AW: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG

KA IT User edv at
Mon Aug 11 13:21:32 CEST 2014


please remove us from the mailing list. We are not longer using GnuPG in our company.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards
Ing. Roman Höller, MSc
Information Technology
Kommunalkredit Austria AG
1092 Wien, Türkenstraße 9
Tel.: +43 (0) 1/31631 519, Fax: -99519
Mobil: +43 (0) 664/80 31631 519
r.hoeller at

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: Gnupg-announce [mailto:gnupg-announce-bounces at] Im Auftrag von Werner Koch
Gesendet: Freitag, 08. August 2014 12:28
An: gnupg-announce at; info-gnu at
Betreff: [Announce] [security fix] Libgcrypt and GnuPG


While evaluating the "Get Your Hands Off My Laptop" [1] paper I missed to describe [2] a software combination which has not been fixed and is thus vulnerable to the attack described by the paper.  If you are using a GnuPG version with a *Libgcrypt version < 1.6.0*, it is possible to mount the described side-channel attack on Elgamal encryption subkeys.
To check whether you are using a vulnerable Libgcrypt version, enter

  gpg2 --version

on the command line; the second line of the output gives the Libgcrypt

  gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.25
  libgcrypt 1.5.3

In this example Libgcrypt is vulnerable.  If you see 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 you are fine.  GnuPG versions since 1.4.16 are not affected because they do not use Libgcrypt.

The recommendation is to update any Libgcrypt version below 1.6.0 to at least the latest version from the 1.5 series which is 1.5.4.  Updating to 1.6.1 is also possible but that requires to rebuild GnuPG.

Libgcrypt 1.5.4 has been released yesterday [3]; for convenience I include the download instructions below.  A CVE-id has not yet been assigned.

Many thanks to Daniel Genkin for pointing out this problem.





Libgcrypt source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at .  On the primary server the source tarball and its digital signature are: (1478k)

That file is bzip2 compressed.  A gzip compressed version is here: (1763k)

Alternativley you may upgrade using this patch file: (17k)

In order to check that the version of Libgcrypt you are going to build is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following

 * Check the supplied OpenPGP signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 you would use this

     gpg --verify libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.  You
   should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made
   by the release signing key 4F25E3B6 which is certified by my well
   known key 1E42B367.  To retrieve the keys you may use the command
   "gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at".

 * If you are not able to use GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1

     sha1sum libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

bdf4b04a0d2aabc04ab3564fbe38fd094135aa7a  libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.bz2 71e432e0ae8792076a40c6059667997250abbb9d  libgcrypt-1.5.4.tar.gz 8876ae002751e6ec26c76e510d17fc3e0eccb3ed  libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.5.4.diff.bz2

Watching out for possible security problems and working with researches to fix them takes a lot of time.  g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by me, is bearing these costs.  To help us carry on this work, we need your support; please see .

Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

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