! are kids confident that they know their snapchats will be deleted just like they were promised ? where are these snap chats now - do they know lest do they care ? to err is human, but to forgive divine - how do you tell hard disks this ? geer's point about moving to a new town also relevant about not forgetting the past if you truly wanna be in control of your data, your gonna have to regulate and restrain yourself until your testicles are drawn over the back of your neck *or* accept it aint possible now, it may never be, and when you accept that you'll keep out of the loony bin & fruit cake parlour or, don't have any data, go to the amazon heck, you probly knew how your traffic was being routed through iceland, why it was, who did it and what the content was, right ? > > In short, privacy of information is still real, still relevant, and > still (largely) within the control of the individual. Tools such as > encryption help retain the reality of privacy of information. > > The question of privacy of information is of critical importance to > liberty. By choosing to believe that privacy (or specifically privacy of > information) is a concept that has "fade"ed you are playing into the > hands of those who would wish to forcefully strip us all of privacy, > whether we like or or not. That would be a mistake, I think. > > > From shmick at riseup.net Wed Aug 27 17:51:14 2014 From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 01:51:14 +1000 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> Message-ID: <53FDFE72.4030707@riseup.net> Jason Antony wrote: > On 2014-08-27 15:02, Mark Rousell wrote: > >> No. Taking part in social networks and other media is a choice. One >> can a) choose not to take part at all, or b) choose how one takes >> part and what information one shares. > > What can't be controlled is when people who know you give out your > personal details on social networks. > > It could happen because they may not see anything wrong with it, they > may be tricked into it [games/surveys], or they wish to harm you. it could also happen because that's what FB wants too: http://owni.eu/2012/07/24/facebook-added-informant/ > > -- Jason > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 27 18:15:09 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 12:15:09 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> > I fully agree with you, which means that I see few ways to preserve > the liberty that privacy represents than to withdraw from much of > civil society while it shares ever more... I see a couple, but much like Dan, I'm not optimistic about them. The first is this: *stop talking about privacy*. What people are calling 'privacy' is really a large number of concepts which are all being glommed together under the umbrella of 'privacy', but these concepts may not all belong together at all. Figure out what *precisely* you're concerned with, and start talking about that -- but "privacy" as a word has become so vague it's almost useless. If we can't describe precisely what we're afraid of losing, we're going to lose it and we won't even be able to accurately tell people what we've lost. The second is a more general observation: authority tends to behave best when it's forced to submit to oversight. Corporations behave best when they're forced to answer to public shareholder meetings where anyone with a single share to their name can demand answers -- and if they don't get them, there's hell to pay. Politicians behave best when there's a free press following them around and asking them rude questions. Terrorists wear masks not to hide from the authorities, but to hide from their own communities -- social oversight would make their job impossible. Unfortunately, oversight only works when those in charge take it seriously. We as a society would rather watch reality television than television about reality: we'd rather watch _Big Brother_ than C-SPAN hearings about whether government has become Big Brother. The third is that those who *do* care, tend to care in deeply broken ways. I can't tell you how many times I've run into self-styled privacy advocates here in the U.S. who are furious over how the U.S. has been reading their email. The only problem is there's very little evidence of that occurring. Reading email metadata, maybe, but not email content. When I try to explain that to them I usually find myself wondering inside of two minutes why I ever bothered trying to bring fact and reason to what is fundamentally an argument from passion and emotion. I have had people literally yell in my face over the metadata-versus-content distinction. When the front line of advocacy appears to be detached from reality in one way, and the body politic is detached from reality in another (reality television), well... how does one fix this? My reading of what Dan's said (I apologize, Dan, if I'm getting you wrong) is that he sees no way to stop the technological assault. I don't think that's quite true, though. If we were as a society to suddenly say, "stop this, right now, let's establish some laws to protect the essential core of privacy," we'd do it. The problem I see is the old one of the Eloi and the Morlocks... and I feel like an Eloi who fell down into the Morlock tunnels and spent just barely enough time down there to get a sense of just how bad it's going to be. Now I'm waving my arms and screaming at the other Eloi that they aren't going to like what happens when the Morlocks come, but nobody's listening to me. I'm getting in the way of the latest special about the Kardashians, you see... From wk at gnupg.org Wed Aug 27 21:06:38 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 21:06:38 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FDE033.8030404@nordnet.fr> (Philip Jackson's message of "Wed, 27 Aug 2014 15:42:11 +0200") References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> <87egw2xt3d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FDE033.8030404@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <871ts1ycox.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 27 Aug 2014 15:42, philip.jackson at nordnet.fr said: > My linux distribution already has libbz2-1.0 but it will be elsewhere in the > file structure and I haven't yet found out how to make use of it for my > installation of 2.0.26. As usual you need to install the development package for a library before you can use it. This includes the static version of the library (foo.a) and most important the header file. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 27 21:19:53 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 20:19:53 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <2310267668.20140827201953@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 27 August 2014 at 5:15:09 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > I've run into self-styled privacy advocates here in the > U.S. who are furious over how the U.S. has been reading > their email. The only problem is there's very little > evidence of that occurring. Reading email metadata, > maybe, but not email content. When I try to explain > that to them I usually find myself wondering inside of > two minutes why I ever bothered trying to bring fact > and reason to what is fundamentally an argument from > passion and emotion. I have had people literally yell > in my face over the metadata-versus-content > distinction. Is there really as much of a distinction as some would have us believe? The EFF [0] puts it quite well, albeit using phone rather than email metadata:- They know you rang a phone sex service at 2:24 am and spoke for 18 minutes. But they don't know what you talked about. They know you called the suicide prevention hotline from the Golden Gate Bridge. But the topic of the call remains a secret. They know you spoke with an HIV testing service, then your doctor, then your health insurance company in the same hour. But they don't know what was discussed. They know you received a call from the local NRA office while it was having a campaign against gun legislation, and then called your senators and congressional representatives immediately after. But the content of those calls remains safe from government intrusion. They know you called a gynecologist, spoke for a half hour, and then called the local Planned Parenthood's number later that day. But nobody knows what you spoke about. Sorry, your phone records?oops, "so-called metadata"?can reveal a lot more about the content of your calls than the government is implying. Metadata provides enough context to know some of the most intimate details of your lives. [0] - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wisdom is a companion to age; yet age may travel alone. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlP+L3VXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pX1MEAKiauaH6FXvPNvQZZNlq97jz3yCtO7u08eKo 0IxEjXpv85USf22kVxzQZ6gIjnbbmaw2IHrLYk2lbFVsC78tf0nJAvqPlp8uDJG3 XNeId6xqPjcfTQh0TdUtl829Z9mIcaaOgCkuOvRSqEKwrHUslnXvmLP98bEMhuwS 0afKQ0EP =p6H2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 27 21:25:09 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 20:25:09 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1186567938.20140827202509@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 27 August 2014 at 11:16:24 AM, in , Jason Antony wrote: > What can't be controlled is when people who know you > give out your personal details on social networks. > It could happen because they may not see anything wrong > with it, they may be tricked into it [games/surveys], > or they wish to harm you. Remove the words "on social networks" and you have a statement that was true long before the invention of the internet. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Day-old pastry is hollow succour to a man who is bereft of ostrich. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlP+MJpXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5p3soD/1jpTbNR9NtBQuzedWP+tUIKSdDGDRxb5Yte lkzkJ2n3rNhn/ZwukpLqq7Zhs091+nBsB0Ct7hHIjzVdGED41tnVwbvkIltzkJY+ lzOnZn5UtkGp5DiGKdCdaqhI4fRy1uFPi88qjee2jEBpiShp1zV0RLYOND5zo9Gd wqJPrVyc =GcTY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Aug 27 21:37:10 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 15:37:10 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <2310267668.20140827201953@my_localhost> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> <2310267668.20140827201953@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53FE3366.6010706@sixdemonbag.org> > Is there really as much of a distinction as some would have us > believe? Yes, absolutely. If the problem is X and your advocacy loudly insists that Y is happening, then you're (a) not solving X (although Y might need fixing anyway), and (b) all the people you've persuaded to join your cause will desert you as soon as they discover you were totally uninformed. As an example: malaria kills millions of children worldwide. Imagine an advocate telling people, "we must end malaria, and we can start by getting these villages clean drinking water!", and getting tens of thousands of people to donate money to the cause of drilling safe water wells in the developing world. Yes, preventable diseases caused by unclean drinking water is a *very* serious problem, and yes, those wells will almost certainly ameliorate some problems... but it will do absolutely nothing to stop the spread of malaria. How do you think people who bought into the advocacy, who believed they were saving the world from malaria, will react when someone comes along and tells them, "uh, the advocate was completely wrong, and although you may have done some good for the eradication of, I don't know, cholera or something, you've had zero effect on malaria"? I'll tell you what happens -- an epidemic of cynicism. And that hurts us all. From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Wed Aug 27 21:43:33 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 21:43:33 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <871ts1ycox.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> <87egw2xt3d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FDE033.8030404@nordnet.fr> <871ts1ycox.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53FE34E5.6070605@nordnet.fr> On 27/08/14 21:06, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 27 Aug 2014 15:42, philip.jackson at nordnet.fr said: > >> My linux distribution already has libbz2-1.0 but it will be elsewhere in the >> file structure and I haven't yet found out how to make use of it for my >> installation of 2.0.26. > > As usual you need to install the development package for a library > before you can use it. This includes the static version of the library > (foo.a) and most important the header file. I downloaded bzip2=1.0.6.tar.gz and now gnupg 2.0.26 seems to be working fine. Thanks everyone for the help. Philip -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Wed Aug 27 23:27:20 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 22:27:20 +0100 Subject: Public Key Algorithms - GnuPG 2.x lists fewer than GnuPG 1.x Message-ID: <1243863615.20140827222720@my_localhost> Hi I only just noticed that among the output of "gpg --version" I get different lists of supported public key algorithms between versions 1.4.16 and 2.0.26. 1.4.16: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA 2.0.26: RSA, ELG, DSA Is this actually a change in what is supported, or just how GnuPG reports it? -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net A nod is as good as a wink to a blind bat! From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Thu Aug 28 01:48:29 2014 From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 00:48:29 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FE3366.6010706@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> <2310267668.20140827201953@my_localhost> <53FE3366.6010706@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <16428859.20140828004829@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Wednesday 27 August 2014 at 8:37:10 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> Is there really as much of a distinction as some would >> have us believe? > Yes, absolutely. If the problem is X and your advocacy > loudly insists that Y is happening, then you're (a) not > solving X (although Y might need fixing anyway), and > (b) all the people you've persuaded to join your cause > will desert you as soon as they discover you were > totally uninformed. A good point well made. The act of collecting metadata is distinct from the act of collecting content. But there will be significant overlap between the dataset collected by somebody harvesting content and the inferences about somebody's life that could be drawn by somebody harvesting metadata. I had hoped the quote from the EFF website would illustrate this. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net Don't be silly, it's all "make believe" anyway -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iPQEAQEKAF4FAlP+bl9XFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0 N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5p9RIEAJQDY9Sam7o5hXGcGzMZ5gKKoss30cfC/DTU pHiARmg6gurELF9hQKVDcYH6WP1SIEqQDjO/3J4hpTvAdv6ukIaWqbPyzmjoRLgG jBQXlX7tsTCYEx0ylFg70rjNOUTe0r0S9dXUVWv2KUZff595OVfGzsVIE0Adz73p fJ8cEg8Q =g3iy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From steve at secretvolcanobase.org Thu Aug 28 00:58:04 2014 From: steve at secretvolcanobase.org (Steve Jones) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 23:58:04 +0100 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53F8734B.10404@nordnet.fr> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> <53F8734B.10404@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <20140827235804.1f0084fb@steves-laptop> On Sat, 23 Aug 2014 12:56:11 +0200 Philip Jackson wrote: > - the email address belongs to a person who does control the key and > he may or may not be the person named in the email address. I am > risking my secrets with an unknown person. I had better take care of > the nature of those secrets. It looks like this is the case covered > by your original post. Presumably you have an email address of the person for some reason, whether or not you want to send secrets to that address depends on where you got it. What you want to know is: how do you send those secrets securely? If the keyserver has certified the key with a challenge response protocol you've got your answer. Ideally you'd have an email address and a fingerprint, but often you don't. -- Steve Jones Key fingerprint: 3550 BFC8 D7BA 4286 0FBC 4272 2AC8 A680 7167 C896 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Aug 28 03:52:08 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 21:52:08 -0400 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <16428859.20140828004829@my_localhost> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> <2310267668.20140827201953@my_localhost> <53FE3366.6010706@sixdemonbag.org> <16428859.20140828004829@my_localhost> Message-ID: <53FE8B48.5030105@sixdemonbag.org> > But there will be significant overlap between the dataset collected by > somebody harvesting content and the inferences about somebody's life > that could be drawn by somebody harvesting metadata. I had hoped the > quote from the EFF website would illustrate this. For some individuals, yes. For others, not so much. While traffic analysis is a tremendously powerful tool it does not apply to all parties to equal degrees. It was also part of why I used the metaphor that I did. Malaria and cholera are two different diseases that often are found in the same populations and some of their symptoms mimic each other. One is a mosquito-borne parasitic disease, and the other is caused by unsafe drinking water. :) From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Aug 28 11:13:55 2014 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 11:13:55 +0200 Subject: installing gnupg-2.0.26 In-Reply-To: <53FE34E5.6070605@nordnet.fr> References: <53F9FB32.9030205@nordnet.fr> <53FA04DD.8050405@sumptuouscapital.com> <53FA117A.2040607@nordnet.fr> <53FC87D3.1040606@nordnet.fr> <87y4ubxsmr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FCFD1A.8090104@nordnet.fr> <87egw2xt3d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FDE033.8030404@nordnet.fr> <871ts1ycox.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FE34E5.6070605@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <53FEF2D3.4040805@digitalbrains.com> On 27/08/14 21:43, Philip Jackson wrote: > I downloaded bzip2=1.0.6.tar.gz and now gnupg 2.0.26 seems to be working fine. > Thanks everyone for the help. The Ubuntu package libbz2-1.0 contains the actual _shared library_ that programs can use. However, if you want to _compile_ a program so it can use libbz2, you need the Ubuntu package libbz2-dev. Your system almost certainly already contains libbz2-1.0 but before you can compile gnupg2 so it can use it, you still need the package libbz2-dev. You should use that one and not bzip2-1.0.6.tar.gz because otherwise you are installing multiple versions of a shared library and this should only be done if you understand the implications. Otherwise, you could cause any program compiled against libbz2 to fail. Although I think this is unlikely in the case of libbz2 because it only has libc as dependency. You still might accidentally override a security update released by Ubuntu, though. The meat of the Ubuntu packages is as follows: libbz2-1.0: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libbz2.so.1 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libbz2.so.1.0 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libbz2.so.1.0.4 libbz2-dev: /usr/include/bzlib.h /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libbz2.a /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libbz2.so (That final .so in -dev is a symlink to the .so in libbz2-1.0). HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 28 11:57:00 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 11:57:00 +0200 Subject: Public Key Algorithms - GnuPG 2.x lists fewer than GnuPG 1.x In-Reply-To: <1243863615.20140827222720@my_localhost> (MFPA's message of "Wed, 27 Aug 2014 22:27:20 +0100") References: <1243863615.20140827222720@my_localhost> Message-ID: <87sikhvswj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 27 Aug 2014 23:27, 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net said: > 1.4.16: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA > > 2.0.26: RSA, ELG, DSA > > Is this actually a change in what is supported, or just how GnuPG > reports it? No. RSA-E and RSA-S are the same as RSA. They merely use different algorithm numbers. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com Thu Aug 28 12:11:01 2014 From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 12:11:01 +0200 Subject: Public Key Algorithms - GnuPG 2.x lists fewer than GnuPG 1.x In-Reply-To: <87sikhvswj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <1243863615.20140827222720@my_localhost> <87sikhvswj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <53FF0035.5050206@sumptuouscapital.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 08/28/2014 11:57 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 27 Aug 2014 23:27, 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net > said: >> 1.4.16: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA >> >> 2.0.26: RSA, ELG, DSA >> >> Is this actually a change in what is supported, or just how GnuPG >> reports it? > > No. RSA-E and RSA-S are the same as RSA. They merely use > different algorithm numbers. > Speaking of which, with libgcrypt 1.7.0 this has the fun variant of (note the 3x RSA, without distinguishing -S and -E) $ gpg2 --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.26 libgcrypt 1.7.0-beta108 Pubkey: RSA, RSA, RSA, ELG, DSA $ gpg2.1 --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.0-beta794 libgcrypt 1.7.0-beta108 Pubkey: RSA, RSA, RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - ---------------------------- "I never worry about action, but only inaction." (Winston Churchill) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT/wAqAAoJEPw7F94F4TagoFAQAIArE7FBtD/bptEOsF+3bFjU jjvES5wLZahhbO9YNgWpG/DpFvB6UbbczvujSWYFG7caRsKGj5NNjmb1O1bpJE7a sZgmmFXJMdkW53arBxHS3IOD8DjTKnp4XVj6QU2+29yz8jBjXZM4nVo3NkhOhAr+ cBuoI42s+yY5dt4Fo4vSqQSw+o2sWAxCMeZLt9ia/CRZSGpqKobUZPUro5noiS1X zG1ADuhd3s0mRs+C6W+b//gaDsqt/lUOh+cg4fjrtQQ9VuXyYsLK7Qhskcqaie0l PpbdNajiWqDsf+r49tqDQkxybKVyfajtVK+Da9iCI5W7/IfNzn4PlbMOZRod5PX8 JxoqkNDAmSZeuOOMf+Q0eNESMTzeDegxtF9+yr2Sr12JHn01Yp5upUJ+z2AHNK4f wmFMwZQAr7tDdczUOcrfBYplkaecf3I1qdGHtjlQJUU+tjPouoCJfxWEUlbCEXiE jUJsXNbbbC9dhLpIRaCLM1G2ISnb+f4m3uVZZaLXYNT2wDKjn0yQreqg7MbVhf1G NMgYe/RQZQQOUOdyQk9UMkkNmfltG1pxgZDp/Q7lz3Ba78uPI6urGA0sn2FsVUpM tg5jWo7rDcQlBGxvJkBpNIFkQJTw73aSNbL1BxVV6b56w56KnNXCrowhcuvAut6X kki7q1lja97CiUwOfhqh =k+Hy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr Thu Aug 28 13:12:30 2014 From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 13:12:30 +0200 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <20140827235804.1f0084fb@steves-laptop> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> <53F8734B.10404@nordnet.fr> <20140827235804.1f0084fb@steves-laptop> Message-ID: <53FF0E9E.1000602@nordnet.fr> On 28/08/14 00:58, Steve Jones wrote: > On Sat, 23 Aug 2014 12:56:11 +0200 > Philip Jackson wrote: > >> - the email address belongs to a person who does control the key and >> he may or may not be the person named in the email address. I am >> risking my secrets with an unknown person. I had better take care of >> the nature of those secrets. It looks like this is the case covered >> by your original post. > > Presumably you have an email address of the person for some reason, > whether or not you want to send secrets to that address depends on > where you got it. What you want to know is: how do you send those > secrets securely? If the keyserver has certified the key with a > challenge response protocol you've got your answer. > > Ideally you'd have an email address and a fingerprint, but often you > don't. Whether or not I want to send secrets to a person depends on lots of things. I think at present that I would be unlikely to send any important secret by email. I cannot imagine my confidence levels on the person's identity or trustworthiness being enhanced at all by a keyserver process alone. Not even if the keyserver were linked to a lie detector :-) The question would always remain "Who is pulling his strings ?" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 455 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From steve at secretvolcanobase.org Thu Aug 28 14:18:55 2014 From: steve at secretvolcanobase.org (Steve Jones) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 13:18:55 +0100 Subject: email verification as casual checking? In-Reply-To: <53FF0E9E.1000602@nordnet.fr> References: <53F76C42.4080405@josuttis.de> <53F8734B.10404@nordnet.fr> <20140827235804.1f0084fb@steves-laptop> <53FF0E9E.1000602@nordnet.fr> Message-ID: <20140828131855.1e4c5d39@steves-laptop> On Thu, 28 Aug 2014 13:12:30 +0200 Philip Jackson wrote: > Whether or not I want to send secrets to a person depends on lots of > things. I think at present that I would be unlikely to send any > important secret by email. I cannot imagine my confidence levels on > the person's identity or trustworthiness being enhanced at all by a > keyserver process alone. Not even if the keyserver were linked to a > lie detector :-) The process described isn't about validating the person, it's about validating the key against an email address. If you're going to email the person anyway you might as well have some confidence that you're using the right key. -- Steve Jones Key fingerprint: 3550 BFC8 D7BA 4286 0FBC 4272 2AC8 A680 7167 C896 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu Aug 28 16:03:21 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 16:03:21 +0200 Subject: Public Key Algorithms - GnuPG 2.x lists fewer than GnuPG 1.x In-Reply-To: <53FF0035.5050206@sumptuouscapital.com> (Kristian Fiskerstrand's message of "Thu, 28 Aug 2014 12:11:01 +0200") References: <1243863615.20140827222720@my_localhost> <87sikhvswj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53FF0035.5050206@sumptuouscapital.com> Message-ID: <877g1sww2e.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 28 Aug 2014 12:11, kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com said: > Speaking of which, with libgcrypt 1.7.0 this has the fun variant of > (note the 3x RSA, without distinguishing -S and -E) be98b59 gpg: Do not show "MD5" and triplicated "RSA" in --version. Thanks, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From gnupg at iam.tj Thu Aug 28 23:53:52 2014 From: gnupg at iam.tj (TJ) Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 22:53:52 +0100 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? Message-ID: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> I've recently been digging deep into the source-code trying to understand what the differences are between --clearsign and --detach-sign signatures. This came about whilst writing code that calls on "gpg --verify" on detached signatures; specifically Debian APT archives that contain "Release" (plaintext) and "Release.gpg" (detached signature). The aim/hope was to combine the plaintext and detached signature into the armored clearsign format and thus avoid needing to write one of them to the file-system (the other can be supplied via stdin). I had thought that the message digest hash (in this case SHA512) should be the same since the input data is the same which-ever signing method is used. This didn't work as I had expected so I have been digging into the source-code to figure out what is different between the two signing methods. This led to a series of tests trying to figure it out but after several hours I'm no clearer so I thought I'd ask. Here is the shell script that captures the tests I've been doing: #!/usr/bin/env /bin/bash set -x gpg --version # gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.16 # Copyright (C) 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc. # License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later # This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. # There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. # # Home: ~/.gnupg # Supported algorithms: # Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA # Cypher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, # CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 # Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 # Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 wget http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/trusty/Release 2>/dev/null wget http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/trusty/Release.gpg 2>/dev/null echo "Verify the detached signature" gpg --keyring /etc/apt/trusted.gpg --verify Release.gpg Release # gpg: Signature made Thu 08 May 2014 15:20:33 BST using DSA key ID 437D05B5 # gpg: Good signature from "Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key " # gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! # gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. # Primary key fingerprint: 6302 39CC 130E 1A7F D81A 27B1 4097 6EAF 437D 05B5 # gpg: Signature made Thu 08 May 2014 15:20:33 BST using RSA key ID C0B21F32 # gpg: Good signature from "Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key (2012) " # gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! # gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. # Primary key fingerprint: 790B C727 7767 219C 42C8 6F93 3B4F E6AC C0B2 1F32 echo "Try to stitch together the plaintext and detached signature into cleartext format for verification" gpg --keyring /etc/apt/trusted.gpg --verify <(set +x && echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(cat Release Release.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Apr 2014 21:05:34 BST using DSA key ID 437D05B5 # gpg: BAD signature from "Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key " # gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Apr 2014 21:05:34 BST using RSA key ID C0B21F32 # gpg: BAD signature from "Ubuntu Archive Automatic Signing Key (2012) " echo "Now try using a local test key, creating both clearsign and detached signatures" gpg --list-key 3591FB89 # pub 2048R/3591FB89 2014-08-28 # uid Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) # sub 2048R/4AD9A3DF 2014-08-28 gpg --clearsign --digest-algo SHA512 --local-user 3591FB89 Release echo "Verify the clearsign document" gpg --verify Release.asc # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 17:21:44 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " echo "Split the clearsign document into plaintext and detached signature files" sed -n '/^Origin:/,/-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE/ {/^-----/d; p}' Release.asc >Release.asc.plaintext sed -n '/-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE/,/-----END PGP SIGNATURE/p' Release.asc >Release.asc.gpg echo "Prove the split plaintext MD5 is identical to the original plaintext" md5sum Release Release.asc.plaintext # abb06855aee7fa5b964800511a515183 Release # abb06855aee7fa5b964800511a515183 Release.asc.plaintext echo "Attempt to verify using the split detached signature and split plaintext" gpg --verify Release.asc.gpg Release.asc.plaintext # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 17:21:44 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " echo "Attempt to verify using the split detached signature and the original plaintext" gpg --verify Release.asc.gpg Release # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 18:32:06 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " gpg --list-packets Release.asc.gpg # :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 9C387A713591FB89 # version 4, created 1409242904, md5len 0, sigclass 0x01 # digest algo 10, begin of digest ce 60 # hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-08-28) # subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 9C387A713591FB89) # data: [2048 bits] echo "Re-join the split plaintext and split detached signature and verify" gpg --verify <(set +x && echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(cat Release.asc.plaintext Release.asc.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 17:21:44 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " echo "Generate a detached armored signature file using the Test key" gpg --detach-sign --digest-algo SHA512 --local-user 3591FB89 --armor --output Release.Test.detached.gpg Release echo "Verify the detached signature" gpg --verify Release.Test.detached.gpg Release # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 19:29:37 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " echo "Join original plaintext and Test Key's detached signature together and attempt to verify" gpg --verify <(set +x && echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(cat Release Release.Test.detached.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 19:29:37 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " echo "Try again, ignoring any timestamp conflicts" gpg --ignore-time-conflict --verify <(set +x && echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(cat Release Release.Test.detached.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 19:29:37 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " From markr at signal100.com Fri Aug 29 10:02:17 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 09:02:17 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <53F5FA09.1050508@sixdemonbag.org> <53F676CE.6020701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <54003389.7040902@signal100.com> >> On 23/08/2014 11:16, dan at geer.org wrote: > actually you chose to step out of the front door today i assume ? > you took the bus to work or maybe you drove ? > i don't know, maybe a tractors more your thing, but you took it to the > gas station and filled 'er up > or you got breakfast at the deli before your meeting ? I think you are conflating separate things with questions like these. See Mark H Wood's comment above: "It was never possible to live in perfect anonymity. You can't participate in society and be invisible to it at the same time. One has to accept being known, to some extent. So, secrecy is only one part of privacy.[...]" > how many times were you photographed by the big bad social network > before your first coffee break? What "big bad social network"? First define what you mean by "social network" in this context. My earlier comment was, as I stated, primarily context of "social networks and other media". You seem to mean something something different by "the big bad social network". > how can you as an individual be in control of this ? I choose where I go and what I do, both online (which was the main context of my earlier comment) and in the physical world. Whilst, as Mark Wood says above, some involvement in society inevitably involves sharing some information about oneself (and always has done), one can nevertheless to a massive extent choose how much one shares, what one says, and what one does. One does not need to blab everything to everyone. > do you honestly believe you're in control of what information you > share? To a very considerable extent, yes. It is a self-evident reality (although what I choose to share versus what I need to share varies on the specific context). I have not given way all control over my mind, body and actions. > no prob, phone[sic] up FB or dr G and have a word to the secretary: > > "yes sir, we just had a looksy & can confirm all your bits are 100% > accounted for, your datas are currently residing on 3,521 servers in > 59> countries and if you like, we can press this red button and have > it all removed straight away sir, no lawyer required, no warrant, no > questions asked and a 100% satisfaction guarantee - this weeks > promotion also includes free removal of your NSA vacuum trail, we can > delete that too with the same red button because your data that we > were forced to share can be accounted for exactly sir, we know where > it went because we take pride in knowing we serve our customers best > interests..." What data on FB? Whilst, as Jason Anthony pointed out, other people can post information about me to social networks such as FB, data leakage by third parties is not a new risk (as MFPA observed). Apart from such data leakage, FB or other social networks only know about me what I choose to tell them. As I say, I do not need to blab to the world about everything. I *am* in practice in control of what I say and do and where I say and do it. > which privacy policy thesis have you read cover-to-cover ? > have you read it each time it was updated ? > did you prepare yourself for opt-out changes ? Perhaps it is more sensible to control what one shares in the first place. > which CV of yours have you parted ways with to prospective employers > is equipped with nice little java scripts phoning home to your > elaborately setup web server all-the-while alerting you to all those, > whose pdf reader allows outgoing comms, who open your file ? > > where is your CV from 15 years ago - you know precisely how many > people have read it don't you ? What point are you trying to prove here? Releasing a CV is still a controlled act, even though you don't necessarily know where it is going to get to. It is all a matter of choice. What you include is under your control. > are kids confident that they know their snapchats will be deleted just > like they were promised ? As I say, the better, wiser option would be to not post in the first place. > where are these snap chats now - do they know lest do they care ? Wise people do care. Wiser people were always careful what they said on third party provided services. > if you truly wanna be in control of your data, your gonna have to > regulate and restrain yourself until your testicles are drawn over the > back of your neck *or* accept it aint possible now, it may never be, > and when you accept that you'll keep out of the loony bin & fruit > cake parlour I think you are looking at the whole situation through defeatist's eyes. :-) -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From markr at signal100.com Fri Aug 29 10:04:54 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 09:04:54 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> <53FDAFF8.30702@gmail.com> Message-ID: <54003426.4030003@signal100.com> On 27/08/2014 11:16, Jason Antony wrote: > What can't be controlled is when people who know you give out your > personal details on social networks. > > It could happen because they may not see anything wrong with it, they > may be tricked into it [games/surveys], or they wish to harm you. This is true and it's a good point but, as MFPA points out, it's not a new threat in principle. I think the key point still remains that what one shares with the world is very much under one's practical control, if one only remembers it. Social interaction inevitably involves some extent of information sharing, and always has, but that doesn't mean that privacy (and all the nuanced concepts that are contained within that word) has somehow evaporated the first time you communicate with someone, or travel somewhere, etc. -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From markr at signal100.com Fri Aug 29 10:13:37 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 09:13:37 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> Message-ID: <54003631.60403@signal100.com> On 27/08/2014 11:46, dan at geer.org wrote: > I fully agree with you, which means that I see few ways to preserve > the liberty that privacy represents than to withdraw from much of > civil society while it shares ever more -- sharing ever more on the > "I've got nothing to hide" premise. Technology makes what is > observable by others daily grow wider; lip reading robots, electric > grids that know the noise signature of every device you own, smart > cameras on every street corner, MIT's "visual microphone," electronic > health records that are and must be shared amongst providers plus > the providers' paymasters, and on and on. That these are possible > is worrisome; that they are widely built into services which promise > "convenience" is the Pied Piper institutionalized. As I wrote > elsewhere(*), we are becoming a society of informants -- I have > nowhere to hide from you. I agree that information sharing, especially statutorily-imposed information collection and sharing, is a great threat to liberty. Fighting it is very difficult without fundamental reform of state structures. But this still does not mean that we need to share more than we want or need to where we have a choice, and we still do have lots of choices in this matter (especially in the context of my earlier message). -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From samir at samirnassar.com Fri Aug 29 10:29:04 2014 From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 10:29:04 +0200 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <1591774.HFpVQVoyKk@forge> It is safe to say this thread has moved way off topic from being about using gnupg. Samir -- Samir Nassar samir at samirnassar.com https://samirnassar.com PGP Fingerprint: EE76 B39E 0778 8F95 F796 B044 FE67 9A90 8E99 7AB2 Public Key: https://samirnassar.com/files/key.asc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From markr at signal100.com Fri Aug 29 10:32:37 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 09:32:37 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20140827104613.5C88A2280AD@palinka.tinho.net> <53FE040D.2080005@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <54003AA5.6000103@signal100.com> On 27/08/2014 17:15, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Figure out what > *precisely* you're concerned with, and start talking about that -- but > "privacy" as a word has become so vague it's almost useless. If we > can't describe precisely what we're afraid of losing, we're going to > lose it and we won't even be able to accurately tell people what we've lost. This is a key point. The words "privacy" and "liberty" are too vague to be useful for this purpose. The big problem is that what we are losing is not easily amenable to rational explanation. It exists, it is real, it matters, and yet it is difficult to explain in intellectually precise terms. This lack of precision plays into the hands of those who desire to remove such liberties. Can anyone describe in clear, intellectually persuasive terms, why liberty (and privacy is a subsection of liberty) matters? No one should have to explain such things and yet that is what is now required. > The second is a more general observation: authority tends to behave best > when it's forced to submit to oversight. Corporations behave best when > they're forced to answer to public shareholder meetings where anyone > with a single share to their name can demand answers -- and if they > don't get them, there's hell to pay. Politicians behave best when > there's a free press following them around and asking them rude > questions. Terrorists wear masks not to hide from the authorities, but > to hide from their own communities -- social oversight would make their > job impossible. Unfortunately, oversight only works when those in > charge take it seriously. We as a society would rather watch reality > television than television about reality: we'd rather watch _Big > Brother_ than C-SPAN hearings about whether government has become Big > Brother. Well observed. > The third is that those who *do* care, tend to care in deeply broken > ways. I can't tell you how many times I've run into self-styled privacy > advocates here in the U.S. who are furious over how the U.S. has been > reading their email. The only problem is there's very little evidence > of that occurring. Reading email metadata, maybe, but not email > content. When I try to explain that to them I usually find myself > wondering inside of two minutes why I ever bothered trying to bring fact > and reason to what is fundamentally an argument from passion and > emotion. I have had people literally yell in my face over the > metadata-versus-content distinction. When the front line of advocacy > appears to be detached from reality in one way, and the body politic is > detached from reality in another (reality television), well... how does > one fix this? Surely the metadata versus data argument is something of a red herring. Whilst there are clear technical differences between metadata and data/content, the fact is that when the powers that be read my communications metadata without warrant and at will (something that I never gave them permission to look at), it is no less an invasion of my privacy than if they read the data/contents. The nature of communications metadata is that it can tell people who look at it a great deal about a person, information that may well be private in nature. Warrantless snooping in metadata is too much. I am also aware that there are longstanding legal definitions that treat metadata differently to content. Well, legal niceties be damned. Technical (and legal) differences between metadata and data/content notwithstanding, the reality is that when my communications metadata is snooped on without warrant and without my permission then it is an invasion of privacy, one that is indistinguishable in seriousness (both morally and practically, in terms of what can be inferred from metadata) from snooping on data/content itself. (For those who are about to point out that we willingly share communications metadata with service providers to allow for routing our communications to the right place, this is done intentionally and for the purposes of routing only. It does not follow that such metadata should be available to anyone and everything; it is still private information that we should have every right to expect is shared only for the purposes of communications routing). > My reading of what Dan's said (I apologize, Dan, if I'm getting you > wrong) is that he sees no way to stop the technological assault. I > don't think that's quite true, though. If we were as a society to > suddenly say, "stop this, right now, let's establish some laws to > protect the essential core of privacy," we'd do it. It seems to me that a great many people believe that there is nothing that can be done. They truly seem to think that the only thing to do is to give in and throw away all aspects of personal information/travel/communications privacy (whatever precise meanings "privacy" has in this context). It's a defeatist attitude and I think it's playing into the enemy's hands. > Now I'm waving my arms and screaming at the other Eloi that they > aren't going to like what happens when the Morlocks come, but nobody's > listening to me. I'm getting in the way of the latest special about the > Kardashians, you see... I know what you mean. I have faith in the longer run but I'm not going to like the process that we end up going through to get there because people are not taking the threat seriously now, whilst there is still time to prevent the worst. -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From markr at signal100.com Fri Aug 29 10:41:32 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 09:41:32 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <53FDF13D.2060601@riseup.net> References: <20140823101653.711A12280FF@palinka.tinho.net> <53FD665F.8050103@signal100.com> <53FDF13D.2060601@riseup.net> Message-ID: <54003CBC.4020205@signal100.com> (This did not seem to reach the list previously. Apologies if you've seen it twice.) On 27/08/2014 15:54, shmick at riseup.net wrote: > actually you chose to step out of the front door today i assume ? > you took the bus to work or maybe you drove ? > i don't know, maybe a tractors more your thing, but you took it to the > gas station and filled 'er up > or you got breakfast at the deli before your meeting ? I think you are conflating separate things with questions like these. See Mark H Wood's comment above: "It was never possible to live in perfect anonymity. You can't participate in society and be invisible to it at the same time. One has to accept being known, to some extent. So, secrecy is only one part of privacy.[...]" > how many times were you photographed by the big bad social network > before your first coffee break? What "big bad social network"? First define what you mean by "social network" in this context. My earlier comment was, as I stated, primarily context of "social networks and other media". You seem to mean something something different by "the big bad social network". > how can you as an individual be in control of this ? I choose where I go and what I do, both online (which was the main context of my earlier comment) and in the physical world. Whilst, as Mark Wood says above, some involvement in society inevitably involves sharing some information about oneself (and always has done), one can nevertheless to a massive extent choose how much one shares, what one says, and what one does. One does not need to blab everything to everyone. > do you honestly believe you're in control of what information you > share? To a very considerable extent, yes. It is a self-evident reality (although what I choose to share versus what I need to share varies on the specific context). I have not given way all control over my mind, body and actions. > no prob, phone[sic] up FB or dr G and have a word to the secretary: > > "yes sir, we just had a looksy & can confirm all your bits are 100% > accounted for, your datas are currently residing on 3,521 servers in > 59> countries and if you like, we can press this red button and have > it all removed straight away sir, no lawyer required, no warrant, no > questions asked and a 100% satisfaction guarantee - this weeks > promotion also includes free removal of your NSA vacuum trail, we can > delete that too with the same red button because your data that we > were forced to share can be accounted for exactly sir, we know where > it went because we take pride in knowing we serve our customers best > interests..." What data on FB? Whilst, as Jason Anthony pointed out, other people can post information about me to social networks such as FB, data leakage by third parties is not a new risk (as MFPA observed). Apart from such data leakage, FB or other social networks only know about me what I choose to tell them. As I say, I do not need to blab to the world about everything. I *am* in practice in control of what I say and do and where I say and do it. > which privacy policy thesis have you read cover-to-cover ? > have you read it each time it was updated ? > did you prepare yourself for opt-out changes ? Perhaps it is more sensible to control what one shares in the first place. > which CV of yours have you parted ways with to prospective employers > is equipped with nice little java scripts phoning home to your > elaborately setup web server all-the-while alerting you to all those, > whose pdf reader allows outgoing comms, who open your file ? > > where is your CV from 15 years ago - you know precisely how many > people have read it don't you ? What point are you trying to prove here? Releasing a CV is still a controlled act, even though you don't necessarily know where it is going to get to. It is all a matter of choice. What you include is under your control. > are kids confident that they know their snapchats will be deleted just > like they were promised ? As I say, the better, wiser option would be to not post in the first place. > where are these snap chats now - do they know lest do they care ? Wise people do care. Wiser people were always careful what they said on third party provided services. > if you truly wanna be in control of your data, your gonna have to > regulate and restrain yourself until your testicles are drawn over the > back of your neck *or* accept it aint possible now, it may never be, > and when you accept that you'll keep out of the loony bin & fruit > cake parlour I think you are looking at the whole situation through defeatist's eyes. :-) -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From markr at signal100.com Fri Aug 29 10:42:08 2014 From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 09:42:08 +0100 Subject: Fwd: GNU hackers discover HACIENDA government surveillance and give us a way to fight back In-Reply-To: <1591774.HFpVQVoyKk@forge> References: <53F5F1F2.9030003@gbenet.com> <1591774.HFpVQVoyKk@forge> Message-ID: <54003CE0.4070106@signal100.com> On 29/08/2014 09:29, Samir Nassar wrote: > It is safe to say this thread has moved way off topic from being about using > gnupg. > > Samir Yes. My apologies for my part in taking it off-topic. -- Mark Rousell PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From kloecker at kde.org Fri Aug 29 20:03:43 2014 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 20:03:43 +0200 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> Message-ID: <3943126.BYlbESroJk@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Thursday 28 August 2014 22:53:52 TJ wrote: > I've recently been digging deep into the source-code trying to > understand what the differences are between --clearsign and > --detach-sign signatures. The RFC is probably much easier to read than the source code: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880 > This came about whilst writing code that calls on "gpg --verify" on > detached signatures; specifically Debian APT archives that contain > "Release" (plaintext) and "Release.gpg" (detached signature). > > The aim/hope was to combine the plaintext and detached signature into > the armored clearsign format and thus avoid needing to write one of > them to the file-system (the other can be supplied via stdin). > > I had thought that the message digest hash (in this case SHA512) > should be the same since the input data is the same which-ever > signing method is used. This didn't work as I had expected so I have > been digging into the source-code to figure out what is different > between the two signing methods. In general the message digest hashes will differ. The reason for this is a different canonicalization of the signed text (provided the detached signature is a text document signature; if it's a binary document signature no canonicalization is applied). A main difference is the stripping of trailing whitespace in the text (which is done for cleartext signatures but not for text document signature). For details see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.4 and http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-7 Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From gnupg at iam.tj Sat Aug 30 01:20:35 2014 From: gnupg at iam.tj (TJ) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 00:20:35 +0100 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <3943126.BYlbESroJk@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> <3943126.BYlbESroJk@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <54010AC3.1090702@iam.tj> On 29/08/14 19:03, Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Thursday 28 August 2014 22:53:52 TJ wrote: >> I've recently been digging deep into the source-code trying to >> understand what the differences are between --clearsign and >> --detach-sign signatures. > > The RFC is probably much easier to read than the source code: > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880 The RFC was fine but, for me, the code is authoritative especially when I suspect implementation differences. >> I had thought that the message digest hash (in this case SHA512) >> should be the same since the input data is the same which-ever >> signing method is used. This didn't work as I had expected so I have >> been digging into the source-code to figure out what is different >> between the two signing methods. > > In general the message digest hashes will differ. The reason for this is > a different canonicalization of the signed text (provided the detached > signature is a text document signature; if it's a binary document > signature no canonicalization is applied). A main difference is the > stripping of trailing whitespace in the text (which is done for > cleartext signatures but not for text document signature). Yes, I worked on that one too, checking that there was no white-space at end of lines: egrep '[\t ]$' Release | wc -l 0 I also tried replacing with as per 5.2.1. and "Signature of a canonical text document". gpg --verify <(echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(sed ':a;N;$!ba;s/\n/\r\n/g' Release)\n$(cat Release.asc.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 18:32:06 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " gpg --verify <(echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(sed ':a;N;$!ba;s/\n/\r\n/g' Release)\n$(cat Release.Test.detached.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 19:29:37 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " Looking at the code the signing path is either of: g10/sign.c::sign_file() g10/clearsign_file() For sign_file() text_filter() and md_filter() are added to the input iobuf filter list. For clearsign_file() copy_clearsig_text() is called, which in turn uses len_without_trailing_chars() to copy the line excluding trailing whitespace from plaintext input to clearsign output. For verify_signatures() and verify_files() (via verify_one_file()), armor_filter() is pushed onto the iobuf filter list then proc_signature_packets() is called, which calls do_proc_packets() which, during IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW calls radix64_read() which skips whitespace characters. This being the case I cannot see any opportunity for the plaintext that is the subject of the message digest hashing to be different, which suggests that something else is added to the hashed value when generating a detached signature. gpg --verify Release.asc # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 18:32:06 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " gpg --verify Release.Test.detached.gpg Release # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 19:29:37 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " gpg --verify Release.asc.gpg Release # gpg: Signature made Thu 28 Aug 2014 18:32:06 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " From jonbrownmasterit at gmail.com Fri Aug 29 20:37:27 2014 From: jonbrownmasterit at gmail.com (Jonathan Brown) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 13:37:27 -0500 Subject: Crypto Stick vs Smart Card Reader /w Pin Pad Message-ID: Is the crypto stick which is fully open source and open hardware more secure than a Gemalto smart card reader with pin pad built in? Which of these would make you more of a hard target and increase security. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From herbert.burnswell at gmail.com Fri Aug 29 21:50:06 2014 From: herbert.burnswell at gmail.com (Herb Burnswell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 12:50:06 -0700 Subject: default user and recipient Message-ID: All, I am new to pgp and would like to understand the minimum flags that I should be using for my encryption/decryption needs. I just want to encrypt files for decryption by one other person. We have exchanged public keys. I have read in several places that I can run: gpg -e filename However I receive: You did not specify a user ID. (you may use "-r") Current recipients: Enter the user ID. End with an empty line: Questions: 1. Can I set default behavior to not have to specify a user ID? 2. What other flags should be used per best practices? Any guidance is greatly appreciated, Herb -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From herbert.burnswell at gmail.com Fri Aug 29 22:05:24 2014 From: herbert.burnswell at gmail.com (Herb Burnswell) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 13:05:24 -0700 Subject: Fwd: default user and recipient In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry. I found the default-recipient parameter in the ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file. However, when I set: default-recipient-self I receive: No such user ID. I have not uploaded my newly created key information to a keyserver, Is that a requirement? TIA, Herb ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Herb Burnswell Date: Fri, Aug 29, 2014 at 12:50 PM Subject: default user and recipient To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org All, I am new to pgp and would like to understand the minimum flags that I should be using for my encryption/decryption needs. I just want to encrypt files for decryption by one other person. We have exchanged public keys. I have read in several places that I can run: gpg -e filename However I receive: You did not specify a user ID. (you may use "-r") Current recipients: Enter the user ID. End with an empty line: Questions: 1. Can I set default behavior to not have to specify a user ID? 2. What other flags should be used per best practices? Any guidance is greatly appreciated, Herb -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net Sat Aug 30 17:17:35 2014 From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 18:17:35 +0300 Subject: default user and recipient In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: You'll need to import the other person?s public key as that is what you are encrypting to. If the other person has uploaded their key to a key server you should be able to find it there: gpg --search-key recipient at example.com If you already know, preferably the long form, key ID you can just use: gpg --recv-keys 6C70228BDC779E9A If their key is not the key server network there are other options (LDAP, DNS etc.) or they could email you their public key. If it?s in a file: gpg --import filename.asc Ok, you?ve got the key imported and then it?s just: gpg -e filename or directly: gpg -r 6C70228BDC779E9A -e filename > I have not uploaded my newly created key information to a keyserver, Is that a requirement? Nope. That might for example help others find your key and encrypt to that. PS. Remember to replace the ID from those examples. -- Ville On 29 Aug 2014, at 23:05, Herb Burnswell wrote: > Sorry. I found the default-recipient parameter in the ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file. However, when I set: > > default-recipient-self > > I receive: > > No such user ID. > > I have not uploaded my newly created key information to a keyserver, Is that a requirement? > > TIA, > > Herb > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Herb Burnswell > Date: Fri, Aug 29, 2014 at 12:50 PM > Subject: default user and recipient > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > > All, > > I am new to pgp and would like to understand the minimum flags that I should be using for my encryption/decryption needs. I just want to encrypt files for decryption by one other person. We have exchanged public keys. > > I have read in several places that I can run: > > gpg -e filename > > However I receive: > > You did not specify a user ID. (you may use "-r") > > Current recipients: > > Enter the user ID. End with an empty line: > > Questions: > > 1. Can I set default behavior to not have to specify a user ID? > 2. What other flags should be used per best practices? > > Any guidance is greatly appreciated, > > Herb > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 630 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From free10pro at gmail.com Sat Aug 30 19:08:36 2014 From: free10pro at gmail.com (Paul R. Ramer) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 10:08:36 -0700 Subject: Crypto Stick vs Smart Card Reader /w Pin Pad In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <71f8cd4b-8018-453d-b0f6-a4d1d204ab0d@email.android.com> On August 29, 2014 11:37:27 AM PDT, Jonathan Brown wrote: >Is the crypto stick which is fully open source and open hardware more >secure than a Gemalto smart card reader with pin pad built in? Which of >these would make you more of a hard target and increase security. I would say that they are both good tools for separating the secret keys from the computer. I have both kinds. The great thing about the Crypto Stick is that it combines the card reader with the OpenPGP card in one discrete package and uses free software and has open specifications. As for the smartcard reader with a PIN pad, the advantage to that is that you can use different smartcards with the same reader, and the PIN pad allows you to keep the PIN separate from the computer. Now some would argue that the advantage of this is that it keeps the PIN safe from compromise by a keylogger, which is true. But if your computer is compromised, the *only* thing that may be safe is your PIN and your smartcard. Beyond that you are screwed. I believe that both are good options and not very different where security is concerned (other than, say, the openness of the hardware specification). I would recommend you pick the one that will work best for you based on how you operate and how you will use your keys and your computer. Cheers, -Paul -- PGP: 3DB6D884 From gnupg at iam.tj Sat Aug 30 19:50:47 2014 From: gnupg at iam.tj (TJ) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 18:50:47 +0100 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <54010AC3.1090702@iam.tj> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> <3943126.BYlbESroJk@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> <54010AC3.1090702@iam.tj> Message-ID: <54020EF7.7060701@iam.tj> I've finally pinned down the issue. The manipulation of the plaintext by clearsign results in the message digest being calculated on different plaintext, as per RFC4880 7.1 Dash-Escaped Text: "As with binary signatures on text documents, a cleartext signature is calculated on the text using canonical line endings. The line ending (i.e., the ) before the '-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----' line that terminates the signed text is not considered part of the signed text." The issue stems from the different ways that DOS/Windows and *nix handle line-endings. In DOS/Windows is the line separator whereas in *nix it is the line terminator. DOS/Windows doesn't require a line-separator at the end of the last line of a text file, whereas *nix requires a line terimantor. I used 3 plaintext test-cases to isolate the issue: Release : A Debian APT archive Release file (all lines end with LF including the last line) Release.CRLF : 'Release' with all line endings converted to CRLF Release.CRLF.2 : 'Release.CRLF' with the final CRLF removed "gpg --debug-all --detach-sign --armor ..." does not modify the plaintext before generated the message digest (see "dbgmd-00001.sign"). "gpg --debug-all --clearsign ... Release.CRLF.2" does *not* modify the plaintext (see "dbgmd-00001-clearsign"). "gpg --debug-all --clearsign ... Release.CRLF" modifies the plaintext by removing the final CRLF pair (see "dbgmd-00001-clearsign"). "gpg --debug-all --clearsign ... Release" modifies the plaintext, replacing all LF with CRLF and removing the last lines terminator (see "dbgmd-00001-clearsign"). So to use a detached signature to verify using clearsign format the plaintext must be pre-formatted to be identical to the clearsign generated plaintext form: gpg --debug-all --digest-algo SHA512 --detach-sign --armor --local-user 3591FB89 --output Release.gpg <(sed 's/$/\r/' Release | head -c -2) gpg --verify <(echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(sed 's/$/\r/' Release | head -c -2)\n$(cat Release.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Sat 30 Aug 2014 18:41:52 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " gpg --verify <(echo -e "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n$(cat Release)\n$(cat Release.gpg)") # gpg: Signature made Sat 30 Aug 2014 18:41:52 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 # gpg: Good signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " Unfortunately, for plaintext that hasn't been pre-formatted, it means gpg needs modifying in order for it to correctly verify clearsign input that embeds a detached signature rather than a clearsign signature. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Aug 30 21:06:21 2014 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 15:06:21 -0400 Subject: default user and recipient In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <540220AD.9050100@sixdemonbag.org> > 1. Can I set default behavior to not have to specify a user ID? Yes. You may find the FAQ to be useful: https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf > 2. What other flags should be used per best practices? When using -e ("encrypt to"), you must also use -r ("recipient"), and -r must come first. You may also wish to use -s ("sign"). Personally, I like to use the long form of the options, as I think it makes things easier to read. For instance, to encrypt a message for me you would type: gpg --recipient 0xD6B98E10 --sign --encrypt filename.txt From kloecker at kde.org Sat Aug 30 23:20:47 2014 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 23:20:47 +0200 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> Message-ID: <1745243.JDdNhTkNpi@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Thursday 28 August 2014 22:53:52 TJ wrote: > I've recently been digging deep into the source-code trying to > understand what the differences are between --clearsign and > --detach-sign signatures. > > This came about whilst writing code that calls on "gpg --verify" on > detached signatures; specifically Debian APT archives that contain > "Release" (plaintext) and "Release.gpg" (detached signature). > > The aim/hope was to combine the plaintext and detached signature into > the armored clearsign format and thus avoid needing to write one of > them to the file-system (the other can be supplied via stdin). You can probably use another approach than trying to create a clearsigned text from a signed text and its detached signature. On the command line one can provide both, the detached signature and the signed text, one after the other via stdin by running gpg --verify - - You need to separate the detached signature and the signed stuff with an EOT, e.g. on the console first you enter the armored detached signature and terminate it with Ctrl+D, then you enter the signed text and terminate it with Ctrl+D. BTW, which language do you want to write the code in? Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From gnupg at iam.tj Sun Aug 31 00:11:17 2014 From: gnupg at iam.tj (TJ) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 23:11:17 +0100 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <1745243.JDdNhTkNpi@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> <1745243.JDdNhTkNpi@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <54024C05.8070709@iam.tj> On 30/08/14 22:20, Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Thursday 28 August 2014 22:53:52 TJ wrote: >> The aim/hope was to combine the plaintext and detached signature into >> the armored clearsign format and thus avoid needing to write one of >> them to the file-system (the other can be supplied via stdin). > > You can probably use another approach than trying to create a > clearsigned text from a signed text and its detached signature. On the > command line one can provide both, the detached signature and the signed > text, one after the other via stdin by running > > gpg --verify - - > > You need to separate the detached signature and the signed stuff with an > EOT, e.g. on the console first you enter the armored detached signature > and terminate it with Ctrl+D, then you enter the signed text and > terminate it with Ctrl+D. This would solve the issue I'm dealing with, but I can't get it to work here: gpg --verify - - < <(echo -ne "$(cat Release.gpg)\004$(cat Release)\004") gpg: Signature made Sat 30 Aug 2014 22:58:07 BST using RSA key ID 3591FB89 gpg: BAD signature from "Test Key (gnupg 1.4.16 Ubuntu 14.04 amd64) " cat -e < <(echo -ne "$(cat Release.gpg)\004$(cat Release)\004") | grep END # -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----^DOrigin: Ubuntu$ With "--debug-all" I noticed that "dgbmd-00001.verify" is empty, which indicates no plaintext was received. > BTW, which language do you want to write the code in? Well, I'm working in C to add another option to gpg, but the code that needs this is a Python library (that imports python-gnupg) that enables the regular verification of the GPG signatures of APT archive 'Release' files in all Debian/Ubuntu/related-distro mirrors world-wide. If I can find a way to pass both plaintext and detached signature via stdin that would solve the issue - I'm trying to avoid any need to create temporary files on the file-system. From herbert.burnswell at gmail.com Sun Aug 31 01:23:39 2014 From: herbert.burnswell at gmail.com (Herb Burnswell) Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2014 16:23:39 -0700 Subject: default user and recipient Message-ID: All, I am new to pgp and would like to understand the minimum flags that I should be using for my encryption/decryption needs. I just want to encrypt files for decryption by one other person. We have exchanged public keys. I have read in several places that I can run: gpg -e filename In ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file, I set: default-recipient-self which I assume means that the default key (I only have one) is used for both encryption and decryption. However, I receive: No such user ID. I have not uploaded my newly created key information to a keyserver, Is that a requirement? What are good 'best practices' flags that should be used with encryption and decryption with pgp? Thanks in advance, any guidance is greatly appreciated. Herb -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kloecker at kde.org Sun Aug 31 02:47:45 2014 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 02:47:45 +0200 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <54024C05.8070709@iam.tj> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> <1745243.JDdNhTkNpi@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> <54024C05.8070709@iam.tj> Message-ID: <3217931.txkpfM8Dcy@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Saturday 30 August 2014 23:11:17 TJ wrote: > On 30/08/14 22:20, Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > > BTW, which language do you want to write the code in? > > Well, I'm working in C to add another option to gpg, but the code that > needs this is a Python library (that imports python-gnupg) that > enables the regular verification of the GPG signatures of APT archive > 'Release' files in all Debian/Ubuntu/related-distro mirrors > world-wide. I strongly suggest that you have a look at using some Python binding for gpgme instead of messing around with gpg. gpgme is _the_ library for using GnuPG in other programs. The following message from last year lists two Python bindings: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2013-April/046477.html Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Sun Aug 31 06:53:44 2014 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 06:53:44 +0200 Subject: default user and recipient In-Reply-To: Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hello Herb ! Herb Burnswell wrote: > I am new to pgp and would like to understand the minimum flags that I > should be using for my encryption/decryption needs. I just want to encrypt > files for decryption by one other person. We have exchanged public keys. > I have read in several places that I can run: > gpg -e filename > In ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file, I set: > default-recipient-self > which I assume means that the default key (I only have one) is used for > both encryption and decryption. However, I receive: In GPG.CONF: default-key 0xCFAF704C default-recipient-self encrypt-to 0xCFAF704C means that the default key for signature is defined; and the message or file will be encrypted always to it too, for your personal use, otherwise you couldn't read your own message. If you got the public key of the other person, you need to tell GNUPG what you want; two ways for that: Add "-r person" on the command line or default-recipient person (in GPG.CONF) - -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iHAEAREDADEFAlQCrc8qGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9pbnRkZWNoYXQubmV0LzB4Q0ZB RjcwNEMuYXNjAAoJEPUdbaDPr3BMD1cAmJywZb9anCm1GfzapKmtrl3RyF4Amwar 9PHKn6j3dXUPHnW9e1ZOxJll =uYDX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From oliverml1 at oli1170.net Sun Aug 31 11:56:01 2014 From: oliverml1 at oli1170.net (Oliver Winker) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 11:56:01 +0200 Subject: Patches gpg-agent + scute for ssl/tls auth using opengpg card with 2048 rsa key Message-ID: <1601141.xVry18ndU2@gamix64> Hello, The two patches below against gpg-agent (gnupg2-2.0.26) [1] and scute-1.4.0 [2] allow ssl/tls auth using an opengpg card with 2048 rsa key. The patch against gpg-agent basically allow a hash length of 51 bytes for signing. And the patch against scute increases a string buffer to be able to hold 51 bytes hash string. The agent command concerned are basically: --- SETHASH --hash=tls-md5sha1 [102 chars =^ 51 bytes here] PKSIGN --- The patches are functional for me, but I can imagine not 100% perfect for a maintainer (string buffer to big, hash-length check not optimally placed). But I prefer to leave the tuning of the details to the specialists ;). Best Regards, Oliver [1]: Patch against gpg-agent (gnupg2-2.0.26) --- Author: Oliver Winker Date: Sat Aug 30 21:09:29 2014 +0200 agent/command: Allow hash length 51 for SSL auth with OpenGPG card and 2048 bit key diff --git a/agent/command.c b/agent/command.c index 2405c54..3849e2c 100644 --- a/agent/command.c +++ b/agent/command.c @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ cmd_sethash (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) if (algo == MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1 && n == 36) ; else if (n != 16 && n != 20 && n != 24 - && n != 28 && n != 32 && n != 48 && n != 64) + && n != 28 && n != 32 && n != 48 && n != 64 && n != 51) return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unsupported length of hash"); if (n > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) --- [2] Patch against scute-1.4.0: --- Author: Oliver Winker Date: Sat Aug 30 21:30:11 2014 +0200 agent: Increase MAX_DATA_LEN buffer length to hold hash for SSL auth using OpenGPG card and 2048 bit key diff --git a/src/agent.c b/src/agent.c index 9265ca2..a1f1d99 100644 --- a/src/agent.c +++ b/src/agent.c @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ scute_agent_sign (char *grip, unsigned char *data, int len, { char cmd[150]; gpg_error_t err; -#define MAX_DATA_LEN 36 +#define MAX_DATA_LEN 128 unsigned char pretty_data[2 * MAX_DATA_LEN + 1]; int i; struct signature sig; --- From wk at gnupg.org Sun Aug 31 17:54:37 2014 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 17:54:37 +0200 Subject: Crypto Stick vs Smart Card Reader /w Pin Pad In-Reply-To: <71f8cd4b-8018-453d-b0f6-a4d1d204ab0d@email.android.com> (Paul R. Ramer's message of "Sat, 30 Aug 2014 10:08:36 -0700") References: <71f8cd4b-8018-453d-b0f6-a4d1d204ab0d@email.android.com> Message-ID: <87d2bgslhe.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 30 Aug 2014 19:08, free10pro at gmail.com said: > I would say that they are both good tools for separating the secret > keys from the computer. I have both kinds. The great thing about the > Crypto Stick is that it combines the card reader with the OpenPGP card > in one discrete package and uses free software and has open > specifications. Note that the crypto chip soldered into the Cryptostick and its software is the same as the one used in the ZeitControl OpenPGP card. Thus it is not free software. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From gnupg at iam.tj Sun Aug 31 18:03:28 2014 From: gnupg at iam.tj (TJ) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 17:03:28 +0100 Subject: Difference between clearsign and detached signatures? In-Reply-To: <3217931.txkpfM8Dcy@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <53FFA4F0.9010908@iam.tj> <1745243.JDdNhTkNpi@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> <54024C05.8070709@iam.tj> <3217931.txkpfM8Dcy@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <54034750.7000302@iam.tj> On 31/08/14 01:47, Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Saturday 30 August 2014 23:11:17 TJ wrote: >> On 30/08/14 22:20, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:> > I strongly suggest that you have a look at using some Python binding for > gpgme instead of messing around with gpg. gpgme is _the_ library for > using GnuPG in other programs. Thanks - somehow I'd missed gpgme and the python-gpgme package which is available for Debian/Ubuntu. pygpgme looks to be a very basic wrapper around gpgme but has no documentation about how it deals with type differences. Looking at the API documentation for gpgme the one thing I've not been able to see how to do is set the keyring file to use. There doesn't appear to be any function that provides for setting an existing key ring; the best I could find is gpgme_op_import_keys() which talks about: "the general interface to move a key from one crypto engine to another as long as they are compatible. In particular it is used to actually import and make keys permanent which have been retrieved from an external source" In my scenario I simply need to tell the crypto engine to use the "/etc/apt/trusted.gpg" keyring which is what I'm doing with the python-gnupg library currently. I had expected gpgme_set_engine_info() would be the most likely function for setting the key ring. From paul.lewis at quadensemble.com Sun Aug 31 16:00:57 2014 From: paul.lewis at quadensemble.com (Paul Lewis) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 15:00:57 +0100 Subject: gnupg privicy assistant - card manager. Message-ID: <1409493657.21352.1@Kingston2> I hope this is the correct list to raise this issue at? The GNU Privicy assistant seems to be working fine, when I start it I can see a list of my keys. I'd like to use the card manager function, but whenever I invoke it the application returns the error "Error accessing the card", and the status bar reports "Checking for card .. " Looking at my system logs, start to fill up with: gnome-keyring-daemon[5531]: unrecognized command: SCD gnome-keyring-daemon[5531]: unrecognized command: GETEVENTCOUNTER gnome-keyring-daemon[5531]: unrecognized command: GETEVENTCOUNTER The last two lines are repeated continiously until the card manager is closed. Otherwise if I run gpg --card-status with a card in the USB card reader I get the following: gpg: detected reader `Alcor Micro AU9540 00 00' Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500001EAD0000 Version ..........: 2.0 More stuff follows - but shows the card reader is functional. At the command prompt I can enter the gpg --card-edit and read and edit the card parameters. I presume, the system is misconfigured is some way. Any one got any suggestions? Thanks From jonbrownmasterit at gmail.com Sun Aug 31 19:31:57 2014 From: jonbrownmasterit at gmail.com (Jonathan Brown) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 12:31:57 -0500 Subject: Smart Card 4096 Key Question Message-ID: Can an OpenPGP 2.0 smart card hold 3 4096 keys at the same-time? Additionally could an OpenPGP 2.0 Smart card hold 4 4096 keys as well? This is assuming you are using a GPG version that supports this. Sorry I couldnt find this answer online. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net Sun Aug 31 23:27:23 2014 From: tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net (Tristan Santore) Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2014 22:27:23 +0100 Subject: Smart Card 4096 Key Question In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5403933B.4070702@internexusconnect.net> On 31/08/14 18:31, Jonathan Brown wrote: > Can an OpenPGP 2.0 smart card hold 3 4096 keys at the same-time? > Additionally could an OpenPGP 2.0 Smart card hold 4 4096 keys as well? > > This is assuming you are using a GPG version that supports this. Sorry > I couldnt find this answer online. > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Johnathan, Yes the card can have a 4096bit Auth, Sign and Encryption key. You have to generate them on a machine though, not on card. No you cannot have 4 keys on a card. Regards, Tristan -- Tristan Santore BSc MBCS TS4523-RIPE Network and Infrastructure Operations InterNexusConnect Mobile +44-78-55069812 Tristan.Santore at internexusconnect.net Former Thawte Notary (Please note: Thawte has closed its WoT programme down, and I am therefore no longer able to accredit trust) For Fedora related issues, please email me at: TSantore at fedoraproject.org -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: