cryptanalysis question: Does knowing some of the content of the message make the full message vulnerable to decryption?

Mark H. Wood mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Fri Jan 31 16:54:50 CET 2014

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 11:48:13PM -0800, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> Just know that no one is going to attack to the cipher itself to get to your messages.  There are much easier methods such as installing a key logger.  Why beat the door down if you can open the window?

Well...that depends on the value of the information, the assets of the
adversary, and the cost of failure.  Passively capturing and analyzing
your traffic from 1000km away offers little hope but also little risk.
Active measures like remotely installing a software keylogger can be
detected and resisted or undone.  Active measures like installing a
hardware keylogger can get the adversary shot dead in the act, or
result in exposure that would be far more costly to his employers than
the failure of his individual mission.

I would likely agree that nobody is going to attack the cipher to get
*my* secrets.  Most people haven't got anything worth that much time
and effort.  The greatest expectation of reward probably lies in
waiting for me to make a misteak.

Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Machines
should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 198 bytes
Desc: Digital signature
URL: </pipermail/attachments/20140131/a2b8102a/attachment-0001.sig>

More information about the Gnupg-users mailing list