key generation: paranoia mode - explicit random input

[Hauke Laging]

Am Mi 26.02.2014, 08:56:17 schrieb Werner Koch:

> You may first want to read about Libgcrypt/GnuPG RNG.  The Libgcrypt
> manual has a section on it.

I had a look at that but I am not sure what you want me to read. Could 
you be more precise about that?

One thing came to my mind reading that: It may not be enough to 
"redirect" /dev/random as more entropy sources are used. I don't know 
though when they are used. Probably not for the generation of asymmetric 
and symmetric keys.

It seems to me that in the worst case three different inputs have to be 
supplied (for the different quality levels).


Hauke
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