How to preserve the permission/owner/group owner on the pubring.gpg, secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg

Peter Lebbing peter at
Wed Aug 6 20:35:20 CEST 2014

On 06/08/14 16:57, Sieu Truc wrote:
>    -rw-rw-rw-.    1 Test1  groupTest2   600  6 août  16:35 random_seed
>    -rw-r--r--.    1 Test1  groupTest2  2851  6 août  16:35 secring.gpg
>    -rw-rw-rw-. 1 Test1  groupTest2  1600  6 août  16:38 trustdb.gpg

These three sound rather insecure, especially world-writable stuff?!
That's pretty extreme. That opens you up to bugs in a lot of services,
not to mention that I think most developers develop with the expectation
that world-readable stuff does not need to be protected from reading by
anybody / any service, so they're not very vigilant about that either.

> Can you suggest to me any solution that will preserve the
> permission/user/group like as it was set originally.

My strong suggestion would be to change the process, giving each user
their own secret keyring. Can't you script a secret key import that
would import for both users?

Alternatively, and I'm not really in favour of this but it's your setup,
the man-pages for gpg and gpg2 mention:

> --preserve-permissions
>               Don't change the permissions of a secret  keyring  back  to  user
>               read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you
>               are doing.

But I would strongly suggest not making the three files mentioned
world-readable, let alone world-writable.

There is no need at all to share random_seed, so I would definitely give
each user their own copy of that for simplicity. It is written much more
often than secring.gpg.

I think trustdb.gpg is, or might also be, written on public key import.

If you fiddle with access permissions, you need to really think about
what you're doing. Your world-writable access makes me suspect you
haven't thought well about all the implications, so
--preserve-permissions might be a great way to shoot yourself in the
foot. I suppose you're using GnuPG for some kind of protection against
something nefarious, because I wouldn't know what else it is for (a
really over-the-top checksum? :). If you then kill off security in
another way, you only get a warm feeling, but so will your attacker,
when he uses a filesystem-traversal bug in some program running on the
same machine.



I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <>

More information about the Gnupg-users mailing list