key generation: paranoia mode - explicit random input

[Hauke Laging]

Am Do 27.02.2014, 08:38:37 schrieb Michael Anders:

> If a private key has been accessed on a system some adversary might
> have had a chance to tamper with(e.g. with the PRNG or generally if
> it is an NSA friendly OS connected to the web ;-) , there could have
> been a keylogger in place and security of the key is gone.

I am talking about a szenario in which everything which can be 
reasonably done already has been done. I am not talking about "Here's my 
system at which I click on every link I see. How can I make GnuPG more 
secure?".

I.e. we are talking about offline systems here (yeah, I remember the 
discussion about USB sticks being dangerous...) thus a keylogger would 
not be a problem.


Hauke
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OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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