Revocation certificates [was: time delay unlock private key.]

Leo Gaspard ekleog at
Thu Jan 23 23:06:14 CET 2014

On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 01:27:58PM -0800, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> [...]
> And yes, a strong passphrase is still the strongest bar against these
> backups being misused -- but unless you've got an eye-poppingly strong
> passphrase, your best bet is to rely on denying attackers access to the data
> as well as the passphrase.
> [...]

Well... Diceware generates 128-bit passphrases of ten words, which is not *that*
much. Yet is can be regarded as far too much. Well... seven-word passphrase
provides 90-bit of security, and should not be so hard to remember. And
bruteforcing it should be quite long...

Sure, you would need to use really good random number generator, yet you could
use /dev/random just as well as you would have for your randomly-generated

Yet, I agree I would not send my encrypted private key. But having your divorced
spouse bruteforce 90 bit of passphrase just to annoy you... seems quite an
unreasonable threat to me. And AFAICT even well-funded-organizations are not yet
powerful enough to bruteforce a 90-bit passphrase with enough s2k iterations.



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