From suspekt at gmx.de  Sun Jun  1 12:54:30 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 12:54:30 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
Message-ID: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>

Hi there,
I understand the concept of using a secure offline key and than creating 
one or multiple subkeys to use in rather insecure environments like a 
internet-connected laptop or a smartphone. Depending on which tutorial 
you look at, the recommended capabilities of the offline key vary.
Some use the key just for certification of own subkeys and keys of other 
people.

Some recommend using it for certification of own subkeys, keys of other 
people and signing of documents that are so important, that the 
signing-subkey is not secure enough.

But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline mainkey 
also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so important that 
subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.

Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?

thanks a lot
suspekt


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Jun  1 16:17:52 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 16:17:52 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>

Am So 01.06.2014, 12:54:30 schrieb Suspekt:

> But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline mainkey
> also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so important that
> subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.

I do :-)

http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/kurzinfo/schluesselqualitaet/#offline
http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/scripte/keygeneration/key-generation.sh


> Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?

There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and 
signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied then 
you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).

There are legal and organizational arguments, too:

1) If you are forced to give a decryption key to the authorities then it 
is an advantage if they cannot use this key to forge signatures.

2) If a signature key has expired then you may delete the private part. 
You should usually never throw away a decryption key, though, as it can 
happen that you have to decrypt data long after the public part has 
expired.

I say: Everyone needs keys at different security levels (German):
http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/

E.g. the key which is going to sign this email is not suitable for 
handling really important data. But as long as hardly anybody has a 
complete high-security key it seems useful to have at least the mainkey 
as a last resort.

Technically you could use other subkeys for higher security levels ? but 
who would understand that? Seems very dangerous to me, more dangerous 
than using the mainkey.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Sun Jun  1 16:52:14 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2014 10:52:14 -0400
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 1, 2014, at 6:54 AM, Suspekt <suspekt at gmx.de> wrote:

> Hi there,
> I understand the concept of using a secure offline key and than creating one or multiple subkeys to use in rather insecure environments like a internet-connected laptop or a smartphone. Depending on which tutorial you look at, the recommended capabilities of the offline key vary.
> Some use the key just for certification of own subkeys and keys of other people.
> 
> Some recommend using it for certification of own subkeys, keys of other people and signing of documents that are so important, that the signing-subkey is not secure enough.
> 
> But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline mainkey also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so important that subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.
> 
> Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?

One reason is that in some places there are legal issues around this.  You can be legally required to give up your encryption key to the authorities or suffer the consequences (arrest / jail / etc).  The idea is that if you have a different encryption and signing/certification key, you can easily give up the encryption (sub)key without compromising your (much more valuable) main key.  At least that's the theory - I don't know offhand if this "I'll give you this key, but not that one" trick has been tested in practice, and if so, which legal jurisdiction it was tried in, and whether it worked or not.  (I'd be curious to find out, if anyone has any pointers).

For the sake of argument, let's say it worked, though: the authorities have your encryption key and can now decrypt as they like.  You promptly make a new encryption key using your (uncompromised) main key and continue on.  They can read your old mail, but not the new, and notably cannot make signatures as you, and cannot make new keys as you.

As a side note, when doing a key signing with someone, I send them a message and request they sign it to prove ownership of the key.  I require that this signature comes from the main key - that's the key I'm signing, so that's the key I need to prove ownership of.  The subkeys are not really relevant here.

David



From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com  Sun Jun  1 20:05:12 2014
From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 20:05:12 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de> <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
Message-ID: <538B6B58.806@gmail.com>

Il 01/06/2014 16:17, Hauke Laging ha scritto:

> There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and 
> signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied then 
> you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).
Then you're using RSA the wrong way.
You should *never* apply RSA directly. Padding is important and *must*
be checked during process. Decryption and signature are the same RSA op,
but use a different padding so you can tell which op got applied.

> 2) If a signature key has expired then you may delete the private part. 
> You should usually never throw away a decryption key, though, as it can 
> happen that you have to decrypt data long after the public part has 
> expired.
And that poses a big problem for everyone that would like to use a
smartcard for decryption...

BYtE,
 Diego.



From suspekt at gmx.de  Sun Jun  1 21:12:49 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 21:12:49 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de> <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
Message-ID: <538B7B31.5080606@gmx.de>

Am 01.06.2014 16:17, schrieb Hauke Laging:
> Am So 01.06.2014, 12:54:30 schrieb Suspekt:
>
>> But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline
>> mainkey also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so
>> important that subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.
>
> I do :-)
>
> http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/kurzinfo/schluesselqualitaet/#offline
>
>http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/scripte/keygeneration
 > /key-generation.sh

Hauke, I read your site, but obviously I should should read them again.
A great help by the way!


>> Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?
>
> There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and
> signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied
> then you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).
I don't get it. Decrypting data by signing it?

> There are legal and organizational arguments, too:
>
> 1) If you are forced to give a decryption key to the authorities then
> it is an advantage if they cannot use this key to forge signatures.
Thats a good point! Also it will be interesting to explain the judge
the details of PGP, main keys and subkeys ;)
Probably we have to get an expert from the CCC for that

> 2) If a signature key has expired then you may delete the private
> part. You should usually never throw away a decryption key, though,
> as it can happen that you have to decrypt data long after the public
> part has expired.
>
> I say: Everyone needs keys at different security levels (German):
> http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/
Thanks, I'll have a look

> E.g. the key which is going to sign this email is not suitable for
> handling really important data. But as long as hardly anybody has a
> complete high-security key it seems useful to have at least the
> mainkey as a last resort.
>
> Technically you could use other subkeys for higher security levels ?
> but who would understand that? Seems very dangerous to me, more
> dangerous than using the mainkey.
>
>
> Hauke
>

suspekt


From suspekt at gmx.de  Sun Jun  1 21:25:36 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 21:25:36 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <538B7E30.5070306@gmx.de>

Am 01.06.2014 16:52, schrieb David Shaw:
> On Jun 1, 2014, at 6:54 AM, Suspekt <suspekt at gmx.de> wrote:
>
>> Hi there, I understand the concept of using a secure offline key
>> and than creating one or multiple subkeys to use in rather insecure
>> environments like a internet-connected laptop or a smartphone.
>> Depending on which tutorial you look at, the recommended
>> capabilities of the offline key vary. Some use the key just for
>> certification of own subkeys and keys of other people.
>>
>> Some recommend using it for certification of own subkeys, keys of
>> other people and signing of documents that are so important, that
>> the signing-subkey is not secure enough.
>>
>> But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline
>> mainkey also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so
>> important that subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.
>>
>> Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?
>
> One reason is that in some places there are legal issues around this.
> You can be legally required to give up your encryption key to the
> authorities or suffer the consequences (arrest / jail / etc).  The
> idea is that if you have a different encryption and
> signing/certification key, you can easily give up the encryption
> (sub)key without compromising your (much more valuable) main key.  At
> least that's the theory - I don't know offhand if this "I'll give you
> this key, but not that one" trick has been tested in practice, and if
> so, which legal jurisdiction it was tried in, and whether it worked
> or not.  (I'd be curious to find out, if anyone has any pointers).
>
> For the sake of argument, let's say it worked, though: the
> authorities have your encryption key and can now decrypt as they
> like.  You promptly make a new encryption key using your
> (uncompromised) main key and continue on.  They can read your old
> mail, but not the new, and notably cannot make signatures as you, and
> cannot make new keys as you.
>
> As a side note, when doing a key signing with someone, I send them a
> message and request they sign it to prove ownership of the key.  I
> require that this signature comes from the main key - that's the key
> I'm signing, so that's the key I need to prove ownership of.  The
> subkeys are not really relevant here.
>
> David
>

OK,lets take the forced-by-law-theory in account. Than the "best" way 
from a pure security-standpoint in this regard would be:
0. OFFline-mainkey (certification of own keys and other people's keys)
-> 1. OFFline-subkey (signing)
-> 2. OFFline-subkey (encryption)
-> 3. ONline-subkey (signing)
-> 4. ONline-subkey (encryption)

You use keys 3&4 for everyday-usage. You use keys 1&2 for high-security 
operations. If you get forced by authorities you would give them exactly 
the keys they demand (lets say key 1 and key 4), revoke them and create 
new ones with your offline-mainkey (key 0).
Or they just force you to hand over your entire keyring but then this 
whole thing would be half the fun



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Jun  1 21:26:47 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 21:26:47 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538B7B31.5080606@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de> <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
 <538B7B31.5080606@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <2547932.DddxG4eDuK@inno>

Am So 01.06.2014, 21:12:49 schrieb Suspekt:

> > There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and
> > signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied
> > then you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).
> 
> I don't get it. Decrypting data by signing it?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_signature#Dangers_of_blind_signing

I just remembered that and didn't read it again before mentioning it. It 
seems I have misunderstood it so that this is not a real-world problem 
(as NdK pointed out).


> Thats a good point! Also it will be interesting to explain the judge
> the details of PGP, main keys and subkeys ;)
> Probably we have to get an expert from the CCC for that

I don't see any legal approach in Germany to force somebody to give his 
decryption key to the police. Don't forget that the police would not 
even need the decryption key to decrypt a certain message. You can give 
them the session key for this message.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From suspekt at gmx.de  Sun Jun  1 22:20:48 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 22:20:48 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <2547932.DddxG4eDuK@inno>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de> <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
 <538B7B31.5080606@gmx.de> <2547932.DddxG4eDuK@inno>
Message-ID: <538B8B20.8040601@gmx.de>

Am 01.06.2014 21:26, schrieb Hauke Laging:
> Am So 01.06.2014, 21:12:49 schrieb Suspekt:
>
>>> There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and
>>> signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied
>>> then you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).
>>
>> I don't get it. Decrypting data by signing it?
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_signature#Dangers_of_blind_signing
>
> I just remembered that and didn't read it again before mentioning it. It
> seems I have misunderstood it so that this is not a real-world problem
> (as NdK pointed out).
Glad to hear


>> Thats a good point! Also it will be interesting to explain the judge
>> the details of PGP, main keys and subkeys ;)
>> Probably we have to get an expert from the CCC for that
>
> I don't see any legal approach in Germany to force somebody to give his
> decryption key to the police. Don't forget that the police would not
> even need the decryption key to decrypt a certain message. You can give
> them the session key for this message.
Also, AFAIK, they can't put you into jail or fine you if you have 
forgotten the according passwords and sometimes those passwords are 
really hard to remember...


From gideon425.gb7 at mailnull.com  Mon Jun  2 00:18:16 2014
From: gideon425.gb7 at mailnull.com (gideon425.gb7 at mailnull.com)
Date: Sun,  1 Jun 2014 18:18:16 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: import from decimal
Message-ID: <20140601221816.ECFD251099D@outside.256.com>

I have a question about gnupg. Suppose I have the decimal for the two primes p and q, and the encrypting power r. Is there some way to convert this RSA information into a form which can be imported into gnupg keyrings?

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Jun  2 03:10:38 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sun, 01 Jun 2014 21:10:38 -0400
Subject: import from decimal
In-Reply-To: <20140601221816.ECFD251099D@outside.256.com>
References: <20140601221816.ECFD251099D@outside.256.com>
Message-ID: <538BCF0E.2010902@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/1/2014 6:18 PM, gideon425.gb7 at mailnull.com wrote:
> I have a question about gnupg. Suppose I have the decimal for the two
> primes p and q, and the encrypting power r. Is there some way to
> convert this RSA information into a form which can be imported into
> gnupg keyrings?

Usually when people ask "is there some way," they really mean "is there
some easy way which a non-programmer can do."

Is there some way?  Yes.

Is there some easy way which a non-programmer can do?  No.

Sorry.  :(


From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Mon Jun  2 16:43:24 2014
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 10:43:24 -0400
Subject: fulldisc encryption
In-Reply-To: <5388EF50.8010803@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <53886217.1070108@ioioioio.eu> <5388EF50.8010803@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <20140602144324.63A2F601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>

On 5/30/2014 at 4:55 PM, "Johan Wevers" <johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl> wrote:

>All other solutions I have seen so far are much more limited than
>TrueCrypt: they are either for only one OS (usually windows or 
>Linux),
>they are only focussed on whole drive encryption (TrueCrypt 
>containers
>can be ptretty usefull too and work even on Android).
>
>The most usefull cause of action seems to me a fork starting from 
>the
>TrueCrypt 7.1a source.

=====

Is there any crypto-archive that has TrueCrypt 7.1 for Ubuntu?

(am so used to just doing; ' sudo apt-get install truecrypt '
which doesn't work anymore because it's no longer on the truecrypt or sourceforge site)

Recently installed ubuntu on a new laptop after Truecrypt was no longer available.

Have read cautionary warnings about LUKS and UBUNTU"

"UBUNTU INSTALLER: In particular the Ubuntu installer seems to be quite willing to kill LUKS containers in several different ways. Those responsible at Ubuntu seem not to care very much (it is very easy to recognize a LUKS container), so treat the process of installing Ubuntu as a severe hazard to any LUKS container you may have. "

https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions

If anyone has a backup copy for Ubuntu please let me know.


TIA

vedaal



From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Mon Jun  2 17:01:11 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 11:01:11 -0400
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538B7E30.5070306@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
 <538B7E30.5070306@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <F1865010-CCE9-4DB1-A311-12440FD512B6@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 1, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Suspekt <suspekt at gmx.de> wrote:

> OK,lets take the forced-by-law-theory in account. Than the "best" way from a pure security-standpoint in this regard would be:
> 0. OFFline-mainkey (certification of own keys and other people's keys)
> -> 1. OFFline-subkey (signing)
> -> 2. OFFline-subkey (encryption)
> -> 3. ONline-subkey (signing)
> -> 4. ONline-subkey (encryption)
> 
> You use keys 3&4 for everyday-usage. You use keys 1&2 for high-security operations. If you get forced by authorities you would give them exactly the keys they demand (lets say key 1 and key 4), revoke them and create new ones with your offline-mainkey (key 0).
> Or they just force you to hand over your entire keyring but then this whole thing would be half the fun

One problem with multiple encryption subkeys is that the person encrypting to you doesn't know which one to use. As things stand in OpenPGP clients today, unless the person encrypting explicitly specifies which subkey to use (and not all clients even offer a choice at all) they'll *a* subkey, which may or may not be the one you (or they) would have wanted.

This problem doesn't exist in exactly the same way for multiple signing subkeys since which key is used is under your control (the signer), but there is a related problem in that you'd have a "low security" signing key and a "high security" signing key. How does the recipient know which is the intended one at any given time?  From the recipient's perspective, it's just a good signature. There is no "this is a good signature from my high security key" (there is a "good signature from key XXXXX", but they don't know what additional meaning you give to that key in particular).

To be sure, OpenPGP does have enough hooks and capabilities to implement what you're talking about (signature notations to say "this is my high security key", for example) but it isn't done at this time.

David



From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Mon Jun  2 17:02:40 2014
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 11:02:40 -0400
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com> 
Message-ID: <20140602150240.CCB88601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>

On 6/1/2014 at 10:55 AM, "David Shaw" <dshaw at jabberwocky.com> wrote:

>One reason is that in some places there are legal issues around 
>this.  You can be legally required to give up your encryption key 
>to the authorities or suffer the consequences (arrest / jail / 
>etc).  The idea is that if you have a different encryption and 
>signing/certification key, you can easily give up the encryption 
>(sub)key without compromising your (much more valuable) main key.  
>At least that's the theory - I don't know offhand if this "I'll 
>give you this key, but not that one" trick has been tested in 
>practice, and if so, which legal jurisdiction it was tried in, and 
>whether it worked or not.  (I'd be curious to find out, if anyone 
>has any pointers).

=====

Am also not familiar with any legal tests or precedents,
but the following could hypothetically just as easily be argued:

" I don't have a separate key for decryption. I'm afraid that if I give you my key, 
you can backdate the computer time and forge something in my name.
My signature would no longer be trusted.
So, I'm willing to provide you with the session key for any message encrypted to my key, which, presumably, is all you are interested in, 
but would prefer not to give you my key itself."

(GnuPG, as well as allowing generation of signing subkeys, and encrypting subkeys, 
also allows generating a key with both signing and encrypting capabilities, and not adding  subkeys .  8^)   )


vedaal




From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Mon Jun  2 17:06:44 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 17:06:44 +0200
Subject: fulldisc encryption
In-Reply-To: <20140602144324.63A2F601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <53886217.1070108@ioioioio.eu> <5388EF50.8010803@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <20140602144324.63A2F601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <538C9304.3010504@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 02-06-2014 16:43, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:

> Is there any crypto-archive that has TrueCrypt 7.1 for Ubuntu?
> 
> (am so used to just doing; ' sudo apt-get install truecrypt '
> which doesn't work anymore because it's no longer on the truecrypt or sourceforge site)

>From what I downloaded on https://github.com/DrWhax/truecrypt-archive
the Linux versions (commandline or GUI) contain only a single
executable; I assume it also works on Ubuntu. Installing should be done
manually but with a single file that isn't much work.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From suspekt at gmx.de  Mon Jun  2 17:30:15 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 17:30:15 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <F1865010-CCE9-4DB1-A311-12440FD512B6@jabberwocky.com>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
 <538B7E30.5070306@gmx.de>
 <F1865010-CCE9-4DB1-A311-12440FD512B6@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>

Am 02.06.2014 17:01, schrieb David Shaw:
 > One problem with multiple encryption subkeys is that the person
 > encrypting to you doesn't know which one to use. As things stand in
 > OpenPGP clients today, unless the person encrypting explicitly
 > specifies which subkey to use (and not all clients even offer a
 > choice at all) they'll *a* subkey, which may or may not be the one
 > you (or they) would have wanted.
 >
 > This problem doesn't exist in exactly the same way for multiple
 > signing subkeys since which key is used is under your control (the
 > signer), but there is a related problem in that you'd have a "low
 > security" signing key and a "high security" signing key. How does the
 > recipient know which is the intended one at any given time?  From the
 > recipient's perspective, it's just a good signature. There is no
 > "this is a good signature from my high security key" (there is a
 > "good signature from key XXXXX", but they don't know what additional
 > meaning you give to that key in particular).
 >
 > To be sure, OpenPGP does have enough hooks and capabilities to
 > implement what you're talking about (signature notations to say "this
 > is my high security key", for example) but it isn't done at this
 > time.
 >
 > David
 >
Correct me if I'm wrong but doesn't GPG prefer the keys created last 
over keys created earlier? So it would use the every-day keys by default 
and use the high-security keys only if told specifically?

suspekt



From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Mon Jun  2 17:37:05 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 11:37:05 -0400
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
 <538B7E30.5070306@gmx.de>
 <F1865010-CCE9-4DB1-A311-12440FD512B6@jabberwocky.com>
 <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <538C9A21.4000207@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/02/2014 11:30 AM, Suspekt wrote:
> Am 02.06.2014 17:01, schrieb David Shaw:
>> One problem with multiple encryption subkeys is that the person
>> encrypting to you doesn't know which one to use. As things stand in
>> OpenPGP clients today, unless the person encrypting explicitly
>> specifies which subkey to use (and not all clients even offer a
>> choice at all) they'll *a* subkey, which may or may not be the one
>> you (or they) would have wanted.
>
> Correct me if I'm wrong but doesn't GPG prefer the keys created last
> over keys created earlier? So it would use the every-day keys by default
> and use the high-security keys only if told specifically?

gpg does this, yes.  but when someone is encrypting an OpenPGP message
to you, you don't know what tools they're using.  they could be using
another OpenPGP toolkit that wouldn't have this same default.

	--dkg

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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Mon Jun  2 17:38:29 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 17:38:29 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <F1865010-CCE9-4DB1-A311-12440FD512B6@jabberwocky.com>
 <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <3722201.Ae0WqiKHNa@inno>

Am Mo 02.06.2014, 17:30:15 schrieb Suspekt:

> Correct me if I'm wrong but doesn't GPG prefer the keys created last
> over keys created earlier? So it would use the every-day keys by
> default and use the high-security keys only if told specifically?

What can possibly go wrong...

-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Mon Jun  2 17:47:51 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 11:47:51 -0400
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
 <538B7E30.5070306@gmx.de>
 <F1865010-CCE9-4DB1-A311-12440FD512B6@jabberwocky.com>
 <538C9887.2060806@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <70EE4817-6099-4FE6-8E71-74758134902D@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 2, 2014, at 11:30 AM, Suspekt <suspekt at gmx.de> wrote:

> Am 02.06.2014 17:01, schrieb David Shaw:
> > One problem with multiple encryption subkeys is that the person
> > encrypting to you doesn't know which one to use. As things stand in
> > OpenPGP clients today, unless the person encrypting explicitly
> > specifies which subkey to use (and not all clients even offer a
> > choice at all) they'll *a* subkey, which may or may not be the one
> > you (or they) would have wanted.
> >
> > This problem doesn't exist in exactly the same way for multiple
> > signing subkeys since which key is used is under your control (the
> > signer), but there is a related problem in that you'd have a "low
> > security" signing key and a "high security" signing key. How does the
> > recipient know which is the intended one at any given time?  From the
> > recipient's perspective, it's just a good signature. There is no
> > "this is a good signature from my high security key" (there is a
> > "good signature from key XXXXX", but they don't know what additional
> > meaning you give to that key in particular).
> >
> > To be sure, OpenPGP does have enough hooks and capabilities to
> > implement what you're talking about (signature notations to say "this
> > is my high security key", for example) but it isn't done at this
> > time.
> >
> > David
> >
> Correct me if I'm wrong but doesn't GPG prefer the keys created last over keys created earlier? So it would use the every-day keys by default and use the high-security keys only if told specifically?

This is the GPG behavior, but this is just what GPG does.  It's not mandated by the OpenPGP standard, so other clients may do other things.  It would be equally as correct for a client to choose the key created earlier, or indeed to choose randomly.

There is some interesting discussion of key selection in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brown-pgp-pfs-03.  They argue (as part of a PFS scheme) that the key most near its expiration time should be chosen.

David



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Jun  2 20:40:25 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 11:40:25 -0700
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <20140602150240.CCB88601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
 <20140602150240.CCB88601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140602114025.Horde.5poDHKzSR4Mo1FJ-QLXOcQ1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>

> Am also not familiar with any legal tests or precedents,
> but the following could hypothetically just as easily be argued:

The government wants you to do X; you're apparently not complying;  
you're now before the judge who has to decide whether the government  
has the power to make you do X.  The judge doesn't care about the  
third way you're proposing: the judge is only concerned with whether  
the government has the legal power to make you do X.  That's it.   
Nothing else.

If you want to negotiate with the government then you can do that  
outside the courtroom.  Within it, all you are allowed to do is argue  
your case ("the government does not have the authority to make me do  
X").

My standard ten-part advice for court appearances still holds true.   
One, hire a lawyer to speak for you.  Two, shut up.  Three through  
ten, see rule #2.





From postpics123 at gmail.com  Mon Jun  2 20:45:04 2014
From: postpics123 at gmail.com (------ ------)
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 20:45:04 +0200
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
	<2870425.xmR3hWykuG@inno>
Message-ID: <CAJeoJjgzVCngcERsuGFVM1TnpAq71S=Sz7Qm=YEEju30GMxVLw@mail.gmail.com>

unsubscribe


2014-06-01 16:17 GMT+02:00 Hauke Laging <mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de>:

> Am So 01.06.2014, 12:54:30 schrieb Suspekt:
>
> > But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline mainkey
> > also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so important that
> > subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.
>
> I do :-)
>
> http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/kurzinfo/schluesselqualitaet/#offline
> http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/scripte/keygeneration/key-generation.sh
>
>
> > Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?
>
> There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and
> signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied then
> you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).
>
> There are legal and organizational arguments, too:
>
> 1) If you are forced to give a decryption key to the authorities then it
> is an advantage if they cannot use this key to forge signatures.
>
> 2) If a signature key has expired then you may delete the private part.
> You should usually never throw away a decryption key, though, as it can
> happen that you have to decrypt data long after the public part has
> expired.
>
> I say: Everyone needs keys at different security levels (German):
> http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/
>
> E.g. the key which is going to sign this email is not suitable for
> handling really important data. But as long as hardly anybody has a
> complete high-security key it seems useful to have at least the mainkey
> as a last resort.
>
> Technically you could use other subkeys for higher security levels ? but
> who would understand that? Seems very dangerous to me, more dangerous
> than using the mainkey.
>
>
> Hauke
> --
> Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
> http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
> OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
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From ocampo1 at rocketmail.com  Sun Jun  1 14:24:49 2014
From: ocampo1 at rocketmail.com (Jose OCampo)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2014 05:24:49 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Installing gnupg-2.022
Message-ID: <1401625489.11227.YahooMailNeo@web141102.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>

Hi,

I spent hours trying to figure out how to get a ?gpg key i was wondering if you can you assist me in installing the gnupd on my windows 8.1 computer so i can get a key. Thanks!
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From doark at mail.com  Sun Jun  1 19:45:45 2014
From: doark at mail.com (frank ernest)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2014 19:45:45 +0200
Subject: How to determine who signed what
Message-ID: <trinity-e202cb36-0fe5-4b19-b2f3-7b77fd479550-1401644745566@3capp-mailcom-lxa07>

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From rejo at zenger.nl  Mon Jun  2 23:03:54 2014
From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger)
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 23:03:54 +0200
Subject: How to determine who signed what
In-Reply-To: <trinity-e202cb36-0fe5-4b19-b2f3-7b77fd479550-1401644745566@3capp-mailcom-lxa07>
References: <trinity-e202cb36-0fe5-4b19-b2f3-7b77fd479550-1401644745566@3capp-mailcom-lxa07>
Message-ID: <20140602210354.GG11686@broop-kidron.home>

++ 01/06/14 19:45 +0200 - frank ernest:
>   Hi again, I have been browsing and downloading gpg signed files and I'm
>   acctually been downloading the sigs! However, I'm having trouble figuring
>   out who signed what. Is there some way to determin this using the sig?
>   Perhaps it has the keys fingerpinnt in it or something. For obvious things
>   like the linux kernel source Linus himself signs it, but on an old ftp
>   server, serving old now dead projects, who signed what is not quite so
>   clear.

I presume this is clear?

  rejo at broop-kidron:~/Downloads$ gpg --verify 
  TorBrowser-3.6.1-osx32_en-US.dmg.asc TorBrowser-3.6.1-osx32_en-US.dmg
  gpg: Signature made Wed May  7 01:36:52 2014 CEST
  gpg:                using RSA key 0x416F061063FEE659
  gpg: Good signature from "Erinn Clark <erinn at torproject.org>" [full]
  gpg:                 aka "Erinn Clark <erinn at debian.org>" [full]
  gpg:                 aka "Erinn Clark <erinn at double-helix.org>" [full]

So, this tells you the (valid) signature has been made with the key 
0x416F061063FEE659. 

Does that answer your question?

-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl
OpenPGP   1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532  A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4
XMPP OTR  271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF  4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF
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From keastes at gmail.com  Mon Jun  2 22:23:21 2014
From: keastes at gmail.com (Kendrick A. Eastes)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 14:23:21 -0600
Subject: Installing gnupg-2.022
In-Reply-To: <1401625489.11227.YahooMailNeo@web141102.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
References: <1401625489.11227.YahooMailNeo@web141102.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e8628fe1-4890-4659-a299-33686e78a297@email.android.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Try looking here: http://www.gpg4win.org/doc/en/gpg4win-compendium.html

For the most part any Windows 7+ install instructions should work.

On June 1, 2014 6:24:49 AM MDT, Jose OCampo <ocampo1 at rocketmail.com> wrote:
>Hi,
>
>I spent hours trying to figure out how to get a ?gpg key i was
>wondering if you can you assist me in installing the gnupd on my
>windows 8.1 computer so i can get a key. Thanks!
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Gnupg-users mailing list
>Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Kendrick A. Eastes
mobile: +1(970)773-0162 <callto://+1%28970%29773-0162>
E-Mail: Keastes at gmail.com
OpenPGP key: D59FA41E<http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x575A936ED59FA41E>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: APG v1.1.1
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=3Nq9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Jun  3 01:32:21 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 16:32:21 -0700
Subject: gnutls heartbleed equivalent?
Message-ID: <538D0985.7030103@dougbarton.us>

I'm noticing this in today's Ubuntu updates:

SECURITY UPDATE: memory corruption due to server hello parsing
-debian/patches/CVE-2014-3466.patch: validate session_id_len in
lib/gnutls_handshake.c

I haven't looked at the code, and the CVE referenced is simply reserved, 
not populated yet. But that description sounds like it's at best a very 
close cousin to our friend heartbleed ...

curious,

Doug


From david at systemoverlord.com  Tue Jun  3 01:51:33 2014
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 16:51:33 -0700
Subject: gnutls heartbleed equivalent?
In-Reply-To: <538D0985.7030103@dougbarton.us>
References: <538D0985.7030103@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <CAOy4VzdnRGem8KpjsmvpuCvQZL_MqVe=rpGA3ok-kqQBSKPmKQ@mail.gmail.com>

It's actually a memory corruption leading to remote code execution, though
it's not clear how reliable the RCE is.  (Possibly, if you can heap spray
the client?)

Technical analysis here:
http://radare.today/technical-analysis-of-the-gnutls-hello-vulnerability/.
 Affects clients only.


On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 4:32 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:

> I'm noticing this in today's Ubuntu updates:
>
> SECURITY UPDATE: memory corruption due to server hello parsing
> -debian/patches/CVE-2014-3466.patch: validate session_id_len in
> lib/gnutls_handshake.c
>
> I haven't looked at the code, and the CVE referenced is simply reserved,
> not populated yet. But that description sounds like it's at best a very
> close cousin to our friend heartbleed ...
>
> curious,
>
> Doug
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>



-- 
David Tomaschik
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun  3 11:29:11 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2014 11:29:11 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.23 released
Message-ID: <878upes5nc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2
release: Version 2.0.23.  This is a maintenance release with a few
new features.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication
and data storage.  It can be used to encrypt data, create digital
signatures, help authenticating using Secure Shell and to provide a
framework for public key cryptography.  It includes an advanced key
management facility and is compliant with the OpenPGP and S/MIME
standards.

GnuPG-2 has a different architecture than GnuPG-1 (e.g. 1.4.14) in
that it splits up functionality into several modules.  However, both
versions may be installed alongside without any conflict.  In fact,
the gpg version from GnuPG-1 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as
included in GnuPG-2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching.  The
advantage of GnuPG-1 is its smaller size and the lack of dependency on
other modules at run and build time.  We will keep maintaining GnuPG-1
versions because they are very useful for small systems and for server
based applications requiring only OpenPGP support.

GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License
(GPLv3+).  GnuPG-2 works best on GNU/Linux and *BSD systems but is
also available for other Unices, Microsoft Windows and Mac OS X.


What's New in 2.0.23
====================

 * gpg: Reject signatures made using the MD5 hash algorithm unless the
   new option --allow-weak-digest-algos or --pgp2 are given.

 * gpg: Do not create a trustdb file if --trust-model=always is used.

 * gpg: Only the major version number is by default included in the
   armored output.

 * gpg: Print a warning if the Gnome-Keyring-Daemon intercepts the
   communication with the gpg-agent.

 * gpg: The format of the fallback key listing ("gpg KEYFILE") is now more
   aligned to the regular key listing ("gpg -k").

 * gpg: The option--show-session-key prints its output now before the
   decryption of the bulk message starts.

 * gpg: New %U expando for the photo viewer.

 * gpgsm: Improved handling of re-issued CA certificates.

 * scdaemon: Various fixes for pinpad equipped card readers.

 * Minor bug fixes.



Getting the Software
====================

Please follow the instructions found at https://www.gnupg.org/download/
or read on:

GnuPG 2.0.23 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ .  The list of mirrors
can be found at https://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note that GnuPG
is not available at ftp.gnu.org.

On the FTP server and its mirrors you should find the following files
in the gnupg/ directory:

  gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2 (4196k)
  gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2.sig

      GnuPG source compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature.

  gnupg-2.0.22-2.0.23.diff.bz2 (53k)

      A patch file to upgrade a 2.0.22 GnuPG source tree.  This patch
      does not include updates of the language files.

Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2.
A Windows version will eventually be released at https://gpg4win.org .


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

c90e47ab95a40dd070fd75faef0a05c7b679553b  gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2
e02cfab2bc046f9fac89eef098c34f58b5745d20  gnupg-2.0.22-2.0.23.diff.bz2


Documentation
=============

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/

or in Portable Document Format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Mutt users may want to use
the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set
use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the
reworked OpenPGP support.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

The driving force behind the development of GnuPG is the company of
its principal author, Werner Koch.  Maintenance and improvement of
GnuPG and related software takes up most of their resources.  To allow
him to continue this work he kindly asks to either purchase a support
contract, engage g10 Code for custom enhancements, or to donate money:

Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than a decade,
g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
them carry on this work, they need your support.  See

  https://gnupg.org/donate/


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.


Happy Hacking,

  The GnuPG Team


--
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From free10pro at gmail.com  Tue Jun  3 14:33:03 2014
From: free10pro at gmail.com (Paul R. Ramer)
Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2014 05:33:03 -0700
Subject: How to determine who signed what
In-Reply-To: <trinity-e202cb36-0fe5-4b19-b2f3-7b77fd479550-1401644745566@3capp-mailcom-lxa07>
References: <trinity-e202cb36-0fe5-4b19-b2f3-7b77fd479550-1401644745566@3capp-mailcom-lxa07>
Message-ID: <bdd5d286-517f-4aa2-8f41-9a7743c5fd68@email.android.com>

On June 1, 2014 10:45:45 AM PDT, frank ernest <doark at mail.com> wrote:
>Hi again, I have been browsing and downloading gpg signed files and I'm
>acctually been downloading the sigs! However, I'm having trouble
>figuring out who signed what. Is there some way to determin this using
>the sig? Perhaps it has the keys fingerpinnt in it or something. For
>obvious things like the linux kernel source Linus himself signs it, but
>on an old ftp server, serving old now dead projects, who signed what is
>not quite so clear.
>
>Recomendations?
>
>Thanks
Use gpg --verify followed by the sig file. Even if you do not have the public key for the person who signed it, you can fetch it with gpg --recv-keys by using the key ID that gpg --verify gave you (e.g. gpg --recv-keys DEADBEEF) or look up the key on a keyserver.

Cheers,

-Paul

--
PGP: 3DB6D884


From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Tue Jun  3 16:22:25 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 10:22:25 -0400
Subject: Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
In-Reply-To: <20140602114025.Horde.5poDHKzSR4Mo1FJ-QLXOcQ1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
References: <538B0666.4050002@gmx.de>
 <8272B823-2811-48AD-97B4-C27B86441826@jabberwocky.com>
 <20140602150240.CCB88601E6@smtp.hushmail.com>
 <20140602114025.Horde.5poDHKzSR4Mo1FJ-QLXOcQ1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20140603142224.GC25614@IUPUI.Edu>

On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 11:40:25AM -0700, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Am also not familiar with any legal tests or precedents,
> > but the following could hypothetically just as easily be argued:
> 
> The government wants you to do X; you're apparently not complying;  
> you're now before the judge who has to decide whether the government  
> has the power to make you do X.  The judge doesn't care about the  
> third way you're proposing: the judge is only concerned with whether  
> the government has the legal power to make you do X.  That's it.   
> Nothing else.
> 
> If you want to negotiate with the government then you can do that  
> outside the courtroom.  Within it, all you are allowed to do is argue  
> your case ("the government does not have the authority to make me do  
> X").

So, anyone who wants to offer to recover session keys rather than hand
over more-general keys should work on that *now*, when you can perhaps
get it into the law and common practice, rather than later, when you
cannot get it into court.  Right now might be a good time to be heard
on questions of narrowing the scope of search w.r.t. electronic
communication.

-- 
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer   mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Machines should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
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From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Wed Jun  4 04:43:22 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 22:43:22 -0400
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
Message-ID: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>

Likely of interest to this group:

  http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html

Briefly, it's a Chrome extension for doing OpenPGP.  It can import and use RSA keys generated elsewhere, but only has code to generate ECC keys internally.

I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it seems like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).

David



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun  4 10:32:55 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 10:32:55 +0200
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com> (David
 Shaw's message of "Tue, 3 Jun 2014 22:43:22 -0400")
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 04:43, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:

> I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it seems
> like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).

Interesting.  This is in contrast to a recent online article in the
German c't magazine [1] where the author claims that Google would
cannibalize their own business model if they offer end-to-end
encryption.  Apple on the other hand can afford the luxury of encrypted
chats because their revenue stream is not alone based on advertising.

Maybe Google now fears that users move away from Gmail and to mitigate
that they provide end-to-end so that they still have access to their
user's traffic pattern.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


[1] http://www.heise.de/security/artikel/Warum-Google-uns-echte-Verschluesselung-verweigert-2191797.html

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rejo at zenger.nl  Wed Jun  4 10:53:02 2014
From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger)
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 10:53:02 +0200
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20140604085302.GG12813@broop-kidron.bof.nl>

++ 04/06/14 10:32 +0200 - Werner Koch:
>> I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it seems
>> like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).
>
>Interesting.  This is in contrast to a recent online article in the
>German c't magazine [1] where the author claims that Google would
>cannibalize their own business model if they offer end-to-end
>encryption.  Apple on the other hand can afford the luxury of encrypted

A few additional remarks:

 - Google talks about a limited group of users in their annoucement:
   "[...]  will probably only be used for very sensitive messages or by 
   those who need added protection. [...] will make it quicker and 
   easier for people to get that extra layer of security should they 
   need it." If they do not make a larger effort, the use of this plugin 
   will remain limited (and Google will not cannibalize their own 
   business model and still can make a good impression).

 - As Google already mentions: this type of encryption has been around 
   for quite a while but hasn't been picked up by the general public 
   due to the difficulties in creating a useful, secure and user 
   friendly user interfaces. Google still has this hurdle to take. 

-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl
OpenPGP   1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532  A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4
XMPP OTR  271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF  4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF
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From markr at signal100.com  Wed Jun  4 10:58:27 2014
From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 09:58:27 +0100
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>

On 04/06/2014 09:32, Werner Koch wrote:
> Maybe Google now fears that users move away from Gmail and to mitigate
> that they provide end-to-end so that they still have access to their
> user's traffic pattern.

Oh perhaps they simply take the view that very few people will use it
(sadly). It will give people the warm and fuzzies because it's there but
few people who use Gmail will know why it's there or how to use it or
bother to use it.


-- 
Mark Rousell

PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp
Key ID: C9C5C162
 
 
 



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Wed Jun  4 11:08:49 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 02:08:49 -0700
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <538EE221.9060701@dougbarton.us>

On 06/04/2014 01:58 AM, Mark Rousell wrote:
> On 04/06/2014 09:32, Werner Koch wrote:
>> Maybe Google now fears that users move away from Gmail and to mitigate
>> that they provide end-to-end so that they still have access to their
>> user's traffic pattern.
>
> Oh perhaps they simply take the view that very few people will use it
> (sadly). It will give people the warm and fuzzies because it's there but
> few people who use Gmail will know why it's there or how to use it or
> bother to use it.

That'd be my guess as well. Good PR + limited uptake == profit!

Doug



From ciprian.craciun at gmail.com  Wed Jun  4 14:45:35 2014
From: ciprian.craciun at gmail.com (Ciprian Dorin Craciun)
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 15:45:35 +0300
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <CA+Tk8fxkXV3yQuioo_b248Y+=uUBT61KV6yDDFa2SRw9NYuP2w@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Jun 4, 2014 at 11:58 AM, Mark Rousell <markr at signal100.com> wrote:
> On 04/06/2014 09:32, Werner Koch wrote:
>> Maybe Google now fears that users move away from Gmail and to mitigate
>> that they provide end-to-end so that they still have access to their
>> user's traffic pattern.
>
> Oh perhaps they simply take the view that very few people will use it
> (sadly). It will give people the warm and fuzzies because it's there but
> few people who use Gmail will know why it's there or how to use it or
> bother to use it.


    Although I find such a plugin welcomed --- at least for trying to
bridge PGP-based security to the browser, like the defunct Firefox
GnuPG plugin did a few years ago --- I also think that the purpose of
such a tool is limited to either public education (getting them used
to the idea of "better" privacy), experimentation (being written
solely in JavaScript), or in the worst case marketing.  (Though I'm
sure its developers have only the best in mind.)

    The reason I'm stating this is based solely on what they write on
the project's page [1] regarding to the "security" of the solution,
it's threat-model, implementation, etc.  For example looking at the
section "How safe are private keys in memory?":

~~~~
Please note that enabling Chrome?s "Automatically send usage
statistics and crash reports to Google" means that, in the event of a
crash, parts of memory containing private key material might be sent
to Google.
~~~~


    Personally I won't use any browser plugin that operates on
cryptographic material inside it's own process.  Instead I would
expect it to delegate such operations to something similar to the
GnuPG agent.


    However I would love to see again a Firefox GnuPG plugin,
    Ciprian.

    [1] https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/


From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Wed Jun  4 17:56:54 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 11:56:54 -0400
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <C0EF7276-BC8F-4A1F-9B80-335CF051C968@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 4, 2014, at 4:32 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 04:43, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:
> 
>> I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it seems
>> like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).
> 
> Interesting.  This is in contrast to a recent online article in the
> German c't magazine [1] where the author claims that Google would
> cannibalize their own business model if they offer end-to-end
> encryption.  Apple on the other hand can afford the luxury of encrypted
> chats because their revenue stream is not alone based on advertising.
> 
> Maybe Google now fears that users move away from Gmail and to mitigate
> that they provide end-to-end so that they still have access to their
> user's traffic pattern.

If we look at it cynically, I think this is a win-win for Google.  They get a lot of good press about "increasing user security" for nearly no cost to their business model.  This still requires manual steps to encrypt which pretty much rules it out for the overwhelming majority of users, and like you say, even for those relatively few users who start encrypting, Google still has access to traffic patterns.

I don't think they're being that cynical though.  The code is real, and presumably does what it is described to do.  It's not a complete solution (which for me would be automating it somehow), but it's a nice step.  And this is an 800 pound gorilla throwing some more weight behind encryption in general and OpenPGP in particular.  I'm quite pleased to see this.

David



From kc9cmt at earthlink.net  Wed Jun  4 18:53:39 2014
From: kc9cmt at earthlink.net (Michael B. Harris)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 11:53:39 -0500
Subject: Engimail & Thunderbird
Message-ID: <538F4F13.2000507@earthlink.net>

I have not been able to use OpenPGP since I upgraded to
Ubuntu 14.04 on my 64 bit Laptop.

Can anyone help?

I have other computers where PGP works well:
32 bit Dell B130 with Xubuntu 12.4, Windows 7 desktop
-- 
  Sincerely;
Michael B. Harris
MRAC Secretary
Linux User# 1063


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun  4 19:02:28 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 13:02:28 -0400
Subject: Engimail & Thunderbird
In-Reply-To: <538F4F13.2000507@earthlink.net>
References: <538F4F13.2000507@earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <538F5124.7020408@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/04/2014 12:53 PM, Michael B. Harris wrote:
> I have not been able to use OpenPGP since I upgraded to
> Ubuntu 14.04 on my 64 bit Laptop.
> 
> Can anyone help?

If you can state the problems you're seeing more specifically, we can
probably help better.

Can you describe your system in more detail?  what versions of the
relevant software (thunderbird, gpg, enigmail) are you using?  where did
you get the software from (e.g. from the ubuntu archives, downloaded
from the web, from AMO, etc)?

When you try to use OpenPGP, what specifically are you trying?  what do
you expect to happen?  What happens instead?  What used to happen?  what
versions were you using before the upgrade?

	--dkg


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From suspekt at gmx.de  Wed Jun  4 19:16:49 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 19:16:49 +0200
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <538F5481.5050305@gmx.de>

I have read the article too but I have to disagree. People using gmail 
will probably be logged in their google account all (most of the) the 
time. So google knows what they're searching, watching, listen to music, 
what the are talking about(g+) and so on. I think google has so massive 
data about their users that scanning emails as another source just isn't 
mission critical any longer. Probably they also know whats going on on 
facebook and twitter by their omnipresent google ads.
IIRC google doesn't scan cooporate mails and students mail (if the 
school or university participates in googles programs)  because of data 
protection issues, at least in europe.

I think google offering PGP is VERY interesting for several reasons:
- it'll integrate seamless in gmail, so no issues with plugins getting 
shut down or incompatible by some changes
- people maybe get used to encryption, so no more or less "i can't open 
the strange attachment you sent me"
- they will probably find a convenient solution to integrate it on 
smartphones, more and more (young) people don't use "classic PCs" at all
- i think some people at google are really angry about the 
3-letter-agencies. see: 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131106/00235225143/pissed-off-google-security-guys-issue-fu-to-nsa-announce-data-center-traffic-now-encrypted.shtml


To be clear: There are of course a lot pitfalls storing keys somewhere 
in the browser etc. but its definitely a interesting development.

regards
Daniel


Am 04.06.2014 10:32, schrieb Werner Koch:
> On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 04:43, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:
>
>> I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it seems
>> like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).
> Interesting.  This is in contrast to a recent online article in the
> German c't magazine [1] where the author claims that Google would
> cannibalize their own business model if they offer end-to-end
> encryption.  Apple on the other hand can afford the luxury of encrypted
> chats because their revenue stream is not alone based on advertising.
>
> Maybe Google now fears that users move away from Gmail and to mitigate
> that they provide end-to-end so that they still have access to their
> user's traffic pattern.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>     Werner
>
>
> [1] http://www.heise.de/security/artikel/Warum-Google-uns-echte-Verschluesselung-verweigert-2191797.html
>



From rejo at zenger.nl  Wed Jun  4 20:15:12 2014
From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger)
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 20:15:12 +0200
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <538F5481.5050305@gmx.de>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <538F5481.5050305@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <20140604181512.GA4666@ix.home>

++ 04/06/14 19:16 +0200 - Suspekt:
>IIRC google doesn't scan cooporate mails and students mail (if the school or
>university participates in googles programs)  because of data protection
>issues, at least in europe.

No. Google announced it will no longer do content scanning for 
advertising purposes in Apps for Education. Please take special note of 
the "for advertising purposses" and "for Education". 

-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl
OpenPGP   1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532  A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4
XMPP OTR  271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF  4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF
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From shmick at riseup.net  Wed Jun  4 23:15:12 2014
From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 07:15:12 +1000
Subject: list packets output & other misc
Message-ID: <538F8C60.3050802@riseup.net>

in a test key i have 4 subkeys; 2 for sign and 2 for encrypt

gnupg automatically chooses the most recently created 's' and 'e'
subkeys to sign and encrypt a file

how can i mandatorily specify using other subkeys for the same primary
key for 's' or 'e' either on command line or in an email client for
example ?

when i list packets, it tells me which key was used for 's' (in long
format) but for 'e' (in short format) it says gpg: encrypted with ELG
key, ID 0x00000000

how do i determine which key was used for encrypt ?
do i assume it used the most recently created 'e' subkey ?

is there a reference for the numerical values of version, hash, cipher,
algo, sk2, etc ?





From akwala at gmail.com  Thu Jun  5 00:59:57 2014
From: akwala at gmail.com (a k'wala)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 18:59:57 -0400
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <CA+Tk8fxkXV3yQuioo_b248Y+=uUBT61KV6yDDFa2SRw9NYuP2w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
 <CA+Tk8fxkXV3yQuioo_b248Y+=uUBT61KV6yDDFa2SRw9NYuP2w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <538FA4ED.2030306@gmail.com>

On 06/04/2014 08:45 AM, Ciprian Dorin Craciun wrote:
> Personally I won't use any browser plugin that operates on
> cryptographic material inside it's own process. Instead I would expect
> it to delegate such operations to something similar to the GnuPG agent. 
I happened to come across one that uses an external gpg binary:
http://thinkst.com/tools/cr-gpg/. It's last release was an alpha in 2012.


aslamK

PGP key <http://is.gd/aslampgpmit> fingerprint: 736C D83E 32DB A2FD 0208
9113 0FC8 BA7D FECF 84FB


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From harningt at gmail.com  Thu Jun  5 01:34:20 2014
From: harningt at gmail.com (Thomas Harning Jr.)
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 19:34:20 -0400
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <538FA4ED.2030306@gmail.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
 <CA+Tk8fxkXV3yQuioo_b248Y+=uUBT61KV6yDDFa2SRw9NYuP2w@mail.gmail.com>
 <538FA4ED.2030306@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAAuvu7cP2-EYjQP1YpokVka_QdAWvGER0OqH4zOeVtt2wp6Q=w@mail.gmail.com>

With Chrome's relatively new native-messaging-api system, it wouldn't be
terribly hard to spawn off external processes to do gpg work. You just have
to implement a JSON messaging api between an extension and
platform-specific executable.
On Jun 4, 2014 7:31 PM, "a k'wala" <akwala at gmail.com> wrote:

>  On 06/04/2014 08:45 AM, Ciprian Dorin Craciun wrote:
>
> Personally I won't use any browser plugin that operates on cryptographic
> material inside it's own process. Instead I would expect it to delegate
> such operations to something similar to the GnuPG agent.
>
> I happened to come across one that uses an external gpg binary:
> http://thinkst.com/tools/cr-gpg/. It's last release was an alpha in 2012.
>
>
> aslamK
>
> PGP key <http://is.gd/aslampgpmit> fingerprint: 736C D83E 32DB A2FD 0208
> 9113 0FC8 BA7D FECF 84FB
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
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From akwala at gmail.com  Thu Jun  5 00:36:40 2014
From: akwala at gmail.com (a k'wala)
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 18:36:40 -0400
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <538F9F78.7030605@gmail.com>

On 06/03/2014 10:43 PM, David Shaw wrote:
> Likely of interest to this group:
>
>   http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html
>
> Briefly, it's a Chrome extension for doing OpenPGP.  It can import and use RSA keys generated elsewhere, but only has code to generate ECC keys internally.
>
> I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it seems like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).
>
> David
>
Good that Google has released the source. Hope to see the implementation
compared to OpenPGP.js.


-aslamK

PGP key <http://is.gd/aslampgpmit> fingerprint: 736C D83E 32DB A2FD 0208
9113 0FC8 BA7D FECF 84FB


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From tzornik at gmail.com  Thu Jun  5 09:26:16 2014
From: tzornik at gmail.com (Cpp)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 03:26:16 -0400
Subject: New user needs some help
Message-ID: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>

Dear GnuPG users,

As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking forward
to using it for secure communication. Currently I am trying to
generate a new PGP key by following some good/best practices. I have
done some research into the matter, and I managed to gather some
knowledge about the whole process. Still there are some details that I
am unsure about. I've read the GnuPG manual, the man page, the
handbook, and various other articles online. In particular these two
were most interesting and helpful:

https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices
https://alexcabal.com/creating-the-perfect-gpg-keypair


Based on what I know so far I managed to come up with the following steps.

- Boot a recent live linux CD on an unrelated computer
- Create a 4096-bit RSA certification key with unlimited expiry
- Add a 4096-bit RSA encryption subkey with 5 year expiry
- Add a 4096-bit RSA signing subkey with 5 year expiry
- Export the master keypair (pub + priv key) to an encrypted USB stick
- Generate a revocation key, put it on the encrypted USB stick
- Put the resulting USB stick somewhere safe, maybe back it up too
- Remove the master private key from the keyring (not the private subkeys)
- Export the public key, and the laptop private key to another USB stick
- Power off the laptop to erase RAM
- Import the laptop key into my laptop's GnuPG keyring for daily use
- Upload the public key to a keyserver
- Get some key signatures
- Sign some other public keys (will need master key for this)


And my gpg.conf (on the PC where the key is generated as well as on
the laptop) looks like this:
--------------------------------------------------
# Keyserver settings
keyserver hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net
keyserver-options no-honor-keyserver-url
ca-cert-file=/etc/ca-certificates/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem

# Display options
no-greeting
no-emit-version
fixed-list-mode
keyid-format 0xlong
with-fingerprint
verify-options show-uid-validity
list-options show-uid-validity
sig-notation issuer-fpr at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g

# Ciphers, hashes, stuff
personal-digest-preferences SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224
default-preference-list SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224 AES256 AES192 AES
CAST5 BZIP2 ZLIB ZIP Uncompressed
cert-digest-algo SHA512

# Misc
use-agent
--------------------------------------------------


Now I have a few questions about the above procedure.

A) Is my key generation procedure okay? Am I missing any critical
steps? I mostly followed one of the articles I linked above. Are these
keys (with additional signing subkey) compatible with other OpenPGP
software?

B) Are my gpg.conf settings ok? Am I missing any important options?
Would you add/remove any? Change any?

C) What is the purpose of this line "sig-notation
issuer-fpr at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g" in the config file?
I can't seem to understand it. Why was it proposed? Is it compatible?

D) While reading the GnuPG manual I came across some missing options
that I *might* want to add. These were not proposed in the article.
Should I add any of the following options to the config file, and what
should I set them to?

cert-notation
personal-cipher-preferences
s2k-cipher-algo
s2k-digest-algo

E) I noticed this: cert-digest-algo SHA512
The GnuPG 2 manual (pg. 51) warns that if this is set to a value that
other OpenPGP implementations don't support, some users will be unable
to use my key signatures. Personally I don't mind using strong hashes,
but is this going to be a problem? I have no idea what other OpenPGP
implementations support. GnuPG is the only one I know about.

F) I like twofish. Should I add it to the list of my personal preferences?

G) I have read some complaints from users about keys that use long
signature hashes like sha512. In particular this makes emails
difficult to read because some discussions can get crowded with long
signatures, which is rather irritating to read and navigate. Is it
possible to use sha256 for email signatures, and sha512 for everything
else i.e. signing files. I use Thunderbird with Enigmail on Linux.

H) Is it okay to generate PGP keys on a live linux CD? I mean is there
sufficient entropy present? What can I do to introduce some more noise
into the system? Some tutorials suggest moving the mouse, others tell
me to use IO-heavy tasks i.e. the "find" command. Comments?

There. That's about everything I came up with. Hopefully we can clear
up the confusion, and I am looking forward to using GnuPG. I would
like to thank you in advance for any answers, hints, comments,
suggestions and advice.


Best regards,
Thomas


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun  5 10:35:49 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 10:35:49 +0200
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <CAAuvu7cP2-EYjQP1YpokVka_QdAWvGER0OqH4zOeVtt2wp6Q=w@mail.gmail.com>
 (Thomas Harning, Jr.'s message of "Wed, 4 Jun 2014 19:34:20 -0400")
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
 <CA+Tk8fxkXV3yQuioo_b248Y+=uUBT61KV6yDDFa2SRw9NYuP2w@mail.gmail.com>
 <538FA4ED.2030306@gmail.com>
 <CAAuvu7cP2-EYjQP1YpokVka_QdAWvGER0OqH4zOeVtt2wp6Q=w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87zjhroisa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  5 Jun 2014 01:34, harningt at gmail.com said:
> With Chrome's relatively new native-messaging-api system, it wouldn't be
> terribly hard to spawn off external processes to do gpg work. You just have
> to implement a JSON messaging api between an extension and
> platform-specific executable.

Actually something which one could add to gpgme-tool or a new tool which
uses gpgme's UI-server concept.  Are Unix domain sockets or TCP
connections to 127.0.0.1 possible with that native-messaging-api?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun  5 10:44:58 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 10:44:58 +0200
Subject: list packets output & other misc
In-Reply-To: <538F8C60.3050802@riseup.net> (shmick@riseup.net's message of
 "Thu, 05 Jun 2014 07:15:12 +1000")
References: <538F8C60.3050802@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <87vbsfoid1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 23:15, shmick at riseup.net said:

> how can i mandatorily specify using other subkeys for the same primary
> key for 's' or 'e' either on command line or in an email client for
> example ?

  fortune | gpg -ea -r '12345678!'

assuming 12345678 is the subkeys' keyid.  Same for -u.

> how do i determine which key was used for encrypt ?
 
  gpg -v

Combined example:

  $ fortune | gpg --no-options --always-trust -ea -r 4ECFEF6F\! | gpg -v
  gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux)
  gpg: public key is 4ECFEF6F
  gpg: using subkey 4ECFEF6F instead of primary key CD8687F6
  
  You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
  user: "Heinrich Heine <heinrichh at duesseldorf.de>"
  gpg: using subkey 4ECFEF6F instead of primary key CD8687F6
  1024-bit ELG-E key, ID 4ECFEF6F, created 2006-01-17 (main key ID CD8687F6)
  
  gpg: gpg-agent is not available in this session
  gpg: encrypted with 1024-bit ELG-E key, ID 4ECFEF6F, created 2006-01-17
        "Heinrich Heine <heinrichh at duesseldorf.de>"
  gpg: AES256 encrypted data
  gpg: original file name=''
  You never know how many friends you have until you rent a house on the beach.

> is there a reference for the numerical values of version, hash, cipher,
> algo, sk2, etc ?

--list-packets is a debugging aid and thus you need to look at the
source or doc/DETAILS for some of these values.  However, most of these
numbers are specified in RFC-4880.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Thu Jun  5 10:55:12 2014
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (Mike Cardwell)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 09:55:12 +0100
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <538F9F78.7030605@gmail.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <538F9F78.7030605@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140605085512.GA2503@glue.grepular.com>

* on the Wed, Jun 04, 2014 at 06:36:40PM -0400, a k'wala wrote:

> Good that Google has released the source. Hope to see the implementation
> compared to OpenPGP.js.

One of the developers of the crypto library behind this "End-To-End"
extension said some pretty damning things about the state of OpenPGP.js
source code yesterday:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7843297

-- 
Mike Cardwell  https://grepular.com https://emailprivacytester.com
OpenPGP Key    35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3   B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F
XMPP OTR Key   8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1   BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4
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From suspekt at gmx.de  Thu Jun  5 11:44:49 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 11:44:49 +0200
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53903C11.4080708@gmx.de>

I just commented on things that I think you may change. I am no 
GPG-Master though. Note that there are people on this list with far more 
expertise than I have.

Am 05.06.2014 09:26, schrieb Cpp:
> - Create a 4096-bit RSA certification key with unlimited expiry
Set an expiration date. You can extend it any time, even after it has 
expired. In a worst case situation (keys and backups are lost) the key 
will not be valid for eternity.
> - Generate a revocation key, put it on the encrypted USB stick
Store the revocation certificate separately. Again, in a worst case (Key 
lost, backup lost) you can still revoke using the certificate. Some 
people print it out and store it at at their bank/safe place.

> And my gpg.conf (on the PC where the key is generated as well as on
> the laptop) looks like this:
> --------------------------------------------------
> # Keyserver settings
> keyserver hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net
Dont know which OS you are using but this won't work if you're using 
Gpg4win on windows. It cant handle the hkps protocol.

> cert-digest-algo SHA512
This will you incompatibility with many (I think all) versions of PGP. 
Maybe its not relevant to you if you mainly communicate with people 
using GPG.


> A) Is my key generation procedure okay? Am I missing any critical
> steps? I mostly followed one of the articles I linked above. Are these
> keys (with additional signing subkey) compatible with other OpenPGP
> software?
see above

> C) What is the purpose of this line "sig-notation
> issuer-fpr at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g" in the config file?
> I can't seem to understand it. Why was it proposed? Is it compatible?
I'm not sure about this option and I don't really know what it means. 
Just leave it out.

> E) I noticed this: cert-digest-algo SHA512
> The GnuPG 2 manual (pg. 51) warns that if this is set to a value that
> other OpenPGP implementations don't support, some users will be unable
> to use my key signatures. Personally I don't mind using strong hashes,
> but is this going to be a problem? I have no idea what other OpenPGP
> implementations support. GnuPG is the only one I know about.
There are commercial implementations. The most known is probably PGP 
(The Original Software created by Phil Zimerman). Check it at Wikipedia.

> F) I like twofish. Should I add it to the list of my personal preferences?
Why not? If your GPG version supports it. Check with "gpg --version"

> G) I have read some complaints from users about keys that use long
> signature hashes like sha512. In particular this makes emails
> difficult to read because some discussions can get crowded with long
> signatures, which is rather irritating to read and navigate. Is it
> possible to use sha256 for email signatures, and sha512 for everything
> else i.e. signing files. I use Thunderbird with Enigmail on Linux.
Don't know, just use PGP/MIME instead of PGP/Inline. This will keep the 
hash separated from the text.
> H) Is it okay to generate PGP keys on a live linux CD? I mean is there
> sufficient entropy present? What can I do to introduce some more noise
> into the system? Some tutorials suggest moving the mouse, others tell
> me to use IO-heavy tasks i.e. the "find" command. Comments?
I would say it's best practice to use linux live cd and stay offline!
Move the mouse, open a texfile and beat your keyboard :) GPG will tell 
you if there is not enough entropy.

Daniel




From bernhard at intevation.de  Thu Jun  5 11:37:19 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 11:37:19 +0200
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <538F9F78.7030605@gmail.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <538F9F78.7030605@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140605093719.GD20061@intevation.de>

On Wed, Jun 04, 2014 at 06:36:40PM -0400, a k'wala wrote:
> Good that Google has released the source. Hope to see the implementation
> compared to OpenPGP.js.

Both End-to-End and OpenPGP.js have starting entries at 
http://wiki.gnupg.org/OtherFreeSoftwareOpenPGP

Please add further facts, so this page help us all to keep the overview.
:)

Bernhard
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From bernhard at intevation.de  Thu Jun  5 11:24:22 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 11:24:22 +0200
Subject: GnuPG for the web (Re: Google releases beta OpenPGP code)
In-Reply-To: <538FA4ED.2030306@gmail.com>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <538EDFB3.1000501@signal100.com>
 <CA+Tk8fxkXV3yQuioo_b248Y+=uUBT61KV6yDDFa2SRw9NYuP2w@mail.gmail.com>
 <538FA4ED.2030306@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140605092422.GC20061@intevation.de>

On Wed, Jun 04, 2014 at 06:59:57PM -0400, a k'wala wrote:
> On 06/04/2014 08:45 AM, Ciprian Dorin Craciun wrote:
> > Personally I won't use any browser plugin that operates on
> > cryptographic material inside it's own process. Instead I would expect
> > it to delegate such operations to something similar to the GnuPG agent. 
> I happened to come across one that uses an external gpg binary:
> http://thinkst.com/tools/cr-gpg/. It's last release was an alpha in 2012.

I've added cr-gpg to http://wiki.gnupg.org/PlatformNotes
(it will probably move to a separate page sooner or later)
You will also find a link to WebPG there.


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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun  5 12:42:43 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 06:42:43 -0400
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <539049A3.7010209@sixdemonbag.org>

> Based on what I know so far I managed to come up with the following steps.

This is overwhelming overkill for most users.  Most users will be
best-served by typing "gpg --gen-key" and using the defaults provided.
Likewise with the gpg.conf file.


From pete at heypete.com  Thu Jun  5 12:06:10 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 12:06:10 +0200
Subject: list packets output & other misc
In-Reply-To: <87vbsfoid1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <538F8C60.3050802@riseup.net> <87vbsfoid1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53904112.2060500@heypete.com>

On 6/5/2014 10:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 23:15, shmick at riseup.net said:
> 
>> how can i mandatorily specify using other subkeys for the same primary
>> key for 's' or 'e' either on command line or in an email client for
>> example ?
> 
>   fortune | gpg -ea -r '12345678!'
> 
> assuming 12345678 is the subkeys' keyid.  Same for -u.

To clarify, it's the exclamation point ("!") that forces GPG to use a
specific key. Normally GPG will pick what it thinks is the appropriate
key, but the exclamation point will override that automatic choice and
use only the key ID specified by the user.

I'm not aware of any email clients that allow such an override -- it's
typically only used in the command line.

<https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/Specify-a-User-ID.html>
has some more details.

>> is there a reference for the numerical values of version, hash, cipher,
>> algo, sk2, etc ?
> 
> --list-packets is a debugging aid and thus you need to look at the
> source or doc/DETAILS for some of these values.  However, most of these
> numbers are specified in RFC-4880.

Specifically, that information is available at
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#page-62>, in sections 9.1 through
9.4, inclusive.

Cheers!
-Pete



From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun  5 17:55:23 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 17:55:23 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
Message-ID: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!
    
I just released the fourth *beta version* of GnuPG 2.1.  It has been
released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and
a new beta was due anyway after 30 months.

  If you need a stable and fully maintained version of GnuPG,
  you should use version 2.0.23 or 1.4.16.

This versions is marked as BETA and as such it should in general not be
used for real work.  However, the core functionality is solid enough for
a long time and I am using this code base for a couple of years now.


What's new in 2.1.0-beta442 since beta3
=======================================

 * gpg: Add experimental signature support using curve Ed25519 and
   with a patched Libgcrypt also encryption support with Curve25519.

 * gpg: Allow use of Brainpool curves.

 * gpg: Accepts a space separated fingerprint as user ID.  This
   allows to copy and paste the fingerprint from the key listing.

 * gpg: The hash algorithm is now printed for signature records in key
   listings.

 * gpg: Reject signatures made using the MD5 hash algorithm unless the
   new option --allow-weak-digest-algos or --pgp2 are given.

 * gpg: Print a warning if the Gnome-Keyring-Daemon intercepts the
   communication with the gpg-agent.

 * gpg: Changed the format of key listings.  To revert to the old
   format the option --legacy-list-mode is available.

 * gpg: New option --pinentry-mode.

 * gpg: Fixed decryption using an OpenPGP card.

 * gpg: Fixed bug with deeply nested compressed packets.

 * gpg: Only the major version number is by default included in the
   armored output.

 * gpg: Do not create a trustdb file if --trust-model=always is used.

 * gpg: Protect against rogue keyservers sending secret keys.

 * gpg: The format of the fallback key listing ("gpg KEYFILE") is now
   more aligned to the regular key listing ("gpg -k").

 * gpg: The option--show-session-key prints its output now before the
   decryption of the bulk message starts.

 * gpg: New %U expando for the photo viewer.

 * gpg,gpgsm: New option --with-secret.

 * gpgsm: By default the users are now asked via the Pinentry whether
   they trust an X.509 root key.  To prohibit interactive marking of
   such keys, the new option --no-allow-mark-trusted may be used.

 * gpgsm: New commands to export a secret RSA key in PKCS#1 or PKCS#8
   format.

 * gpgsm: Improved handling of re-issued CA certificates.

 * agent: The included ssh agent does now support ECDSA keys.

 * agent: New option --enable-putty-support to allow gpg-agent on
   Windows to act as a Pageant replacement with full smartcard support.

 * scdaemon: New option --enable-pinpad-varlen.

 * scdaemon: Various fixes for pinpad equipped card readers.

 * scdaemon: Rename option --disable-pinpad (was --disable-keypad).

 * scdaemon: Better support fo CCID readers.  Now, internal CCID
   driver supports readers with no auto configuration feature.

 * dirmngr: Removed support for the original HKP keyserver which is
   not anymore used by any site.

 * dirmngr: Improved support for keyserver pools.

 * tools: New option --dirmngr for gpg-connect-agent.

 * The GNU Pth library has been replaced by the new nPth library.

 * Support installation as portable application under Windows.

 * All kind of other improvements - see the git log.


Getting the Software
====================

GnuPG 2.1-beta442 is available at

 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2
 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2.sig

and soon on all mirrors <http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html>.

Please read the README file !


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches this:

656fef6454972cb91741c37a0fd19cd9ade9db9c  gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2


Documentation
=============

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Mutt users may want to use
the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set
use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the
reworked OpenPGP support.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than a decade,
g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
them carry on this work, they need your support.  See

  https://gnupg.org/donate/


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.  The commits since the last beta are by:

   329	Werner Koch
    68	NIIBE Yutaka 
    13	Ben Kibbey 
     8	David Shaw 
     8	Marcus Brinkmann 
     4	Jim Meyering 
     3	David Pr?vot
     2	Daniel Kahn Gillmor 
     2	Marcus Brinkmann 
     1	Christian Aistleitner
     1	Daiki Ueno
     1	Hans-Christoph Steiner
     1	Ian Abbott
     1	Jonas Borgstr?m



Happy Hacking,

  The GnuPG Team


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Jun  5 18:55:43 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 12:55:43 -0400
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <53903C11.4080708@gmx.de>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <53903C11.4080708@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <5390A10F.8080608@fifthhorseman.net>

We've had this same discussion recently, i think on this very list.
please also review the archives.

On 06/05/2014 05:44 AM, Suspekt wrote:
> Am 05.06.2014 09:26, schrieb Cpp:
>> cert-digest-algo SHA512
> This will you incompatibility with many (I think all) versions of PGP.
> Maybe its not relevant to you if you mainly communicate with people
> using GPG.

The latest version of PGP supports SHA-512 just fine:

http://www.symantec.com/command-line/system-requirements

I haven't done a review of when that was originally introduced, but i
suspect it was years ago.  If anyone knows the timeline for this, please
send a pointer to it.

>> C) What is the purpose of this line "sig-notation
>> issuer-fpr at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g" in the config file?
>> I can't seem to understand it. Why was it proposed? Is it compatible?
> I'm not sure about this option and I don't really know what it means.
> Just leave it out.

I suspect you got this configuration from
https://we.riseup.net/debian/openpgp-best-practices -- on that page,
there is a link to an explanation about it.  you can read the rationale
for it here:

  http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.mail.notmuch.general/3721/focus=7234

hth,

	--dkg


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From holtzm at cox.net  Thu Jun  5 20:09:15 2014
From: holtzm at cox.net (Bob Holtzman)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 11:09:15 -0700
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>

On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
> Dear GnuPG users,
> 
> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
> encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking forward
> to using it for secure communication.

This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating 
using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is remotely
interested in it. I get the standard answer "I have nothing to hide".
Mentioning their bank p/w does tend to pull them up short. I do enjoy
the look on their faces.

          .........snip..........

-- 
Bob Holtzman
A man is a man who will fight with a sword
or tackle Mt Everest in snow, but the bravest 
of all owns a '34 Ford and tries for 6000 in low.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  6 00:09:43 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 00:09:43 +0200
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net> (Bob Holtzman's message of "Thu, 
 5 Jun 2014 11:09:15 -0700")
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>
Message-ID: <87r433m2jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  5 Jun 2014 20:09, holtzm at cox.net said:
> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>> Dear GnuPG users,
>> 
>> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
>> encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking forward
>> to using it for secure communication.
>
> This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating 
> using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is remotely

Well, with 80000 new keys in the last 7 days there is at least some hope
to find someone to send send encrypted messages.

Kristian: Is spike at the right side of the charts at
https://sks-keyservers.net/status/key_development.php a bug?


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun  6 00:49:27 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 00:49:27 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5390F3F7.7040700@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/05/2014 05:55 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Hello!
> 
> I just released the fourth *beta version* of GnuPG 2.1.  It has
> been released to give you the opportunity to check out new features
> and a new beta was due anyway after 30 months.
> 
> If you need a stable and fully maintained version of GnuPG, you
> should use version 2.0.23 or 1.4.16.
> 
> This versions is marked as BETA and as such it should in general
> not be used for real work.  However, the core functionality is
> solid enough for a long time and I am using this code base for a
> couple of years now.
> 
> 

Congratulations on the beta release, it is good to see this
development continuing steadily and I can confirm that it is working
rather nicely.

A trivial issue with this beta release is the naming; which at least
for me gives gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.0-betabeta442 currently :)

Anyways; If anyone using gentoo wants to try out 2.1, there is a live
ebuild app-crypt/gnupg-9999 in my overlay accessible through
layman[mercurial] titled k_f.


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Potius sero quam numquam
Better late then never
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTkPP3AAoJEPw7F94F4TagabYP/Ri7eXrPyHk1cVzBje4aqeks
lTgtLfC4r3ElNXUR3CDQjDgxINPTAt2uOtdM219OFuNQZ3RE2dzhA4y7pFPPXcYx
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py6zg3oh1WTnSfdyWgNMwMeFCtS5Qs+LzutgtfPfvbZAG+Gt6LWcD0tie1J6nTUy
ANhMxsnyQ/CtA/ngvOraiIcC6BIOY8hYTjqxYlovYseLd3CgxIkCqab9a8j2kJGX
HTDuhb0sc3au6mbTCqG0
=xcCU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From mirimir at riseup.net  Fri Jun  6 01:32:38 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 17:32:38 -0600
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>
Message-ID: <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>

On 06/05/2014 12:09 PM, Bob Holtzman wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>> Dear GnuPG users,
>>
>> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
>> encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking forward
>> to using it for secure communication.
> 
> This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating 
> using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is remotely
> interested in it. I get the standard answer "I have nothing to hide".

I've used GnuPG almost exclusively with people who know me only as
mirimir, or as another of my online personas. For the most part, those
are people that I know only as their online personas. I've also used
GnuPG with a few consulting clients.

> Mentioning their bank p/w does tend to pull them up short. I do enjoy
> the look on their faces.

I've never used GnuPG with a bank ;)


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun  6 00:24:09 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 00:24:09 +0200
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <87r433m2jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>	<20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>
 <87r433m2jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5390EE09.101@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/06/2014 12:09 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu,  5 Jun 2014 20:09, holtzm at cox.net said:
>> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>>> Dear GnuPG users,
>>> 
>>> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using
>>> email encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is
>>> looking forward to using it for secure communication.
>> 
>> This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating
>>  using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is
>> remotely
> 
> Well, with 80000 new keys in the last 7 days there is at least some
> hope to find someone to send send encrypted messages.
> 
> Kristian: Is spike at the right side of the charts at 
> https://sks-keyservers.net/status/key_development.php a bug?
> 

Its not a bug in the crawler software, however the spike occurred in
[0] that reports to be 73,350 keys ahead of the rest of the pool, so
I'm trying to get a confirmation from the operator what it is about. I
expect it is an issue with that server (running Hockeypuck) but won't
remove the data unless I get a confirmation. It would just be re-added
on next key count check, so if it is an error it will have to be
fixed, or I will have to put the server in the global exclude list.
And if it is not in error, we need to get the keys distributed out to
there rest of the pool.

References
[0] https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/keys.cmarstech.com

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Veni vidi velcro
I came, I saw, I got stuck
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTkO4JAAoJEPw7F94F4TagNp4QAJsVhPQJIbWiFodZq9rVM0GB
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gYP19rN0Hl1PFmKoqnVG/ZLgTFhHsNOztqOuDzR96GNU2R9OJLBCDgBDyyv4xza9
7W/ys/1/WgLkNFhyV66mxkP3ScroKqNmzrWqv9CwLrIa9NAWjf2xIX6sWlQ8doY0
mN3y3JXVzVoyigJ79uNkY/fSLxz7pO5TUvZFW4vT5nwi2ALI21ko2eUNHJkkmFWN
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oS7dqDcctVhg7XK1Euik
=i1N0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun  6 08:08:58 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 08:08:58 +0200
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <5390EE09.101@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>	<20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>
 <87r433m2jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5390EE09.101@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <53915AFA.6030400@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/06/2014 12:24 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 06/06/2014 12:09 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Thu,  5 Jun 2014 20:09, holtzm at cox.net said:
>>> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>>>> Dear GnuPG users,
>>>> 

...

> 
>> Kristian: Is spike at the right side of the charts at 
>> https://sks-keyservers.net/status/key_development.php a bug?
> 
> 
> Its not a bug in the crawler software, however the spike occurred
> in [0] that reports to be 73,350 keys ahead of the rest of the
> pool, so I'm trying to get a confirmation from the operator what it
> is about. I expect it is an issue with that server (running
> Hockeypuck) but won't remove the data unless I get a confirmation.
> It would just be re-added on next key count check, so if it is an
> error it will have to be fixed, or I will have to put the server in
> the global exclude list. And if it is not in error, we need to get
> the keys distributed out to there rest of the pool.

This has been confirmed to be a corruption in key counting on the
server. As such its key numbers have been discarded and the chart and
data should be back to its usual self.

Keys added the past 7 days:	7,128
Keys added the past 30 days:	26,122

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those
who have not got it."
George Bernard Shaw
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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0AsxA5QKAt3RMpsRpqmn
=LKvm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  6 08:18:50 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 08:18:50 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <5390F3F7.7040700@sumptuouscapital.com> (Kristian Fiskerstrand's
 message of "Fri, 06 Jun 2014 00:49:27 +0200")
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5390F3F7.7040700@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <87k38umugl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  6 Jun 2014 00:49, kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com
said:

> Congratulations on the beta release, it is good to see this
> development continuing steadily and I can confirm that it is working
> rather nicely.

Well, LDAP keyserver support has not yet been implemented.  But that
is minor thing just some hours works.

> A trivial issue with this beta release is the naming; which at least
> for me gives gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.0-betabeta442 currently :)

Ooops.  How does that come?  My test build shows 2.1.0-beta442 as to be
expected.  Did you really run just ./configure and make?  I just tested
it with running ./autogen.sh on the extracted tarball but the error is a
different one.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From holtzm at cox.net  Fri Jun  6 08:32:06 2014
From: holtzm at cox.net (Bob Holtzman)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 23:32:06 -0700
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net> <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <20140606063206.GB16112@cox.net>

On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 05:32:38PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
> On 06/05/2014 12:09 PM, Bob Holtzman wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
> >> Dear GnuPG users,
> >>
> >> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
> >> encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking forward
> >> to using it for secure communication.
> > 
> > This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating 
> > using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is remotely
> > interested in it. I get the standard answer "I have nothing to hide".
> 
> I've used GnuPG almost exclusively with people who know me only as
> mirimir, or as another of my online personas. For the most part, those
> are people that I know only as their online personas. I've also used
> GnuPG with a few consulting clients.
> 
> > Mentioning their bank p/w does tend to pull them up short. I do enjoy
> > the look on their faces.
> 
> I've never used GnuPG with a bank ;)

I mentioned their bank p/w in reply to their mindless statement "I have
nothing to hide" to show them that yes lad, you do indeed have plenty to
hide. 

-- 
Bob Holtzman
A man is a man who will fight with a sword
or tackle Mt Everest in snow, but the bravest 
of all owns a '34 Ford and tries for 6000 in low.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  6 08:34:36 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 08:34:36 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <87k38umugl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> (Werner Koch's message of
 "Fri, 06 Jun 2014 08:18:50 +0200")
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5390F3F7.7040700@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <87k38umugl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <87bnu6mtqb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  6 Jun 2014 08:18, wk at gnupg.org said:

> Ooops.  How does that come?  My test build shows 2.1.0-beta442 as to be

Never mind.  I just replicated it while hacking on the new Windows
installer.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From mirimir at riseup.net  Fri Jun  6 08:58:47 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 00:58:47 -0600
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <20140606063206.GB16112@cox.net>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net> <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>
 <20140606063206.GB16112@cox.net>
Message-ID: <539166A7.2020602@riseup.net>

On 06/06/2014 12:32 AM, Bob Holtzman wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 05:32:38PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
>> On 06/05/2014 12:09 PM, Bob Holtzman wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>>>> Dear GnuPG users,
>>>>
>>>> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
>>>> encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking forward
>>>> to using it for secure communication.
>>>
>>> This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating 
>>> using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is remotely
>>> interested in it. I get the standard answer "I have nothing to hide".
>>
>> I've used GnuPG almost exclusively with people who know me only as
>> mirimir, or as another of my online personas. For the most part, those
>> are people that I know only as their online personas. I've also used
>> GnuPG with a few consulting clients.
>>
>>> Mentioning their bank p/w does tend to pull them up short. I do enjoy
>>> the look on their faces.
>>
>> I've never used GnuPG with a bank ;)
> 
> I mentioned their bank p/w in reply to their mindless statement "I have
> nothing to hide" to show them that yes lad, you do indeed have plenty to
> hide. 

Indeed. And that reminds me of a similar issue. I don't recall any
hosting provider that asked for my key for securely sending passwords,
even IPMI passwords! And when asked, most have said that they weren't
set up for that.


From mirimir at riseup.net  Fri Jun  6 09:40:28 2014
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 01:40:28 -0600
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <3389e7ef-63ff-464b-8a9a-50dcc396e0a7@email.android.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net> <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>
 <20140606063206.GB16112@cox.net> <539166A7.2020602@riseup.net>
 <3389e7ef-63ff-464b-8a9a-50dcc396e0a7@email.android.com>
Message-ID: <5391706C.20205@riseup.net>

On 06/06/2014 01:11 AM, Anthony Papillion wrote:
> 
> 
> On June 6, 2014 1:58:47 AM CDT, Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net> wrote:
>> On 06/06/2014 12:32 AM, Bob Holtzman wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 05:32:38PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
>>>> On 06/05/2014 12:09 PM, Bob Holtzman wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>>>>>> Dear GnuPG users,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using email
>>>>>> encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is looking
>> forward
>>>>>> to using it for secure communication.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating 
>>>>> using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is remotely
>>>>> interested in it. I get the standard answer "I have nothing to
>> hide".
>>>>
>>>> I've used GnuPG almost exclusively with people who know me only as
>>>> mirimir, or as another of my online personas. For the most part,
>> those
>>>> are people that I know only as their online personas. I've also used
>>>> GnuPG with a few consulting clients.
>>>>
>>>>> Mentioning their bank p/w does tend to pull them up short. I do
>> enjoy
>>>>> the look on their faces.
>>>>
>>>> I've never used GnuPG with a bank ;)
>>>
>>> I mentioned their bank p/w in reply to their mindless statement "I
>> have
>>> nothing to hide" to show them that yes lad, you do indeed have plenty
>> to
>>> hide. 
>>
>> Indeed. And that reminds me of a similar issue. I don't recall any
>> hosting provider that asked for my key for securely sending passwords,
>> even IPMI passwords! And when asked, most have said that they weren't
>> set up for that.
> 
> Wait, why would  you want that?  That would mean they were storing
> your password insecurely. 

I'm not referring to web account passwords. I mean root login passwords
for servers. Once I login, change the root password, set up SSH, etc it
doesn't matter. But it bugs me. And passwords for IPMI interfaces are
far worse, because customers can't change them.


From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Fri Jun  6 10:13:23 2014
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 09:13:23 +0100
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> Hello!
>
> I just released the fourth *beta version* of GnuPG 2.1.  It has been
> released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and
> a new beta was due anyway after 30 months.

Dear Werner,

Congratulations on this.

I just wonder if anyone would have time to put together a HOW-TO for
people building GnuPG 2.1 and all of its associated libraries from
source.  For those of us who don't do this often, this is currently a
rather frustrating process, and a mini-how-to explaining what all the
pieces are and which order to build them would be really welcome.

Best wishes,

N.


From bernhard at intevation.de  Fri Jun  6 11:36:06 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:36:06 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
Message-ID: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>

Friends of OpenPGP, GnuPG, End-to-End encryption,

in the last 18 months, people started writing more about GnuPG
and its relatives. We need to keep the overview and if possible
provide a central place where people can find the best documentation
for them to read. 

This is a task which we can and should tackle together!
The sheer number of new guides and blog entry shows that there is a need
for guidance. If we can help to unlock what is already there,
this will further Ende-to-End encryption and help Werner and the other
GnuPG developers to focus on doing the software engineeiring itself.

Thus I've started
  http://wiki.gnupg.org/documentation
and did a first entry for the new CC-BY-(SA) short guide from the FSF.
I could use more critical review, so if you read it or other documents,
please add a link or a comment.

Regards,
Bernhard
-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From doark at mail.com  Thu Jun  5 23:17:55 2014
From: doark at mail.com (frank ernest)
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 23:17:55 +0200
Subject: How to determine who signed what
Message-ID: <trinity-dc042960-8e2d-48d4-a5b8-85e91fd982ba-1402003075008@3capp-mailcom-lxa14>

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From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Fri Jun  6 11:51:43 2014
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (Mike Cardwell)
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 10:51:43 +0100
Subject: How to determine who signed what
In-Reply-To: <trinity-dc042960-8e2d-48d4-a5b8-85e91fd982ba-1402003075008@3capp-mailcom-lxa14>
References: <trinity-dc042960-8e2d-48d4-a5b8-85e91fd982ba-1402003075008@3capp-mailcom-lxa14>
Message-ID: <20140606095143.GA27424@glue.grepular.com>

* on the Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 11:17:55PM +0200, frank ernest wrote:

>    Yes, that is exactly what I desire. But when I run I get:
>     
>    gpg --verify
>     
>    And it hangs until I hit ctrl-D and then I get:
>     
>    gpg: verify signatures failed: Unknown system error
>     
>    If I select a paricular file I get:
>     
>    gpg2 --verify gtypist-2.9.tar.xz.sig gtypist-2.9.tar.xz
>    gpg: Signature made Mon 31 Oct 2011 06:31:17 PM EDT using RSA key ID
>    C94AFA52
>    gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
>     
>    So, how can I find the oublic key?

mike at glue:~/.gnupg$ gpg --recv-key C94AFA52
gpg: requesting key C94AFA52 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net
gpg: key C94AFA52: public key "Tim Marston <tim at ed.am>" imported
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid:  10  signed:   2  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 10u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   2  signed:   0  trust: 1-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 1f, 0u
gpg: next trustdb check due at 2014-11-02
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1  (RSA: 1)
mike at glue:~/.gnupg$ 

If you want gpg to automatically look up and fetch keys so you don't
have to do this particular step, you can add e.g the following to
your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file:

keyserver         keys.gnupg.net
keyserver-options auto-key-retrieve

-- 
Mike Cardwell  https://grepular.com https://emailprivacytester.com
OpenPGP Key    35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3   B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F
XMPP OTR Key   8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1   BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4
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From shmick at riseup.net  Fri Jun  6 12:55:21 2014
From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 20:55:21 +1000
Subject: list packets output & other misc
In-Reply-To: <53904112.2060500@heypete.com>
References: <538F8C60.3050802@riseup.net> <87vbsfoid1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53904112.2060500@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <53919E19.20405@riseup.net>

hey pete,

Pete Stephenson:
> On 6/5/2014 10:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 23:15, shmick at riseup.net said:
>>
>>> how can i mandatorily specify using other subkeys for the same primary
>>> key for 's' or 'e' either on command line or in an email client for
>>> example ?
>>
>>   fortune | gpg -ea -r '12345678!'
>>
>> assuming 12345678 is the subkeys' keyid.  Same for -u.
> 
> To clarify, it's the exclamation point ("!") that forces GPG to use a
> specific key. Normally GPG will pick what it thinks is the appropriate
> key, but the exclamation point will override that automatic choice and
> use only the key ID specified by the user.

cheers

couldn't resist ;-)

> 
> I'm not aware of any email clients that allow such an override -- it's
> typically only used in the command line.
> 
> <https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/Specify-a-User-ID.html>
> has some more details.
> 
>>> is there a reference for the numerical values of version, hash, cipher,
>>> algo, sk2, etc ?
>>
>> --list-packets is a debugging aid and thus you need to look at the
>> source or doc/DETAILS for some of these values.  However, most of these
>> numbers are specified in RFC-4880.
> 
> Specifically, that information is available at
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#page-62>, in sections 9.1 through
> 9.4, inclusive.
> 
> Cheers!
> -Pete
> 
> 


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  6 13:12:06 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 13:12:06 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>
 (Nicholas Cole's message of "Fri, 6 Jun 2014 09:13:23 +0100")
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <874mzymgvt.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  6 Jun 2014 10:13, nicholas.cole at gmail.com said:

> I just wonder if anyone would have time to put together a HOW-TO for
> people building GnuPG 2.1 and all of its associated libraries from
> source.  For those of us who don't do this often, this is currently a

I know.  That is my Marcus once wrote the speedo.mk script:

  make -f build-aux/speedo.mk

However, I fear that it is currently not in the best shape.  The reason
for this is that I am currently integrating code to build a complete
Windows installer including GPA etc.  Once this is finished it will be
distributed with GnuPG.  As of now it is only in the repo.  I attach it
for reference.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

--
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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From bernhard at intevation.de  Fri Jun  6 13:22:25 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 13:22:25 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <201406061322.36501.bernhard@intevation.de>

On Friday 06 June 2014 at 10:13:23, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> I just wonder if anyone would have time to put together a HOW-TO for
> people building GnuPG 2.1 and all of its associated libraries from
> source.

The tarball already has the documentation. 
Maybe we should place more hints in the wiki.gnupg.org?

For the hottest development version there alreadys:
http://wiki.gnupg.org/BuildingFromGIT

Seriously for Werner (and some others) it is hard to know
at what point information is missing where by whom.

Best Regards,
Bernhard


-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  6 17:39:44 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 17:39:44 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <201406061322.36501.bernhard@intevation.de> (Bernhard Reiter's
 message of "Fri, 6 Jun 2014 13:22:25 +0200")
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>
 <201406061322.36501.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <87vbsekpxb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  6 Jun 2014 13:22, bernhard at intevation.de said:

> Seriously for Werner (and some others) it is hard to know
> at what point information is missing where by whom.

Actually I know the problem.  GnuPG-2 requires a lot of libraries and
they all need to be build and installed in a certain order.  This far
more labor intensive that  ./configure && make install.  speedo.mk has
been written to make building more convenient.



Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Fri Jun  6 18:15:24 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 12:15:24 -0400
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2A=mhSjVODKDDRK+mvOibpS90jvGLu6DGZUpdOm0YC=1cA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <53903C11.4080708@gmx.de> <5390A10F.8080608@fifthhorseman.net>
 <CAHeB2A=mhSjVODKDDRK+mvOibpS90jvGLu6DGZUpdOm0YC=1cA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87ha3y9fqb.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/06/2014 04:19 AM, Cpp wrote me privately (but later OKed publication):
> On 6/5/14, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>> there is a link to an explanation about it.  you can read the rationale
>> for it here:
>>
>>   http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.mail.notmuch.general/3721/focus=7234
> 
> Yes, that is where I got it from.
> 
> I am aware of the discussion thread at gmane. In fact I've read the
> entire chain before posting here, but I still didn't fully understand
> it. It seems to be some advanced way to distinguish keys via full
> fingerprints, but it doesn't seem to be a standard yet. By the looks
> of it, it's more like a temporary feature or a placeholder for
> something else. The big question is whether I should add it to my key.
> The article above seems to think so though I'm not sure how useful the
> feature really is considering the fact that it's not that widespread.

including this notation allows a remote peer who receives a signed
message from you to reliably distinguish between two cases:

 0) this signature is bad

 1) this signature status is unknown and i just don't have the right key

Without the extension, a signature verification process has no way to
determine which of these scenarios is the correct one when the signature
doesn't appear to validate.

Without the extension, an attacker willing to do a fair amount of work
(2^64 operations -- not out of reach of an organization willing to
devote some time and resources) can create a key with a colliding long
keyID.  If the party verifying a signature is verifying against the
new/colliding key instead of the proper key, then all the signatures
will appear in this broken state.

few OpenPGP signature-verifying tools make this check currently; but
your messages may be verified by systems that you don't know about
(including systems in the future).  If you want to provide those tools
with an way to reliably distinguish between the two cases, you should
use the notation.

Regards,

        --dkg
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From tzornik at gmail.com  Fri Jun  6 18:46:44 2014
From: tzornik at gmail.com (Cpp)
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 18:46:44 +0200
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <87ha3y9fqb.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <53903C11.4080708@gmx.de> <5390A10F.8080608@fifthhorseman.net>
 <CAHeB2A=mhSjVODKDDRK+mvOibpS90jvGLu6DGZUpdOm0YC=1cA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87ha3y9fqb.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <CAHeB2Am4coUAeNbSbqtCvuPwsidS-5jvn=MysF8YwbanqwGX0A@mail.gmail.com>

Gmail is annoying... anyway, reposting:

Alright, thanks for elaborating it. Does this mean that the notation
(the "sig-notation issuer-fpr at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g"
line) is final, and is not going to change in the future?

I noticed that GnuPG also offers a "cert-notation" option - should
this be set too or can I safely omit it?

dkg: I have no idea what the answers should be. But guessing I'd just
put the second answer as "cert-notation
issuer-crt at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g" though I'm unsure
whether the presence of cert-notation it is necessary.



On 6/6/14, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> On 06/06/2014 04:19 AM, Cpp wrote me privately (but later OKed
> publication):
>> On 6/5/14, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>>> there is a link to an explanation about it.  you can read the rationale
>>> for it here:
>>>
>>>   http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.mail.notmuch.general/3721/focus=7234
>>
>> Yes, that is where I got it from.
>>
>> I am aware of the discussion thread at gmane. In fact I've read the
>> entire chain before posting here, but I still didn't fully understand
>> it. It seems to be some advanced way to distinguish keys via full
>> fingerprints, but it doesn't seem to be a standard yet. By the looks
>> of it, it's more like a temporary feature or a placeholder for
>> something else. The big question is whether I should add it to my key.
>> The article above seems to think so though I'm not sure how useful the
>> feature really is considering the fact that it's not that widespread.
>
> including this notation allows a remote peer who receives a signed
> message from you to reliably distinguish between two cases:
>
>  0) this signature is bad
>
>  1) this signature status is unknown and i just don't have the right key
>
> Without the extension, a signature verification process has no way to
> determine which of these scenarios is the correct one when the signature
> doesn't appear to validate.
>
> Without the extension, an attacker willing to do a fair amount of work
> (2^64 operations -- not out of reach of an organization willing to
> devote some time and resources) can create a key with a colliding long
> keyID.  If the party verifying a signature is verifying against the
> new/colliding key instead of the proper key, then all the signatures
> will appear in this broken state.
>
> few OpenPGP signature-verifying tools make this check currently; but
> your messages may be verified by systems that you don't know about
> (including systems in the future).  If you want to provide those tools
> with an way to reliably distinguish between the two cases, you should
> use the notation.
>
> Regards,
>
>         --dkg
>


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Fri Jun  6 19:22:09 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 13:22:09 -0400
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2Am4coUAeNbSbqtCvuPwsidS-5jvn=MysF8YwbanqwGX0A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <53903C11.4080708@gmx.de> <5390A10F.8080608@fifthhorseman.net>
 <CAHeB2A=mhSjVODKDDRK+mvOibpS90jvGLu6DGZUpdOm0YC=1cA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87ha3y9fqb.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <CAHeB2Am4coUAeNbSbqtCvuPwsidS-5jvn=MysF8YwbanqwGX0A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5391F8C1.90106@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/06/2014 12:46 PM, Cpp wrote:
> Alright, thanks for elaborating it. Does this mean that the notation
> (the "sig-notation issuer-fpr at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g"
> line) is final, and is not going to change in the future?

I don't know if anyone is going to introduce another extension with
roughly the same semantics in the future.  It also seems likely that
future revisions of OpenPGP (OpenPGPv5, though that may take years) will
change the issuer-keyID subpacket to just include the full fingerprint
(there might also be a different fingerprint mechanism by that point).

Anyway, this is the only currently proposed mechanism to provide this
information -- and no one else has suggested an alternative that i have
seen.

> I noticed that GnuPG also offers a "cert-notation" option - should
> this be set too or can I safely omit it?
> 
> dkg: I have no idea what the answers should be. But guessing I'd just
> put the second answer as "cert-notation
> issuer-crt at notations.openpgp.fifthhorseman.net=%g" though I'm unsure
> whether the presence of cert-notation it is necessary.

If you're going to use the cert-notation, i think you'd want to use the
exact same name -- the point is that the label offers the full
fingerprint of the issuer, so changing it from issuer-fpr to issuer-crt
doesn't seem like a good idea.

So, should you include this notation in your certifications as well as
your data signatures?  The use cases i tend to see for ambiguity in data
signatures (e.g. "e-mail signature can't be validated, but we do not
know whether that is because we have the wrong key or we have a bad
signature") seem different in how they're presented to the user from the
way that unverifiable certifications are presented.

In particular, only fully-verified certifications should ever be used by
certification-checking mechanisms, and those that fail to verify should
probably be ignored, whether it's because they were bad, or because they
are from an unknown key.

what do other folks think?  would this distinction be useful in
certifications?

	--dkg

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From hans at guardianproject.info  Fri Jun  6 22:05:38 2014
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2014 16:05:38 -0400
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <87vbsekpxb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAAu18hf+vxVWeK1PB_Q9u50McnbF4n9Agf98y5idBJuQX2CaWw@mail.gmail.com>
 <201406061322.36501.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <87vbsekpxb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53921F12.1030409@guardianproject.info>


After working with GnuPG 2.1 for over a year now, its great to see it in beta!
 Let's try to sync up the Android build with the official 2.1 release, so the
2.1 final release can include new support for a very popular platform :)

That should be pretty straightforward since it has been building fine on our
jenkins server.  So it will hopefully mostly about communicating the timing so
I can get an official Android build out.

.hc

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81

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From alphazo at gmail.com  Sat Jun  7 21:45:59 2014
From: alphazo at gmail.com (Alphazo)
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2014 21:45:59 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAHJqNbxp5m5NjH6obLoAHqQG7bLghgPUVp6M+1GSQpGoBCfU3w@mail.gmail.com>

Thanks Werner. This is very exciting. This new version already works on
ArchLinux via AUR. Now where can we can find this mysterious patch for
libgcrypt mentioned in the announcement  for enabling encryption with
Curve255519 ?  I looked at libgcrypt development repository and don't find
it. I'm about to release libgcrypt-git and libgcrypt-error-git to AUR as
well and wanted to take an opportunity to add that extra support as well.

Thank you in advance
Alphazo


On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 5:55 PM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> Hello!
>
> I just released the fourth *beta version* of GnuPG 2.1.  It has been
> released to give you the opportunity to check out new features and
> a new beta was due anyway after 30 months.
>
>   If you need a stable and fully maintained version of GnuPG,
>   you should use version 2.0.23 or 1.4.16.
>
> This versions is marked as BETA and as such it should in general not be
> used for real work.  However, the core functionality is solid enough for
> a long time and I am using this code base for a couple of years now.
>
>
> What's new in 2.1.0-beta442 since beta3
> =======================================
>
>  * gpg: Add experimental signature support using curve Ed25519 and
>    with a patched Libgcrypt also encryption support with Curve25519.
>
>  * gpg: Allow use of Brainpool curves.
>
>  * gpg: Accepts a space separated fingerprint as user ID.  This
>    allows to copy and paste the fingerprint from the key listing.
>
>  * gpg: The hash algorithm is now printed for signature records in key
>    listings.
>
>  * gpg: Reject signatures made using the MD5 hash algorithm unless the
>    new option --allow-weak-digest-algos or --pgp2 are given.
>
>  * gpg: Print a warning if the Gnome-Keyring-Daemon intercepts the
>    communication with the gpg-agent.
>
>  * gpg: Changed the format of key listings.  To revert to the old
>    format the option --legacy-list-mode is available.
>
>  * gpg: New option --pinentry-mode.
>
>  * gpg: Fixed decryption using an OpenPGP card.
>
>  * gpg: Fixed bug with deeply nested compressed packets.
>
>  * gpg: Only the major version number is by default included in the
>    armored output.
>
>  * gpg: Do not create a trustdb file if --trust-model=always is used.
>
>  * gpg: Protect against rogue keyservers sending secret keys.
>
>  * gpg: The format of the fallback key listing ("gpg KEYFILE") is now
>    more aligned to the regular key listing ("gpg -k").
>
>  * gpg: The option--show-session-key prints its output now before the
>    decryption of the bulk message starts.
>
>  * gpg: New %U expando for the photo viewer.
>
>  * gpg,gpgsm: New option --with-secret.
>
>  * gpgsm: By default the users are now asked via the Pinentry whether
>    they trust an X.509 root key.  To prohibit interactive marking of
>    such keys, the new option --no-allow-mark-trusted may be used.
>
>  * gpgsm: New commands to export a secret RSA key in PKCS#1 or PKCS#8
>    format.
>
>  * gpgsm: Improved handling of re-issued CA certificates.
>
>  * agent: The included ssh agent does now support ECDSA keys.
>
>  * agent: New option --enable-putty-support to allow gpg-agent on
>    Windows to act as a Pageant replacement with full smartcard support.
>
>  * scdaemon: New option --enable-pinpad-varlen.
>
>  * scdaemon: Various fixes for pinpad equipped card readers.
>
>  * scdaemon: Rename option --disable-pinpad (was --disable-keypad).
>
>  * scdaemon: Better support fo CCID readers.  Now, internal CCID
>    driver supports readers with no auto configuration feature.
>
>  * dirmngr: Removed support for the original HKP keyserver which is
>    not anymore used by any site.
>
>  * dirmngr: Improved support for keyserver pools.
>
>  * tools: New option --dirmngr for gpg-connect-agent.
>
>  * The GNU Pth library has been replaced by the new nPth library.
>
>  * Support installation as portable application under Windows.
>
>  * All kind of other improvements - see the git log.
>
>
> Getting the Software
> ====================
>
> GnuPG 2.1-beta442 is available at
>
>  ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2
>  ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/unstable/gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2.sig
>
> and soon on all mirrors <http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html>.
>
> Please read the README file !
>
>
> Checking the Integrity
> ======================
>
> In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
> install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
> the following ways:
>
>  * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
>    can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
>    signature of the file gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2 you would use this command:
>
>      gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2.sig
>
>    This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
>    You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
>    made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
>    either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
>    or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
>    key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command
>
>      finger wk ,at' g10code.com
>
>    or using a keyserver like
>
>      gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6
>
>    The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
>    1E42B367.
>
>    NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
>    INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!
>
>  * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
>    the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
>    gnupg-2.0.23.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:
>
>      sha1sum gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2
>
>    and check that the output matches this:
>
> 656fef6454972cb91741c37a0fd19cd9ade9db9c  gnupg-2.1.0-beta442.tar.bz2
>
>
> Documentation
> =============
>
> The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
> Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
> details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
> complete manual online in HTML format at
>
>   https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/
>
> The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
> to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
> list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
> how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
> several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.
>
> Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Mutt users may want to use
> the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set
> use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the
> reworked OpenPGP support.
>
>
> Support
> =======
>
> Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
> reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
> We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
> of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
> service directory at:
>
>   https://www.gnupg.org/service.html
>
> Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than a decade,
> g10 Code GmbH, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
> author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
> them carry on this work, they need your support.  See
>
>   https://gnupg.org/donate/
>
>
> Thanks
> ======
>
> We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
> testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
> servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
> lists.  The commits since the last beta are by:
>
>    329  Werner Koch
>     68  NIIBE Yutaka
>     13  Ben Kibbey
>      8  David Shaw
>      8  Marcus Brinkmann
>      4  Jim Meyering
>      3  David Pr?vot
>      2  Daniel Kahn Gillmor
>      2  Marcus Brinkmann
>      1  Christian Aistleitner
>      1  Daiki Ueno
>      1  Hans-Christoph Steiner
>      1  Ian Abbott
>      1  Jonas Borgstr?m
>
>
>
> Happy Hacking,
>
>   The GnuPG Team
>
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-announce mailing list
> Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-devel mailing list
> Gnupg-devel at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel
>
>
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Jun  8 01:38:39 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 00:38:39 +0100
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net> <5390FE16.2020706@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <66668969.20140608003839@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 6 June 2014 at 12:32:38 AM, in
<mid:5390FE16.2020706 at riseup.net>, Mirimir wrote:



> I've used GnuPG almost exclusively with people who know
> me only as mirimir, or as another of my online
> personas. For the most part, those are people that I
> know only as their online personas. I've also used
> GnuPG with a few consulting clients.


I use it with PGPNET at yahoogroups.com which is an encrypted discussion
list.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

CAUTION! - Beware of Warnings!
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hiffMdbp7454mwHBEMYVGnhIeXk/fTOIpGVbf8aZ8xPzvrDD+OtHmS+VQy2XrU4A
U5HkAntF
=tXfu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From faramir.cl at gmail.com  Sun Jun  8 02:29:16 2014
From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir)
Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2014 20:29:16 -0400
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
In-Reply-To: <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <8B9A2E1D-878A-4E50-89B1-33F04686AF6C@jabberwocky.com>
 <878updqdl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5393AE5C.3040700@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

El 04-06-2014 4:32, Werner Koch escribi?:
> On Wed,  4 Jun 2014 04:43, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:
> 
>> I haven't looked at the fine details yet, but on the surface it
>> seems like they're aiming at Gmail (mainly, but not solely).
> 
> Interesting.  This is in contrast to a recent online article in
> the German c't magazine [1] where the author claims that Google
> would cannibalize their own business model if they offer
> end-to-end encryption.  Apple on the other hand can afford the
> luxury of encrypted chats because their revenue stream is not alone
> based on advertising.

  I have the feeling about Google doesn't care if a small percentage
of users avoid the business model. As an example, since I made my
first gmail account (at that time you needed an invitation to make an
account, and people only had 6 invitations to send), I've been using
my account through POP3/SMTP, so I never see the advertisement. Of
course, when I got my 6 invitations, I sent them to other friends, and
none of them use Thunderbird or equivalent, so google lost the
advertisement I don't see, but got other 6 people that see it... I
guess they bet it will be the same with OpenPGP. Most people value the
ability to access their messages from anywhere, using webmail, and
won't want to have to carry their private keys with them.


   Best Regards
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTk65cAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAZjgH/3PxixC9U7mhHydMvho9Jlcj
o2YZ7WLkwcthXF9XEhMjtNQFUCz3WsCb4NhveVv3MZjlpYkZ78te0yOWQ7jDoxNr
I5ggxidGzEmB89WiTbKeUu6rY+rhuExPvIHVICOJf6z3Pz/lRZNIWtLbuVzwy/yI
5FjP/56NSwk1bjH4Cr6HyLD0cWt95JfFwD0980c/1qBbMDwniJLzppLvWCeIvMaF
6qOAl7SapGjKPrymNeo4Objus8qmfyVt/78Pp4se4cpcfuP8BZP6LlWSZvmmC419
Su1KXkOzZHne9rz9gmK4DpcoQ5rnw1EC3wbC/HLA7WjzWNcmQcFmA1YX1mfoeHQ=
=a3We
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From suspekt at gmx.de  Sun Jun  8 17:49:41 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 17:49:41 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <53948615.2000700@gmx.de>

Hi,
I have some links about key creation and gpg in general that I would 
provide of course. the problem is, that I don't know if/how correct they 
are because I am not that into gpg yet. Some blogposts are rather old, 
which can mean they are no longer up to date but doesn't have to. I 
don't want to spread outdated/incorrect information so how to proceed? 
That said, adding them to the wiki directly doesn't seem to be ideal...



Am 06.06.2014 11:36, schrieb Bernhard Reiter:
> Friends of OpenPGP, GnuPG, End-to-End encryption,
>
> in the last 18 months, people started writing more about GnuPG
> and its relatives. We need to keep the overview and if possible
> provide a central place where people can find the best documentation
> for them to read.
>
> This is a task which we can and should tackle together!
> The sheer number of new guides and blog entry shows that there is a need
> for guidance. If we can help to unlock what is already there,
> this will further Ende-to-End encryption and help Werner and the other
> GnuPG developers to focus on doing the software engineeiring itself.
>
> Thus I've started
>    http://wiki.gnupg.org/documentation
> and did a first entry for the new CC-BY-(SA) short guide from the FSF.
> I could use more critical review, so if you read it or other documents,
> please add a link or a comment.
>
> Regards,
> Bernhard
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>



From kindaro at gmail.com  Sat Jun  7 18:04:24 2014
From: kindaro at gmail.com (sonne)
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2014 20:04:24 +0400
Subject: The purpose and origin of the file "pubring.gpg~"
Message-ID: <CAB-2Q09kRR=GBuFLzrkPr7uPO15VK7hzgB3jcy8z5xcrm+_B1Q@mail.gmail.com>

Hi all.


I just set up a keypair and I notice there is a file:

-rw------- 1 1000 10 1203 Jun  6 00:32 /home/kindaro/.gnupg/pubring.gpg~

 -- that is not mentioned in man gpg.


It is quite a challenge to search for a tilde in the Internet but I did do
my best. That same question was asked once in this very mailing list and
once again in the Ubuntu forums, and both times it was dismissed as "well
it has a tilde in the end, it must be a backup". I don't feel satisfied
with such a kind of answer.


I notice the following facts about the file in question:

1. The file was created the same time as other *.gpg files in ~/.gnupg, has
the same time and ownership.

2. The file has checksums different from any other *.gpg files present,
however it appears to only differ in a few bytes.

3. There are no other *.gpg~ files present in ~/.gnupg.

All of those facts make me doubt that the file in question is actually just
a backup.


Could someone clarify on this point? That is, hint an answer to questions
such as:

1. What purpose does the file serve?

2. What is its importance?

3. What would be the consequence of deleting the file?

4. What would be the consequence of sharing the file?

5. What would be the consequence of having the file stolen by a malicious
party?

6. In what way does it relate to some public keys stored in the keyring?

7. In what way does it relate to some private keys stored in the keyring?


Thank you very much for your time.
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From kindaro at gmail.com  Sun Jun  8 02:19:22 2014
From: kindaro at gmail.com (sonne)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 04:19:22 +0400
Subject: Alice, Blake, Chloe and Dharma.
Message-ID: <CAB-2Q0_HvrxUp81pRaBBVF1bDNytdYSLsvRjpmOQjoL0BY9XXA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi all. Hello, Mike Ashley

Reading gpg manuals, I wonder why the usual example agents of a
cryptography-related situation are called in an unusual way.

I notice that in related RFCs the usual Alice and Bob are used, and no
apparent trace of Chloe or Dharma.

Google doesn't reveal the origin of these names. The only pages I
found are either gnupg manual itself or excerpts thereof.

Could someone announce the name of the person that introduced these
names? Is there something we may know of their origin?

Since the gnupg manual I refer to appears to be last modified about
year 2000 A.D. I chose to address my questions to both the maintainer
and the community in case the maintainer's e-mail is somewhat
abandoned.

Thank you very much for your time.


From pete at heypete.com  Sun Jun  8 18:16:48 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 18:16:48 +0200
Subject: Alice, Blake, Chloe and Dharma.
In-Reply-To: <CAB-2Q0_HvrxUp81pRaBBVF1bDNytdYSLsvRjpmOQjoL0BY9XXA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAB-2Q0_HvrxUp81pRaBBVF1bDNytdYSLsvRjpmOQjoL0BY9XXA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4_cSKCK2=ieepLGzXpB9tbybw1sP8Am9-0C90ObMOnJA@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Jun 8, 2014 at 2:19 AM, sonne <kindaro at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi all. Hello, Mike Ashley
>
> Reading gpg manuals, I wonder why the usual example agents of a
> cryptography-related situation are called in an unusual way.
>
> I notice that in related RFCs the usual Alice and Bob are used, and no
> apparent trace of Chloe or Dharma.

True, but there is a Carol, Charles, Dave, etc. Typically (but not
always) the names aren't just a placeholder for a participant, but the
first letter of the name means something (e.g. "Eve" is an
"eavesdropper" who can see but not modify the data between Alice and
Bob, "Mallory" is a malicious attacker who can perform active attacks,
etc.).

See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob> for details.

Bruce Schneier's book "Applied Cryptography" was published in 1996 and
contains reference to several of those names. I'm not sure if that's
the origin of their use in this context, though. Anyone else?

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Jun  8 18:28:55 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 18:28:55 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <53948615.2000700@gmx.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53948615.2000700@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <53948F47.7020807@digitalbrains.com>

On 08/06/14 17:49, Suspekt wrote:
> I have some links about key creation and gpg in general that I would provide of
> course.

There is a /lot/ of bad advice out there; I'd be wary of linking to it.

There is no single best way, a lot of bad ways, and a lot of clashing outspoken
opinions.

In my humble opinion, the best advice is: stick to the defaults, they are there
for a reason. Unless you have a specific threat model, in which case, good for
you, work with that, not your gut feeling.

Just my 2 cents,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From suspekt at gmx.de  Sun Jun  8 18:51:39 2014
From: suspekt at gmx.de (Suspekt)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 18:51:39 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <53948F47.7020807@digitalbrains.com>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53948615.2000700@gmx.de> <53948F47.7020807@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5394949B.1030503@gmx.de>

Am 08.06.2014 18:28, schrieb Peter Lebbing:
> On 08/06/14 17:49, Suspekt wrote:
>> I have some links about key creation and gpg in general that I would provide of
>> course.
>
> There is a /lot/ of bad advice out there; I'd be wary of linking to it.
I understand that. But those links are out there and just by searching 
on the internet you'll find a lot of some, because they seem to quite 
popular on google... Maybe start a "bad practice" list? naming and shaming?


> There is no single best way, a lot of bad ways, and a lot of clashing outspoken
> opinions.
>
> In my humble opinion, the best advice is: stick to the defaults, they are there
> for a reason. Unless you have a specific threat model, in which case, good for
> you, work with that, not your gut feeling.
I really like the idea of taking the threat model approach. The problem 
I see: What if I have a thread model with needs beyonds defaults? Say I 
assume that someone could launch a targeted attack, where should I look 
up best practices then?

I recently started to dive into gpg and find it very hard to find 
reliable information between "just stick to the defaults" and "look up 
rfc4880". Looking at the gnupg homepage I can choose between 1-4 howtos, 
a 158 page manual, the man page, the gnu privacy handbook and the gnu FAQ.

I think that is part of the reason for many blog posts and some of the 
questions on this mailinglist: based on the official documentations it's 
kind of hard to do the step between "beginner" and "master of the gpg 
universe".



From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Jun  8 19:08:41 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 19:08:41 +0200
Subject: The purpose and origin of the file "pubring.gpg~"
In-Reply-To: <CAB-2Q09kRR=GBuFLzrkPr7uPO15VK7hzgB3jcy8z5xcrm+_B1Q@mail.gmail.com>
 (sonne's message of "Sat, 7 Jun 2014 20:04:24 +0400")
References: <CAB-2Q09kRR=GBuFLzrkPr7uPO15VK7hzgB3jcy8z5xcrm+_B1Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87r42zjply.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat,  7 Jun 2014 18:04, kindaro at gmail.com said:

> once again in the Ubuntu forums, and both times it was dismissed as "well
> it has a tilde in the end, it must be a backup". I don't feel satisfied

Standard Unix pattern for a backup of another file.  Another common
pattern are temporary files whicg start with ".#".  It is common that
cron jobs remove such files after some time if the program did not do it
due to an unexpected event.

> 1. What purpose does the file serve?

Backup done by gpg while working on the file.

> 2. What is its importance?

None.  It does not make sense to automatically delete it because the
next modification of the file will create a new one.

> 3. What would be the consequence of deleting the file?

None.

> 4. What would be the consequence of sharing the file?

No different from "~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg".  It hat the public keys.
However, "~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg~" also stores cache of key signature
verification results.

> 5. What would be the consequence of having the file stolen by a malicious
> party?

You should not trust your box anymore.  I someone got access to the box
the box has been comprimised.  The public keyring is the least of your
problems.  You need to assume that secret keys are compromised
(~/.gnupg/secring.gpg or ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/)

> 6. In what way does it relate to some public keys stored in the keyring?

It is a backup of them.  Modification of these files (e.e. adding or
editing keys) works by taking a temporary copy of the file, change that
file, rename the original file to pubring.gpg~, and the rename the
temporary file to pubring.gpg.

> 7. In what way does it relate to some private keys stored in the keyring?

Private keys are not stored there.  However, the secring.gpg is modified
using the same scheme but to minimize the available secret key material
the backup file is deleted.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From tim at piratemail.se  Sun Jun  8 19:13:27 2014
From: tim at piratemail.se (tim at piratemail.se)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 13:13:27 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Google releases beta OpenPGP code
Message-ID: <936041b6-7100-4104-c104-a0bb2ed69823@piratemail.se>

I hope the two code bases can create a common API. It would be really useful to be able to test one against the other.

I have to say that the OpenPGPJs developers have been quite responsive to the bugs I've been raising. I personally think their project is a gold mine.

And personally, I do not trust google. Enough said in that regard. ;-)

Anyhow, with regard to, "Most people value the ability to access their messages from anywhere, using webmail, and won't want to have to carry their private keys with them." I've been working on such a project. Little by little. If you'd care to help, feel free to hack/clone/steal/whatever.  The project is designed so that, you can create your own css file and make it look like google or whatever.

You can find it here: https://github.com/timprepscius/mv
With a test site here:http://pmx.mooo.com
(I haven't optimized the js files into one [will eventually do], so allow much time to load)

-tim

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From ekleog at gmail.com  Sun Jun  8 20:12:02 2014
From: ekleog at gmail.com (Leo Gaspard)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 20:12:02 +0200
Subject: Trust and distrust [was: Re: Google releases beta OpenPGP code]
In-Reply-To: <936041b6-7100-4104-c104-a0bb2ed69823@piratemail.se>
References: <936041b6-7100-4104-c104-a0bb2ed69823@piratemail.se>
Message-ID: <20140608181202.GC31448@leortable>

On Sun, Jun 08, 2014 at 01:13:27PM -0400, tim at piratemail.se wrote:
> And personally, I do not trust google. Enough said in that regard. ;-)

Sorry to hijack this topic, but... Why would you trust the OpenPGP.js
developers?

At least, you can hold google as accountable for their actions. You cannot for
them: perhaps they do not even physically exist, and are just nameholders for a
three-letter-agency project, willingly introducing backdoors in this project.
Maybe they just fixed the bugs you reported because it made them look less
conspicuous.

Maybe will bring us all very far away.

What's great about open source is that you do not at all have to trust the
maintainer of a project. You only have to trust the project -- and by this I
mean the fact that at least a developer will have noticed the flaw. I may even
distrust Werner, and yet use gpg -- if e.g. I trust another gnupg developer.

And even this trust is not strictly required: you can always inspect the source
code all by yourself.

Sure, this model of "trust the community" is far from perfect, heartbleed being
the latest proof of that. But it is better than "trust the maintainer", who is
always part of the community.

And what's great about google's project is that they are quite likely to be
highly audited: if anyone found a willingly placed security flaw in google's
end-to-end library, it would mean a lot of prestige.

So, even if I trusted google less than OpenPGP.js developers [and who tells us
these developers are not disguised google agents?], I would likely, after a
period during which security experts will have had their time with this new
library, trust it more than OpenPGP.js.

Despite the fact that it might have a backdoor while the other does not. Because
the opposite is even more likely.

Cheers,

Leo


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Sun Jun  8 20:34:35 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 20:34:35 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <5394949B.1030503@gmx.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53948F47.7020807@digitalbrains.com> <5394949B.1030503@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <3162328.ZITYJQHEnb@inno>

Am So 08.06.2014, 18:51:39 schrieb Suspekt:

> > There is a /lot/ of bad advice out there; I'd be wary of linking to
> > it.
> I understand that. But those links are out there and just by searching
> on the internet you'll find a lot of some, because they seem to quite
> popular on google... Maybe start a "bad practice" list? naming and
> shaming?

There are recommendations you can discuss for quite a while but there 
are also (and that's probably the majority of cases you mean) statements 
which are stupid or plain wrong.

"Before you can use a key you have to make it valid. In order to get 
this done just set the owner trust to ultimate"...

And incomplete information:

"After creating the key create a revocation certificate, too." I still 
have to be told why it shall be possible to have a safe backup of the 
revocation certificate but impossible (or less possible) to have a safe 
backup of the secret mainkey...

When I encounter such statements (more or less limited to German pages) 
then I contact the author or leave a comment on that page. As they all 
make the same mistakes I meanwhile have a list of text blocks which I 
can use with copy&paste...


I even offer to check articles before or after publication:

http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/webautoren/


I recommend that all qualified people do the same when encountering bad 
articles. It seems important to me to increase the quality of 
information out there.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Jun  8 20:59:41 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 20:59:41 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <3162328.ZITYJQHEnb@inno>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53948F47.7020807@digitalbrains.com> <5394949B.1030503@gmx.de>
 <3162328.ZITYJQHEnb@inno>
Message-ID: <5394B29D.9090802@digitalbrains.com>

On 08/06/14 20:34, Hauke Laging wrote:
> "After creating the key create a revocation certificate, too." I still have
> to be told why it shall be possible to have a safe backup of the revocation
> certificate but impossible (or less possible) to have a safe backup of the
> secret mainkey...

This one seems easy... leakage of the revocation certificate is much more
benign. No secret stuff is compromised, and in order for the leakage to be
useful, your adversary would need to publish the revocation certificate, so you
would notice. This in stark contrast with the private key, which can be used
without you noticing, to read your secrets. And any new secrets produced in the
future, on account of you not noticing.

So the storage requirements for the revocation certificate are much less
demanding than for the backup secret keys, meaning there are more places you can
keep it, meaning you have a higher chance of still being able to access it.

... because a revocation certificate is only useful when the key backup is lost.
So obviously you should make sure that they are stored separately. This is one
of the silly recommendations I've also seen: store your revocation certificate
with your private key. That only covers the case of forgetting the passphrase;
in all other cases it's useless (I think). And that's hoping you didn't use the
same passphrase with your "encrypted USB-drive" and lost access to the
certificate as well.

It all boils down to: "a safe backup" depends on what you are backing up.

> I recommend that all qualified people do the same when encountering bad 
> articles.

The problem lies in "qualified". I think the authors of the bad advice consider
themselves qualified, for instance. Otherwise why are they giving advice.

> It seems important to me to increase the quality of information out there.

Hmmmm... this is the internet. I don't think you can keep the bad advice off the
net. You need to have the good advice in a prominent place. But maybe that's
what you meant.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From martijn.list at gmail.com  Sun Jun  8 21:03:36 2014
From: martijn.list at gmail.com (martijn.list)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2014 21:03:36 +0200
Subject: GnuPG 2.1 exporting secret keys
Message-ID: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com>

Hi,

I'm trying to export the secret keys which were generated with the
latest GPG 2.1 beta.

I do however receive the following error:

~$ gpg2 -v --export-secret-key -a -o test.key 2BAD7887
gpg: NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!
gpg: It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be
gpg: used in a production environment or with production keys!
gpg: writing to 'test.key'
gpg: key 2BAD7887: asking agent for the secret parts
gpg: key 2BAD7887: error receiving key from agent: Missing item in
object - skipped
gpg: key 2BAD7887/F1D5FF9D: asking agent for the secret parts
gpg: key 2BAD7887/F1D5FF9D: error receiving key from agent: Missing item
in object - skipped
gpg: WARNING: nothing exported

Any idea what I'm doing wrong or what might be the problem?

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers


From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun  9 11:43:06 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 11:43:06 +0200
Subject: GnuPG 2.1 exporting secret keys
In-Reply-To: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com> (martijn list's message of "Sun, 08
 Jun 2014 21:03:36 +0200")
References: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87k38qju51.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun,  8 Jun 2014 21:03, martijn.list at gmail.com said:

> gpg: key 2BAD7887: asking agent for the secret parts
> gpg: key 2BAD7887: error receiving key from agent: Missing item in
> object - skipped

Are you sure that you are using the latest gpg-agent.

  gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye

show the version.  Does it match the version of gpg (2.1.0-beta422)?

If it does, can you pleae repeat that with a test key you can send to
me?  What I need is the public key and the corresponding private key
which you find similar to this example:

  $ gpg -K --with-keygrip 439F02CA
  sec   dsa768/439F02CA 1998-03-17
        Keygrip = FD692BD59D6640A84C8422573D469F84F3B98E53
  uid                  pgp5 test <pgp5 at dev.null>
  ssb   elg768/CB879DE9 1998-03-17
        Keygrip = 0D6F6AD4C4C803B25470F9104E9F4E6A4CA64255
  
  $ cd ~/.gnupg
  $ cp private-keys-v1.d/FD692BD59D6640A84C8422573D469F84F3B98E53 foo.sec

send me foo.sec and the result of 

  gpg --export-key 439F02CA >foo.pub



Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From martijn.list at gmail.com  Mon Jun  9 14:30:48 2014
From: martijn.list at gmail.com (martijn.list)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 14:30:48 +0200
Subject: GnuPG 2.1 exporting secret keys
In-Reply-To: <87k38qju51.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com> <87k38qju51.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5395A8F8.4090305@gmail.com>

On 06/09/2014 11:43 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun,  8 Jun 2014 21:03, martijn.list at gmail.com said:
> 
>> gpg: key 2BAD7887: asking agent for the secret parts
>> gpg: key 2BAD7887: error receiving key from agent: Missing item in
>> object - skipped
> 
> Are you sure that you are using the latest gpg-agent.
> 
>   gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
> 
> show the version.  Does it match the version of gpg (2.1.0-beta422)?

Hmm strange, it reports a different version

$ gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
D 2.1.0-beta704

I have used the following script to build it from GIT so I assumed that
it uses the latest release from git://git.gnupg.org since it basically
does a "git clone git://git.gnupg.org" for all the required parts

https://github.com/Wikinaut/utils/wiki#How_to_compile_GnuPG_gpg_from_the_github_sources

The script seems to clone the head and not a specific branch.

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers

> 
> If it does, can you pleae repeat that with a test key you can send to
> me?  What I need is the public key and the corresponding private key
> which you find similar to this example:
> 
>   $ gpg -K --with-keygrip 439F02CA
>   sec   dsa768/439F02CA 1998-03-17
>         Keygrip = FD692BD59D6640A84C8422573D469F84F3B98E53
>   uid                  pgp5 test <pgp5 at dev.null>
>   ssb   elg768/CB879DE9 1998-03-17
>         Keygrip = 0D6F6AD4C4C803B25470F9104E9F4E6A4CA64255
>   
>   $ cd ~/.gnupg
>   $ cp private-keys-v1.d/FD692BD59D6640A84C8422573D469F84F3B98E53 foo.sec
> 
> send me foo.sec and the result of 
> 
>   gpg --export-key 439F02CA >foo.pub
> 
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 


-- 
DJIGZO email encryption


From martijn.list at gmail.com  Mon Jun  9 15:43:06 2014
From: martijn.list at gmail.com (martijn.list)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 15:43:06 +0200
Subject: GnuPG 2.1 exporting secret keys
In-Reply-To: <5395A8F8.4090305@gmail.com>
References: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com> <87k38qju51.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5395A8F8.4090305@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5395B9EA.7030204@gmail.com>

On 06/09/2014 02:30 PM, martijn.list wrote:
> On 06/09/2014 11:43 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Sun,  8 Jun 2014 21:03, martijn.list at gmail.com said:
>>
>>> gpg: key 2BAD7887: asking agent for the secret parts
>>> gpg: key 2BAD7887: error receiving key from agent: Missing item in
>>> object - skipped
>>
>> Are you sure that you are using the latest gpg-agent.
>>
>>   gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
>>
>> show the version.  Does it match the version of gpg (2.1.0-beta422)?
> 
> Hmm strange, it reports a different version
> 
> $ gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
> D 2.1.0-beta704
> 
> I have used the following script to build it from GIT so I assumed that
> it uses the latest release from git://git.gnupg.org since it basically
> does a "git clone git://git.gnupg.org" for all the required parts
> 
> https://github.com/Wikinaut/utils/wiki#How_to_compile_GnuPG_gpg_from_the_github_sources
> 
> The script seems to clone the head and not a specific branch.

It seems that autogen.sh returns the wrong version.

The following command seems to return the correct version (this is from
autogen,sh)

$ git describe --match "gnupg-2.1.*[0-9]" --long

gnupg-2.1.0-beta442-2-gb67e4e5

However piping it through awk (as done in autogen.sh) it returns an
empty string

$ git describe --match "gnupg-2.1.*[0-9]" --long  | awk -F- '$3!=0 && $3
!~ /^beta/ {print"-beta"$3}'

Because of this the following line is tried:

$ git describe --match "gnupg-2.1-base" --long | awk -F-
'$4!=0{print"-beta"$4}'

which returns

-beta704

Since this part is a recent addition to autogen.sh could it be that
there is a problem with the new code in relation to the current tags?

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers


From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun  9 15:53:21 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 15:53:21 +0200
Subject: GnuPG 2.1 exporting secret keys
In-Reply-To: <5395A8F8.4090305@gmail.com> (martijn list's message of "Mon, 09
 Jun 2014 14:30:48 +0200")
References: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com> <87k38qju51.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5395A8F8.4090305@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87egyyjijy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon,  9 Jun 2014 14:30, martijn.list at gmail.com said:

> $ gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
> D 2.1.0-beta704

That is probaly okay.  I canged the way the beta number are generated on
Friday.  Thus you see that higher number.  No problem.

> The script seems to clone the head and not a specific branch.

With GIT you always close the entire repository.  Given that beta number
you have likely used the the HEAD of the master branch.

Thus to look at your problem, I need to replicate it using a test key
provided by you.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From tim at piratemail.se  Mon Jun  9 18:44:02 2014
From: tim at piratemail.se (tim at piratemail.se)
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 12:44:02 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Trust and distrust [was: Re: Google releases beta OpenPGP code]
Message-ID: <c0782c37-91d6-93aa-012e-5245b00d5ab2@piratemail.se>

---- some ideas that would help a distrustful person such as myself before addressing your mistrust question ---

I wish that there was a "standard API" for low level encryption JS libraries..
Not only so that I could swap them in OpenPGPJS on a whim. But so that I could also swap them in my code as well, without writing the glue. 

I wish there was a standard for the random number generators. So that I could easily swap out, and ALSO, use a fake number generator to test that different implementations of PGP create *exactly* the same results.

I then I wish there was a "standard API" for PGP. 
So that when the google code comes out I could swap as I wish. Test one against the other. Use the fake number generator and fake "timestamps" to verify that the resulting output is *exactly* the same in hundreds of test cases.


And then code coverage. I wish there were statistics published about code coverage.
If there is 100% code coverage and the output of two PGP implementations is the same. It gives me a much higher "I trust this code doesn't have an insert somewhere," than just "well the results were the same for the test cases I have."

Swapping + code-coverage + exactly same results + disparate code bases with maintainers who don't look at the other code base (and possibly distrust the other coding group) = more trust from me.


--- begin response to distrust, which I've tried not to make emotionally bated, but really I would just ignore this section ---

I'm not exactly sure if this list is an appropriate place for me to state my reasons for distrusting google.

Find the congressional testimony by google about what they were doing in china, especially the "auto censoring." That was my moment where I realized the google that I had hoped for had nothing to do with the google it transformed into.

In terms of just plain security. 
I will say that I also do not trust OpenPGPJs. But in a different way. After that china testimony I didn't trust google to put people before governments. And unfortunately I feel as if my fears have been proven correct. Since google controls chrome-- a plugin by google designed to thwart google, running within google's chrome?? Ummmm.. Not sure...

If I were an adversary that could force google to do something I wanted, I would make them take screensots of anybody using this plugin, and send them to me.

-tim



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun  9 19:26:04 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 19:26:04 +0200
Subject: GnuPG 2.1 exporting secret keys
In-Reply-To: <5395B9EA.7030204@gmail.com> (martijn list's message of "Mon, 09
 Jun 2014 15:43:06 +0200")
References: <5394B388.8090306@gmail.com> <87k38qju51.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5395A8F8.4090305@gmail.com> <5395B9EA.7030204@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <878up6j8pf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon,  9 Jun 2014 15:43, martijn.list at gmail.com said:

> -beta704
>
> Since this part is a recent addition to autogen.sh could it be that
> there is a problem with the new code in relation to the current tags?

No.  The problem was the following.  Back when I introduced the new beta
numbering code we already had a release tag for the 2.0 series.  Thus
the original match worked correct.  However, the 2.1 has never seen a
2.1.x annotated tag and thus the git-describe looked for some other
value.  To fix that I introduced the "gnupg-2.1-base" base tag which
gives the start point for beta numbering for a new release series.  This
was more shell code that would fit easily into M4 macros and thus I
factored it out to autogen.sh.  Another advantage is that autogen.sh is
meanwhile shared by all gnupg related code and thus future changes to
the beta release numbering will be more easy.

Thanks for the test data you sent.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Jun 10 01:56:34 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 01:56:34 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <5394B29D.9090802@digitalbrains.com>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <3162328.ZITYJQHEnb@inno> <5394B29D.9090802@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <4068908.aaH5cj4Tf0@inno>

Am So 08.06.2014, 20:59:41 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> This one seems easy... leakage of the revocation certificate is much
> more benign.

> It all boils down to: "a safe backup" depends on what you are backing
> up.

That would be a good explanation of this aspect but that is usually not 
what you read there.


> > I recommend that all qualified people do the same when encountering
> > bad articles.
> 
> The problem lies in "qualified". I think the authors of the bad advice
> consider themselves qualified, for instance. Otherwise why are they
> giving advice.

I understand the guess but that is at least not my experience. If I tell 
authors about their mistakes they are usually happy that I help them 
improve their article.

Maybe the main reason for writing is not feeling qualified but the wish 
to help. Or they feel there are people even less qualified than they 
themselves and write for those but do not believe that they are close to 
the upper end of knowledge. Maybe the reaction depends on how they 
assess the knowledge of the one who tries to correct them. The from 
address of those of my emails may help there. ;-)

I suggest: Just give it a try.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From cmars at cmarstech.com  Mon Jun  9 21:50:32 2014
From: cmars at cmarstech.com (Casey Marshall)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 14:50:32 -0500
Subject: New user needs some help
In-Reply-To: <5390EE09.101@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <CAHeB2AnPVYpo1ZARsK1A12TfaqQOfcHq0JErmv=JGCSDp1-dwA@mail.gmail.com>	<20140605180915.GC4751@cox.net>
 <87r433m2jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5390EE09.101@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <53961008.7020002@cmarstech.com>

Hi Kristian,
I've fixed inaccuracies in the Hockeypuck total key count. Hockeypuck
now uses an exact row count, updated in the background every few hours
(at release hockeypuck_1.0.1~a2~dev20140609+8e0dfc6).

keys.cmarstech.com has been updated to this latest version, which is
available in the unstable PPA, ppa:hockeypuck/unstable. I'll be
proposing this fix along with a few others into trusty/universe soon.

Apologies for any confusion this has caused.

-Casey

On 06/05/2014 05:24 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 06/06/2014 12:09 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Thu,  5 Jun 2014 20:09, holtzm at cox.net said:
>>> On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 03:26:16AM -0400, Cpp wrote:
>>>> Dear GnuPG users,
>>>>
>>>> As part of the ResetTheNet campaign I decided to start using
>>>> email encryption. I am a relatively new user of gpg, who is
>>>> looking forward to using it for secure communication.
>>>
>>> This is not a critism, but with who do you plan on communicating
>>>  using encryption? Absolutely no one I know uses it or is
>>> remotely
> 
>> Well, with 80000 new keys in the last 7 days there is at least some
>> hope to find someone to send send encrypted messages.
> 
>> Kristian: Is spike at the right side of the charts at 
>> https://sks-keyservers.net/status/key_development.php a bug?
> 
> 
> Its not a bug in the crawler software, however the spike occurred in
> [0] that reports to be 73,350 keys ahead of the rest of the pool, so
> I'm trying to get a confirmation from the operator what it is about. I
> expect it is an issue with that server (running Hockeypuck) but won't
> remove the data unless I get a confirmation. It would just be re-added
> on next key count check, so if it is an error it will have to be
> fixed, or I will have to put the server in the global exclude list.
> And if it is not in error, we need to get the keys distributed out to
> there rest of the pool.
> 
> References
> [0] https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/keys.cmarstech.com
> 
> 

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From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Tue Jun 10 14:23:43 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 08:23:43 -0400
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <4068908.aaH5cj4Tf0@inno>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <3162328.ZITYJQHEnb@inno> <5394B29D.9090802@digitalbrains.com>
 <4068908.aaH5cj4Tf0@inno>
Message-ID: <20140610122343.GA7196@IUPUI.Edu>

On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 01:56:34AM +0200, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am So 08.06.2014, 20:59:41 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
[snip]
> > > I recommend that all qualified people do the same when encountering
> > > bad articles.
> > 
> > The problem lies in "qualified". I think the authors of the bad advice
> > consider themselves qualified, for instance. Otherwise why are they
> > giving advice.
> 
> I understand the guess but that is at least not my experience. If I tell 
> authors about their mistakes they are usually happy that I help them 
> improve their article.
> 
> Maybe the main reason for writing is not feeling qualified but the wish 
> to help. Or they feel there are people even less qualified than they 
> themselves and write for those but do not believe that they are close to 
> the upper end of knowledge. Maybe the reaction depends on how they 
> assess the knowledge of the one who tries to correct them. The from 
> address of those of my emails may help there. ;-)

From time to time I will try to explain something, convinced that I am
*not* the best choice to explain it, in the hope that someone more
knowledgable will correct my errors.  I figure that, if I trot out my
limited knowledge, I may help someone to understand just a bit, and I
too may learn something in the process.

> I suggest: Just give it a try.

That is my suggestion as well.

-- 
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer   mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Machines should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
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From bernhard at intevation.de  Tue Jun 10 16:31:21 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 16:31:21 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <87vbsekpxb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <201406061322.36501.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <87vbsekpxb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <201406101631.23594.bernhard@intevation.de>

On Friday 06 June 2014 at 17:39:44, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, ?6 Jun 2014 13:22, bernhard at intevation.de said:
> > Seriously for Werner (and some others) it is hard to know
> > at what point information is missing where by whom.
>
> Actually I know the problem. ?GnuPG-2 requires a lot of libraries and
> they all need to be build and installed in a certain order. 

A dependency diagram would be cool to have! :)

> This far more labor intensive that ?./configure && make install. ?
> speedo.mk has been written to make building more convenient.

Bernhard

-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From bernhard at intevation.de  Tue Jun 10 16:38:26 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 16:38:26 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <53948615.2000700@gmx.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53948615.2000700@gmx.de>
Message-ID: <201406101638.29030.bernhard@intevation.de>

Hi,

On Sunday 08 June 2014 at 17:49:41, Suspekt wrote:
> I have some links about key creation and gpg in general that I would
> provide of course. the problem is, that I don't know if/how correct they
> are because I am not that into gpg yet. Some blogposts are rather old,
> which can mean they are no longer up to date but doesn't have to. I
> don't want to spread outdated/incorrect information so how to proceed?
> That said, adding them to the wiki directly doesn't seem to be ideal...

please still add them and possibly add a date and if you are unsure
just add the fact that you are unsure because of reason X.

I agree with the other writers:
We must first make good information available!
And then we can point out other people to this central place
which is easier to keep uptodate.

Hypertext is very suited for this, because the knowledge and desires of users 
will be very different, so they can jump from level to level if they want to 
learn more.

A wiki is well suited because it shall make it easier for more people
to contribute and write, but keep a consolidated (brief) version in the end.

Best,
Bernhard

> > Thus I've started
> >    http://wiki.gnupg.org/documentation
> > and did a first entry for the new CC-BY-(SA) short guide from the FSF.
> > I could use more critical review, so if you read it or other documents,
> > please add a link or a comment.

> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 10 17:04:45 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 17:04:45 +0200
Subject: [Announce] A new Beta of GnuPG 2.1 is now available
In-Reply-To: <201406101631.23594.bernhard@intevation.de> (Bernhard Reiter's
 message of "Tue, 10 Jun 2014 16:31:21 +0200")
References: <87oay7nyfo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <201406061322.36501.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <87vbsekpxb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <201406101631.23594.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <871tuw4xgy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 10 Jun 2014 16:31, bernhard at intevation.de said:

> A dependency diagram would be cool to have! :)

That is easy.  Build in this order:

speedo_spkgs  = \
	libgpg-error npth libgcrypt  \
	zlib libiconv gettext \
	libassuan libksba gnupg \
	libffi glib pkg-config \
	gpgme \
	libpng \
	gdk-pixbuf atk pixman cairo pango gtk+ \
	pinentry gpa

For just gnupg this is sufficient:

speedo_spkgs  = \
	libgpg-error npth libgcrypt  \
	zlib libiconv gettext \
	libassuan libksba gnupg

If you need gpgme with glib support you need to install a glib-dev
package first or build everything up to gpgme.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From raffaelr at gmx.de  Tue Jun 10 23:36:10 2014
From: raffaelr at gmx.de (raffaelr at gmx.de)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:36:10 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <53977A4A.3050908@gmx.de>

Dear Bernhard,
hello everyone,

On 06.06.2014 11:36, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> Thus I've started http://wiki.gnupg.org/documentation and did a
> first entry for the new CC-BY-(SA) short guide from the FSF. I
> could use more critical review, so if you read it or other
> documents, please add a link or a comment.

Do you know if there are translations of the fsf-guide planned?

Cheers,
--rr


From jerome at jerome.cc  Wed Jun 11 04:34:03 2014
From: jerome at jerome.cc (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=E9r=F4me_Pinguet?=)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 04:34:03 +0200
Subject: adele
Message-ID: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc>

Hello!

I'm Jerome from France, GPG user and cryptoparty organizer in Marseille.
I just joined the list! It seems to be a very friendly place.

I would like to make a french speaking adele (The friendly GPG Robot)
available to the community of french speaking GPG evangelists and beginners.

Is there a source code or a recipe available somewhere? Is it written in
english? If everything is in german, it's ok, i have basic skills in
german, and with a little help from the community, I'll manage to clone
and translate the robot. But I don't have the skill and time to write
another one from scratch.

The only information about Adele I could find about are those two messages:

First message by Werner (2007):
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-de/2007-March/000149.html saying
that it's not a free software.
Second message by Bernhard Reiter (2009)
http://lists.wald.intevation.org/pipermail/gpg4win-devel/2009-September/000869.html
asking about the development of a free software replacement robot.

English speaking Adele say it's made by www.g-n-u.de I guess i'll have
to contact them also.

Do you have more information?

Thank you.

j?r?me
--
GPG fingerprint E063 9B6A 3892 84A4 74FE AB0E EF73 E6DA 5836 B81A
www.cryptoparty.fr

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From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun 11 11:06:23 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 11:06:23 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> (=?utf-8?B?IkrDqXLDtG1l?=
 Pinguet"'s message of "Wed, 11 Jun 2014 04:34:03 +0200")
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc>
Message-ID: <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 11 Jun 2014 04:34, jerome at jerome.cc said:

> I would like to make a french speaking adele (The friendly GPG Robot)
> available to the community of french speaking GPG evangelists and beginners.

Good idea.

> Is there a source code or a recipe available somewhere? Is it written in

Not that I know.

> English speaking Adele say it's made by www.g-n-u.de I guess i'll have
> to contact them also.

That is Peter Gerwinski's company.  You may also try to connect him at
his privat eaddress which is NAME at SURNAME.de.  IIRC, he speaks French.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From labrani at gmail.com  Wed Jun 11 11:34:27 2014
From: labrani at gmail.com (Fl)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 11:34:27 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc>
Message-ID: <9BFCEADB-57F2-47E9-AB29-3386E302C6ED@gmail.com>

Hy jerome
I can eventually help you if you want. Im also speaking french. 

Ppr

> On 11 juin 2014, at 04:34, J?r?me Pinguet <jerome at jerome.cc> wrote:
> 
> Hello!
> 
> I'm Jerome from France, GPG user and cryptoparty organizer in Marseille.
> I just joined the list! It seems to be a very friendly place.
> 
> I would like to make a french speaking adele (The friendly GPG Robot)
> available to the community of french speaking GPG evangelists and beginners.
> 
> Is there a source code or a recipe available somewhere? Is it written in
> english? If everything is in german, it's ok, i have basic skills in
> german, and with a little help from the community, I'll manage to clone
> and translate the robot. But I don't have the skill and time to write
> another one from scratch.
> 
> The only information about Adele I could find about are those two messages:
> 
> First message by Werner (2007):
> http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-de/2007-March/000149.html saying
> that it's not a free software.
> Second message by Bernhard Reiter (2009)
> http://lists.wald.intevation.org/pipermail/gpg4win-devel/2009-September/000869.html
> asking about the development of a free software replacement robot.
> 
> English speaking Adele say it's made by www.g-n-u.de I guess i'll have
> to contact them also.
> 
> Do you have more information?
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> j?r?me
> --
> GPG fingerprint E063 9B6A 3892 84A4 74FE AB0E EF73 E6DA 5836 B81A
> www.cryptoparty.fr
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun 11 18:03:03 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 09:03:03 -0700
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>

>> Is there a source code or a recipe available somewhere? Is it written in
>
> Not that I know.

I believe John Clizbe has a copy of the Adele source code.



From John at enigmail.net  Wed Jun 11 22:43:17 2014
From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 15:43:17 -0500
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5398BF65.5040709@enigmail.net>

Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>>> Is there a source code or a recipe available somewhere? Is it written in
>>
>> Not that I know.
> 
> I believe John Clizbe has a copy of the Adele source code.


I still have the copy from when the Enigmail team translated to message file
from German to English six+ years ago. One file is all that needs translated
to any new language. It should be fairly easy to implement a polyglot Adele
site.  adele_de.pas is ISO-8859. adele_en.pas is ASCII. IMO, I think they and
future work should probably be UTF-8/16.

Copyright is to G-N-U.de. License (on what I have) is GPL 2.

The source language is Pascal, specifically Gnu Pascal. The requirements from
the INSTALL file are:
  - GPC 2.1
  - librx
  - GnuPG 1.0.6
  - GPGME 0.3.4
  - MySQL 3.23.25
  - any standard MTA (syntax below given for exim)
  - cron

I have not tried building it with fpc.

When we did the translation work, I tested it against gpgme 0.3.15 and gnupg
1.4.8. The gpgme Pascal bindings need to be updated to work with the current
version. This will probably also require some updating in the main program unit.

-John

-- 
John P. Clizbe                      Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP                  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
     mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?"
A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels"


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From jerome at jerome.cc  Thu Jun 12 02:45:51 2014
From: jerome at jerome.cc (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=E9r=F4me_Pinguet?=)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 02:45:51 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <5398BF65.5040709@enigmail.net>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
 <5398BF65.5040709@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <5398F83F.1050201@jerome.cc>

On 11/06/2014 22:43, John Clizbe wrote:
>
> I still have the copy from when the Enigmail team translated to message file
> from German to English six+ years ago. One file is all that needs translated
> to any new language. It should be fairly easy to implement a polyglot Adele
> site.  adele_de.pas is ISO-8859. adele_en.pas is ASCII. IMO, I think they and
> future work should probably be UTF-8/16.
>
> Copyright is to G-N-U.de. License (on what I have) is GPL 2.
>
> The source language is Pascal, specifically Gnu Pascal. The requirements from
> the INSTALL file are:
>   - GPC 2.1
>   - librx
>   - GnuPG 1.0.6
>   - GPGME 0.3.4
>   - MySQL 3.23.25
>   - any standard MTA (syntax below given for exim)
>   - cron
>
> I have not tried building it with fpc.
>
> When we did the translation work, I tested it against gpgme 0.3.15 and gnupg
> 1.4.8. The gpgme Pascal bindings need to be updated to work with the current
> version. This will probably also require some updating in the main program unit.
>
> -John
This is very good news!

Do you think you could upload the source files to a revision control
system website such as GitHub or any other publicly available platform
so that the community can start working on the update process? To avoid
any copyright issue we might have to use another name, at least until we
get approval to use the traditional Adele name from the copyright holder.

I hope the use of a feminine name to depict a robot doesn't raise gender
issues. Maybe we could choose a masculine name for a change. I suggest
'Werner'. ;-) Or maybe 'Phil'.

Thank you.

j?r?me
--
GPG fingerprint E063 9B6A 3892 84A4 74FE AB0E EF73 E6DA 5836 B81A
www.cryptoparty.fr

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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun 12 09:34:51 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 09:34:51 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <5398F83F.1050201@jerome.cc> (=?utf-8?B?IkrDqXLDtG1l?=
 Pinguet"'s message of "Thu, 12 Jun 2014 02:45:51 +0200")
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
 <5398BF65.5040709@enigmail.net> <5398F83F.1050201@jerome.cc>
Message-ID: <8761k637j8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 12 Jun 2014 02:45, jerome at jerome.cc said:

> Do you think you could upload the source files to a revision control
> system website such as GitHub or any other publicly available platform

I can offer to host it on git.gnupg.org.  The number of committers is
limited but after all git is a decentralized system and enough people
can get or have write acces to that host.

> any copyright issue we might have to use another name, at least until we
> get approval to use the traditional Adele name from the copyright holder.

A name is not copyrightable, in particular not a common name like that
of Peter's Grandma.  In any case, if it is really GPL, it is not a
problem at all.

> issues. Maybe we could choose a masculine name for a change. I suggest

Ed or Glenn might be better than your suggestions ;-).  But you would
need to draw new pictures of them for the Gpg4win compendium.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From mailinglist at krebs.uno  Thu Jun 12 09:17:41 2014
From: mailinglist at krebs.uno (Daniel Krebs)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 09:17:41 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <201406101638.29030.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53948615.2000700@gmx.de> <201406101638.29030.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <53995415.1090309@krebs.uno>

Am 10.06.2014 16:38, schrieb Bernhard Reiter:
>>> > >Thus I've started
>>> > >    http://wiki.gnupg.org/documentation
>>> > >and did a first entry for the new CC-BY-(SA) short guide from the FSF.
>>> > >I could use more critical review, so if you read it or other documents,
>>> > >please add a link or a comment.

Does the column "language" imply, that you are also looking for links to 
non-english sites?
-- 
kind regards
daniel krebs


From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Thu Jun 12 15:06:05 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 09:06:05 -0400
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <8761k637j8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
 <5398BF65.5040709@enigmail.net> <5398F83F.1050201@jerome.cc>
 <8761k637j8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20140612130605.GA15487@IUPUI.Edu>

On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 09:34:51AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Jun 2014 02:45, jerome at jerome.cc said:
[snip]
> > any copyright issue we might have to use another name, at least until we
> > get approval to use the traditional Adele name from the copyright holder.
> 
> A name is not copyrightable, in particular not a common name like that
> of Peter's Grandma.  In any case, if it is really GPL, it is not a
> problem at all.

Copyright isn't used for names, but a name in association with a
business or service can, in some jurisdictions, be protected by
*trademark* or *service mark*.

-- 
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer   mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Machines should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
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From tux.tsndcb at free.fr  Thu Jun 12 19:46:35 2014
From: tux.tsndcb at free.fr (tux.tsndcb at free.fr)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:46:35 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: Cannot reset smartcard
In-Reply-To: <752849381.60637931.1402595150058.JavaMail.root@zimbra33-e6.priv.proxad.net>
Message-ID: <1460261132.60640331.1402595195056.JavaMail.root@zimbra33-e6.priv.proxad.net>

Hello all,

Sorry to disturb you but I cannot more used my smartcard and I wanted to known if someone has already have this :

gpg2 --card-status
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Reset card required
gpg: OpenPGP smartcard not available : Reset card required

I've tried to reset it :

gpg-connect-agent < Reset
ERR 100663405 Reset card required <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
ERR 100663406 card removed <SCD>
card has been reset to factory defaults

But in fact my smartcard is not reseted, is it bricked ?

Thanks in advanced for your return.

Best Regards


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Jun 12 20:38:18 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:38:18 +0100
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <5398F83F.1050201@jerome.cc>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <87k38n3je8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20140611090303.Horde.0ZuSXBnjN12IirVyBLbTNg1@mail.sixdemonbag.org>
 <5398BF65.5040709@enigmail.net> <5398F83F.1050201@jerome.cc>
Message-ID: <656843164.20140612193818@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 12 June 2014 at 1:45:51 AM, in
<mid:5398F83F.1050201 at jerome.cc>, J?r?me Pinguet wrote:


> I hope the use of a feminine name to depict a robot
> doesn't raise gender issues. Maybe we could choose a
> masculine name for a change


Or maybe an androgenous name, such as "Fran" or "Stacie" or...

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Success isn't how far you got, but the distance you travelled from where you started
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From kloecker at kde.org  Fri Jun 13 00:40:20 2014
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 00:40:20 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <20140612130605.GA15487@IUPUI.Edu>
References: <5397C01B.4040306@jerome.cc> <8761k637j8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20140612130605.GA15487@IUPUI.Edu>
Message-ID: <2106135.N8OEQ4fZW4@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Thursday 12 June 2014 09:06:05 Mark H. Wood wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 09:34:51AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> > On Thu, 12 Jun 2014 02:45, jerome at jerome.cc said:
> [snip]
> 
> > > any copyright issue we might have to use another name, at least
> > > until we get approval to use the traditional Adele name from the
> > > copyright holder.> 
> > A name is not copyrightable, in particular not a common name like
> > that of Peter's Grandma.  In any case, if it is really GPL, it is
> > not a problem at all.
> 
> Copyright isn't used for names, but a name in association with a
> business or service can, in some jurisdictions, be protected by
> *trademark* or *service mark*.

In Germany resp. the EU "Adele" does not seem to be a registered 
trademark for computer software. (I've quickly checked this via 
https://register.dpma.de/DPMAregister/marke/einsteiger?lang=en.)


Regards,
Ingo
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From jhs at berklix.com  Fri Jun 13 01:43:37 2014
From: jhs at berklix.com (Julian H. Stacey)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 01:43:37 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: Your message "Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:38:18 +0100."
 <656843164.20140612193818@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <201406122343.s5CNhbsA053330@fire.js.berklix.net>

> On Thursday 12 June 2014 at 1:45:51 AM, in
> <mid:5398F83F.1050201 at jerome.cc>, J?r?me Pinguet wrote:
> 
> > I hope the use of a feminine name to depict a robot
> > doesn't raise gender issues. Maybe we could choose a
> > masculine name for a change
> 
> Or maybe an androgenous name, such as "Fran" or "Stacie" or...

Fran & Stac[ie|y] seem female American first names to me (British). 
Leslie is an indeterminate British name.  Jean would be an indeterminate
name for all of {gender, nationality, & pronunciation} :-)

Hurricanes now alternate male & female.  Lows over Germany often
[used to] get the most peculiar names only Germans easily recognise,
let alone could put a gender to (despite those Westerlies blow over
France or British Isles first).

Cars & bikes get no names though some boats foolishly get called She.
Euro fighter plane managers made fools of themselves once, changing
the sex of their planes. (3 genders were available in German, male
female & neuter, They failed to choose Neuter).

Robots seem best with androgenous names, eg Majordomo.

Cheers,
Julian
-- 
Julian Stacey, BSD Linux Unix C Sys Eng Consultant Munich http://berklix.com
		Interleave replies Below, like a play script.
	Heatwave in Munich.  The longer forecast: http://xkcd.com/1379/


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Fri Jun 13 07:36:44 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 06:36:44 +0100
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <201406122343.s5CNhbsA053330@fire.js.berklix.net>
References: Your message "Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:38:18 +0100."
 <656843164.20140612193818@my_localhost>
 <201406122343.s5CNhbsA053330@fire.js.berklix.net>
Message-ID: <811016933.20140613063644@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 13 June 2014 at 12:43:37 AM, in
<mid:201406122343.s5CNhbsA053330 at fire.js.berklix.net>, Julian H.
Stacey wrote:


> Fran & Stac[ie|y] seem female American first names to
> me (British).

Fran is short for Francis/Frances, so is clearly (to me, at least)
androgynous. And is fairly common in the UK.

Stacy Keach is a famous male, and the only male I have heard of with
that first name, which is usually used for a female and spelled -ey or
- -ie.




> Leslie is an indeterminate British name.

Except it is another with gender-variant spellings, this time usually
- -ey for a female and -ie for a male where I come from (ignoring the
modern trend to invent your own spellings, which is a different
story).



> Jean would be an indeterminate name for all of {gender,
> nationality, & pronunciation} :-)

Isn't Jean usually female in English-speaking countries and male in
French-speaking countries?



> Hurricanes now alternate male & female.

I'm sure they used to be male names one year and female names the
next, but they seem to now alternate within the same year


> Cars & bikes get no names though some boats foolishly
> get called She.

A lot of people call their car "she" as well.Never understood that.




- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

No matter what a man's past may have been, his future is spotless.
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Jun 13 08:13:45 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 02:13:45 -0400
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: <811016933.20140613063644@my_localhost>
References: Your message "Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:38:18 +0100."
 <656843164.20140612193818@my_localhost>
 <201406122343.s5CNhbsA053330@fire.js.berklix.net>
 <811016933.20140613063644@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <539A9699.304@sixdemonbag.org>

> Stacy Keach is a famous male, and the only male I have heard of with
> that first name, which is usually used for a female and spelled -ey or
> -ie.

Stacy Andrews, used to be an offensive lineman for the Cincinnati
Bengals.  Stacy Peralta, an actor from one of my all-time favorite
movies (_Real Genius_).  Stacy Compton, owner of Turn One Racing and a
former highly-ranked race driver.

I agree it's a rare name, but it's not unheard-of.

> Except it is another with gender-variant spellings, this time usually
> -ey for a female and -ie for a male where I come from (ignoring the
> modern trend to invent your own spellings, which is a different
> story).

In the U.S., it's almost always Leslie.  The only Lesley I've ever met
was an Australian.

> Isn't Jean usually female in English-speaking countries and male in
> French-speaking countries?

Yep.

> A lot of people call their car "she" as well. Never understood that.

	Delilah was a woman fine and fair
	With pleasant looks and her coal-black hair
	Delilah gained old Samson's mind
	When first he saw the woman that looked so fine
	...
	Samson's mother replied to him
	"Can't you find a woman of your kind and kin?
	Samson, will you please your mother's mind?"
	Still he go'd and married that Philistine.
	...
	Samson's trick, though, they never found out
	Till they began to wonder about
	Till his wife sat upon his knee
	"Tell me where your strength lie, if you please?"
	Samson's wife she talked so fair
	Told his wife to cut off his hair
	"Shave my head clean as your hand
	And I become a natural man!"

		-- "If I Had My Way", by Willie Johnson [*]

I drive a charcoal-black Mustang GT, and much like the Biblical Delilah,
oh brother, does she ever tempt me into doing things I know I shouldn't.
 The name makes *exquisite* sense to me...



[*] The song's probably older than that, but Blind Willie Johnson had
the first recording of it in 1927.  In the '70s it became a staple of
Grateful Dead concerts, and then Springsteen started to include it in
his concerts.  Recently, Shirley Manson made a heavy metal version of it
that's musically excellent, but it's theologically incoherent -- it does
no justice to the story of Samson and Delilah.

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From daniel at pocock.com.au  Fri Jun 13 09:25:50 2014
From: daniel at pocock.com.au (Daniel Pocock)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 09:25:50 +0200
Subject: problems after changing primary UID
Message-ID: <539AA77E.8070506@pocock.com.au>


I recently changed my primary UID from daniel at pocock.com.au to
daniel at pocock.pro

I've been able to sign from one machine but not from another.  The
second machine only has subkeys.

On the second machine, I would always get "secret key not available"
errors from git tag, signing packages, etc.

In fact, the secret key was never changed, I just added more UIDs, so
this error appeared inaccurate.

Programs like "git tag" and dpkg-genchanges could be coerced to sign
things on the second computer if I manually specified the numeric key ID
on the command line.

Adding "default-key" in ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf didn't help either - it always
seems necessary to specify the key ID on every occasion.

Looking at it again today, "gpg --list-secret-keys" shows me that two of
my UIDs, including the new one, were not listed on the second computer. 
However, looking at it with "gpg --edit-key" the uids are listed in the
public view but not the secret key view.  It seems that running "adduid"
doesn't fully update the list of uids for secret key usage.

I came across this rather detailed blog from somebody else who had this
problem:
https://we.riseup.net/risuplabs+paow/missing-uid-in-secret-key

and I couldn't help wondering, isn't it feasible to just copy the
~/.gnupg/secring.gpg from one computer to the other?

I made a backup and tried doing so and it appears to solve the problem. 
The only gotcha I can think of is that if the second computer is only
meant to contain subkeys, then the secret master key needs to be removed
as described in https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys

Is copying the file like this a valid solution?

Is there an easier way to deal with this situation?





From jhs at berklix.com  Fri Jun 13 12:14:49 2014
From: jhs at berklix.com (Julian H. Stacey)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 12:14:49 +0200
Subject: adele
In-Reply-To: Your message "Fri, 13 Jun 2014 06:36:44 +0100."
 <811016933.20140613063644@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <201406131015.s5DAEnhv005136@fire.js.berklix.net>

> > Jean would be an indeterminate name for all of {gender,
> > nationality, & pronunciation} :-)
> 
> Isn't Jean usually female in English-speaking countries and male in
> French-speaking countries?

Yes a name avoiding implying gender & nationality when read, until pronounced.

Cheers,
Julian
-- 
Julian Stacey, BSD Linux Unix C Sys Eng Consultant Munich http://berklix.com
		Interleave replies Below, like a play script.


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 13 16:06:28 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 16:06:28 +0200
Subject: problems after changing primary UID
In-Reply-To: <539AA77E.8070506@pocock.com.au> (Daniel Pocock's message of
 "Fri, 13 Jun 2014 09:25:50 +0200")
References: <539AA77E.8070506@pocock.com.au>
Message-ID: <87r42szyxn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 13 Jun 2014 09:25, daniel at pocock.com.au said:

> Looking at it again today, "gpg --list-secret-keys" shows me that two of
> my UIDs, including the new one, were not listed on the second computer. 

That the usual of gpg not able to merge secret keys.

> as described in https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys
>
> Is copying the file like this a valid solution?

Yes. I used to do something similar.

> Is there an easier way to deal with this situation?

Give 2.1.0-beta a try; it makes the secret key management much easier.
Despite that 2.1 has warnings about being a beta versions, I am using it
for about 4 years now.

But take care, the latest beta has a problem exporting secret ECC keys.
But ECC keys are not very common anway.  I introduced that bug in the
last beta without noticing.  I'll fix next week.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From K.Chambers at openmailbox.org  Sat Jun 14 22:33:07 2014
From: K.Chambers at openmailbox.org (Kristy Chambers)
Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2014 20:33:07 +0000
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org>

I think providing an official, complete, easily-understandable,
up-to-date, reviewed and qualitative documentation by experts for
beginners and experts is absolutely necessary for security-software.
Therefore GnuPG is in need of that.

If I have a (superficial) look on the documentations, FAQs, HOWTOWs and
manuals of/about GnuPG, I would say some of them look a little bit sale.
A potential gpg-interested person could probably not know, where to
start. Some documents are old and incomplete. I'm not saying that old
manuals are implying bad manuals (some options haven't changed for long,
therefore no change in docs in need).

After all, I don't have the feeling, that the docs (where some of them
are really good) linked on the GnuPG-page are providing, what I
mentioned in the first sentences of my message.

Although some people would probably deny, that it's not the job
gnupg.org to provide a good tutorial about using gpg for e-mail-security
with some other gpg-related software like Enigmail+Thunderbird, I would
really appreciate it. Bad tutorials on the web reaffirm my thoughts on
that. Actually I think it would be really cool, if there are official
statements/comments about gpg-related software. This could maybe help
users decision of trusting some gpg-related software or the developers.
It could also probably put software developers under pressure, who are
writing wrong software. Enigmail is the best example for that. Many
people are relying on that piece of software. Many (wrong) tutorials on
the web are talking about Thunderbird+Enigmail. The documentation of it
is not that bad I think, but could be better, but the most annoying
thing is that Enigmail is broken by default because of the default trust
of all keys. Who if not GnuPG-experts should write good,
easily-understandable tutorials about the practical use of gpg by
beginners for e-mail-encryption?

Last but not least, a lot of gpg-related things are not matured in my
opinion. Nor the documentation, nor the graphical front-ends, nor the
mua-plugins, nor the OpenPGP-standard itself.

When if not now is the time for finally bring this stuff in a neat quality?

K.C.


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Jun 15 22:33:53 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 21:33:53 +0100
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org>
Message-ID: <816601028.20140615213353@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Saturday 14 June 2014 at 9:33:07 PM, in
<mid:539CB183.10102 at openmailbox.org>, Kristy Chambers wrote:


> I think providing an official, complete,
> easily-understandable, up-to-date, reviewed and
> qualitative documentation by experts for beginners and
> experts is absolutely necessary for security-software.
> Therefore GnuPG is in need of that.

I'm not sure about "official" in this context, but agree the rest is
at least desirable.



> I'm not
> saying that old manuals are implying bad manuals (some
> options haven't changed for long, therefore no change
> in docs in need).

Indeed. When I was doing my physics A-level (a long time ago now), for
certain subject areas we used elderly textbooks that covered the
material much better than the more modern references. In one
particular case, the books were over 40 years old. The style of
writing was very dated and the units described had been superceded
several times, but it was still a very useful reference.



> After all, I don't have the feeling, that the docs
> (where some of them are really good) linked on the
> GnuPG-page are providing, what I mentioned in the first
> sentences of my message.

A single, joined-up documentation providing what you mentioned would
be a valuable resource, if people with the appropriate expertise and
profile could be induced to produce it and to revise/update it from
time to time. And the plethora of existing and third-party
documentation would still be available for broader reference.



> Although some people would probably deny, that it's not
> the job gnupg.org to provide a good tutorial about
> using gpg for e-mail-security with some other
> gpg-related software like Enigmail+Thunderbird,

I would say providing a good tutorial on email security could easily
be seen to fall within the documentation set you seek. But I would
also say it should be a broad-brush approach, because detailed
specifics about a range of related applications should fall outwith
the scope of a documentation project such as you suggest. That said,
there might be merit in including one or two case studies that did go
into such specifics.



> Who if not
> GnuPG-experts should write good, easily-understandable
> tutorials about the practical use of gpg by beginners
> for e-mail-encryption?

For the documentation to be useful to beginners, it is important to
also have input from people who recently were beginners. Experts in
any field tend not to have a reasonably fresh memory of the
difficulties and doubts they had as beginners.



- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Can you imagine a world with no hypothetical situations?
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Jun 15 23:27:39 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 17:27:39 -0400
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <816601028.20140615213353@my_localhost>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org> <816601028.20140615213353@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <539E0FCB.4080208@sixdemonbag.org>

>> I think providing an official, complete,
>> easily-understandable, up-to-date, reviewed and
>> qualitative documentation by experts for beginners and
>> experts is absolutely necessary for security-software.
>> Therefore GnuPG is in need of that.
> 
> I'm not sure about "official" in this context, but agree the rest is
> at least desirable.

Impractical, perhaps.  Good tech writers are rare; good tech writers who
understand the intricacies of crypto and communications security are
moreso; good tech writers who understand the intricacies and who are
willing to keep everything up-to-date while not getting paid a dime for
it are so rare as to be virtually nonexistent.



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Jun 15 23:39:38 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 23:39:38 +0200
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <539E0FCB.4080208@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org> <816601028.20140615213353@my_localhost>
 <539E0FCB.4080208@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <539E129A.3050401@digitalbrains.com>

On 15/06/14 23:27, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> keep everything up-to-date

Is there really that much flux in the crypto world? It seems rather steady to
me. Things which seem stable stay stable, things which seem suspect, stay
suspect. Generally.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Jun 15 23:45:42 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 17:45:42 -0400
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <539E129A.3050401@digitalbrains.com>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org> <816601028.20140615213353@my_localhost>
 <539E0FCB.4080208@sixdemonbag.org> <539E129A.3050401@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <539E1406.8050808@sixdemonbag.org>

> Is there really that much flux in the crypto world? It seems rather steady to
> me. Things which seem stable stay stable, things which seem suspect, stay
> suspect. Generally.

Definitely.  Keeping up-to-date with the most recent versions, with new
features, with security advisories, etc.

Imagine if someone were to have written comprehensive and detailed
documentation for GnuPG 2.0, and how much of it would need to be
rewritten for the introduction of ECC into GnuPG 2.1.



From John at enigmail.net  Mon Jun 16 00:17:56 2014
From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe)
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2014 17:17:56 -0500
Subject: Docs central, with 'Email Self-Defence'
In-Reply-To: <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org>
References: <201406061136.28405.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <539CB183.10102@openmailbox.org>
Message-ID: <539E1B94.4060908@enigmail.net>

Kristy Chambers wrote:
> Although some people would probably deny, that it's not the job
> gnupg.org to provide a good tutorial about using gpg for e-mail-security
> with some other gpg-related software like Enigmail+Thunderbird, I would
> really appreciate it. Bad tutorials on the web reaffirm my thoughts on
> that. Actually I think it would be really cool, if there are official
> statements/comments about gpg-related software. This could maybe help
> users decision of trusting some gpg-related software or the developers.
> It could also probably put software developers under pressure, who are
> writing wrong software. Enigmail is the best example for that. Many
> people are relying on that piece of software. Many (wrong) tutorials on
> the web are talking about Thunderbird+Enigmail. The documentation of it
> is not that bad I think, but could be better, but the most annoying
> thing is that Enigmail is broken by default because of the default trust
> of all keys. Who if not GnuPG-experts should write good,
> easily-understandable tutorials about the practical use of gpg by
> beginners for e-mail-encryption?

Hi, Kristy,

Have you tried the Thunderbird/Seamonkey-Enigmail documentation written by the
Enigmail folks? https://www.enigmail.net/documentation/

If you have specific issues with enigmail, would you please address them to
the enigmail-users mailing list, mailto://enigmail-users at enigmail.net
You'll need to subscribe or your posts will be held for moderation.
To unsubscribe or make changes to your subscription click here:
https://admin.hostpoint.ch/mailman/listinfo/enigmail-users_enigmail.net

In the present team's twelfth year, we're now "broken by default." Broken for
whom precisely? The default trust of all keys has recently been discussed
(again). Search both the enigmail-user and gnupg-user list archives.

Setting defaults comes down to a decision of how high to set the bar for
enabling a new user to encrypt email. "Crypto training-wheels" seems an apt
analogy. One needs them at first but later they can be removed.

Setting defaults to values that make using the extension simple enough for the
beginner is often at odds to what "experts" desire. Given the often XOR nature
of the two groups, we as a team tend to choose defaults in favor of the
beginners. As they learn, they can make the changes to more secure settings.
More knowledgeable users can make the changes when installing Enigmail.

Thank you for your opinion. We hope to see you on enigmail-users.

-John
-- 
John P. Clizbe                      Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP                  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
     mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?"
A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels"


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From rodolfo.conde at compumed.com.mx  Tue Jun 17 01:11:17 2014
From: rodolfo.conde at compumed.com.mx (Rodolfo Conde)
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 18:11:17 -0500
Subject: Fwd: Using gpg to sign database information, problems with signature
 verification
In-Reply-To: <0pxpbmwh8idsn0iq7wq6jyle.1402960082215@email.android.com>
References: <0pxpbmwh8idsn0iq7wq6jyle.1402960082215@email.android.com>
Message-ID: <539F7995.4080409@compumed.com.mx>

   
    Hi everyone,

    I have been using gnupg to secure my personal data for a long time
and it has worked very fine. But now I need to use it in a very
different way. I have developed a dll in .net (with c#) which must
encapsulate the program gpg. Thus, the dll is a library wrapper that
provides my .net programs with basic encryption/decryption and
signing/verification of information used in these programs.  The signing
process implemented in the dll is separate signing, so that the signed
data is not included in the gpg signature. The dll uses the .net Process
class to invoke the gpg executable. 

    So far so good, the dll behaves well in general, but now I need to
use this dll with a c# program which manipulates information stored in a
database. In general, I have some database tables which contain a column
named "signature" that stores the gpg-generated signature (using the
dll) of the rest of the columns in the corresponding table. Each time a
new row is generated,  the data of some columns is gathered to build a
string which is then used to generate the signature column of the new
row. All the information is inserted in the database and the signing
process is completed for the new row.

    The problem comes later, when I want to verify that the database
information has not been altered by an external party. My c# program can
retrieve the information stored in a row of a table with the signature
column and then it builds again the string used to sign the row data and
then this string together with the signature generated in the previous
step are feed to my gpg dll wrapper to perform a verification process
using the gpg executable. In general, the verification process works
fine, but there are times in which gpg tells me that the signature or
the data is wrong... but no one has altered the data in the database !!!
As I have said, this happens from time to time. It is very important
that the verification process works in the right way every time, such
that if the dll wrapper says something is wrong, it is because the data
has been really altered.

    My question is: What could be wrong ? Why sometimes gpg tells me
that the signature is bad or that the data has been altered ? Could it
be some issue concerning character encodings ? Why the data is altered
when I download it from the database Server? Any hints ?

    Thanks a lot in advance !!!

    Greetings.

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 17 02:36:01 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 20:36:01 -0400
Subject: Fwd: Using gpg to sign database information,
 problems with signature verification
In-Reply-To: <539F7995.4080409@compumed.com.mx>
References: <0pxpbmwh8idsn0iq7wq6jyle.1402960082215@email.android.com>
 <539F7995.4080409@compumed.com.mx>
Message-ID: <539F8D71.5040305@sixdemonbag.org>

>     I have been using gnupg to secure my personal data for a long time
> and it has worked very fine. But now I need to use it in a very
> different way. I have developed a dll in .net (with c#) which must
> encapsulate the program gpg. Thus, the dll is a library wrapper that
> provides my .net programs with basic encryption/decryption and
> signing/verification of information used in these programs.  The signing
> process implemented in the dll is separate signing, so that the signed
> data is not included in the gpg signature. The dll uses the .net Process
> class to invoke the gpg executable. 

Please don't do this.  Use gpgme-sharp instead.  (It will require
compiling your assembly as a 32-bit app, but this is normally not a big
deal.)

https://github.com/danm-de/gpgme-sharp


From jambalaya.jrs at gmail.com  Tue Jun 17 02:04:14 2014
From: jambalaya.jrs at gmail.com (john s.)
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 20:04:14 -0400
Subject: Changeing the expiry date of a sub key
Message-ID: <20140616200414.dede879a3356aa837c5af003@gmail.com>

Please help me to understand what is going on here when I attempt to change the
expiry date of a sub key. This is a "learning by doing" key.  

john at erica:~/Desktop$ gpg -K
/home/john/.gnupg/secring.gpg
-----------------------------
sec   3072R/2419BD42 2014-06-15 [expires: 2014-06-21]
uid                  John R Song <john at ageinggracefully.ca>
uid                  [jpeg image of size 6326]
ssb   3072R/C6A5A9DB 2014-06-15

john at erica:~/Desktop$ gpg -k
/home/john/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
-----------------------------
pub   3072R/2419BD42 2014-06-15 [expires: 2014-06-21]
uid                  John R Song <john at ageinggracefully.ca>
uid                  [jpeg image of size 6326]
sub   3072R/C6A5A9DB 2014-06-15 [expires: 2015-06-15]

john at erica:~/Desktop$ gpg --edit-key C6A5A9DB
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.16; Copyright (C) 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Secret key is available.

pub  3072R/2419BD42  created: 2014-06-15  expires: 2014-06-21  usage: SC  
                     trust: ultimate      validity: ultimate
sub  3072R/C6A5A9DB  created: 2014-06-15  expires: 2015-06-15  usage: E   
[ultimate] (1). John R Song <john at ageinggracefully.ca>
[ultimate] (2)  [jpeg image of size 6326]

gpg> expire C6A5A9DB
Changing expiration time for the primary key.
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
         0 = key does not expire
      <n>  = key expires in n days
      <n>w = key expires in n weeks
      <n>m = key expires in n months
      <n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0) 5
Key expires at Sat 21 Jun 2014 07:47:35 PM EDT
Is this correct? (y/N) y

pub  3072R/2419BD42  created: 2014-06-15  expires: 2014-06-21  usage: SC  
                     trust: ultimate      validity: ultimate
sub  3072R/C6A5A9DB  created: 2014-06-15  expires: 2015-06-15  usage: E   
[ultimate] (1). John R Song <john at ageinggracefully.ca>
[ultimate] (2)  [jpeg image of size 6326]

gpg> save

-- 
John Song -  via Penguin Powered Desktop.


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Jun 17 07:18:19 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 07:18:19 +0200
Subject: Changeing the expiry date of a sub key
In-Reply-To: <20140616200414.dede879a3356aa837c5af003@gmail.com>
References: <20140616200414.dede879a3356aa837c5af003@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1460989.btHW1pMdrS@inno>

Am Mo 16.06.2014, 20:04:14 schrieb john s.:
> Please help me to understand what is going on here when I attempt to
> change the expiry date of a sub key.

> john at erica:~/Desktop$ gpg --edit-key C6A5A9DB

> gpg> expire C6A5A9DB
> Changing expiration time for the primary key.

The command is just "expire".

And as you did not select the subkey with "key 1" before, the expire 
command refers to the mainkey.


> Key is valid for? (0) 5
> Key expires at Sat 21 Jun 2014 07:47:35 PM EDT
> Is this correct? (y/N) y

This does not change anything as the mainkey was already valid for five 
days before the --edit-key.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 17 11:36:11 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:36:11 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
Message-ID: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hi,

the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we do not
have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion on that?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Jun 17 12:18:09 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:18:09 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>

I think a mascot would be nice. Is there some especially secretive animal? Some
animal that hides stuff? Or just a nice animal, something cuddly like a
pufferfish. Erm.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From tux.tsndcb at free.fr  Tue Jun 17 12:55:28 2014
From: tux.tsndcb at free.fr (tux.tsndcb at free.fr)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:55:28 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <913743900.12809303.1403002528019.JavaMail.root@zimbra33-e6.priv.proxad.net>

Hi,

>I think a mascot would be nice. Is there some especially secretive animal? Some
>animal that hides stuff? Or just a nice animal, something cuddly like a
>pufferfish. Erm.
>
>Peter.

Yes or may be an animal with two Gnus like the old smartcard GnuPG V1 logo with the new GnuPG logo (padlock) on their bellies ?

Best Regards


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Jun 17 12:58:14 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:58:14 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <2295767.dBqgbq67Dk@inno>

Am Di 17.06.2014, 11:36:11 schrieb Werner Koch:
> Hi,
> 
> the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we do
> not have a mascot like many other projects. 

But something similar to a mascot.


I would like to point at this:

http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2013-July/046969.html

That wasn't about GnuPG specifically but about OpenPGP in general though 
(which seems much more useful to me).


And for those who understand German (or consider the Google translator 
fun):

http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/mitmach-symbol/

This is even more general and IMHO the biggest chance to really change 
the game (especially with little effort) ? in contrast to a project or 
even standard logo. I have the promise of the c't editorship to support 
this ? if somebody else gets it done.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From neal at walfield.org  Tue Jun 17 12:04:20 2014
From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:04:20 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>

At Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:36:11 +0200,
Werner Koch wrote:
> the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we do not
> have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion on that?

How about an Octopus?  As I understand it, they like to try and open
locks.

Neal


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Mon Jun 16 23:59:49 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 17:59:49 -0400
Subject: [Enigmail] 15 June nightly build
In-Reply-To: <539EF81E.8080708@nordnet.fr>
References: <539D5011.5080409@josuttis.de> <539D9757.6060008@nordnet.fr>
 <539E805D.8040301@fifthhorseman.net> <539EF81E.8080708@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <539F68D5.10200@fifthhorseman.net>

Hi Philip--

over on enigmail-users,
On 06/16/2014 09:58 AM, Philip Jackson wrote:
> me at me-desktop:~$ gpg --sign test-message
> 
> You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
> user: "Philip Jackson <philip.jackson at nordnet.fr>"
> 2048-bit RSA key, ID 23543A63, created 2013-01-22
> (here I entered the passphrase)
> gpg: problem with the agent - disabling agent use
> gpg: can't open `test-message': No such file or directory
> gpg: signing failed: file open error
> 
> I tried a couple of times - same both times.

is there a file named "test-message" ?  you can find out with:

 ls -l test-message


If that doesn't exist, you can create a simple text file with "example"
in it with:

  echo example > test-message

> command gpg-agent shows "gpg-agent: gpg-agent running and available"

are you doing this from within a terminal emulator in a graphical
environment, or are you doing this entirely from a text-mode virtual
terminal?

You might do better to debug this problem with gpg over on gnupg-users
(i've cc'ed them here).  If you want to follow up on that mailing list,
you'll probably need to subscribe first at:

 http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

hth,

	--dkg

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From harakiri_23 at yahoo.com  Tue Jun 17 12:50:08 2014
From: harakiri_23 at yahoo.com (Harakiri)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:50:08 -0700
Subject: Character Encoding used for Passphrase for edit-key
In-Reply-To: <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1403002208.76129.YahooMailNeo@web120901.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>

Im unable to use a key created by gnupg which contains german umlauts with other crypto libaries (bouncycastle).

It works well with non umlaut passwords.

What character encoding does gnupg use when setting/changing the passphrase ?

I tried UTF-8 but that did not work the passphrase is not recognized by bouncycastle

Thanks
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 17 13:51:05 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:51:05 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <2295767.dBqgbq67Dk@inno> (Hauke Laging's message of "Tue, 17 Jun
 2014 12:58:14 +0200")
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2295767.dBqgbq67Dk@inno>
Message-ID: <87egynsqja.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:58, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said:

> And for those who understand German (or consider the Google translator 
> fun):
>
> http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/mitmach-symbol/

Well, we already decided on a logo a couple of years ago.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 17 14:20:01 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 08:20:01 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A03271.8030403@sixdemonbag.org>

> the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we do not
> have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion on that?

I'd go for Terry, the Tinfoil-Hatted Terrapin, myself.  :)



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Jun 17 14:24:11 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 14:24:11 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <87egynsqja.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2295767.dBqgbq67Dk@inno>
 <87egynsqja.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4125139.YiyFGvs1lk@inno>

Am Di 17.06.2014, 13:51:05 schrieb Werner Koch:
> On Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:58, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said:
> > And for those who understand German (or consider the Google
> > translator fun):
> > 
> > http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/mitmach-symbol/
> 
> Well, we already decided on a logo a couple of years ago.

That's what my first remark referred to.

I guess you have misunderstood the linked text: That is not specific to 
GnuPG, OpenPGP or any other standard or tool at all.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Tue Jun 17 15:00:52 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 09:00:52 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
Message-ID: <20140617130052.GA27224@IUPUI.Edu>

On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 12:04:20PM +0200, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> At Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:36:11 +0200,
> Werner Koch wrote:
> > the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we do not
> > have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion on that?

We have one, but it's a secret. :-)

> How about an Octopus?  As I understand it, they like to try and open
> locks.

Alas, the octopus is already associated with GitHub:

  https://octodex.github.com/original/

-- 
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer   mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Machines should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
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From neal at walfield.org  Tue Jun 17 15:16:31 2014
From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 15:16:31 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <20140617130052.GA27224@IUPUI.Edu>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
 <20140617130052.GA27224@IUPUI.Edu>
Message-ID: <871tunn0b4.wl%neal@walfield.org>

At Tue, 17 Jun 2014 09:00:52 -0400,
Mark H. Wood wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 12:04:20PM +0200, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> > At Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:36:11 +0200,
> > Werner Koch wrote:
> > > the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we do not
> > > have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion on that?
> 
> We have one, but it's a secret. :-)
> 
> > How about an Octopus?  As I understand it, they like to try and open
> > locks.
> 
> Alas, the octopus is already associated with GitHub:
> 
>   https://octodex.github.com/original/

That looks more like a cat...

Neal


From neal at walfield.org  Tue Jun 17 15:29:08 2014
From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 15:29:08 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <871tunn0b4.wl%neal@walfield.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
 <20140617130052.GA27224@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tunn0b4.wl%neal@walfield.org>
Message-ID: <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org>

FWIW, I was thinking of a stylized version of something like this:

  http://i76.photobucket.com/albums/j24/joebnfran/blog%20pics2/octopus.jpg

(Found here: http://hideousseacreatures.tumblr.com/post/61030684038/octopi-will-keep-trying-to-kill-you-after-theyre-dead)
  
Neal


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 17 15:45:03 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 09:45:03 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org> <20140617130052.GA27224@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tunn0b4.wl%neal@walfield.org> <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org>
Message-ID: <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>

First -- yes, I would love to see Terry the Tinfoil-Hatted Terrapin
become our mascot.  We've got a very businesslike logo; a mascot is an
opportunity for playfulness.  And what better way to poke a little
good-natured fun at ourselves?

Second -- okay, if the Tinfoil-Hatted Terrapin strikes a little close to
home (maybe some of us *are* terrapins: certainly, though, no one on
this list could ever be accused of wearing a tinfoil hat), I'd propose
something else entirely: the coelacanth.  Why?  Well, because I've got
this really weird and inexplicable fondness for them.  They're a fish
that's been around for 400 million years or more, has basically given
evolution the middle finger and dared Darwin to kill it off more times
than a Bruce Willis action movie, and ... well ... it has *style*.

The coelacanth also suggests Time, big-T Time.  (Like 400 million years'
worth.)  Given how often we wind up talking about brute-force analysis
and the megayears and megatons required and how much of an
extinction-level event it would be, a fish that's survived four hundred
megayears and several mass extinctions would be ironically appropriate.

Here, have a cool photo of a coelacanth:

http://bio1151.nicerweb.com/Locked/media/ch34/34_18Coelacanth.jpg


From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Tue Jun 17 16:55:47 2014
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:55:47 -0400
Subject: Mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>

UPR 12.04r1, ( https://www.privacy-cd.org/en ), Ubuntu Privacy Remix's new bootable modified Ubuntu static install disc, with GnuPG and Truecrypt already on it,
has a very cute 3D armored robo-lizard on it's boot screen. (no picture available on the UPR site  ;-((  )

Maybe an armored robotic #D Gnu might be a consideration.


vedaal



From simon+gnupg at bleah.co.uk  Tue Jun 17 18:22:36 2014
From: simon+gnupg at bleah.co.uk (Simon Ward)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:22:36 +0100
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
Message-ID: <f0f6787a-a6ec-4ab9-8265-77b2683d2d15@email.android.com>



On 17 June 2014 11:04:20 BST, "Neal H. Walfield" <neal at walfield.org> wrote:
>How about an Octopus?  As I understand it, they like to try and open
>locks.

And more!

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/05/nro-satellite-logo_n_4394577.html

Simon
-- 
Sent from Kaiten Mail. Please excuse my brevity.


From markr at signal100.com  Tue Jun 17 18:53:50 2014
From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 17:53:50 +0100
Subject: Mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <53A0729E.4010606@signal100.com>

On 17/06/2014 15:55, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
> [...]
> Maybe an armored robotic #D Gnu might be a consideration.

Oh yes, excellent idea. :-)


-- 
Mark Rousell

PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp
Key ID: C9C5C162
 
 
 



From jimoe at sohnen-moe.com  Tue Jun 17 18:58:32 2014
From: jimoe at sohnen-moe.com (James Moe)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 09:58:32 -0700
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <sig.12454efcc5.53A073B8.40309@sohnen-moe.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 06/17/2014 02:36 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we
> do not have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion
> on that?
> 
  An armadillo?
  A pack rat? (They are really cute.)
  A tortoise?

- -- 
James Moe
moe dot james at sohnen-moe dot com
520.743.3936
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/

iEYEARECAAYFAlOgc7gACgkQzTcr8Prq0ZPaIACgjH8fMQgP/SeE0Piuq6ay8iwq
F9MAn1rOd5QpvgVCGMt4y2R/nuzI0Hla
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From robertc at broadcom.com  Tue Jun 17 20:12:45 2014
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 18:12:45 +0000
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <sig.12454efcc5.53A073B8.40309@sohnen-moe.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <sig.12454efcc5.53A073B8.40309@sohnen-moe.com>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D32E677@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

My Vote is for the armadillo, pangolin, or hedgehog. All cute&cuddly until you try to look too close...

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh

-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of James Moe
Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2014 9:59 AM
To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: mascot_p

* PGP Signed by an unknown key

On 06/17/2014 02:36 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> the guy I am working with on a new website, recently asked why we
> do not have a mascot like many other projects.  What's your opinion
> on that?
> 
  An armadillo?
  A pack rat? (They are really cute.)
  A tortoise?

-- 
James Moe
moe dot james at sohnen-moe dot com
520.743.3936

* Unknown Key
* 0xFAEAD193(L)

_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From mick.crane at gmail.com  Tue Jun 17 19:47:43 2014
From: mick.crane at gmail.com (Mick Crane)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 18:47:43 +0100
Subject: Mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A0729E.4010606@signal100.com>
References: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>
 <53A0729E.4010606@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <256526CD-F085-4723-9F26-52FEFBDFC076@gmail.com>



> On 17 Jun 2014, at 17:53, Mark Rousell <markr at signal100.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 17/06/2014 15:55, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
>> [...]
>> Maybe an armored robotic #D Gnu might be a consideration.
> 
> Oh yes, excellent idea. :-)
> 
> 
Maybe a mask of some sort


From johannes at zarl.at  Tue Jun 17 18:24:29 2014
From: johannes at zarl.at (Johannes Zarl)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 18:24:29 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org> <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani>

Hi,

A project mascot is certainly a great idea. In my opinion a mascot and a logo 
have different purposes and can beautifully complement each other. The logo 
stands for the product and has to follow certain rules in its design. A 
mascot, on the other hand stands more for the whole community and can create 
ties between several projects much more easily.

On Tuesday 17 June 2014 09:45:03 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> First -- yes, I would love to see Terry the Tinfoil-Hatted Terrapin
> become our mascot.  We've got a very businesslike logo; a mascot is an
> opportunity for playfulness.  And what better way to poke a little
> good-natured fun at ourselves?

I was going to suggest a hedgehog (it's likeable, generally favours security 
over speed, and knows to protect itself), but a terrapin sounds great. Now I 
just have to find out the difference between a terrapin and a turtle?

Cheers,
  Johannes


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 17 21:14:53 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 15:14:53 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org> <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
 <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani>
Message-ID: <53A093AD.1050402@sixdemonbag.org>

> I was going to suggest a hedgehog (it's likeable, generally favours security 
> over speed, and knows to protect itself), but a terrapin sounds great. Now I 
> just have to find out the difference between a terrapin and a turtle?

The Algonquin tribe of Native Americans, originally living in Virginia,
had a word for turtle: "torope".  American settlers adopted this word
and over the last 400 years it's been corrupted into "terrapin."  As a
result, "terrapin" has become a common American synonym for "turtle,"
but the word's rarely used in the rest of the world.


From markr at signal100.com  Tue Jun 17 21:48:59 2014
From: markr at signal100.com (Mark Rousell)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 20:48:59 +0100
Subject: Mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <256526CD-F085-4723-9F26-52FEFBDFC076@gmail.com>
References: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>
 <53A0729E.4010606@signal100.com>
 <256526CD-F085-4723-9F26-52FEFBDFC076@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53A09BAB.50706@signal100.com>

On 17/06/2014 18:47, Mick Crane wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 17 Jun 2014, at 17:53, Mark Rousell <markr at signal100.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 17/06/2014 15:55, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
>>> [...]
>>> Maybe an armored robotic #D Gnu might be a consideration.
>>
>> Oh yes, excellent idea. :-)
>>
>>
> Maybe a mask of some sort

Unfortunately I think people associate masks with having something
(negative) to hide. Perhaps people shouldn't see it that way but they
seem to do so.


-- 
Mark Rousell

PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp
Key ID: C9C5C162
 
 
 



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Jun 17 21:54:38 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 12:54:38 -0700
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A093AD.1050402@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org> <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
 <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani> <53A093AD.1050402@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53A09CFE.9020107@dougbarton.us>

On 06/17/2014 12:14 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> I was going to suggest a hedgehog (it's likeable, generally favours security
>> over speed, and knows to protect itself), but a terrapin sounds great. Now I
>> just have to find out the difference between a terrapin and a turtle?
>
> The Algonquin tribe of Native Americans, originally living in Virginia,
> had a word for turtle: "torope".  American settlers adopted this word
> and over the last 400 years it's been corrupted into "terrapin."  As a
> result, "terrapin" has become a common American synonym for "turtle,"
> but the word's rarely used in the rest of the world.

Your etymology may be correct, as well as the common usage; but in 
zoology a turtle is an animal that lives only in the water, a tortoise 
is an animal that lives only on the land, and a terrapin moves between 
the two.

Doug


From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Jun 17 22:00:32 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:00:32 -0700
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org> <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
 <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani>
Message-ID: <53A09E60.3080002@dougbarton.us>

On 06/17/2014 09:24 AM, Johannes Zarl wrote:
> A project mascot is certainly a great idea.

Can I take a curmudgeonly view here, and ask why? On one hand that 
question is "Should we do it at all?" and on the other hand it's a 
question of, "If we're going to do it, what purpose would be trying to 
achieve?"

The latter question helps inform the discussion about what kind of 
mascot would be the best choice, if we decide to do it at all.

I'm aware of the whole "unite the community" and other aspects involved 
in having a mascot, but I wonder how much more united the community 
could be. :)

Doug



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 17 22:22:11 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 16:22:11 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A09CFE.9020107@dougbarton.us>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org> <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
 <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani> <53A093AD.1050402@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53A09CFE.9020107@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <53A0A373.40302@sixdemonbag.org>

> Your etymology may be correct, as well as the common usage; but in
> zoology a turtle is an animal that lives only in the water, a tortoise
> is an animal that lives only on the land, and a terrapin moves between
> the two.

Huh!  Learn something new every day.  If you have a source for that, you
may wish to edit the Wikipedia page for turtles, which does not make
that distinction.  (Wikipedia, wrong about something?  Imagine that...)



From johannes at zarl.at  Tue Jun 17 23:09:31 2014
From: johannes at zarl.at (Johannes Zarl)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 23:09:31 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A0A373.40302@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A09CFE.9020107@dougbarton.us> <53A0A373.40302@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <1564226.muKNSoExQr@mani>

> Learn something new every day.

Indeed. Thank you both for teaching me about the subtleties of the English 
language *and* some biology!

  Johannes




From erik.hjalmar.josefsson at gmail.com  Tue Jun 17 22:05:28 2014
From: erik.hjalmar.josefsson at gmail.com (Erik Josefsson)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 22:05:28 +0200
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D32E677@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <sig.12454efcc5.53A073B8.40309@sohnen-moe.com>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D32E677@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <53A09F88.7030308@gmail.com>

On 06/17/2014 08:12 PM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
> My Vote is for the armadillo, pangolin, or hedgehog. All cute&cuddly until you try to look too close...

Hedgehog is taken :-)

http://sirireiter.dk/edge/

  License
  -------
  This artwork is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under
  the terms of either
  CC-BY-SA-3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/> or the
GNU Public
  License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or
  (at your option) any later version, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  http://source.sirireiter.dk/?p=edge.git;a=blob;f=README

//Erik


From mick.crane at gmail.com  Wed Jun 18 10:19:08 2014
From: mick.crane at gmail.com (Mick Crane)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 09:19:08 +0100
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A09F88.7030308@gmail.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <sig.12454efcc5.53A073B8.40309@sohnen-moe.com>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D32E677@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <53A09F88.7030308@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <06F7029C-2E72-4821-AB39-CC9E504DB387@gmail.com>



> On 17 Jun 2014, at 21:05, Erik Josefsson <erik.hjalmar.josefsson at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 06/17/2014 08:12 PM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
>> My Vote is for the armadillo, pangolin, or hedgehog. All cute&cuddly until you try to look too close...
> 
> Hedgehog is taken :-)
> 
> http://sirireiter.dk/edge/
The turtle ( teenage mutant ninja ) is ok because it shows armour but also they are slow normally so probably making it look faster somehow would be a good thing, with wings ?

From ricul77 at gmail.com  Wed Jun 18 10:46:06 2014
From: ricul77 at gmail.com (Richard Ulrich)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 10:46:06 +0200
Subject: Order of keys attempted to decrypt
Message-ID: <1403081166.4976.12.camel@XPS13dev>

I have my private sub keys on a smart card, and up until recently
decrypting was always fine.
Then I found out that for signing other people's keys, I need to have
the primary private key available. So I put it on a second smart card as
described here:
http://gnupg.10057.n7.nabble.com/Issues-with-primary-key-amp-subkeys-on-different-smartcards-td32228.html
Now decryption still works, but with a small hiccup: 

$ gpg -d test.txt.gpg 
gpg: Anonymer Empf?nger; Versuch mit geheimem Schl?ssel 0AE275A9 ?
gpg: sending command `SCD PKDECRYPT' to agent failed: ec=6.91
gpg: Anonymer Empf?nger; Versuch mit geheimem Schl?ssel 8760DB3E ?
gpg: Alles klar, wir sind der ungenannte Empf?nger.
gpg: verschl?sselt mit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 00000000

It first tries to decrypt using the primary key. And since the card with
the primary key is not plugged in, it outputs an error, before it tries
the sub key that succeeds.
I tried using the -r option to specify the key to use, but it was
seemingly ignored.

Is there a way to specify which key to try first?

The problem I have at the moment ist that some scripts fail probably
because the error that is output.
For example, it never reaches line 43 of the following script since I
have the stub for the primary key: 
https://github.com/ulrichard/locally_encrypted_remote_storage/blob/master/open_locally_encrypted_remote_storage.sh

Rgds
Richard


PS: out of curiosity: What does the "ID 00000000" mean in the output
from gpg : 
gpg: verschl?sselt mit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 00000000

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From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Wed Jun 18 14:45:26 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:45:26 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <f0f6787a-a6ec-4ab9-8265-77b2683d2d15@email.android.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
 <f0f6787a-a6ec-4ab9-8265-77b2683d2d15@email.android.com>
Message-ID: <20140618124522.GA24028@IUPUI.Edu>

Assuming that there *should * be a mascot, the discussion seems to
concentrate on the secrecy aspect of GnuPG.  But what about the
other aspect -- assertion of identity?  Does that spark any ideas?
What sort of mascot would combine the two aspects?

-- 
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer   mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Machines should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
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From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Wed Jun 18 15:28:32 2014
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 07:28:32 -0600
Subject: public key E6602099 is 131772146 seconds newer than the signature
Message-ID: <20140618132830.GO16781@irc.ae7.st>

As per my understanding of the gpg(1) manpage, '--ignore-time-conflicts' should
supress messages such as the one in the subject. However, that doesn't seem to
be the case: http://ae7.st/p/2u6. It appears that only when redirecting STDERR
to /dev/null is it supressed. Is this expected behavior, or am I missing
something?

Thanks,

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun 18 15:43:57 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 09:43:57 -0400
Subject: Order of keys attempted to decrypt
In-Reply-To: <1403081166.4976.12.camel@XPS13dev>
References: <1403081166.4976.12.camel@XPS13dev>
Message-ID: <53A1979D.8000807@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/18/2014 04:46 AM, Richard Ulrich wrote:
> $ gpg -d test.txt.gpg 
> gpg: Anonymer Empf?nger; Versuch mit geheimem Schl?ssel 0AE275A9 ?
> gpg: sending command `SCD PKDECRYPT' to agent failed: ec=6.91
> gpg: Anonymer Empf?nger; Versuch mit geheimem Schl?ssel 8760DB3E ?
> gpg: Alles klar, wir sind der ungenannte Empf?nger.
> gpg: verschl?sselt mit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 00000000
> 
> It first tries to decrypt using the primary key. And since the card with
> the primary key is not plugged in, it outputs an error, before it tries
> the sub key that succeeds.

> I tried using the -r option to specify the key to use, but it was
> seemingly ignored.
> 
> Is there a way to specify which key to try first?

see the --try-secret-key option or the --default-key option as described
in gpg(1).

> PS: out of curiosity: What does the "ID 00000000" mean in the output
> from gpg : 
> gpg: verschl?sselt mit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 00000000

This is a "hidden recipient" in the public key encrypted session key packet.

from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.1 :

   An implementation MAY accept or use a Key ID of zero as a "wild card"
   or "speculative" Key ID.  In this case, the receiving implementation
   would try all available private keys, checking for a valid decrypted
   session key.  This format helps reduce traffic analysis of messages.

hth,

	--dkg

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From brad at fineby.me.uk  Wed Jun 18 14:56:45 2014
From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:56:45 +0100
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <20140618124522.GA24028@IUPUI.Edu>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
 <f0f6787a-a6ec-4ab9-8265-77b2683d2d15@email.android.com>
 <20140618124522.GA24028@IUPUI.Edu>
Message-ID: <20140618135645.6f5aa274@abydos.stargate.org.uk>

On Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:45:26 -0400
"Mark H. Wood" <mwood at IUPUI.Edu> wrote:

Hello Mark,

>What sort of mascot would combine the two aspects?

Racoon?   Easily recognised so an allusion to identity there.  Their face
has a 'mask', alluding to privacy.

-- 
 Regards  _
         / )           "The blindingly obvious is
        / _)rad        never immediately apparent"
You're not so safe in the safety of your room
Nasty - The Damned
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From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun 18 16:00:17 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 16:00:17 +0200
Subject: public key E6602099 is 131772146 seconds newer than the signature
In-Reply-To: <20140618132830.GO16781@irc.ae7.st> (Aaron Toponce's message of
 "Wed, 18 Jun 2014 07:28:32 -0600")
References: <20140618132830.GO16781@irc.ae7.st>
Message-ID: <87tx7inwr2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 18 Jun 2014 15:28, aaron.toponce at gmail.com said:
> As per my understanding of the gpg(1) manpage, '--ignore-time-conflicts' should
> supress messages such as the one in the subject. However, that doesn't seem to
> be the case: http://ae7.st/p/2u6. It appears that only when redirecting STDERR
> to /dev/null is it supressed. Is this expected behavior, or am I missing
> something?

No, it continues checking even in the case of a time conflict.  The
diagnostic is always printed.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Wed Jun 18 15:31:25 2014
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 07:31:25 -0600
Subject: public key E6602099 is 131772146 seconds newer than the signature
In-Reply-To: <20140618132830.GO16781@irc.ae7.st>
References: <20140618132830.GO16781@irc.ae7.st>
Message-ID: <20140618133124.GP16781@irc.ae7.st>

On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 07:28:32AM -0600, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> As per my understanding of the gpg(1) manpage, '--ignore-time-conflicts' should
> supress messages such as the one in the subject.

Er, '--ignore-time-conflict'. Singular, not plural.

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun 18 18:27:16 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 12:27:16 -0400
Subject: Order of keys attempted to decrypt
In-Reply-To: <53A1979D.8000807@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <1403081166.4976.12.camel@XPS13dev>
 <53A1979D.8000807@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <53A1BDE4.20608@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/18/2014 09:43 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 06/18/2014 04:46 AM, Richard Ulrich wrote:
>> $ gpg -d test.txt.gpg 
>> gpg: Anonymer Empf?nger; Versuch mit geheimem Schl?ssel 0AE275A9 ?
>> gpg: sending command `SCD PKDECRYPT' to agent failed: ec=6.91
>> gpg: Anonymer Empf?nger; Versuch mit geheimem Schl?ssel 8760DB3E ?
>> gpg: Alles klar, wir sind der ungenannte Empf?nger.
>> gpg: verschl?sselt mit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 00000000
>>
>> It first tries to decrypt using the primary key. And since the card with
>> the primary key is not plugged in, it outputs an error, before it tries
>> the sub key that succeeds.
> 
>> I tried using the -r option to specify the key to use, but it was
>> seemingly ignored.
>>
>> Is there a way to specify which key to try first?
> 
> see the --try-secret-key option or the --default-key option as described
> in gpg(1).

Sorry -- i think try-secret-key is only available in gnupg 2.1, but
seems to have erroneously made it into the man pages for gpg 1.4 and 2.0
somehow.

the thread from October 2013 with  "@ifset gpgtwoone macro not working
in gpg.texi?" on gnupg-devel suggests that this documentation issue was
already fixed, but it looks to me like the documentation wasn't actually
fixed.

The fix appears to have been backported into the 2.0 branch in commit
d03df688 earlier this month (not yet released) and doesn't seem to be
applied to the 1.4 branch at all.

Werner, are you ok with cherry-picking a15c35f into the 1.4 branch as well?

	--dkg

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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Wed Jun 18 19:04:16 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 19:04:16 +0200
Subject: help needed getting gnupg to function correctly in linux
Message-ID: <53A1C690.7010600@nordnet.fr>

I can't send signed or encrypted emails in Thunderbird.

I am using Thunderbird 24.5, enigmail 1.6, UbuntuStudio 14.04. Gnupg 1.4.16 was
already installed in the linux distribution and I installed gnupg2  v2.0.22. I
also installed Kleopatra and GPA because I am used to those gui's in Win7.  I
imported my public and secret keyrings from Win7 and also the trust database.

All the keys are displayed correctly in enigmail, Kleo, GPA and Thunderbird
indicates good signature for those emails received where I have the public key.

I am in the process of moving everything I can off Windows7 onto UbuntuStudio.
I have been using T'bird and enigmail for several years under windows so I know
more or less how it works at user level.

Currently, sending signed or encrypted mails fails with a 'bad passphrase
message' without even having given me the opportunity to enter the passphrase.

I am comparatively new to linux but turning to a terminal to try gpg leads to
the following conclusions :

using gpg :

I can sign a test message.  gpg warns that there is a problem with the agent and
it has disabled it.  But nevertheless it produces a test-message.gpg or
test-message.asc depending on the command given.  It requests and accepts my
passphrase.

gpg can verify the .gpg and the .asc files and gives 'good signature message'

using gpg2 :

I cannot sign a test message - gpg2 says that a passphrase is needed for my key
but then aborts before I can enter anything and the following error is returned -
> gpg: problem with the agent: No PINentry
> gpg: no default secret key: Operation cancelled
> gpg: signing failed: Operation cancelled

In /.gnupg/gpg.conf : default-key has been entered.

gpg2 can and does verify the .gpg and .asc files produced by gpg returning a
good signature message.

Kleopatra cannot sign files.  Returns 'bad passphrase' message without ever
having asked for a passphrase.

Kleopatra cannot verify the clearsigne .asc file produced on the cli bu gpg :
returns message 'no signature found'

Kleopatra cannot verify the .gpg file produced by gpg and returns message  :
'could not open file "" for reading: Input/output error (218136625)'

Note that it doesn't even have the name of the file.

It appears to me (in all my ignorance) that there is a problem connected with
gpg-agent and PINentry.   The Synaptic Package Manager shows that I have
gnupg-agent v.2.0.22-3ubuntu1 installed.

I'd appreciate all and any help offered bearing in mind that I'm new to linux
and command line stuff.

Thanks.





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From mailinglist at krebs.uno  Thu Jun 19 11:33:16 2014
From: mailinglist at krebs.uno (Daniel Krebs)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 11:33:16 +0200
Subject: Mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A09BAB.50706@signal100.com>
References: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>
 <53A0729E.4010606@signal100.com>
 <256526CD-F085-4723-9F26-52FEFBDFC076@gmail.com>
 <53A09BAB.50706@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <53A2AE5C.4040402@krebs.uno>

Am 17.06.2014 21:48, schrieb Mark Rousell:
  Maybe a mask of some sort
>
> Unfortunately I think people associate masks with having something
> (negative) to hide. Perhaps people shouldn't see it that way but they
> seem to do so.

I think as a mascot some kind of animal is better, because it might be 
more attracting to new users that a rather 'cold' robot. unless you can 
crate a really cute robot of course! something like wall-e from that 
disney (?) picture.


-- 
kind regards
daniel krebs


From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Thu Jun 19 15:42:45 2014
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 09:42:45 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <20140618135645.6f5aa274@abydos.stargate.org.uk>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87a99bn97f.wl%neal@walfield.org>
 <f0f6787a-a6ec-4ab9-8265-77b2683d2d15@email.android.com>
 <20140618124522.GA24028@IUPUI.Edu>
 <20140618135645.6f5aa274@abydos.stargate.org.uk>
Message-ID: <20140619134245.GA20755@IUPUI.Edu>

On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 01:56:45PM +0100, Brad Rogers wrote:
> On Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:45:26 -0400
> "Mark H. Wood" <mwood at IUPUI.Edu> wrote:
> >What sort of mascot would combine the two aspects?
> 
> Racoon?   Easily recognised so an allusion to identity there.  Their face
> has a 'mask', alluding to privacy.

Yes, but that's the opposite of what I meant.  A digital signature
does not hide one's identity, but asserts it rather loudly and (we
hope) provably.

-- 
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer   mwood at IUPUI.Edu
Machines should not be friendly.  Machines should be obedient.
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Jun 19 20:38:10 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 19:38:10 +0100
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <367042739.20140619193810@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 17 June 2014 at 11:18:09 AM, in
<mid:53A015E1.2030003 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:


> I think a mascot would be nice. Is there some
> especially secretive animal?

A squirrel?



>  Some animal that hides
> stuff?

A squirrel?



> Or just a nice animal,

OK, that rules out a squirrel: it is essentially a rat with good PR.
(-;


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Dreams come true on this side of the Rainbow too!
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Jun 19 20:40:16 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 19:40:16 +0100
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A09E60.3080002@dougbarton.us>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87zjhbll5n.wl%neal@walfield.org> <53A0465F.9080608@sixdemonbag.org>
 <31890429.UIveruk34r@mani> <53A09E60.3080002@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <753740128.20140619194016@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 17 June 2014 at 9:00:32 PM, in
<mid:53A09E60.3080002 at dougbarton.us>, Doug Barton wrote:


> On 06/17/2014 09:24 AM, Johannes Zarl wrote:
>> A project mascot is certainly a great idea.

> Can I take a curmudgeonly view here, and ask why?

I wondered that, too.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Colourless green ideas sleep furiously (Noam Chomsky)
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Jun 19 20:43:45 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 19:43:45 +0100
Subject: Character Encoding used for Passphrase for edit-key
In-Reply-To: <1403002208.76129.YahooMailNeo@web120901.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
References: <874mzjubck.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A015E1.2030003@digitalbrains.com>
 <1403002208.76129.YahooMailNeo@web120901.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <34552204.20140619194345@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 17 June 2014 at 11:50:08 AM, in
<mid:1403002208.76129.YahooMailNeo at web120901.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>,
Harakiri wrote:


> What character encoding does gnupg use when
> setting/changing the passphrase ?

I do not know the answer. I suggest that somebody who does know the
answer is more likely to see your question if you start your own
thread rather than posting a reply into an existing thread and
changing the subject line.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Roses smell better than onions but don't make such good soup
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From werewolf6851 at gmail.com  Fri Jun 20 06:28:21 2014
From: werewolf6851 at gmail.com (Werewolf)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 23:28:21 -0500
Subject: Mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <53A09BAB.50706@signal100.com>
References: <20140617145547.42927A0398@smtp.hushmail.com>
 <53A0729E.4010606@signal100.com>
 <256526CD-F085-4723-9F26-52FEFBDFC076@gmail.com>
 <53A09BAB.50706@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <20140620042821.GA3726@gmail.com>

On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 08:48:59PM +0100, Mark Rousell wrote:
> On 17/06/2014 18:47, Mick Crane wrote:
> 
> Unfortunately I think people associate masks with having something
> (negative) to hide. Perhaps people shouldn't see it that way but they
> seem to do so.
> 
> 
> -- 
> Mark Rousell

So instead of Mask.  Think "Helmet" used to protect!

Wolf

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From bernhard at intevation.de  Fri Jun 20 09:03:06 2014
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 09:03:06 +0200
Subject: help needed getting gnupg to function correctly in linux
In-Reply-To: <53A1C690.7010600@nordnet.fr>
References: <53A1C690.7010600@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <201406200903.21789.bernhard@intevation.de>

On Wednesday 18 June 2014 at 19:04:16, Philip Jackson wrote:
> It appears to me (in all my ignorance) that there is a problem connected
> with gpg-agent and PINentry. ? The Synaptic Package Manager shows that I
> have gnupg-agent v.2.0.22-3ubuntu1 installed.

Check if you have a functional pinentry package installed.
It may come in an extra package, e.g. try to install 
pinentry-qt4

A simple test if pinentry works:

pinentry
OK Your orders please
getpin
D asdf
OK
bye
OK closing connection


Next check if your agent can do it.
  gpg-agent

-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Fri Jun 20 11:33:43 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 11:33:43 +0200
Subject: help needed getting gnupg to function correctly in linux
In-Reply-To: <201406200903.21789.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <53A1C690.7010600@nordnet.fr>
 <201406200903.21789.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <53A3FFF7.9020608@nordnet.fr>

Thank you Bernhard for your reply :

On 20/06/14 09:03, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> On Wednesday 18 June 2014 at 19:04:16, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> It appears to me (in all my ignorance) that there is a problem connected
>> with gpg-agent and PINentry.   The Synaptic Package Manager shows that I
>> have gnupg-agent v.2.0.22-3ubuntu1 installed.
> 
> Check if you have a functional pinentry package installed.
> It may come in an extra package, e.g. try to install 
> pinentry-qt4
> 
> A simple test if pinentry works:
> 
> pinentry
> OK Your orders please
> getpin
> D asdf
> OK
> bye
> OK closing connection

I checked using the entries above and get exactly what you quoted.  So does this
mean that pinentry is working ok ?

Checking with Synaptic package manager shows that both pinentry-qt4 and
pinentry-gtk2 are installed.  Notes in the package manager say that the qt4
version is especially for users of KDE4 and that the gtk2 version is especially
suitable for users of Gnome.

It seems to me that UbuntuStudio is Gnome based but when I check the version :

pinentry --version  on my pc returns
pinentry-qt4 (pinentry)


> 
> 
> Next check if your agent can do it.
>   gpg-agent
> 

I'm not quite sure what you mean by "....can do it'

gpg-agent  returns
gpg-agent: gpg-agent running and available

and it's version 2.0.22

when I look in the gpg-agent.conf file, there are only 2 settings and these are
for cache size and max cache.
Should there be other entries telling the agent how and what to do ?

Where should I go from here ?

Philip


From tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net  Fri Jun 20 11:41:32 2014
From: tristan.santore at internexusconnect.net (Tristan Santore)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 10:41:32 +0100
Subject: help needed getting gnupg to function correctly in linux
In-Reply-To: <201406200903.21789.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <53A1C690.7010600@nordnet.fr>
 <201406200903.21789.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <53A401CC.5080901@internexusconnect.net>

On 20/06/14 08:03, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> On Wednesday 18 June 2014 at 19:04:16, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> It appears to me (in all my ignorance) that there is a problem connected
>> with gpg-agent and PINentry.   The Synaptic Package Manager shows that I
>> have gnupg-agent v.2.0.22-3ubuntu1 installed.
> Check if you have a functional pinentry package installed.
> It may come in an extra package, e.g. try to install 
> pinentry-qt4
>
> A simple test if pinentry works:
>
> pinentry
> OK Your orders please
> getpin
> D asdf
> OK
> bye
> OK closing connection
>
>
> Next check if your agent can do it.
>   gpg-agent
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Phillip,

I suggest you contact the package maintainer for Ubuntu's GNUPG2
packages. I have just recompiled Fedora's locally and it fixed my issues
with pinpad entry I was having. I was running 2.0.21 before.
I will email the package maintainer in Fedora to as him to roll another
gnupg2, even if it is just sits in updates-testing for a bit.

If you are not using the pinpad entry on a pinpad based smart card
reader, try setting the pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2
option(or whichever pin entry option you prefer), in a file called
gpg-agent.conf, within the gnupg directory.

Hope this helps!

Regards,
Tristan

-- 

Tristan Santore BSc MBCS
TS4523-RIPE
Network and Infrastructure Operations
InterNexusConnect
Mobile +44-78-55069812
Tristan.Santore at internexusconnect.net

Former Thawte Notary
(Please note: Thawte has closed its WoT programme down,
and I am therefore no longer able to accredit trust)

For Fedora related issues, please email me at:
TSantore at fedoraproject.org

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From anatol.pomozov at gmail.com  Sat Jun 21 06:22:26 2014
From: anatol.pomozov at gmail.com (Anatol Pomozov)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 21:22:26 -0700
Subject: Broken ECDSA in gnupg 2.0.23
Message-ID: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

It is a followup for Linux Arch bug https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/40552

At Linux Arch we have gnupg 2.0.23 and found that gpg-agent does not
handle private ecdsa keys correctly. rsa works fine. Here is how it
looks:


[anatol at foo ~]$ eval $(gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support)

GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/gpg-i3poXG/S.gpg-agent:20508:1; export GPG_AGENT_INFO;
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/gpg-xJfp79/S.gpg-agent.ssh; export SSH_AUTH_SOCK;
SSH_AGENT_PID=20508; export SSH_AGENT_PID;
[anatol at foo ~]$ ssh-add ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Identity added: /home/anatol/.ssh/id_rsa (/home/anatol/.ssh/id_rsa)
[anatol at foo ~]$ ssh-add ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
Enter passphrase for /home/anatol/.ssh/id_ecdsa:
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
Could not add identity: /home/anatol/.ssh/id_ecdsa

Our users claim that this stated since libgcrypt 1.6.0 update. With
libgcrypt 1.5+ gpg-agent worked without a problem. Some people tried
to build gnupg from 'master' branch (i.e. 2.1-beta) and found it works
fine with libgcrypt 1.6+.

This makes us believe that the problem is in gnupg<->libgcrypt
integration. Looking at 'master' branch I see this commit
http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=21dab64030c95a909767bf6d8f99e8476f9df8a2
that fixes ECC for libgcrypt 1.6. gnupg developers, do you think that
it could be the reason of the problem we see? Do you plan to backport
it to 2.0-stable branch? It would be great to have ECC back in the
stable release.


From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Jun 21 11:32:49 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2014 11:32:49 +0200
Subject: Broken ECDSA in gnupg 2.0.23
In-Reply-To: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>
 (Anatol Pomozov's message of "Fri, 20 Jun 2014 21:22:26 -0700")
References: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87ppi2mwu6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 21 Jun 2014 06:22, anatol.pomozov at gmail.com said:

> Our users claim that this stated since libgcrypt 1.6.0 update. With
> libgcrypt 1.5+ gpg-agent worked without a problem. Some people tried

Which Libgcrypt version is that? 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 ?

> http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=21dab64030c95a909767bf6d8f99e8476f9df8a2
> that fixes ECC for libgcrypt 1.6. gnupg developers, do you think that

That is not releated.  The ssh-agent support is implemented in gpg-agent
and thus not affected by this patch.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From anatol.pomozov at gmail.com  Sat Jun 21 15:14:55 2014
From: anatol.pomozov at gmail.com (Anatol Pomozov)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2014 06:14:55 -0700
Subject: Broken ECDSA in gnupg 2.0.23
In-Reply-To: <87ppi2mwu6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>
 <87ppi2mwu6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAOMFOmUZspcN19JOThPSsAAcFYHoEy5vGwd234tzZETtHgrchQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hi

On Sat, Jun 21, 2014 at 2:32 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Sat, 21 Jun 2014 06:22, anatol.pomozov at gmail.com said:
>
>> Our users claim that this stated since libgcrypt 1.6.0 update. With
>> libgcrypt 1.5+ gpg-agent worked without a problem. Some people tried
>
> Which Libgcrypt version is that? 1.6.0 or 1.6.1 ?

The latest stable i.e. 1.6.1.

I looked at list of API changes for libgcrypt 1.6.0
http://upstream-tracker.org/changelogs/libgcrypt/1.6.0/changelog.html
and see "The algorithm ids GCRY_PK_ECDSA and GCRY_PK_ECDH are now
deprecated. Use GCRY_PK_ECC if you need an algorithm id.".

The libgcrypt functions such as gcry_pk_map_name() return GCRY_PK_ECC
instead of GCRY_PK_ECDSA. So I modified gnupg 2.0.23 sources with this
patch:

diff --git a/common/ssh-utils.c b/common/ssh-utils.c
index d8f057d..987966f 100644
--- a/common/ssh-utils.c
+++ b/common/ssh-utils.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ get_fingerprint (gcry_sexp_t key, void **r_fpr, size_t *r_len,
elems = "pqgy";
gcry_md_write (md, "\0\0\0\x07ssh-dss", 11);
break;
- case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:
+ case GCRY_PK_ECC:
/* We only support the 3 standard curves for now. It is just a
quick hack. */
elems = "q";



Now I am able to add a ECDSA via ssh-add:

[anatol at foo gnupg]$ ps ax | grep agent
8921 ? Ss 0:00 gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support
[anatol at foo gnupg]$ echo $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
/tmp/gpg-MQPevx/S.gpg-agent.ssh
[anatol at foo gnupg]$ echo $SSH_AGENT_PID
8921
[anatol at foo gnupg]$ ssh-add -l
2048 f4:a7:bd:43:fc:aa:ab:f2:f2:ff:6b:f3:9b:37:96:be
/home/anatol/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA)
521 87:e8:e1:f6:1b:64:aa:58:ff:97:1a:20:5d:91:46:d7
/home/anatol/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA)

I do not know if there are other libgcrypt 1.6 related problems. But
at least I can 'ssh' into my machine without typing the passphrase
now.


>> http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=21dab64030c95a909767bf6d8f99e8476f9df8a2
>> that fixes ECC for libgcrypt 1.6. gnupg developers, do you think that
>
> That is not releated.  The ssh-agent support is implemented in gpg-agent
> and thus not affected by this patch.
>
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>    Werner
>
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>


From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Sat Jun 21 16:45:27 2014
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2014 16:45:27 +0200
Subject: help needed getting gnupg to function correctly in linux
In-Reply-To: <53A401CC.5080901@internexusconnect.net>
References: <53A1C690.7010600@nordnet.fr>
 <201406200903.21789.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <53A401CC.5080901@internexusconnect.net>
Message-ID: <53A59A87.10803@nordnet.fr>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 20/06/14 11:41, Tristan Santore wrote:
> On 20/06/14 08:03, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
>> On Wednesday 18 June 2014 at 19:04:16, Philip Jackson wrote:
>>> It appears to me (in all my ignorance) that there is a problem
>>> connected with gpg-agent and PINentry.   The Synaptic Package Manager
>>> shows that I have gnupg-agent v.2.0.22-3ubuntu1 installed.
>> Check if you have a functional pinentry package installed. It may come in
>> an extra package, e.g. try to install pinentry-qt4
>> 
>> A simple test if pinentry works:
>> 
>> pinentry OK Your orders please getpin D asdf OK bye OK closing
>> connection
>> 
>> 
>> Next check if your agent can do it. gpg-agent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list 
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> Phillip,
> 
> I suggest you contact the package maintainer for Ubuntu's GNUPG2 packages.
> I have just recompiled Fedora's locally and it fixed my issues with pinpad
> entry I was having. I was running 2.0.21 before. I will email the package
> maintainer in Fedora to as him to roll another gnupg2, even if it is just
> sits in updates-testing for a bit.
> 
> If you are not using the pinpad entry on a pinpad based smart card reader,
> try setting the pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2 option(or
> whichever pin entry option you prefer), in a file called gpg-agent.conf,
> within the gnupg directory.
> 
> Hope this helps!
> 
> Regards, Tristan

Ok Tristan, thanks.  I went and opened an account on my wife's pc which uses
Ubuntu Desktop and just has gnupg 1 installed as basic.  Thunderbird and
enigmail sent off a signed mail with no problem after asking for my password.

I then un-installed gnupg2 from my pc, rebooted and sent a test signed message
ok - Thunderbird and enigmail presented the usual pinentry dialog (showing
pinentry-GTK-2) asking for password.

I have checked with some signing and encrypting and verfiying using a terminal
(gpg 1.4.16) and all now works as it should. Terminal reports pinentryQt4.

So either the UbuntuStudio release of gnupg2 is defective or gnupg 1 and
gnupg2 have problems of coexistence.  But the gnupg.org site does say they can
coexist.

I'll try and take it up with Ubuntu.

Regards,
Philip

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From vbontchev at yahoo.com  Fri Jun 20 19:02:58 2014
From: vbontchev at yahoo.com (Dr. Vesselin Bontchev)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 10:02:58 -0700
Subject: Compiling GnuPG for Windows
Message-ID: <1403283778.37065.YahooMailNeo@web124504.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>

Hello folks,

Could somebody please point me to a step-by-step guide for compiling GnuPG for Windows? The particular brand of Windows I use is Windows 7 Professional 64-bit - but I want to compile just the 32-bit version. Also, I need only gpg - not the other tools.

Long time ago, when there was no GnuPG, I was involved in the development of PGP - cleaned up the code a bit to reduce the number of compiler warnings, wrote some scripts for integration with a popular (at the time) e-mail program (Elm) and so on. But at that time (decades ago), I was just able to compile PGP for DOS using the Borland C compiler without any problems... How things have changed, eh?

It seems that nowadays gpg is heavily *nix-ish, so I guess I need the gcc compiler. I found this guide

http://clbianco.altervista.org/gnupg/eng/gnupg.html

but it seems to be heavily outdated. Even its instructions for installing MinGW didn't work "out-of-the-box". I had to figure out by myself that I need to add C:\MinGW\bin to the PATH and how to start the shell (no entry for that is created by the MinGW installer on the Start menu - only a link to the installer itself is created there).

However, I still cannot compile GnuPG. The process stops while running ./configure, complaining about a missing library. According to the README in the GnuPG distribution, I need to compile and install the following libraries first (something which the guide doesn't mention at all):

? libgpg-error???? (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/)
? libgcrypt??????? (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/)
? libksba????????? (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/)
? libassuan >= 2.0 (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libassuan/)

However, I cannot do even that much. I downloaded them, switched to the directory for the first one, ran ./configure, then make - but the compilation process barfs with the following error message:

c:/mingw/bin/../lib/gcc/mingw32/4.8.1/../../../../mingw32/bin/ld.exe: .libs/libgpg-error-0.dll.def:8: syntax error
c:/mingw/bin/../lib/gcc/mingw32/4.8.1/../../../../mingw32/bin/ld.exe:.libs/libgpg-error-0.dll.def: file format not recognized; treating as linker script
c:/mingw/bin/../lib/gcc/mingw32/4.8.1/../../../../mingw32/bin/ld.exe:.libs/libgpg-error-0.dll.def:7: syntax error
collect2.exe: error: ld returned 1 exit status

What now? Is there anywhere an understandable and up-to-date guide how to compile the whole thing?


Regards,
Vesselin



From quickcracktime at gmail.com  Fri Jun 20 23:25:57 2014
From: quickcracktime at gmail.com (Vladimir)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2014 01:25:57 +0400
Subject: Problem with "gpg-connect-agent" command
Message-ID: <CALnsgKzUwmE8s8i_ZHvHsW=Lb-_mH4RgD-VSJJ1DCJCH+kD+2Q@mail.gmail.com>

Good day! I am trying to follow the setup guide here:

http://no-passwd.net/askbot/question/34/how-gnuk-supports-firmware-upgrade/
it is all fine, until I get to the following command

gpg-connect-agent "KEYINFO --list" /bye

instead of writing KEYINFO, it just outputs "OK".

Please, could you tell, how to solve this problem?
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sat Jun 21 23:57:41 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2014 17:57:41 -0400
Subject: Compiling GnuPG for Windows
In-Reply-To: <1403283778.37065.YahooMailNeo@web124504.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
References: <1403283778.37065.YahooMailNeo@web124504.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <53A5FFD5.5070205@sixdemonbag.org>

> Could somebody please point me to a step-by-step guide for compiling
> GnuPG for Windows?

I'm not aware of one.  There are a few that are somewhat to completely
out-of-date, but nothing that's current.  The official way to compile a
Windows version of GnuPG is to cross-compile from a Debian system.



From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Jun 22 18:29:48 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2014 18:29:48 +0200
Subject: Compiling GnuPG for Windows
In-Reply-To: <53A5FFD5.5070205@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Sat, 21 Jun 2014 17:57:41 -0400")
References: <1403283778.37065.YahooMailNeo@web124504.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
 <53A5FFD5.5070205@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87wqc8lxfn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 21 Jun 2014 23:57, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> I'm not aware of one.  There are a few that are somewhat to completely
> out-of-date, but nothing that's current.  The official way to compile a
> Windows version of GnuPG is to cross-compile from a Debian system.

Right, with master it is actually quite easy with a decent Debian
system:

  make -f build-aux/speedo.mk installer

You need to have a couple of extra packages installed which are all part
of Debian.  For example:

   mingw-w64-x86-64-dev
   mingw-w64-i686-dev
   nsis

and probably a couple more packages which are usually found on
developer machines anyway.  The mingw-w64-x86-64-dev package is only
required for building gpgex but that is the default in master.

For the stable versions follow the instructions you find in the 1.4.16
source or for 2.0 those found at gpg4win.org.

Note that some versions of the mingw toolchain are broken and won't
create a working gnupg.  I am currently using these versions:

mingw-w64-i686-dev   2.0.3-1  all    MinGW-w64 targeting Win32
mingw-w64-x86-64-dev 2.0.3-1  all    MinGW-w64 targeting Win64
nsis                 2.46-7   amd64  Nullsoft Scriptable Install System
                                     (modified for Debian)
on an amd64 box.

And yes, we should figure out the real dependencies for Debian and
Fedora and the Makefile should check them.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From nicolas at legland.fr  Sun Jun 22 18:36:22 2014
From: nicolas at legland.fr (Nicolas Le Gland)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2014 18:36:22 +0200
Subject: Key-binding signature notation
Message-ID: <CAGfeJf1dt8ve5OSq0U6VzF2AqaiyZDP0YmPis+OqbVhvDjgQcw@mail.gmail.com>

Dear list.

I have a perfectly functional key for certification, with an
encryption sub-key and one other for signature. How could I add a
notation to the key-binding signatures?

I could generate a new sub-key, with a key-binding signature notation:

  gpg --cert-notation @key=value --edit-key ######## addkey

But given my existing key and sub-keys, how do I add a new notation?
How can I generate a new key-binding signature with the notation I
want? Likewise, how could I add a preferred keyserver? Or a policy URI
like 0xFFCE1C9A4FADF197 has?

Thank you in advance.

--
Nicolas Le Gland


From vbontchev at yahoo.com  Mon Jun 23 10:26:31 2014
From: vbontchev at yahoo.com (Dr. Vesselin Bontchev)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 01:26:31 -0700
Subject: Compiling GnuPG for Windows
Message-ID: <1403511991.63689.YahooMailNeo@web124502.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>

Thank you, guys, for your input.

Apparently, GnuPG is not suitable for use in my environment. (And not just because I am unable to compile it on my machine. Bugs, annoyances, wrong documentation, incompatibilities...) I already wasted three weeks trying to make it work according to my needs and it is time to admit to myself that it is just not going to happen.

I guess I'm stuck with PGP for now. Too bad that it no longer works on 64-bit Windows, so I am forced to run in on an emulated WinXP machine, which is a major inconvenience. :-(

Or I might try to compile a 32-bit version of PGP... Way back when I was involved in the development, we made sure that the sources compiled and ran correctly on pretty much everything (even VAX/VMS!), so it ought not to be a huge problem.

Regards,
Vesselin



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun 23 13:19:02 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 13:19:02 +0200
Subject: Broken ECDSA in gnupg 2.0.23
In-Reply-To: <CAOMFOmUZspcN19JOThPSsAAcFYHoEy5vGwd234tzZETtHgrchQ@mail.gmail.com>
 (Anatol Pomozov's message of "Sat, 21 Jun 2014 06:14:55 -0700")
References: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>
 <87ppi2mwu6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAOMFOmUZspcN19JOThPSsAAcFYHoEy5vGwd234tzZETtHgrchQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87k387lvq1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 21 Jun 2014 15:14, anatol.pomozov at gmail.com said:

> The libgcrypt functions such as gcry_pk_map_name() return GCRY_PK_ECC
> instead of GCRY_PK_ECDSA. So I modified gnupg 2.0.23 sources with this
> patch:

Thanks.  Applied.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org  Mon Jun 23 14:47:52 2014
From: MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org (MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 08:47:52 -0400
Subject: mascot_p
In-Reply-To: <mailman.12263.1403256810.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.12263.1403256810.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <OF53560181.4F8DC531-ON85257D00.0045ECFB-85257D00.00464CEA@TheWay.org>

> ----- Message from MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> on

  <snip...>

> 
> >  Some animal that hides
> > stuff?
> 
> A squirrel?
> 
> 
> 
> > Or just a nice animal,
> 
> OK, that rules out a squirrel: it is essentially a rat with good PR.
> (-;
> 

Perhaps it's just PR, but they seem to live in better neighborhoods--e.g., 
trees, wooded areas rather than sewers.

;-)
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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun 23 18:21:30 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 18:21:30 +0200
Subject: [Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.17 released
Message-ID: <87tx7bk35h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-1
release: Version 1.4.17.  This release includes a *security fix* to stop
a possible DoS using garbled compressed data packets which can be used
to put gpg into an infinite loop.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication and
data storage.  It is a complete and free replacement of PGP and can be
used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures.  It includes an
advanced key management facility, smartcard support and is compliant
with the OpenPGP Internet standard as described by RFC-4880.  GnuPG is
distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPLv3+).

Note that this version is from the GnuPG-1 series and thus smaller than
those from the GnuPG-2 series, easier to build, and also better portable
to ancient platforms.  In contrast to GnuPG-2 (e.g version 2.0.23) it
comes with no support for S/MIME, Secure Shell, or other tools useful
for desktop environments.  Fortunately you may install both versions
alongside on the same system without any conflict.


What's New
===========

 * Avoid DoS due to garbled compressed data packets.

 * Screen keyserver reponses to avoid import of unwanted keys by rogue
   servers.

 * Add hash algorithms to the "sig" records of the colon output.

 * More specific reason codes for INV_RECP status.

 * Fixes for PC/SC access on Apple.

 * Minor bug fixes.


Getting the Software
====================

First of all, decide whether you really need GnuPG version 1.4.x - most
users are better off with the modern GnuPG 2.0.x version.  Then follow
the instructions found at https://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on:

GnuPG 1.4.17 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/ .  The list of mirrors can be
found at https://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note, that GnuPG is not
available at ftp.gnu.org.

On ftp.gnupg.org and on its mirrors you should find the following new
files in the *gnupg* directory:

  - The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2     (3563k)
    gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2.sig

  - The GnuPG source code compressed using GZIP and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-1.4.17.tar.gz      (4929k)
    gnupg-1.4.17.tar.gz.sig

  - A patch file to upgrade a 1.4.16 GnuPG source tree.  This patch does
    not include updates of the language files.

    gnupg-1.4.16-1.4.17.diff.bz2 (21k)
 
Select one of them. To shorten the download time, you probably want to
get the BZIP2 compressed file.  Please try another mirror if exceptional
your mirror is not yet up to date.

In the *binary* directory, you should find these files:

  - GnuPG compiled for Microsoft Windows and its OpenPGP signature.
    This is a command line only version; the source files are the same
    as above.

    gnupg-w32cli-1.4.17.exe (1574k)
    gnupg-w32cli-1.4.17.exe.sig

Note, that this is a minimal installer and unless you are only in need
for the simple the gpg binary, you are better off using the full
featured installer at https://www.gpg4win.org .


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com | gpg --import

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.  If you get an key expired message, you should retrieve a
   fresh copy as the expiration date might have been prolonged.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

830c7f749ad92d6577c521addea5e5d920128d42  gnupg-1.4.17.tar.bz2
d5b3c25901f182ea20c31f09669f44681c3aaa89  gnupg-1.4.17.tar.gz
ff761de4efc3876c57199612c24b677208da7c10  gnupg-1.4.16-1.4.17.diff.bz2
b2f0db9eebf028d27d0a119334e5e357773dd0d6  gnupg-w32cli-1.4.17.exe


Internationalization
====================

GnuPG comes with support for 29 languages.  The Chinese (Simple and
Traditional), Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Norwegian, Polish,
Romanian, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Ukrainian, and Turkish translations
are close to be complete.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

The driving force behind the development of GnuPG is the company of
its principal author, Werner Koch.  Maintenance and improvement of
GnuPG and related software takes up most of their resources.  To allow
him to continue this work he kindly asks to either purchase a support
contract, engage g10 Code for custom enhancements, or to donate money:

  https://gnupg.org/donate/


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, donating money,
spreading the word, or answering questions on the mailing lists.



Happy Hacking,

  The GnuPG Team


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Mon Jun 23 19:19:22 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 19:19:22 +0200
Subject: [Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.17 released
In-Reply-To: <87tx7bk35h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87tx7bk35h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A8619A.3050705@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/23/2014 06:21 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Hello!
> 

Hi

> 
> * Avoid DoS due to garbled compressed data packets.


Is this CVE-2013-4402 as fixed in 2.0.22 or a new bug?


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme."
(Mark Twain)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=CHCN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Mon Jun 23 19:21:56 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 19:21:56 +0200
Subject: [Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.17 released
In-Reply-To: <53A8619A.3050705@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <87tx7bk35h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A8619A.3050705@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <53A86234.3020907@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/23/2014 07:19 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 06/23/2014 06:21 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> Hello!
> 
> 
> Hi
> 
> 
>> * Avoid DoS due to garbled compressed data packets.
> 
> 
> Is this CVE-2013-4402 as fixed in 2.0.22 or a new bug?
> 

Nevermind, I notice the git commit comment. Has a CVE been requested
for this already or should I ask for one?

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Aut dosce, aut disce, aut discede
Either teach, or study, or leave
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTqGI0AAoJEPw7F94F4Tagzw4P/0dlzt4V+aPvfjfsVDcPKJbT
yMl/W9oeeVofC1T3FkH+k0aQ0M66w/9PcU+pEYgLN0xXUuyqMVn/lodgEFFkU9dG
xSvAWJeBXu6YU30WsdQJD+KGUT38YrdnKqGm0vYPh0OtteJA0JfUdZxD3VlY1Ah4
l0+vLikjLkbPKV6Lnc9E+5N9iqHhLV4/+XGFqF0DueQiRD3bhZ2p5rOwHe7WQ86m
Y+NMUemDO8qCsEcs3Llpc3bR2sbnovPEE22M7OTGrKMG77/VPAxTfZVyjEZ+SeY+
ff6Vlb80eaMPS8DjJdaSLCSEkiW90cA+uzjCAa1/uMWJ03IX4EWiqqbqHu9fn1rE
MZmRTaqc7hhFbdXhYaLIBWCWACWMV9ysZGW/7geJj6JGCE0O2YY8hZ1kRXL+Hkuw
hM42BauUErBcgmTD3ywhkQYkwXbK+P86golxUXzey5EpM+89Yg8noeQYWp4TwWlO
D14emnaCNJZvmQBXjFnmxEseEQV7K/ib0m9nHkS5y2GxYWmEfg9gilbGd6ZDOEDQ
hxzCYmPQjTxlrZYpEKjG46NeH79I/FAAvuXfijnthlGiwny5brfY1vgOLl9o0hQ/
1FobHe9figvcnd7z1/8WJrv+Zp/9ef6df3TZ55Gcxf0FtITdTzCUANuqksZYIDH0
Xt0Rv62WzTed4ufaQlSG
=9GtQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Jun 23 19:30:07 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 13:30:07 -0400
Subject: Compiling GnuPG for Windows
In-Reply-To: <1403511991.63689.YahooMailNeo@web124502.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
References: <1403511991.63689.YahooMailNeo@web124502.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <53A8641F.9070304@sixdemonbag.org>

> Apparently, GnuPG is not suitable for use in my environment. (And not
> just because I am unable to compile it on my machine. Bugs,
> annoyances, wrong documentation, incompatibilities...)

We would appreciate it if you would list the bugs, annoyances,
documentation errors, and incompatibilities you found.  Or even just
some of them.  We'd like to fix them.

> I guess I'm stuck with PGP for now. Too bad that it no longer works
> on 64-bit Windows, so I am forced to run in on an emulated WinXP
> machine, which is a major inconvenience. :-(

I've seen PGP 10.x running on 64-bit Windows in WOW64 mode.  You may
want to consider going that route.


From shavital at mac.com  Mon Jun 23 20:23:42 2014
From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 21:23:42 +0300
Subject: [Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.17 released
In-Reply-To: <53A8619A.3050705@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <87tx7bk35h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A8619A.3050705@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <53A870AE.5060807@mac.com>

Hi,

Version info:   gnupg 1.4.17
Configured for: Darwin (x86_64-apple-darwin13.2.0)

Thanks,
Charly

0x15E4F2EA
OS X OS X 10.9.3 (13D65)
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.17
TB 24.6.0  Enigmail version 1.7.a1pre 2014/04/06



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Mon Jun 23 22:18:03 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 13:18:03 -0700
Subject: Compiling GnuPG for Windows
In-Reply-To: <1403511991.63689.YahooMailNeo@web124502.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
References: <1403511991.63689.YahooMailNeo@web124502.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <53A88B7B.7000005@dougbarton.us>

On 6/23/2014 1:26 AM, Dr. Vesselin Bontchev wrote:
> Thank you, guys, for your input.
>
> Apparently, GnuPG is not suitable for use in my environment. (And not just because I am unable to compile it on my machine.

Out of curiosity, why do you believe that you need to compile it?

Doug



From ca+gnupg at esmtp.org  Tue Jun 24 04:38:13 2014
From: ca+gnupg at esmtp.org (Claus Assmann)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 19:38:13 -0700
Subject: GnuPG 2.1.0-beta442: t-timestuff.c:118: test 17 failed
Message-ID: <20140624023813.GA28837@x2.esmtp.org>

On OpenBSD 5.3 i386 one test fails:
t-timestuff.c:118: test 17 failed
FAIL: t-timestuff

This patch (hack?) fixes it for me (local timezone is PDT).

--- t-timestuff.c-	Mon Jun 23 19:33:25 2014
+++ t-timestuff.c	Mon Jun 23 19:33:38 2014
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
   (void)argc;
   (void)argv;
 
+  setenv("TZ", "UTC", 1); tzset();
   test_timegm ();
 
   return 0;


From frase at frase.id.au  Tue Jun 24 05:55:53 2014
From: frase at frase.id.au (Fraser Tweedale)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 13:55:53 +1000
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
Message-ID: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>

Hi all,

An OpenPGP Best Practices article from riseup.net has been doing the
rounds today.  Quite a lot of good info, especially regarding key
strength and expiry, and digest preferences.

https://help.riseup.net/en/gpg-best-practices

Cheers,

Fraser


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 24 08:47:59 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 08:47:59 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au> (Fraser
 Tweedale's message of "Tue, 24 Jun 2014 13:55:53 +1000")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
Message-ID: <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 24 Jun 2014 05:55, frase at frase.id.au said:

> rounds today.  Quite a lot of good info, especially regarding key
> strength and expiry, and digest preferences.

Just for the records: _I_ do not consider the use of a 4096 bit RSA key
and a preference for SHA-512 a best practice.  For a secure system it is
important to make the system stronger and not parts of the system which
will never be attacked in real life.  Granted, there are user with a
need for non default algorithms, but those users have the resources to
develop a security policy which fits their use case.

How does a help 4096 key help if I can send you an encrypted mail which
will lock up your MUA until you kill it (unless your MUA has some kind
of timeout mechanism).  There are more important things to be made
stronger than the key size.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From tzornik at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 09:36:22 2014
From: tzornik at gmail.com (Cpp)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 09:36:22 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>

I was going to create a new PGP key myself by following that article.
Werner, do you have any more input or comments to add regarding that
article? I am curious to hear input from multiple sources/people.



On 6/24/14, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 24 Jun 2014 05:55, frase at frase.id.au said:
>
>> rounds today.  Quite a lot of good info, especially regarding key
>> strength and expiry, and digest preferences.
>
> Just for the records: _I_ do not consider the use of a 4096 bit RSA key
> and a preference for SHA-512 a best practice.  For a secure system it is
> important to make the system stronger and not parts of the system which
> will never be attacked in real life.  Granted, there are user with a
> need for non default algorithms, but those users have the resources to
> develop a security policy which fits their use case.
>
> How does a help 4096 key help if I can send you an encrypted mail which
> will lock up your MUA until you kill it (unless your MUA has some kind
> of timeout mechanism).  There are more important things to be made
> stronger than the key size.
>
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>    Werner
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 24 09:55:51 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 09:55:51 +0200
Subject: show-uid-validity default to yes
In-Reply-To: <52AB8F63.3020307@fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's
 message of "Fri, 13 Dec 2013 17:51:15 -0500")
References: <10125856.7jfF6JoXsq@inno.berlin.laging.de>
 <201312121424.23552.bernhard@intevation.de>
 <2229901.gKbUVoJkIQ@inno.berlin.laging.de>
 <52A9F9AF.1010200@fifthhorseman.net>
 <52AA1078.8000501@digitalbrains.com>
 <87iousq0jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <52AB301A.4080502@digitalbrains.com>
 <87lhzoo9e8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <52AB6D0B.8010506@fifthhorseman.net>
 <87ppp0mogc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <52AB8F63.3020307@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <87y4wmivw8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 13 Dec 2013 23:51, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said:

> securely.  Exposing the UID validity is a step toward making the trust
> model calculations more visible to users, which is necessary for
> understanding.

2.0.24 will use

   --list-options show-uid_validay 

as default.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From pete at heypete.com  Tue Jun 24 11:42:33 2014
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:42:33 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>

On 6/24/2014 8:47 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 24 Jun 2014 05:55, frase at frase.id.au said:
> 
>> rounds today.  Quite a lot of good info, especially regarding key
>> strength and expiry, and digest preferences.
> 
> Just for the records: _I_ do not consider the use of a 4096 bit RSA key
> and a preference for SHA-512 a best practice.  For a secure system it is
> important to make the system stronger and not parts of the system which
> will never be attacked in real life.  Granted, there are user with a
> need for non default algorithms, but those users have the resources to
> develop a security policy which fits their use case.

I also generally agree that the default key size is a sensible choice
for most users.

I would think that adversaries will not try breaking the crypto at all:
there's plenty of alternatives, from keyloggers to compelling the sender
or recipient (through legal means or otherwise) to decrypt the message,
that require considerably less resources. ObXKCD: http://xkcd.com/538/

That said, is there any particular reason for avoiding SHA-2?

There's been discussion in the past regarding some other OpenPGP
software not playing nicely with SHA-512, with recommendations to not
use SHA-512. Is that still an issue? I've not run into any issues, but
that's merely an anecdote.

Would SHA-256 be a better (in the context of being more compatible)
choice if one preferred using a non-SHA-1 hash?

> How does a help 4096 key help if I can send you an encrypted mail which
> will lock up your MUA until you kill it (unless your MUA has some kind
> of timeout mechanism).  There are more important things to be made
> stronger than the key size.

Absolutely. Obviously, using a too-weak key (e.g. 512-bit RSA) is a
problem, but key size is not an issue with the defaults.

Cheers!
-Pete


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Jun 24 13:51:42 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 07:51:42 -0400
Subject: show-uid-validity default to yes
In-Reply-To: <87y4wmivw8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <10125856.7jfF6JoXsq@inno.berlin.laging.de>	<201312121424.23552.bernhard@intevation.de>	<2229901.gKbUVoJkIQ@inno.berlin.laging.de>	<52A9F9AF.1010200@fifthhorseman.net>	<52AA1078.8000501@digitalbrains.com>	<87iousq0jc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<52AB301A.4080502@digitalbrains.com>	<87lhzoo9e8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<52AB6D0B.8010506@fifthhorseman.net>	<87ppp0mogc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<52AB8F63.3020307@fifthhorseman.net>
 <87y4wmivw8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A9664E.5010606@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/24/2014 03:55 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Dec 2013 23:51, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said:
> 
>> securely.  Exposing the UID validity is a step toward making the trust
>> model calculations more visible to users, which is necessary for
>> understanding.
> 
> 2.0.24 will use
> 
>    --list-options show-uid_validay 
> 
> as default.

This is great to hear.  Thanks, Werner.

	--dkg

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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 24 14:29:12 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 14:29:12 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com> (Pete Stephenson's message of
 "Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:42:33 +0200")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <87ionqij8n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:42, pete at heypete.com said:

> Would SHA-256 be a better (in the context of being more compatible)
> choice if one preferred using a non-SHA-1 hash?

At least on 32 bit machines SHA-256 is faster than SHA-512.  Some CPUs
have hardware support for SHA-256 but not for SHA-512.  With DSA and
ECDSA a SHA-512 digest is anyway truncated (to 256 bit for dsa3072).


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gabriel.niebler at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 13:28:16 2014
From: gabriel.niebler at gmail.com (Gabriel Niebler)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 13:28:16 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Am 24.06.2014 09:36, schrieb Cpp:
> I was going to create a new PGP key myself by following that
> article. Werner, do you have any more input or comments to add
> regarding that article? I am curious to hear input from multiple
> sources/people.

I consider myself quite the amateur (I haven't even read most of RFC
4880 yet), but I do take issue with one point in the riseup.net Best
Practices page, namely the bit where it says "self-signatures must not
use SHA1".
I find that statement too strong.

AFAICS this will lead to keys which may not be understood by some
perfectly standards-compliant OpenPGP implementations, since SHA-1 is
the _only_ hashing algorithm that MUST be supported by all
implementations of that standard. Everything else is up to the
implementer.

I do not know that there are any such implementations out there, but
there seem to be a lot of people "rolling their own" who occasionally
post to this very list.

Possibly breaking OpenPGP compatibility does not seem like a Best
Practice to me. I raised this concern in a comment on the _original_
page at https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices
but it didn't garner any interest.

I believe additional self-signatures can always be added to existing
UIDs and subkeys later and I presume (someone correct me, if I'm
wrong, please) they can use other hashing algos. That might be a way
to get "the best of both worlds": Not breaking standards compliant
clients (which would hopefully just ignore the selfsigs they can't
understand and focus on those they can) AND strong hashing.

Maybe other people can weigh in on this, notably those involved with
that document. I would be especially interested to hear dkg's opinion.

Cheers
gabe
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJTqWDJAAoJEO7XEikU4kSzTHwH/RDpwO5DI71kEMm5MwgH05yi
lO91dlfO8RZygbHZGGN0TaxckqG2OgwXB6ItBZkJumjlXpU5rP6Z4UmrHbUyTTmp
KZYqv98UFLunZ9W784gel1fbI3pCycTs+yaODanHFIsGOapqiW14DnWhJVLFY6Zj
M+SuIz9t+x9f15x1jdhUGz8FlKp5+3ptYapMNaFgeruUPNHCD6lRIdFGjSc1MV7r
PLC7s9yWpOBVmw0n5vlkL5uiRRryrTYkuU3/66sOgtSzCT9EEyAmFkSp6P0sztcl
CitahspXrCiT8KHxd9w8gsOHSKwGT+EY4g9UFUciC1ED0F9HP55hcJSsfL1U/oU=
=gMvc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 24 16:01:18 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 16:01:18 +0200
Subject: [Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 2.0.24 released
Message-ID: <87zjh2h0ep.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2
release: Version 2.0.24.  This release includes a *security fix* to
stop a possible DoS using garbled compressed data packets which can
be used to put gpg into an infinite loop.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication
and data storage.  It can be used to encrypt data, create digital
signatures, help authenticating using Secure Shell and to provide a
framework for public key cryptography.  It includes an advanced key
management facility and is compliant with the OpenPGP and S/MIME
standards.

GnuPG-2 has a different architecture than GnuPG-1 (e.g. 1.4.17) in
that it splits up functionality into several modules.  However, both
versions may be installed alongside without any conflict.  In fact,
the gpg version from GnuPG-1 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as
included in GnuPG-2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching.  The
advantage of GnuPG-1 is its smaller size and the lack of dependency on
other modules at run and build time.  We will keep maintaining GnuPG-1
versions because they are very useful for small systems and for server
based applications requiring only OpenPGP support.

GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License
(GPLv3+).  GnuPG-2 works best on GNU/Linux and *BSD systems but is
also available for other Unices, Microsoft Windows and Mac OS X.


What's New in 2.0.24
====================

 * gpg: Avoid DoS due to garbled compressed data packets.

 * gpg: Screen keyserver responses to avoid importing unwanted keys
   from rogue servers.

 * gpg: The validity of user ids is now shown by default.  To revert
   this add "list-options no-show-uid-validity" to gpg.conf.

 * gpg: Print more specific reason codes with the INV_RECP status.

 * gpg: Allow loading of a cert only key to an OpenPGP card.

 * gpg-agent: Make ssh support for ECDSA keys work with Libgcrypt 1.6.

 * Minor bug fixes.


Getting the Software
====================

Please follow the instructions found at https://www.gnupg.org/download/
or read on:

GnuPG 2.0.24 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ .  The list of mirrors
can be found at https://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note that GnuPG
is not available at ftp.gnu.org.

On ftp.gnupg.org and on its mirrors you should find the following new
files in the gnupg/ directory:

  - The GnuPG-2 source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2     (4201k)
    gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2.sig

  - A patch file to upgrade a 2.0.23 GnuPG source tree.  This patch does
    not include updates of the language files.

    gnupg-2.0.23-2.0.24.diff.bz2 (20k)

Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2.
A Windows version will eventually be released at https://gpg4win.org .


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

010e027d5f622778cadc4c124013fe515ed705cf  gnupg-2.0.24.tar.bz2
594d7f91ba4fc215345f18afee46c4aa9f2b3303  gnupg-2.0.23-2.0.24.diff.bz2


Documentation
=============

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/

or in Portable Document Format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Mutt users may want to use
the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set
use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the
reworked OpenPGP support.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

The driving force behind the development of GnuPG is the company of
its principal author, Werner Koch.  Maintenance and improvement of
GnuPG and related software takes up most of their resources.  To allow
him to continue this work he kindly asks to either purchase a support
contract, engage g10 Code for custom enhancements, or to donate money:

  https://gnupg.org/donate/


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.


Happy Hacking,

  The GnuPG Team


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 24 17:39:00 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:39:00 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A99B94.9070202@sixdemonbag.org>

> Just for the records: _I_ do not consider the use of a 4096 bit RSA key
> and a preference for SHA-512 a best practice.

I'll go one step further: I think the article is going to do more harm
than good.

When young people ask me where to begin programming, I tell them to just
begin.  Don't worry about whether Javascript is better than Python or C
or anything else: just find something they think is neat and start.  The
most important thing for them is to begin, and the second-most important
thing is for them to finish what they begin.  Only later, once they're
well and truly on their way, should they start worrying about technical
details.

The same applies here.  The most important thing in using GnuPG is that
people begin using it; the second-most important thing is that they keep
on using it.  Guides such as these may ultimately do more harm than
good, in that they tend to lead new users into thinking they *have* to
do all these things, daunting and maybe even scary things (and let's be
clear: there's a lot of opaque terminology and technical jargon there!),
in order to effectively use GnuPG.

Which just isn't true.

The best practice for GnuPG: --gen-key and find a plugin for your email
client.  Everything after that needs to be relegated to an advanced
class.  There's nothing wrong with advanced material: advanced material
is great.  But let's not go about scaring newcomers by making them think
they need to do and understand all of that.


From n6ghost at yahoo.com  Tue Jun 24 18:21:31 2014
From: n6ghost at yahoo.com (Nex6|Bill)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 09:21:31 -0700
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <1403626891.55272.YahooMailNeo@web163504.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I recently, generated a new keypair (GPG4win), and the defaults presented where RSA/2048. I did, some digging around on the RSA vs DSA thing and RSA still seems
to be the recommended way to go, the only thing I did was up my key size to 4096 I left all the other defaults.....

??


On Monday, June 23, 2014 11:52 PM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
 

>
>
>On Tue, 24 Jun 2014 05:55, frase at frase.id.au said:
>
>> rounds today.? Quite a lot of good info, especially regarding key
>> strength and expiry, and digest preferences.
>
>Just for the records: _I_ do not consider the use of a 4096 bit RSA key
>and a preference for SHA-512 a best practice.? For a secure system it is
>important to make the system stronger and not parts of the system which
>will never be attacked in real life.? Granted, there are user with a
>need for non default algorithms, but those users have the resources to
>develop a security policy which fits their use case.
>
>How does a help 4096 key help if I can send you an encrypted mail which
>will lock up your MUA until you kill it (unless your MUA has some kind
>of timeout mechanism).? There are more important things to be made
>stronger than the key size.
>
>
>Salam-Shalom,
>
>?  Werner
>
>-- 
>Die Gedanken sind frei.? Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Gnupg-users mailing list
>Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
>
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From n6ghost at yahoo.com  Tue Jun 24 18:50:04 2014
From: n6ghost at yahoo.com (Nex6|Bill)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 09:50:04 -0700
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53A99B94.9070202@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A99B94.9070202@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <1403628604.29388.YahooMailNeo@web163503.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I just finished reading the article, I don't know anyone who does all of those things. most people I know
who are advid GPG users, gen a key, maybe a revoke, upload it to a keyserver sometimes. and that's about it.

using subkeys, offline keys etc, adds way more complexity to something arguably that's already complex.
anykind of "best practice", should be simple, so that it encourages a sane baseline for people. things like
RSA vs DSA, key size etc, should be in it. not a long doc that that has you doing primary and secondary?
keys.... ??



On Tuesday, June 24, 2014 9:24 AM, Robert J. Hansen <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:
 

>
>
>> Just for the records: _I_ do not consider the use of a 4096 bit RSA key
>> and a preference for SHA-512 a best practice.
>
>I'll go one step further: I think the article is going to do more harm
>than good.
>
>When young people ask me where to begin programming, I tell them to just
>begin.? Don't worry about whether Javascript is better than Python or C
>or anything else: just find something they think is neat and start.? The
>most important thing for them is to begin, and the second-most important
>thing is for them to finish what they begin.? Only later, once they're
>well and truly on their way, should they start worrying about technical
>details.
>
>The same applies here.? The most important thing in using GnuPG is that
>people begin using it; the second-most important thing is that they keep
>on using it.? Guides such as these may ultimately do more harm than
>good, in that they tend to lead new users into thinking they *have* to
>do all these things, daunting and maybe even scary things (and let's be
>clear: there's a lot of opaque terminology and technical jargon there!),
>in order to effectively use GnuPG.
>
>Which just isn't true.
>
>The best practice for GnuPG: --gen-key and find a plugin for your email
>client.? Everything after that needs to be relegated to an advanced
>class.? There's nothing wrong with advanced material: advanced material
>is great.? But let's not go about scaring newcomers by making them think
>they need to do and understand all of that.
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Gnupg-users mailing list
>Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
>
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun 24 19:52:25 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 13:52:25 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <1403626891.55272.YahooMailNeo@web163504.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <1403626891.55272.YahooMailNeo@web163504.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <53A9BAD9.2050804@sixdemonbag.org>

> I recently, generated a new keypair (GPG4win), and the defaults
> presented where RSA/2048. I did, some digging around on the RSA vs DSA
> thing and RSA still seems
> to be the recommended way to go, the only thing I did was up my key size
> to 4096 I left all the other defaults.....

This depends on what you mean by recommended, and why.  The last time I
checked it wasn't possible to use DSA2 keys to sign a Linux RPM file,
for instance.  Likewise, there are smartcards that don't support DSA2,
and so on.

But if you're not using one of those niche applications then there's
really not much difference worth mentioning between RSA2048 and DSA2048.  :)


From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Jun 24 19:57:12 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 19:57:12 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <1403628604.29388.YahooMailNeo@web163503.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53A99B94.9070202@sixdemonbag.org>
 <1403628604.29388.YahooMailNeo@web163503.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <24629356.s0CqYyEi85@inno>

Am Di 24.06.2014, 09:50:04 schrieb Nex6|Bill:

> anykind of "best practice", should
> be simple, so that it encourages a sane baseline for people.

That depends on it whether you need security or the illusion of security 
is enough for you.

IMHO it is one of the main problems that hardly anyone cares about 
telling protection levels apart. "Security" is a really wide spectrum, 
for some beginning at "random six letter passwords". You cannot say in a 
useful sense what is a good recommendation without looking at what is 
needed in the respective situation.


Thus I advocate a standardized set of security levels for data, keys and 
systems. And authentication on the other hand:

http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/
(German only)


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From n6ghost at yahoo.com  Tue Jun 24 20:37:35 2014
From: n6ghost at yahoo.com (Nex6|Bill)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:37:35 -0700
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53A9BAD9.2050804@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <1403626891.55272.YahooMailNeo@web163504.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
 <53A9BAD9.2050804@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53A9C56F.20201@yahoo.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1



On 6/24/2014 10:52 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> I recently, generated a new keypair (GPG4win), and the defaults 
>> presented where RSA/2048. I did, some digging around on the RSA
>> vs DSA thing and RSA still seems to be the recommended way to go,
>> the only thing I did was up my key size to 4096 I left all the
>> other defaults.....
> 
> This depends on what you mean by recommended, and why.  The last
> time I checked it wasn't possible to use DSA2 keys to sign a Linux
> RPM file, for instance.  Likewise, there are smartcards that don't
> support DSA2, and so on.
> 
> But if you're not using one of those niche applications then
> there's really not much difference worth mentioning between RSA2048
> and DSA2048.  :)

yea, compatibility is a big issue from what I understand RSA is far more
compatible than DSA is. which is why i use an RSA key, though a larger
key....
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From n6ghost at yahoo.com  Tue Jun 24 20:35:25 2014
From: n6ghost at yahoo.com (Nex6|Bill)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:35:25 -0700
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <24629356.s0CqYyEi85@inno>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53A99B94.9070202@sixdemonbag.org>
 <1403628604.29388.YahooMailNeo@web163503.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
 <24629356.s0CqYyEi85@inno>
Message-ID: <53A9C4ED.7010005@yahoo.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1



On 6/24/2014 10:57 AM, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Di 24.06.2014, 09:50:04 schrieb Nex6|Bill:
> 
>> anykind of "best practice", should be simple, so that it
>> encourages a sane baseline for people.
> 
> That depends on it whether you need security or the illusion of
> security is enough for you.
> 
> IMHO it is one of the main problems that hardly anyone cares about
>  telling protection levels apart. "Security" is a really wide
> spectrum, for some beginning at "random six letter passwords". You
> cannot say in a useful sense what is a good recommendation without
> looking at what is needed in the respective situation.
> 
> 
> Thus I advocate a standardized set of security levels for data,
> keys and systems. And authentication on the other hand:
> 
> http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/ (German
> only)
> 
> 
> Hauke
> 

how did you get, security vs illusionary security from that? and while
I agree that "security" is not well defined, in a way that a user or
admin can tell what level of security an object or configuration will
give him.

that does not mean we should get all hyper paranoid on all of our best
practices and guidelines to a point where only advanced geeks can
understand it.

for things, like encryption we, should make an effort for the
baselines to be sane, and simple. leave the more advanced stuff to the
advanced users. I have found that, when something is complex and or
hard to use
users will not use it, or will find ways around it.




> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing
> list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
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From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Tue Jun 24 21:35:15 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 21:35:15 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53A9D2F3.8010300@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 24-06-2014 8:47, Werner Koch wrote:

> How does a help 4096 key help if I can send you an encrypted mail which
> will lock up your MUA until you kill it

Finally upgrade that 286 to DOS > 3.0? If you have a system that can't
handle 4k keys you have very specific needs. Sending a lot of messages
through some embedded system perhaps, but if you need do that I assume
you know what you're doing.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Tue Jun 24 21:37:30 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 21:37:30 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 24-06-2014 11:42, Pete Stephenson wrote:

> ObXKCD: http://xkcd.com/538/

The problem with that method is that it only works once, after that
other communication methods will be used. Al Quaida use horse couriers
who memorise the message, the American's could not intercept them.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From anatol.pomozov at gmail.com  Wed Jun 25 03:53:06 2014
From: anatol.pomozov at gmail.com (Anatol Pomozov)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 18:53:06 -0700
Subject: Broken ECDSA in gnupg 2.0.23
In-Reply-To: <87k387lvq1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>
 <87ppi2mwu6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAOMFOmUZspcN19JOThPSsAAcFYHoEy5vGwd234tzZETtHgrchQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <87k387lvq1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAOMFOmVr6UffZBCjmChNmfE6PaubeQOoN343K_opTv5QfM6N2A@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Werner

On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Sat, 21 Jun 2014 15:14, anatol.pomozov at gmail.com said:
>
>> The libgcrypt functions such as gcry_pk_map_name() return GCRY_PK_ECC
>> instead of GCRY_PK_ECDSA. So I modified gnupg 2.0.23 sources with this
>> patch:
>
> Thanks.  Applied.

Thanks for applying it! But I do not think this is enough to fix all
the ECDSA issues with the latest gcrypt. At least 'ssh-add -D' and
'ssh-add -d ..' do not work correctly. I used ssh-add from openssh and
I see errors like 'Error reading response length from authentication
socket.'

Could anyone who has more experience with gnupg sources than me check
other ssh-add usecases? Or even better to add a unit test to avoid
issues like this in the future.

# here is the use-case
# build the latest gnupg with latest libgcrypt

ssh-add ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
ssh-add -l
ssh-add -d ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
ssh-add -D


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun 25 08:25:36 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 08:25:36 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53A9D2F3.8010300@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of
 "Tue, 24 Jun 2014 21:35:15 +0200")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A9D2F3.8010300@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <87fvith5en.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 24 Jun 2014 21:35, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said:

> Finally upgrade that 286 to DOS > 3.0? If you have a system that can't
> handle 4k keys you have very specific needs. Sending a lot of messages

This misunderstanding is actually an indication of the problem.  You are
talking 4096 vs. 2048 while the more important case is to read the
security announcements and update your gpg.

Over the last two days I release 1.4.17 and 2.0.24 just to fix a simple
regression introduced 15 years ago: Create an OpenPGP packet from these
bytes: a3 01 5b ff.  Put it into an ascii armor and sent it by mail.
The MUA will lock up while trying to decrypt it.  This is a naked
compressed data packet, you may need to embed it into a regular
encrypted packet.

I wonder why the keysize triggers bikeshedding discussions in all
security groups.  After all the majority of us (including me) has not
the education and experience to select the color (i.e. crypto math) on
their own.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun 25 15:29:54 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 15:29:54 +0200
Subject: Broken ECDSA in gnupg 2.0.23
In-Reply-To: <CAOMFOmVr6UffZBCjmChNmfE6PaubeQOoN343K_opTv5QfM6N2A@mail.gmail.com>
 (Anatol Pomozov's message of "Tue, 24 Jun 2014 18:53:06 -0700")
References: <CAOMFOmVhaHaHenxC8zgRTupJFnb=7sjvJm2anDz1+rw8AW4ojg@mail.gmail.com>
 <87ppi2mwu6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAOMFOmUZspcN19JOThPSsAAcFYHoEy5vGwd234tzZETtHgrchQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <87k387lvq1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAOMFOmVr6UffZBCjmChNmfE6PaubeQOoN343K_opTv5QfM6N2A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87simtdsml.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 25 Jun 2014 03:53, anatol.pomozov at gmail.com said:

> the ECDSA issues with the latest gcrypt. At least 'ssh-add -D' and
> 'ssh-add -d ..' do not work correctly. I used ssh-add from openssh and

There has never been any support for deleting any ssh key from
gpg-agent.  Thus -D and -d can't work.  It also does not make any sense
because in contrast to ssh-agent, gpg-agent stores the ssh keys
persistent.  ssh-add is only used to migrate the keys to gpg-agent.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From jerome at jerome.cc  Wed Jun 25 19:53:26 2014
From: jerome at jerome.cc (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=E9r=F4me_Pinguet?=)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 19:53:26 +0200
Subject: more bikeshedding about offline primary keys &  auth subkeys
Message-ID: <53AB0C96.4050807@jerome.cc>

Hello!

Thanks to Werner, I learned a new english word today: bikeshedding! :-)

This guide
http://spin.atomicobject.com/2013/11/24/secure-gpg-keys-guide/ suggests
creating a subkey with authentication capability. Most other sources
stress the fact that the primary key and the offline computer must be
used to authenticate other people's public keys.

I'm at a loss.

Can I use an RSA subkey with autentication capability (and cross
certified) to authenticate other people's public keys, will it be
recognized by sks key servers and used in the web of trust?
Or do I have to use the primary key?

Hauke posted comments with critics about a few points, but not about
this issue.

In other developments, I'm impressed by the reactivity of the Arch Linux
community! The security fix 1.4.17 hasn't been released for Debian
Stable at the time of writing. The patch has only been applied to Sid.

Thanks.

J?r?me


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From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Wed Jun 25 20:30:18 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 14:30:18 -0400
Subject: more bikeshedding about offline primary keys &  auth subkeys
In-Reply-To: <53AB0C96.4050807@jerome.cc>
References: <53AB0C96.4050807@jerome.cc>
Message-ID: <5861683C-1654-4CEE-B00C-4959B133FE55@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 25, 2014, at 1:53 PM, J?r?me Pinguet <jerome at jerome.cc> wrote:

> Hello!
> 
> Thanks to Werner, I learned a new english word today: bikeshedding! :-)
> 
> This guide
> http://spin.atomicobject.com/2013/11/24/secure-gpg-keys-guide/ suggests
> creating a subkey with authentication capability. Most other sources
> stress the fact that the primary key and the offline computer must be
> used to authenticate other people's public keys.
> 
> I'm at a loss.
> 
> Can I use an RSA subkey with autentication capability (and cross
> certified) to authenticate other people's public keys, will it be
> recognized by sks key servers and used in the web of trust?
> Or do I have to use the primary key?

I think the confusion here is with the term "authenticate".  The ability to sign someone else's key is to "certify".  To "authenticate" is to prove your identity (for example, using an OpenPGP keys for ssh).  You can only certify with a primary key, and all primary keys are capable of certification (you literally can't turn the ability off).  Authentication is a different capability.

David



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Wed Jun 25 21:35:33 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 12:35:33 -0700
Subject: more bikeshedding about offline primary keys &  auth subkeys
In-Reply-To: <53AB0C96.4050807@jerome.cc>
References: <53AB0C96.4050807@jerome.cc>
Message-ID: <53AB2485.60804@dougbarton.us>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 06/25/2014 10:53 AM, J?r?me Pinguet wrote:
| Thanks to Werner, I learned a new english word today:
| bikeshedding!

http://bikeshed.com/

Be sure to reload the page a few times :)

Doug
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Wed Jun 25 21:51:04 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 20:51:04 +0100
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 24 June 2014 at 8:37:30 PM, in
<mid:53A9D37A.605 at vulcan.xs4all.nl>, Johan Wevers wrote:


> Al Quaida use horse couriers who memorise the
> message, the American's could not intercept them.

Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
interrogating a horse?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Wisdom is a companion to age; yet age may travel alone.
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From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Wed Jun 25 21:53:16 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 21:53:16 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87fvith5en.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>	<87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<53A9D2F3.8010300@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87fvith5en.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53AB28AC.4090600@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 25-06-2014 8:25, Werner Koch wrote:

> This misunderstanding is actually an indication of the problem.  You are
> talking 4096 vs. 2048 while the more important case is to read the
> security announcements and update your gpg.

While important I don't loose a night's sleep over a DOS attack. It's
annoying but it doesn't reveal any confidential information.

> I wonder why the keysize triggers bikeshedding discussions in all
> security groups.

Perhaps a "better safe than sorry" approach after remembering that
RSA-768 was once (in the pgp 2.0 days) advertised as futureproof
"military-grade" encryption? Attacks only get better in time, never worse.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Wed Jun 25 21:55:30 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 21:55:30 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <53AB2932.9040304@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 25-06-2014 21:51, MFPA wrote:

> Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
> interrogating a horse?

I don't know, but torturing the courtier turned out to be unreliable at
best.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun 25 22:58:16 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 16:58:16 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org>

> Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
> interrogating a horse?

Yes.  We are world champions at beating dead horses.  To interrogate a
horse, first simply shoot it in the head, and then we can leverage our
dead-horse-beating skills in order to do enhanced equine interrogation.


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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun 26 08:40:14 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 08:40:14 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AB28AC.4090600@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of
 "Wed, 25 Jun 2014 21:53:16 +0200")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53A9D2F3.8010300@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87fvith5en.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <53AB28AC.4090600@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <87fvisdvht.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 25 Jun 2014 21:53, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said:

> While important I don't loose a night's sleep over a DOS attack. It's
> annoying but it doesn't reveal any confidential information.

Nor do I.  However, such a simple DoS is generally consideres a security
bug and thus you should better update.

> Perhaps a "better safe than sorry" approach after remembering that
> RSA-768 was once (in the pgp 2.0 days) advertised as futureproof
> "military-grade" encryption? Attacks only get better in time, never worse.

Back then it was.  Unless you used any computer.  Back then almost all
boxes were vulnerable to several FOO root/supervisor exploit of the
month.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From John at enigmail.net  Thu Jun 26 13:55:08 2014
From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 06:55:08 -0500
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>

Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
>> interrogating a horse?
> 
> Yes.  We are world champions at beating dead horses.  To interrogate a
> horse, first simply shoot it in the head, and then we can leverage our
> dead-horse-beating skills in order to do enhanced equine interrogation.

Ah, yes... the fetish of equinonecroflagellation. It has an strikingly common
rate of incidence with maxicryptosizism[*], along with Internet posts labeling
the author[s]'s opinions vis-a-vis cryptography usage as "Best Practices".

I have found the best way to handle best practice cryptography posts is to
look for the writer[s]'s academic and/or professional qualifications and act
accordingly. Recommendations of RSA-4096 for general use allow me to bypass
that step. Security is a system, a chain. Fixating on a single, unlikely to be
attacked, link in that chain often ignores the other more easily attacked
links. Think of it as installing a bank vault door on a Bedouin tent.

-J

[*] Rob, I believe you can guess the argot I use for practitioners of this
dubious rite.


-- 
John P. Clizbe                      Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP                  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
     mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?"
A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels"


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From shmick at riseup.net  Thu Jun 26 14:22:25 2014
From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 22:22:25 +1000
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <53AC1081.8080404@riseup.net>



MFPA:
> Hi
> 
> 
> On Tuesday 24 June 2014 at 8:37:30 PM, in
> <mid:53A9D37A.605 at vulcan.xs4all.nl>, Johan Wevers wrote:
> 
> 
>> Al Quaida use horse couriers who memorise the
>> message, the American's could not intercept them.
> 
> Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
> interrogating a horse?

might be ok if they ask "why the long face" ;-)

could be difficult if slang was used since that was always an issue for
US intelligence trying to decipher radio comms with, literally, slang
from particular farms, communities

i always keep this is mind; the fact that you can throw all possible
resources you have and decrypt something, then don't understand the
decryption

> 
> 
> --
> Best regards
> 
> MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net
> 
> Wisdom is a companion to age; yet age may travel alone.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun 26 16:26:43 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 10:26:43 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>

> Ah, yes... the fetish of equinonecroflagellation. It has an strikingly common
> rate of incidence with maxicryptosizism...

Although I'm going to be (almost wholly) agreeing with John here, I'm
speaking just for myself.  If anyone wants to chime in with a
"d'accord," that's on them.  :)

What gets me about the RSA-2048/-3072/-4096 debate is how (largely)
pointless it is.  Per NIST, RSA-2048 has about a 112-bit effective
keyspace and -3072 has about a 128-bit effective keyspace.  There is no
official NIST recommendation for RSA-4096, but the cryppies I've spoken
with at conferences ballpark it at somewhere around 140 bits of
effective keyspace.

Now for the kicker: *no one* is guaranteed more than 112 bits of
effective keyspace in the emails they receive.  No one.  Even if you use
a hacked-up GnuPG and RSA-16384, you're deluding yourself if you think
you're guaranteed your emails will have an effective keyspace of 256 bits.

The reason why is four letters long: 3DES.  3DES, which is an
always-accept algorithm, has a keyspace of 112 bits[*].  Someone can use
your RSA-16384 key with 3DES and bam, the effective protection of your
email is down to 112 bits.

So in a very real sense, anything past RSA-2048 is at best a "you
*might* get some additional security, depending on what symmetric
algorithm your correspondent uses.  Oh, and you can't forbid your
correspondent from using 3DES, either."

I think it's funny how the people who advocate moving to RSA-4096 by
default generally don't talk much about how it is impossible to
guarantee more than 112 bits of effective encryption keyspace for an
email message.  Will it give you a stronger signature?  Maybe.  But it
very possibly won't give you any stronger encryption.

Now, this isn't to say there's no purpose in RSA-3072 or -4096.  Some
organizations have requirements that say "any encryption key we use must
provide 128 effective bits of keyspace."  In that case, if them's the
rules, then sure, use RSA-3072, it meets your requirements.

But for the people who advocate "let's shift to RSA-4096, it gives us
about an effective 32 bits more than RSA-2048!", well... I really wish
they'd talk about the drawbacks (can't use on a smartcard, may cause
problems for mobile devices, etc.) and the inherent limitations of
OpenPGP (can't guarantee more than 112 effective bits of encryption
keyspace).

So, in summation: I think the RSA-2048/-3072/-4096 debate is utterly
pointless.  To the extent I have any strong feelings on it at all, it is
this: you are less likely to delude yourself about the strength of the
system if you use RSA-2048.



[*] ... against an adversary with access to more computing power than is
likely to ever exist in the world, true; but 112 bits nevertheless.

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From martijn.list at gmail.com  Thu Jun 26 16:56:47 2014
From: martijn.list at gmail.com (martijn.list)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 16:56:47 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53AC34AF.10709@gmail.com>

On 06/26/2014 04:26 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Ah, yes... the fetish of equinonecroflagellation. It has an
>> strikingly common rate of incidence with maxicryptosizism...
> 
> Although I'm going to be (almost wholly) agreeing with John here,
> I'm speaking just for myself.  If anyone wants to chime in with a 
> "d'accord," that's on them.  :)
> 
> What gets me about the RSA-2048/-3072/-4096 debate is how
> (largely) pointless it is.  Per NIST, RSA-2048 has about a 112-bit
> effective keyspace and -3072 has about a 128-bit effective
> keyspace.  There is no official NIST recommendation for RSA-4096,
> but the cryppies I've spoken with at conferences ballpark it at
> somewhere around 140 bits of effective keyspace.
> 
> Now for the kicker: *no one* is guaranteed more than 112 bits of 
> effective keyspace in the emails they receive.  No one.  Even if
> you use a hacked-up GnuPG and RSA-16384, you're deluding yourself
> if you think you're guaranteed your emails will have an effective
> keyspace of 256 bits.
> 
> The reason why is four letters long: 3DES.  3DES, which is an 
> always-accept algorithm, has a keyspace of 112 bits[*].  Someone
> can use your RSA-16384 key with 3DES and bam, the effective
> protection of your email is down to 112 bits.
> 
> So in a very real sense, anything past RSA-2048 is at best a "you 
> *might* get some additional security, depending on what symmetric 
> algorithm your correspondent uses.  Oh, and you can't forbid your 
> correspondent from using 3DES, either."
> 
> I think it's funny how the people who advocate moving to RSA-4096
> by default generally don't talk much about how it is impossible to 
> guarantee more than 112 bits of effective encryption keyspace for
> an email message.  Will it give you a stronger signature?  Maybe.
> But it very possibly won't give you any stronger encryption.
> 
> Now, this isn't to say there's no purpose in RSA-3072 or -4096.
> Some organizations have requirements that say "any encryption key
> we use must provide 128 effective bits of keyspace."  In that case,
> if them's the rules, then sure, use RSA-3072, it meets your
> requirements.
> 
> But for the people who advocate "let's shift to RSA-4096, it gives
> us about an effective 32 bits more than RSA-2048!", well... I
> really wish they'd talk about the drawbacks (can't use on a
> smartcard, may cause problems for mobile devices, etc.) and the
> inherent limitations of OpenPGP (can't guarantee more than 112
> effective bits of encryption keyspace).
> 
> So, in summation: I think the RSA-2048/-3072/-4096 debate is
> utterly pointless.  To the extent I have any strong feelings on it
> at all, it is this: you are less likely to delude yourself about
> the strength of the system if you use RSA-2048.
> 
> 
> 
> [*] ... against an adversary with access to more computing power
> than is likely to ever exist in the world, true; but 112 bits
> nevertheless.

While in principle I agree that 2048 bit key is strong enough for most
uses, comparing 3DES keys space (or any other symmetric encryption
algorithm) and RSA (or some other public key system) key space is a
bit like comparing apples and oranges. If you crack the 3DES
encryption of a message you have cracked that particular message. If
you crack the RSA key, you have cracked all messages. So the effective
key space of your public key should be larger then the key space of
the session key(s).

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers

-- 
CipherMail email encryption

Open source email encryption gateway with support for S/MIME, OpenPGP
and PDF encryption.

www.ciphermail.com


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun 26 17:18:24 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 11:18:24 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC34AF.10709@gmail.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC34AF.10709@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53AC39C0.2010508@sixdemonbag.org>

> While in principle I agree that 2048 bit key is strong enough for most
> uses, comparing 3DES keys space (or any other symmetric encryption
> algorithm) and RSA (or some other public key system) key space is a
> bit like comparing apples and oranges. If you crack the 3DES
> encryption of a message you have cracked that particular message. If
> you crack the RSA key, you have cracked all messages. So the effective
> key space of your public key should be larger then the key space of
> the session key(s).

This is, IMHO, a complete nonissue.

If your adversary has the ability to brute-force a 112-bit keyspace,
then you are now living in a world where crypto cannot protect you.


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Jun 26 17:22:21 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 11:22:21 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87fvith5en.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A9D2F3.8010300@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87fvith5en.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53AC3AAD.5070908@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/25/2014 02:25 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> This misunderstanding is actually an indication of the problem.  You are
> talking 4096 vs. 2048 while the more important case is to read the
> security announcements and update your gpg.

That's a great point.  I've just proposed a pull request on that page to
emphasize keeping your GnuPG implementation up-to-date.

however, if you *do* keep your software up-to-date, it would be a shame
for the crypto itself to be flawed enough to be broken by a
well-resourced attacker.  So standardizing on stronger crypto by default
seems reasonable to me.  The point is to ensure that the math itself is
not the weak point.

> I wonder why the keysize triggers bikeshedding discussions in all
> security groups.  After all the majority of us (including me) has not
> the education and experience to select the color (i.e. crypto math) on
> their own.

These choices are not pulled out of thin air or made up out of arbitrary
fancy.  There are people who do have the education and experience to
determine reasonable keysizes, like the ECRYPT project.

  http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/
  http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/documents/D.SPA.20.pdf

suggests (on pages 30-32) that the current GnuPG default of 2048-bit RSA
provides roughly 103-bit-equivalent security, which falls in the middle
of "legacy standard level" (?10 years of protection) and "medium-term
protection" (?20 years of protection).

ECRYPT's "Good, generic application-indep. recommendation" is at the
128-bit level, which they note for RSA keys is 3248 bits. The Riseup
guide suggests a marginally more conservative 4096-bit RSA keysize.

In practice, i've never found a modern cryptographic system that can't
handle 4096-bit RSA keys.  I have, however, found modern systems that
*can't* deal with 3248-bit RSA keys (X.509 certificate authorities who
expect the bitlength of any key to be a power of two for some unknown
and probably stupid reason).

So if we want to make a good, generic recommendation, the riseup
recommendation doesn't seem to be a bad one to me based on my reading of
ECRYPT II.

Regards,

	--dkg

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Jun 26 17:26:16 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 11:26:16 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/26/2014 10:26 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> So in a very real sense, anything past RSA-2048 is at best a "you
> *might* get some additional security, depending on what symmetric
> algorithm your correspondent uses.  Oh, and you can't forbid your
> correspondent from using 3DES, either."

Of course you can't, but this is a terrible argument.  You can't forbid
your correspondent from sending you mail in the clear either.

At any rate, the document under discussion also encourages people to
advertise preferences for stronger ciphers, so correspondents using
tools which respect those advertised preferences (like GnuPG) *will* get
the increase in strength described.


The goal of this document is to encourage people to make sure that
crypto is not the weak point in their communications.  brute forcing
anything at a 2^103 security level [0] is likely infeasible, yes, but
brute-force isn't the only possible means of attack.  we don't know what
cryptanalytic improvements are known privately, but if anyone has a
speedup on the order of 2^30 (about a billion), then increasing the
keysize by about the same amount seems like a pretty reasonable safeguard.

Please read Bernstein's paper suggesting larger keysizes as a defense
against common parallel constructions (one form of speedup):

  http://cr.yp.to/snuffle/bruteforce-20050425.pdf

As for arguments about use on smartcards -- if you plan to get a
smartcard, and you have a primary key that is too large for it, you can
always generate and publish new subkeys that will fit in your smartcard.
 If that's the tradeoff that seems the most secure for you, that's fine,
and the fact that you were using stronger keys in your non-smartcard
implementation doesn't hurt you at all.  Smartcards are not a good
reason to object to larger keysizes for people who don't use smartcards.

The pushback of "don't bother using stronger crypto, something else will
be your problem" seems silly to me.  It's like saying "don't bother
fighting sexism, people are going hungry!"  We can (and should) push on
all of these fronts concurrently.

Regards,

	--dkg

[0] 2048-bit RSA is roughly equivalent to 103-bit symmetric crypto
according to ECRYPT-II:

 page 30 of http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/documents/D.SPA.20.pdf

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun 26 17:39:13 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 11:39:13 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <53AC3EA1.2040002@sixdemonbag.org>

> The goal of this document is to encourage people to make sure that 
> crypto is not the weak point in their communications.

If that's your criteria, RSA-1024 is sufficient.  Real systems are so
exploitable that crypto is never the weak point.

> Please read Bernstein's paper suggesting larger keysizes as a
> defense against common parallel constructions (one form of speedup):

I have.

> We can (and should) push on all of these fronts concurrently.

It must be nice to live in a world where you have unlimited resources to
direct to such efforts.

Pick and choose your battles.  At even RSA-1024, crypto is not going to
be the weak link in your system.  If your criteria is truly, "make sure
that crypto is not the weak link," then this entire discussion is moot:
any certificate GnuPG creates will do.

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Jun 26 20:25:26 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 14:25:26 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/24/2014 07:28 AM, Gabriel Niebler wrote:
> I consider myself quite the amateur (I haven't even read most of RFC
> 4880 yet), but I do take issue with one point in the riseup.net Best
> Practices page, namely the bit where it says "self-signatures must not
> use SHA1".
> I find that statement too strong.
> 
> AFAICS this will lead to keys which may not be understood by some
> perfectly standards-compliant OpenPGP implementations, since SHA-1 is
> the _only_ hashing algorithm that MUST be supported by all
> implementations of that standard. Everything else is up to the
> implementer.
> 
> I do not know that there are any such implementations out there, but
> there seem to be a lot of people "rolling their own" who occasionally
> post to this very list.
> 
> Possibly breaking OpenPGP compatibility does not seem like a Best
> Practice to me. I raised this concern in a comment on the _original_
> page at https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices
> but it didn't garner any interest.
> 
> I believe additional self-signatures can always be added to existing
> UIDs and subkeys later and I presume (someone correct me, if I'm
> wrong, please) they can use other hashing algos. That might be a way
> to get "the best of both worlds": Not breaking standards compliant
> clients (which would hopefully just ignore the selfsigs they can't
> understand and focus on those they can) AND strong hashing.

to be clear: clients that support stronger digests than SHA-1 are *also*
standards-compliant.  I don't know of any modern OpenPGP client that
doesn't support SHA-256 or SHA-512.  Pretty much anything built today
should be using libraries for their digest algorithms, and all
reasonable libraries that support SHA-1 also support SHA-256 and SHA-512.

If you know of a modern OpenPGP implementation that supports SHA-1 but
not SHA-256 or SHA-512, please point it out (and no, creating one just
to be able to point to it doesn't count :P)

What you're proposing would indeed be slightly more widely-compatible,
and it would work like this:

 0) every self-certification made by GnuPG would be issued twice: once
using SHA-1 (selfsig A), and once using a stronger digest algorithm
(e.g. SHA-512) (selfsig B).

 1) selfsig A should probably have a timestamp that is strictly earlier
(probably by 1 second, since that's the quantum that the OpenPGP spec
recognizes) than selfsig B, so that implementations that prefer the most
recent self-sig and support the stronger digest algorithm will know to
prefer it. (this works around any buggy clients that might get confused
by two self-sigs with the same timestamp -- if we want to be widely
compatible, we should probably cater to them too)

 2) While you're at it, you could create selfsigs with each supported
digest algorithm, rather than just 2 -- that would make the signature
even more widely-compatible, because it would work for clients who
implement, for example, RIPEMD-160 but not SHA-256.

But i don't think the additional complexity and bulk (these OpenPGP
certs would be larger) are worth the tradeoff, because (a) any OpenPGP
implementation that only supports SHA-1 in 2014 should be upgraded and
fixed, not coddled (they're probably vulnerable to implementation errors
at least if they're that out of date) and (b) i don't think they exist.

SHA-1 is within range of collision attacks by sophisticated attackers.
By the time someone decides it is unreliable (that is, that they will
not rely on certifications made using SHA-1), people should have
*already* moved on.

It's conceivable that someone who wants to reject SHA-1 certifications
in general could make an exception for selfsigs (as distinct from
third-party certifications) since the worst thing that an attacker can
do if they can forge a selfsig is to make you assert an identity for
your key that you don't actually control.  But this is still an attack,
however silly, and the complexity of splitting out what digests you'll
accept in self-certifications from what digests you'll accept in
third-party certifications smells like trouble to me.

So i think that the simplest practice is best: use a single self-sig,
made over a single strong, widely-supported digest algorithm.  SHA-512
meets that requirement.

I hope this analysis is useful.

	--dkg

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun 26 22:06:25 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 16:06:25 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/26/2014 11:26 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> The pushback of "don't bother using stronger crypto, something else
> will be your problem" seems silly to me.  It's like saying "don't
> bother fighting sexism, people are going hungry!"  We can (and
> should) push on all of these fronts concurrently.

I've been writing and rewriting this several times now: I'm not sure if
I've found diplomacy here, but there comes a point where you have to say
"screw it" and hit send.

Four of the best guiding principles I've found are:

	1.  Design the system as if the bad guys control
	    everything that is not an immediate game-over.
	2.  Assume the bad guys will degrade your system in
	    the most damaging ways possible (subject only
	    to #1).
	3.  Your level of protection is defined by your
	    resistance to the enemy's worst skulduggery,
	    not your performance in the absence of
	    skulduggery.
	4.  Just because you define something to be an
	    immediate game-over doesn't mean the enemy can't
	    do it -- it just means you can't defend against it
	    and for that reason aren't covering it.

One of the justifications you give for your faith in increased key
lengths is "[RFC4880] also encourages people to advertise preferences
for stronger ciphers, so correspondents using tools which respect those
advertised preferences (like GnuPG) *will* get the increase in strength
described."

But see #2 above, though.  The bad guys will degrade your system in the
most damaging ways possible, subject to the assumptions we make in #1.
Since it's possible to degrade the cipher preference to 3DES, we need to
assume that's exactly what will happen.  (Your next objection is "How?".
 That's a non-sequitur right now.  I believe serious adversaries can do
this because (a) there's no mechanism to prevent them from doing it, and
(b) system degradation is such a bog-standard attack vector that I can't
believe they haven't already thought up ways.  Whether *I* have thought
up ways is irrelevant.)

People should feel free to use cipher preferences, but they shouldn't
have any expectation that it matters a damn.  The most you can guarantee
out of it is 3DES with 112 bits of keyspace: everything beyond that is a
gift from your enemy.  If your security model depends on using
Camellia256, then you need to use something other than OpenPGP, because #3.



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Thu Jun 26 22:35:40 2014
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 22:35:40 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net> <53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <6134419.xed50sakqP@inno>

Am Do 26.06.2014, 16:06:25 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:

> Since it's possible to degrade the cipher preference to 3DES,
> we need to assume that's exactly what will happen.  (Your next
> objection is "How?". That's a non-sequitur right now.  I believe
> serious adversaries can do this because (a) there's no mechanism to
> prevent them from doing it,

You mean except for that you must be capable of forging a mainkey 
signature (if you don't control the sending system anyway in which case 
you don't need the key any more)?

I would say that if you think it's OK to just assume that signing is 
really broken why not also just assume that encryption is really broken 
(i.e. not offering those 112 bit by far)?

But I strongly support your main point. Whether anyone cares or not... 
;-)  I would like to put it (or one of the consequences) this way: 
Educating users is much more important than changing default settings. 

When I teach people I tell them that as a rule of thumb

10% of the overall security they get are provided by technology

60% of it come from their own knowledge

and the last 30% come from the discipline to really (not) do what you 
know you should (not) do.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto f?r alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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From free10pro at gmail.com  Thu Jun 26 22:28:22 2014
From: free10pro at gmail.com (Paul R. Ramer)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 13:28:22 -0700
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>

On June 26, 2014 8:26:16 AM PDT, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:

>As for arguments about use on smartcards -- if you plan to get a
>smartcard, and you have a primary key that is too large for it, you can
>always generate and publish new subkeys that will fit in your
>smartcard.
>If that's the tradeoff that seems the most secure for you, that's fine,
>and the fact that you were using stronger keys in your non-smartcard
>implementation doesn't hurt you at all.  Smartcards are not a good
>reason to object to larger keysizes for people who don't use
>smartcards.

Actually, it is for those of us who prefer smartcards.  I was once newbie trying to use a smartcard. Repeated emphasis on having only a 4k key can create the impression that a smartcard is not strong enough, that it is weaker because it can only go up to 3072 bits (depending on the card).

The reason for me to have a smartcard was to physically separate the key from the computer.  Using a key that is too large for the smartcard does not fit my purpose for having one.

>The pushback of "don't bother using stronger crypto, something else
>will
>be your problem" seems silly to me.  It's like saying "don't bother
>fighting sexism, people are going hungry!"  We can (and should) push on
>all of these fronts concurrently.

On the contrary, shouting, "Bigger! Larger! Greater!" without a justification based on actual threats posed to that user when the defaults will suffice creates the impression that only the most heavy duty crypto will keep their communications private, and the user will eschew the defaults simply because they aren't "big enough." It's bad education. Or worse--the lack thereof.

Cheers,

-Paul


--
PGP: 3DB6D884


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun 26 23:36:45 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 17:36:45 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <6134419.xed50sakqP@inno>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net> <53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org>
 <6134419.xed50sakqP@inno>
Message-ID: <53AC926D.1030007@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/26/2014 4:35 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
> You mean except for that you must be capable of forging a mainkey 
> signature (if you don't control the sending system anyway in which case 
> you don't need the key any more)?

Nope.  :)  I meant what I said.

The preference list on the key is advisory, not binding.  There's
nothing requiring an implementation to even look at the preference list
on the key.  For any OpenPGP certificate, you can send it 3DES-encrypted
traffic and be in complete accordance with the spec and the recipient's
preferences.

A conformant implementation MUST choose a cipher that is listed in the
certificate preferences, but (a) the spec is completely silent about
*which* preferred cipher should be used, and (b) the spec guarantees
3DES will always be a preferred cipher.

This is why I've always pushed to call them capability sets, instead of
preference lists.  The spec doesn't guarantee they'll be treated as
preference lists.  The spec only guarantees they'll be treated as a
capability set.




From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Jun 26 23:45:01 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 17:45:01 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/26/2014 2:25 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> If you know of a modern OpenPGP implementation that supports SHA-1 but
> not SHA-256 or SHA-512, please point it out (and no, creating one just
> to be able to point to it doesn't count :P)

PGP 8.x, which is still in use today by a surprising number of people,
has limited support for SHA-256 and none at all for SHA-512.



From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Jun 26 23:57:57 2014
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 17:57:57 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>

On 06/26/2014 05:45 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 6/26/2014 2:25 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> If you know of a modern OpenPGP implementation that supports SHA-1 but
>> not SHA-256 or SHA-512, please point it out (and no, creating one just
>> to be able to point to it doesn't count :P)
> 
> PGP 8.x, which is still in use today by a surprising number of people,
> has limited support for SHA-256 and none at all for SHA-512.


PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern implementation:

 http://www.pgpi.org/news/

In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm having a hard time
finding documentation for it.

How many people use it?  Can you share where you got your "surprising
number" reference?   Are there software vulnerabilities in it or any
support or maintenance at all?

To paraphrase Werner elsewhere in this thread: The more important case
is to read security announcements and update your OpenPGP implementation.

Why should anyone cater to users of PGP 8.x in 2014 when we have an
opportunity to provide a stronger cryptographic baseline for everyone else?

	--dkg



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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Jun 27 00:07:18 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 18:07:18 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern
> implementation:

And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880.  Methinks you're
objecting because it's a largely-conforming implementation that doesn't
have good support for SHA256.  ;)

> In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm having a hard
> time finding documentation for it.

If I recall correctly, it can understand SHA-256 but not generate
SHA-256.  SHA-256 generation support was added late in the 8.x series,
but earlier 8.x releases could understand it.

> How many people use it?

It's not as if there are Nielsen ratings for these things.  All I can do
is say that I still regularly encounter it when I talk to people about
PGP.  For instance, I know of one law firm that purchased a site license
for 8.x and refuses to upgrade, since the more recent editions cost a
fortune in per-seat licenses and have very little in the way of new
functionality.

> Why should anyone cater to users of PGP 8.x in 2014 when we have an 
> opportunity to provide a stronger cryptographic baseline for everyone
> else?

Because there are still people using it.

Remember, GnuPG also supports most of RFC1991 because we've got a large
base of PGP 2.6 users who are refusing to upgrade...



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 27 09:14:37 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 09:14:37 +0200
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AC926D.1030007@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Thu, 26 Jun 2014 17:36:45 -0400")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org> <6134419.xed50sakqP@inno>
 <53AC926D.1030007@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87d2duddsy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 26 Jun 2014 23:36, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> on the key.  For any OpenPGP certificate, you can send it 3DES-encrypted
> traffic and be in complete accordance with the spec and the recipient's
> preferences.

Assuming the sender uses a decent implementation, the attacker must have
been able to modify the senders system by changing the code or the
config files.  This requires write access to the machine; with that an
attacker has thousands of ways to tap the communication.  Degrading to
the still good 3DES is an option which is even not very promising.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 27 09:21:17 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 09:21:17 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's
 message of "Thu, 26 Jun 2014 17:57:57 -0400")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <878uoiddhu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 26 Jun 2014 23:57, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said:

> Why should anyone cater to users of PGP 8.x in 2014 when we have an
> opportunity to provide a stronger cryptographic baseline for everyone else?

Probably for the same reason that some sites are using GnuPG 1.2, which
had its last regular release in 2004 (and an exceptional security
release in 2006).


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From shmick at riseup.net  Fri Jun 27 15:54:51 2014
From: shmick at riseup.net (shmick at riseup.net)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 23:54:51 +1000
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>



Robert J. Hansen:
> On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern
>> implementation:
> 
> And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880.  Methinks you're
> objecting because it's a largely-conforming implementation that doesn't
> have good support for SHA256.  ;)
> 
>> In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm having a hard
>> time finding documentation for it.
> 
> If I recall correctly, it can understand SHA-256 but not generate
> SHA-256.  SHA-256 generation support was added late in the 8.x series,
> but earlier 8.x releases could understand it.
> 
>> How many people use it?
> 
> It's not as if there are Nielsen ratings for these things.  All I can do
> is say that I still regularly encounter it when I talk to people about
> PGP.  For instance, I know of one law firm that purchased a site license
> for 8.x and refuses to upgrade, since the more recent editions cost a
> fortune in per-seat licenses and have very little in the way of new
> functionality.

i think the point daniel is making is that there is freely available
software which is actively maintained and receives security updates and
is not a decade old

any modern OS can utilise thunderbird + enigmail as an example

there's great work done to bring gnupg to windows with gpg4win

why *wouldn't* you use it ?

is it really a case of obdurateness, "if it ain't broke don't fix it,"
or an unwillingness to use and get accustomed to something new and/or
different, perhaps a new gui - look, i completely sympathise with the
latter especially for older people if i may generalise

if you're a windows user you'll have to upgrade after 10 years if you
want to keep safe or pay ($) for it; ok, now i sympathise with people
not wanting a new gui with windows 8

> 
>> Why should anyone cater to users of PGP 8.x in 2014 when we have an 
>> opportunity to provide a stronger cryptographic baseline for everyone
>> else?
> 
> Because there are still people using it.

see above
the don't *have* to but, sure, they *can*

> 
> Remember, GnuPG also supports most of RFC1991 because we've got a large
> base of PGP 2.6 users who are refusing to upgrade...
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 


From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Fri Jun 27 16:52:22 2014
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 10:52:22 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net> 
Message-ID: <20140627145223.1E653A0149@smtp.hushmail.com>

On 6/27/2014 at 9:59 AM, shmick at riseup.net wrote:

>is it really a case of obdurateness, "if it ain't broke don't fix 
>it,"
>or an unwillingness to use and get accustomed to something new 
>and/or
>different, perhaps a new gui - look, i completely sympathise with 
>the
>latter especially for older people if i may generalise
>
>if you're a windows user you'll have to upgrade after 10 years if 
>you
>want to keep safe or pay ($) for it; ok, now i sympathise with 
>people
>not wanting a new gui with windows 8
>
>> 
>>> Why should anyone cater to users of PGP 8.x in 2014 when we 
>have an 
>>> opportunity to provide a stronger cryptographic baseline for 
>everyone
>>> else?
>> 
>> Because there are still people using it.

=====

And it supports/promotes wider cryptography usage ...

We, (the Cryptography community in general, and the GnuPG community in particular)
want to encourage more widespread cryptography use,

and to have newbies who finally take the step of using it, to then find problems in e-mailing other users of different programs because of incompatibilities ....
it could be discouraging enough to just stop using it before one has had a chance to appreciate what it can do, and come to love it.


Many thanks to WK and the GnuPG development team for taking the trouble to provide backward compatibility even as GnuPG grows better and more robust.


vedaal



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun 27 16:57:25 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:57:25 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/27/2014 03:54 PM, shmick at riseup.net wrote:
> 
> 
> Robert J. Hansen:
>> On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern 
>>> implementation:
>> 
>> And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880.  Methinks
>> you're objecting because it's a largely-conforming implementation
>> that doesn't have good support for SHA256.  ;)
>> 
>>> In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm having a
>>> hard time finding documentation for it.
>> 
>> If I recall correctly, it can understand SHA-256 but not
>> generate SHA-256.  SHA-256 generation support was added late in
>> the 8.x series, but earlier 8.x releases could understand it.
>> 
>>> How many people use it?
>> 
>> It's not as if there are Nielsen ratings for these things.  All I
>> can do is say that I still regularly encounter it when I talk to
>> people about PGP.  For instance, I know of one law firm that
>> purchased a site license for 8.x and refuses to upgrade, since
>> the more recent editions cost a fortune in per-seat licenses and
>> have very little in the way of new functionality.
> 
> i think the point daniel is making is that there is freely
> available software which is actively maintained and receives
> security updates and is not a decade old
> 
> any modern OS can utilise thunderbird + enigmail as an example
> 
> there's great work done to bring gnupg to windows with gpg4win
> 
> why *wouldn't* you use it ?

You won't convince a corporate IT department in a Law firm (or for
that matter Financial world) about it. They want SLAs and support, and
who knows what custom addons they have for their Outlook setup for
various functions that makes it impractical to switch to Thunderbird
(does it support Exchange these days?)

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Aut disce aut discede
Either learn or leave
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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AMfLZxGSJfF35HWs21AP+NbMs24QUY1Med66lq30wJjJt9/FaoHlk7nT9OUU3Eu/
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Bz7nkPUpqiPbU5YISumS
=Fath
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Jun 27 19:46:45 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:46:45 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <53ADAE05.1060502@digitalbrains.com>

On 27/06/14 15:54, shmick at riseup.net wrote:
> why *wouldn't* you use it ?

I think it's possible a good portion of these users have custom-written software
that's integrated into a larger system, which uses PGP. So even though GnuPG is
free to use, they'd still have to contract some software development company to
integrate it into their custom software.

I'm purely speculating, however, it doesn't seem an unreasonable case where it's
not just obtuse "I don't like change".

Plus, you still need to pay your system administrator or similar to deploy all
the changes, and the lost productivity of your employees while they get used to
the new system.

And this not because management wanted it, but because people on a mailing list
thought this would really be the best for you. Never mind that in the current
economy you're worrying whether you can afford to keep that young father or
mother employed and keep your business running. Fire that guy/gal, and get
yourself some SHA-256. Okay, now I'm getting a bit carried away ;). If you
didn't like this last bit, here's the start: ^H^H^H^H^H

I however have no clue what you expose yourself to when you still use PGP 8.x.
It could be possible that these guys take irresponsible risks, I don't know.

HT^H,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Jun 27 19:48:46 2014
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:48:46 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <53ADAE7E.50801@digitalbrains.com>

On 27/06/14 16:57, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> who knows what custom addons they have for their Outlook setup

Oops, I missed this post when I wrote my own; quite some overlap there. Sorry
about that.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 27 20:51:00 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 20:51:00 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53ADAE05.1060502@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of
 "Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:46:45 +0200")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net> <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net> <53ADAE05.1060502@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <87pphu9off.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:46, peter at digitalbrains.com said:

> I however have no clue what you expose yourself to when you still use PGP 8.x.
> It could be possible that these guys take irresponsible risks, I don't know.

They will tell you that they send the encrypted messages only within
their VPN and that the company policy requires end to end encryption.
Check box security.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Fri Jun 27 21:08:40 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 20:08:40 +0100
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <476168704.20140627200840@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 27 June 2014 at 3:57:25 PM, in
<mid:53AD8655.4090603 at sumptuouscapital.com>, Kristian Fiskerstrand
wrote:



> You won't convince a corporate IT department in a Law
> firm (or for that matter Financial world) about it.
> They want SLAs and support, and who knows what custom
> addons they have for their Outlook setup for various
> functions that makes it impractical to switch to
> Thunderbird (does it support Exchange these days?)

I'm sure somebody is more than willing to sell them these things.



- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Ultimate consistency lies in being consistently inconsistent
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pIv8EAJJHPI9KCl2/qnHnMvsUq3FXEqfQXoFUlcSm
M9bZh1OApER1c5Lz6SPKk6nX9XitmYRPckJF6Z3QZ/708vh3p5yKjs12a4VEF13D
+2Hmx1DzF7odyc1s2/VKrneyEpMnkg1wz1aezFmToepyLvDVvjb0p9DrwupxYKgg
tqe1iYfz
=I+/f
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 27 21:05:19 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 21:05:19 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com> (Kristian Fiskerstrand's
 message of "Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:57:25 +0200")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net> <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net> <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <87lhsi9nrk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:57, kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com
said:
> that matter Financial world) about it. They want SLAs and support, and
> who knows what custom addons they have for their Outlook setup for
> various functions that makes it impractical to switch to Thunderbird

With Gpg4win we have been in contact with several companies who would
love to use gpg4win iff we could provide a decent Outlook plugin.  The
old one does not work with 2010 anymore and the current one is quite
limited.  Unfortunately our price tag for the _development_ of a new
outlook plugin is too high to be paid out of the general IT service
budget and thus there has been no progress here.

Despite that I am not keen to do work on GpgOL again [1], it has has
been a major source of revenues.  There is quite some interest in using
E2E encryption but the upfront development costs are the major problem -
not the costs for the SLA.  Given all the uncertainties in
Outlook/Exchange development we can't risk to do the development and
then re-finance that with support contracts.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


[1] Those two years literally grayed out my hair.
-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From vics at eq.by  Fri Jun 27 12:45:42 2014
From: vics at eq.by (Viktar Siarheichyk)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 13:45:42 +0300
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
Message-ID: <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>

On 26.06.2014 23:28, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> On June 26, 2014 8:26:16 AM PDT, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
> <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> 
>> As for arguments about use on smartcards -- if you plan to get a 
>> smartcard, and you have a primary key that is too large for it, you
>> can always generate and publish new subkeys that will fit in your 
>> smartcard. If that's the tradeoff that seems the most secure for
>> you, that's fine, and the fact that you were using stronger keys in
>> your non-smartcard implementation doesn't hurt you at all.
>> Smartcards are not a good reason to object to larger keysizes for
>> people who don't use smartcards.
> 
> Actually, it is for those of us who prefer smartcards.  I was once
> newbie trying to use a smartcard. Repeated emphasis on having only a
> 4k key can create the impression that a smartcard is not strong
> enough, that it is weaker because it can only go up to 3072 bits
> (depending on the card).
> 
> The reason for me to have a smartcard was to physically separate the
> key from the computer.  Using a key that is too large for the
> smartcard does not fit my purpose for having one.

I got an FSFE Fellowhip card and an OpenPGP SmartCard V2 from
kernelconcepts.de (both were received early this year) and they both
happily support 4096-bit keys. I do not know about YubiKey NEO "an
experimental OpenPGP applet" though.

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From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Fri Jun 27 21:44:47 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 15:44:47 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
 <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>
Message-ID: <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 27, 2014, at 6:45 AM, Viktar Siarheichyk <vics at eq.by> wrote:

> On 26.06.2014 23:28, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
>> On June 26, 2014 8:26:16 AM PDT, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
>> <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>> 
>>> As for arguments about use on smartcards -- if you plan to get a 
>>> smartcard, and you have a primary key that is too large for it, you
>>> can always generate and publish new subkeys that will fit in your 
>>> smartcard. If that's the tradeoff that seems the most secure for
>>> you, that's fine, and the fact that you were using stronger keys in
>>> your non-smartcard implementation doesn't hurt you at all.
>>> Smartcards are not a good reason to object to larger keysizes for
>>> people who don't use smartcards.
>> 
>> Actually, it is for those of us who prefer smartcards.  I was once
>> newbie trying to use a smartcard. Repeated emphasis on having only a
>> 4k key can create the impression that a smartcard is not strong
>> enough, that it is weaker because it can only go up to 3072 bits
>> (depending on the card).
>> 
>> The reason for me to have a smartcard was to physically separate the
>> key from the computer.  Using a key that is too large for the
>> smartcard does not fit my purpose for having one.
> 
> I got an FSFE Fellowhip card and an OpenPGP SmartCard V2 from
> kernelconcepts.de (both were received early this year) and they both
> happily support 4096-bit keys. I do not know about YubiKey NEO "an
> experimental OpenPGP applet" though.

My understanding is that the YubiKey Neo applet supports up to 2048 bit RSA.  Thus there are some keys that will work with the V2 SmartCard but not on the Neo.

I do admire the Neo form factor though.

David



From John at enigmail.net  Fri Jun 27 22:24:51 2014
From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 15:24:51 -0500
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>

Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 06/27/2014 03:54 PM, shmick at riseup.net wrote:
> 
> 
>> Robert J. Hansen:
>>> On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>>> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern 
>>>> implementation:
>>> 
>>> And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880.  Methinks
>>> you're objecting because it's a largely-conforming implementation
>>> that doesn't have good support for SHA256.  ;)
>>> 
>>>> In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm having a
>>>> hard time finding documentation for it.
>>> 
>>> If I recall correctly, it can understand SHA-256 but not
>>> generate SHA-256.  SHA-256 generation support was added late in
>>> the 8.x series, but earlier 8.x releases could understand it.
>>> 

That is as I remember it, Rob. I don't recall if there was a difference
between 8.0 and 8.1 with respect to SHA-256. JM3 probably would.

> 
>> any modern OS can utilise thunderbird + enigmail as an example

Any? Maybe for the Windows/Linux/Mac case.

>> there's great work done to bring gnupg to windows with gpg4win
> 
>> why *wouldn't* you use it ? 

In the US? Sarbanes-Oxley or any other retention/retrieval laws and
regulations. [see below] Those requirements have a way of spreading
internationally within a corporation or business sector.

> 
> You won't convince a corporate IT department in a Law firm (or for
> that matter Financial world) about it. They want SLAs and support, and
> who knows what custom addons they have for their Outlook setup for
> various functions that makes it impractical to switch to Thunderbird
> (does it support Exchange these days?)

HR, and Compliance/Legal are some other departments that would veto the move.

PGP 8.x has a couple non-RFC extensions that make it quite popular in the
corporate world: ADKs, and X.509 certifications on PGP keys.

The accompanying LDAP-based PGP Keyserver is also often found in this
environment, if they haven't added the keyserver functionality to their
corporate directories.

PGP also had plugins for GroupWise and Notes, in addition to Outlook.

-John

-- 
John P. Clizbe                      Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP                  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
     mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?"
A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels"



From tux.tsndcb at free.fr  Fri Jun 27 22:45:57 2014
From: tux.tsndcb at free.fr (tux.tsndcb at free.fr)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 22:45:57 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <307335696.27082237.1403901957743.JavaMail.root@zimbra33-e6.priv.proxad.net>



> My understanding is that the YubiKey Neo applet supports up to 2048 bit RSA.  Thus there are some keys that will work with the V2 SmartCard but not on the Neo.

Yes limitation is physical, the ship cannot have key size more than 2048 bit RSA on Yubikey, for the V2 SmartCard GnuPG, it's different, limitation was software (by GnuPG) but not hardware, so now it works with 4096 bit RSA.

Best Regards


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Jun 27 23:02:01 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 17:02:01 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <87d2duddsy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>	<53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>	<53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org>
 <6134419.xed50sakqP@inno>	<53AC926D.1030007@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87d2duddsy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <53ADDBC9.4040802@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/27/2014 3:14 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Assuming the sender uses a decent implementation, the attacker must have
> been able to modify the senders system by changing the code or the
> config files.

Nope.

It took me about fifteen seconds to come up with a way to do this with
acceptable (if not-100%) probability of success and acceptable (but
extremely low) probability of intercept.

Tomorrow I'll post my method to the list.

If I can come up with a method to degrade things to 3DES in fifteen
seconds, then I believe the people who do this stuff professionally have
spent at least a few weeks inventing and perfecting other methods.



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun 27 23:09:05 2014
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 23:09:05 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <53ADDD71.8070400@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/27/2014 10:24 PM, John Clizbe wrote:
> Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> On 06/27/2014 03:54 PM, shmick at riseup.net wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> Robert J. Hansen:
>>>> On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>>>> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a
>>>>> modern implementation:
>>>> 
>>>> And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880.  Methinks 
>>>> you're objecting because it's a largely-conforming
>>>> implementation that doesn't have good support for SHA256.
>>>> ;)
>>>> 
>>>>> In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm
>>>>> having a hard time finding documentation for it.
>>>> 
>>>> If I recall correctly, it can understand SHA-256 but not 
>>>> generate SHA-256.  SHA-256 generation support was added late
>>>> in the 8.x series, but earlier 8.x releases could understand
>>>> it.
>>>> 
> 
> That is as I remember it, Rob. I don't recall if there was a
> difference between 8.0 and 8.1 with respect to SHA-256. JM3
> probably would.

My recollection is that SHA256 was added read-only in 8.1


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Veni vidi velcro
I came, I saw, I got stuck
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=LgOx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From johannes at zarl.at  Sat Jun 28 00:31:52 2014
From: johannes at zarl.at (Johannes Zarl)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 00:31:52 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <87pphu9off.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53ADAE05.1060502@digitalbrains.com> <87pphu9off.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani>

On Friday 27 June 2014 20:51:00 Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:46, peter at digitalbrains.com said:
> > I however have no clue what you expose yourself to when you still use PGP
> > 8.x. It could be possible that these guys take irresponsible risks, I
> > don't know.
> They will tell you that they send the encrypted messages only within
> their VPN and that the company policy requires end to end encryption.
> Check box security.

So basically there are (at least) two user groups:

1. legacy PGP implementations in closed corporate environments
2. people who want to exchange messages over the internet

Group 1 can afford not to have frequent security updates since the systems are 
isolated from the internet and don't upgrade because this would incur a 
significant cost with little benefit.

Group 2 is willing to keep their software up to date, but are in a generally 
more "attackable" environment. They push for "more secure" standards and 
defaults (whatever that means).

The way I see it compatibility between those two groups is a non-issue - they 
simply don't exchange messages.

Arguing that "internet-users" should not adopt SHA-x because SHA-1 is the only 
thing supported by legacy systems makes about as much sense as arguing that 
"legacy-users" should throw money into upgrading their isolated systems.

Cheers,
  Johannes


From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Sat Jun 28 00:35:00 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 18:35:00 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 27, 2014, at 4:24 PM, John Clizbe <John at enigmail.net> wrote:

> Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> On 06/27/2014 03:54 PM, shmick at riseup.net wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> Robert J. Hansen:
>>>> On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>>>> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern 
>>>>> implementation:
>>>> 
>>>> And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880.  Methinks
>>>> you're objecting because it's a largely-conforming implementation
>>>> that doesn't have good support for SHA256.  ;)
>>>> 
>>>>> In what ways is its support for SHA-256 limited?  I'm having a
>>>>> hard time finding documentation for it.
>>>> 
>>>> If I recall correctly, it can understand SHA-256 but not
>>>> generate SHA-256.  SHA-256 generation support was added late in
>>>> the 8.x series, but earlier 8.x releases could understand it.
>>>> 
> 
> That is as I remember it, Rob. I don't recall if there was a difference
> between 8.0 and 8.1 with respect to SHA-256. JM3 probably would.

My notes say that PGP 8.1 can verify sigs made with SHA-256, but won't generate it.  I'm afraid I don't have a copy of 8.1 handy any longer to check.

Incidentally, since subkeys have come up in this thread, I seem to recall a few strange bugs with 8.x (8.0? 8.1?) that make it difficult to use if the key you are encrypting to has a signing subkey.  8.x didn't always handle signing subkeys properly, so could end up failing to encrypt (it wasn't 100% of the time - it depended on which subkey was dated first).  If anyone is curious, I'll dig out my notes for this.  I submitted the bug to PGP, and I know it was fixed in a later version.

David



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sat Jun 28 01:35:12 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:35:12 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53ADAE05.1060502@digitalbrains.com> <87pphu9off.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani>
Message-ID: <53ADFFB0.6080306@sixdemonbag.org>

On 6/27/2014 6:31 PM, Johannes Zarl wrote:
> 1. legacy PGP implementations in closed corporate environments

Be careful about that phrase "legacy."  Too often it's used as a slur.
It's more accurate to say, "PGP installations in corporate
environments."  There's no reason to think these installations are
closed, or that the IT departments are being unreasonable.

Just because they're not doing what you think they should doesn't mean
they're not playing with a full deck.

> Group 1 can afford not to have frequent security updates since the systems are 
> isolated from the internet and don't upgrade because this would incur a 
> significant cost with little benefit.

The "since" is probably inaccurate.  Group 1 can afford to keep using
PGP 8.x because it meets their needs.  They don't upgrade because it
doesn't make business sense to do so.

> The way I see it compatibility between those two groups is a non-issue - they 
> simply don't exchange messages.

You may not exchange emails with corporations; many other people do.

> Arguing that "internet-users" should not adopt SHA-x because SHA-1 is the only 
> thing supported by legacy systems makes about as much sense as arguing that 
> "legacy-users" should throw money into upgrading their isolated systems.

That's a subtle rephrasing of the position -- and an inaccurate one.

SHA-x should not be used *by default in places where it would break the
spec*.  But no one is saying that SHA-x should not be used, period, nor
is anyone saying that if after careful deliberation you decide that
breaking the spec is appropriate, that you shouldn't do so.




From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sat Jun 28 06:09:40 2014
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 00:09:40 -0400
Subject: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article
In-Reply-To: <53ADDBC9.4040802@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>	<53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>	<53AC7D41.5010906@sixdemonbag.org>
 <6134419.xed50sakqP@inno>	<53AC926D.1030007@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87d2duddsy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53ADDBC9.4040802@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <53AE4004.70006@sixdemonbag.org>

Since it looks as if I'm going to be out of contact for the next few
days (traveling), I figured I'd share the degradation a little early --

Alice and Bob are communicating.  Bob insists on using extremely large
keyspaces: his certificate is RSA-16384 and his preference list is
AES256 CAMELLIA256.  Alice does not.  She's not naive or clueless: she's
a competent user who understands that Bob insists everything be
encrypted with an RSA-16384 certificate.

Charlene wants to degrade Bob to 112 bits of effective keyspace.  (Why?
 Beats me.  Let's say she's working for the Zarbnulaxian Intelligence
Service, and ZIS has tasked her with preparing the Earth for its
eventual domination.  To further this goal, ZIS has given her a quantum
computer one of them got from their kid's breakfast cereal box.  It
doesn't provide enough qubits to break RSA, but can attack 3DES.)

Charlene can't do anything to Bob.  She *can* do something to Alice.
The next conference Alice goes to, the next OpenPGP Birds of a Feather,
Charlene makes sure people there are talking about how 3DES is "really
the most-trusted cipher in all of OpenPGP."[*]  Charlene makes sure a
few well-written webpages get put up talking about how 3DES is really a
superior choice to AES256 because Cortois[**].  Ultimately, Charlene
arranges for Alice to meet someone else who's privacy-paranoid and
insists that Alice only use 3DES to communicate, because "that's the
only MUST algorithm in OpenPGP, it's the most interoperable, and because
it's been turning brilliant young cryptanalysts into burned-out
alcoholic wrecks for 30 years" [***].

When faced with that, it's only a matter of time until Alice decides to
put 3DES first in her own preference list.  And then all her
communications to Bob have 112 bits of keyspace, not the 256 Bob
demands.  And unless Bob is paranoid enough to check the symmetric
algorithm used on every single encrypted message, Bob will never know
that Alice's communications to him have been degraded.

Werner and others are absolutely right: there is no *technical* way to
degrade things to 3DES.  But given that cipher preference lists are
fundamentally a *human* decision, well... the human being is always
exploitable.



[*]   ... which is probably true.
[**]  ... of which I've seen several.
[***] ... okay, yes, Charlene paid me to hook up with Alice.  YOU
      DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW CRUSHING GRADUATE STUDENT DEBT IS, OKAY?


From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Jun 28 08:09:10 2014
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:09:10 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <53ADAE05.1060502@digitalbrains.com> <87pphu9off.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani>
Message-ID: <53AE5C06.80402@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 28-06-2014 0:31, Johannes Zarl wrote:

> The way I see it compatibility between those two groups is a non-issue - they 
> simply don't exchange messages.

Why not? Robert came with the example of a law firm. Lawyers exchange
messages with their clients, and in criminal cases the police might want
to intercept and decrypt them. That's illegal in many countries and may
not be used as evidence, but they will try anyway. So encryption that
works between the corporate computer of a lawyer and the private
computer of his/her client would be usefull.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Jun 28 10:18:48 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:18:48 +0200
Subject: card reader (was: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article)
In-Reply-To: <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com> (David
 Shaw's message of "Fri, 27 Jun 2014 15:44:47 -0400")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
 <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>
 <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <87ha35a1lj.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 21:44, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:

> I do admire the Neo form factor though.

The SCT3512 [1] with an OpenPGP card is also quite convenient:

  http://werner.eifzilla.de/sct3512.jpg

I have taken off the ID-000 form factor card for the picture.  The label
is also non-standard but easy to apply.  I have that reader in daily use
for about a year now.  kernelconcepts distributes pre-punched cards but
it is also possible to cut an ID-000 out off a regular sized card.
Price for the reader w/o card is in the 20 Euro range.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


[1] http://www.identive-infrastructure.com/pdf/usa/SCT3512-dat-en.pdf

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Jun 28 11:20:53 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:20:53 +0100
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3@jabberwocky.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
 <A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <1139708022.20140628102053@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 27 June 2014 at 11:35:00 PM, in
<mid:A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3 at jabberwocky.com>, David Shaw
wrote:


> Incidentally, since subkeys have come up in this
> thread, I seem to recall a few strange bugs with 8.x
> (8.0? 8.1?) that make it difficult to use if the key
> you are encrypting to has a signing subkey.  8.x didn't
> always handle signing subkeys properly, so could end up
> failing to encrypt (it wasn't 100% of the time - it
> depended on which subkey was dated first).  If anyone
> is curious, I'll dig out my notes for this.  I
> submitted the bug to PGP, and I know it was fixed in a
> later version.


My recollection is that PGP 8.x would always try to encrypt to the
newest subkey, and encryption would fail if the newest was a signing
subkey. I had 8.0.3 and 8.1; if memory serves, both had this issue -
signing subkeys were fairly new at the time.




- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Never lean forward to push an invisible object.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iPQEAQEKAF4FAlOuiQVXFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl
bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0
N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pkWMD/Rcv4i/MDuEQ5gujWhAjiKQimX9K0gZ8XaqZ
0zHcyHUDdUGkKHhaV9c4C3vkTkPKpZpTLhv6n5ADTHf4f1ggaZiwo48sI3aJ34O+
egbYC0AIyl8sw+aj/o54/bH6z+tsYH9pEH9dSl8Z/9NPi/vsjQpf/nK4bT+PAVnW
KbUR8+Vr
=Vmtp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Jun 28 11:37:46 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:37:46 +0100
Subject: PGP insecurities?
In-Reply-To: <BLU436-SMTP2501DAB5BB2ED692950B555851B0@phx.gbl>
References: <loj7jj+1jbbh93@YahooGroups.com>
 <CAJUMiQupxniVLKRpv-7tNoLRyKujB8jOQLhyvnp4_vex7s0kzA@mail.gmail.com>
 <1403883805.35735.YahooMailNeo@web161302.mail.bf1.yahoo.com>
 <1312849580.20140627192917@my_localhost>
 <BLU436-SMTP2501DAB5BB2ED692950B555851B0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <19633419.20140628103746@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 27 June 2014 at 10:58:18 PM, in
<mid:BLU436-SMTP2501DAB5BB2ED692950B555851B0 at phx.gbl>, 'Mark W.
Walton' mark.walton at sympatico.ca [PGP-Basics] wrote:



> What is FIPS?

[0] lists quite a few possibilities, of which the most promising is
"Federal Information Processing Standard."

[1] lists current Federal Information Processing Standards, with
links.



[0] <www.acronymfinder.com>
[1] <http://www.nist.gov/itl/fipscurrent.cfm>

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Coffee doesn't need a menu, it needs a cup.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iPQEAQEKAF4FAlOujO9XFIAAAAAALgAgaXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3Bl
bnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEJBMjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0
N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pT74D/2Nso4ns/pRC7we6dbqlHXlfR9WgBQJsMQut
HZIlWAyDHMwLbT2P6bnhLcLkLrvHsLQY+0bopmM96jKAqCB0ZDqpxpjCGZ8fOhup
IH7FUsJb7GlA6pjyFToEBdlnKZ6AMjbwr86iXUdOwHoi553i37FLVlZUxNJ8TB02
EN2/w3ps
=5EMN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From johannes at zarl.at  Sat Jun 28 13:57:57 2014
From: johannes at zarl.at (Johannes Zarl)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:57:57 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53ADFFB0.6080306@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani> <53ADFFB0.6080306@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <2012076.daqDCLmOu6@mani>

On Friday 27 June 2014 19:35:12 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 6/27/2014 6:31 PM, Johannes Zarl wrote:
> > 1. legacy PGP implementations in closed corporate environments
> 
> Be careful about that phrase "legacy."  Too often it's used as a slur.
> It's more accurate to say, "PGP installations in corporate
> environments."  There's no reason to think these installations are
> closed, or that the IT departments are being unreasonable.

I do not think of "legacy" as a slur, but as a descriptive term.

Yes, it can have a negative connotation, but that largely depends on who you 
ask: the person using a legacy application that pre-dates the internet and 
holds 30+ years of distilled business-knowledge might have a vastly different 
take on the term "legacy" than the person who's task it is to couple a webshop 
with worldwide shipping to a database that uses 7-bit fixed length database 
fields.


To me there is a simple "legacy" test: If X could sensibly used for a newly 
developed project that runs for at least the next 5 years, then it is not a 
legacy system; otherwise it is.

Nobody (at least I assume nobody) goes around exclaiming: "PGP 8 is just the 
tool that we want to base our future projects on."


From johannes at zarl.at  Sat Jun 28 14:11:40 2014
From: johannes at zarl.at (Johannes Zarl)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 14:11:40 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <53AE5C06.80402@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <5487551.KL8IEDrM2v@mani> <53AE5C06.80402@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <27002737.2kXib9F0hL@mani>

On Saturday 28 June 2014 08:09:10 Johan Wevers wrote:
> On 28-06-2014 0:31, Johannes Zarl wrote:
> > The way I see it compatibility between those two groups is a non-issue -
> > they simply don't exchange messages.
> 
> Why not?

My assumptions were as follows:
 - When exchanging messages with untrusted parties it's a Bad Idea(tm) to use 
unmaintained software that is vulnerable to attacks.
 - PGP 8 is unmaintained software and must be assumed to be vulnerable to 
attacks (we know how many security related bugs gpg saw in the last 12 years)
 - Corporate environments do often use legacy systems, but are usually risk-
aware and isolate vulnerable systems.

I therefore assumed that PGP 8 is only used in closed environments, where the 
risk is manageable.

I assumed it is just the same as with, say Internet Explorer 6: Since many 
intranet applications depend on it, is is still used - it is a sensible 
business decision for some companies to do so. Browsing the web using IE6 on 
the other hand is something no corporate environment would allow.

If the lawyer example is a fitting one, then I guess I have an error in my 
assumptions.

<rant>
If I communicate with someone who must use PGP 8, anything stronger than 
1024bit RSA, SHA1 and 3DES is probably wasted effort, anyways.
</rant>


  Johannes


From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Sat Jun 28 15:22:17 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 09:22:17 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications [was: Re: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article]
In-Reply-To: <1139708022.20140628102053@my_localhost>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
 <A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3@jabberwocky.com>
 <1139708022.20140628102053@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <1D8B6398-91A0-4BBF-90BA-A9D3D98BE6AA@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 28, 2014, at 5:20 AM, MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
> 
> Hi
> 
> 
> On Friday 27 June 2014 at 11:35:00 PM, in
> <mid:A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3 at jabberwocky.com>, David Shaw
> wrote:
> 
> 
>> Incidentally, since subkeys have come up in this
>> thread, I seem to recall a few strange bugs with 8.x
>> (8.0? 8.1?) that make it difficult to use if the key
>> you are encrypting to has a signing subkey.  8.x didn't
>> always handle signing subkeys properly, so could end up
>> failing to encrypt (it wasn't 100% of the time - it
>> depended on which subkey was dated first).  If anyone
>> is curious, I'll dig out my notes for this.  I
>> submitted the bug to PGP, and I know it was fixed in a
>> later version.
> 
> 
> My recollection is that PGP 8.x would always try to encrypt to the
> newest subkey, and encryption would fail if the newest was a signing
> subkey. I had 8.0.3 and 8.1; if memory serves, both had this issue -
> signing subkeys were fairly new at the time.

Yes, that was it.  It got particularly strange when someone was using an RSA signing subkey or auth key (as they would do if they had a smartcard).  In that case, the PGP encryption would actually succeed (after all, RSA is capable of it, despite what the key flags instructed for use) but the GnuPG recipient would be unable to decrypt as from their perspective, that key was sign or auth only.

I put a limited workaround in GnuPG at the time - that's why the encryption key is always written to the card after the auth key (so the encryption key would always be the "newest".  Of course, that didn't handle existing keys.  The real fix was needed in PGP, and it was fixed.

David



From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Sat Jun 28 20:33:24 2014
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 19:33:24 +0100
Subject: card reader (was: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article)
In-Reply-To: <87ha35a1lj.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
 <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>
 <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com>
 <87ha35a1lj.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAAu18heouOBseHaxZDdaSN3T43FWPtOL+kx=Bdc=dJUgtXHQdw@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 9:18 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 21:44, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:
>
>> I do admire the Neo form factor though.
>
> The SCT3512 [1] with an OpenPGP card is also quite convenient:
>
>   http://werner.eifzilla.de/sct3512.jpg
>
> I have taken off the ID-000 form factor card for the picture.  The label
> is also non-standard but easy to apply.  I have that reader in daily use
> for about a year now.  kernelconcepts distributes pre-punched cards but
> it is also possible to cut an ID-000 out off a regular sized card.
> Price for the reader w/o card is in the 20 Euro range.

I can't find a UK source for this, but it does look good.

Speaking of which, is there an alternative source for GnuPG
Smartcards?  KernelConcepts is out of stock until August.

Best wishes,

N.


From chelfa2029 at gmail.com  Sat Jun 28 09:09:15 2014
From: chelfa2029 at gmail.com (Aaron Chelf)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 02:09:15 -0500
Subject: New to OpenPGP  getting frustrated.
Message-ID: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>

Okay so I'm using Open PGP software in conjunction with Thunderbird in
Linux.  I've figured out about everything except the only way I can add
public keys to my key ring so far is to save them as an attachment from
an e-mail sent to me.
How can I just copy a public key to my clipboard and add it to my key-ring?


From rejo at zenger.nl  Sat Jun 28 21:55:37 2014
From: rejo at zenger.nl (Rejo Zenger)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 21:55:37 +0200
Subject: New to OpenPGP  getting frustrated.
In-Reply-To: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>
References: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140628195537.GD7524@ix.local>

++ 28/06/14 02:09 -0500 - Aaron Chelf:
>Okay so I'm using Open PGP software in conjunction with Thunderbird in
>Linux.  I've figured out about everything except the only way I can add
>public keys to my key ring so far is to save them as an attachment from
>an e-mail sent to me.
>How can I just copy a public key to my clipboard and add it to my key-ring?

If you are using the Enigmail plugin:

  <https://www.enigmail.net/documentation/keyman.php>

Search for:

  "Import Keys from File: will allow you to import a key/keys into your 
   keyring from a text file."

And:

  "Search for Keys: allows you to search for a key on a keyserver. 
  (Keyserver)."
   

-- 
Rejo Zenger
E rejo at zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J rejo at zenger.nl
OpenPGP   1FBF 7B37 6537 68B1 2532  A4CB 0994 0946 21DB EFD4
XMPP OTR  271A 9186 AFBC 8124 18CF  4BE2 E000 E708 F811 5ACF
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From dougb at dougbarton.us  Sat Jun 28 22:44:49 2014
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:44:49 -0700
Subject: New to OpenPGP  getting frustrated.
In-Reply-To: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>
References: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53AF2941.4040501@dougbarton.us>

On 06/28/2014 12:09 AM, Aaron Chelf wrote:
> Okay so I'm using Open PGP software in conjunction with Thunderbird in
> Linux.  I've figured out about everything except the only way I can add
> public keys to my key ring so far is to save them as an attachment from
> an e-mail sent to me.
> How can I just copy a public key to my clipboard and add it to my key-ring?

There is an enigmail-users mailing list, this message should have gone 
there instead, for future reference.

The answer to your question is to click the "Decrypt" button. It's 
understandable that you missed it since this usage is not exactly 
obvious, but it will allow you to add the key to your keyring directly 
without having to save the file first.

hope this helps,

Doug




From vmaatta at gmail.com  Sat Jun 28 22:47:48 2014
From: vmaatta at gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 23:47:48 +0300
Subject: card reader (was: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article)
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18heouOBseHaxZDdaSN3T43FWPtOL+kx=Bdc=dJUgtXHQdw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
 <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>
 <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com>
 <87ha35a1lj.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAAu18heouOBseHaxZDdaSN3T43FWPtOL+kx=Bdc=dJUgtXHQdw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <A0A264CD-B107-406D-AF1D-1E473A8FD5CC@gmail.com>

I'm using the FSFE card [1] with SCR3500 [2]. Ok yeah sure, that?s a fellowship card but I actually also wanted to point out the SCR3500 which is a nice similar form factor option for a reader.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/jbaxi8ulfdz5585/fsfe_with_scr3500.jpg

[1] http://fsfe.org/fellowship/card.html
[2] http://www.chipdrive.de/index.php/en/smart-card-reader-writer/rfid-nfc-contact-smart-card-reader-writer/kontakt/scr3500-faltbarer-usb-chipkartenleser.htm

-- 
Ville

> On 28.6.2014, at 21.33, Nicholas Cole <nicholas.cole at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 9:18 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
>> On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 21:44, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:
>> 
>>> I do admire the Neo form factor though.
>> 
>> The SCT3512 [1] with an OpenPGP card is also quite convenient:
>> 
>> http://werner.eifzilla.de/sct3512.jpg
>> 
>> I have taken off the ID-000 form factor card for the picture.  The label
>> is also non-standard but easy to apply.  I have that reader in daily use
>> for about a year now.  kernelconcepts distributes pre-punched cards but
>> it is also possible to cut an ID-000 out off a regular sized card.
>> Price for the reader w/o card is in the 20 Euro range.
> 
> I can't find a UK source for this, but it does look good.
> 
> Speaking of which, is there an alternative source for GnuPG
> Smartcards?  KernelConcepts is out of stock until August.
> 
> Best wishes,
> 
> N.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From John at enigmail.net  Sun Jun 29 00:13:25 2014
From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 17:13:25 -0500
Subject: New to OpenPGP  getting frustrated.
In-Reply-To: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>
References: <53AE6A1B.4020006@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <53AF3E05.7080802@enigmail.net>

Aaron Chelf wrote:
> Okay so I'm using Open PGP software in conjunction with Thunderbird in
> Linux.  I've figured out about everything except the only way I can add
> public keys to my key ring so far is to save them as an attachment from
> an e-mail sent to me.
> How can I just copy a public key to my clipboard and add it to my key-ring?

Right-click attached key. Select import from the context menu.

Clicking 'Decrypt' on a message with an inline key will import the key

-John
-- 
John P. Clizbe                      Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net
SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP                  or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net
FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797  hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net  or
     mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP

Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?"
A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels"


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From mail at tgries.de  Sun Jun 29 10:54:57 2014
From: mail at tgries.de (Thomas Gries)
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 11:54:57 +0300
Subject: How to "regenerate" a key ?
Message-ID: <53AFD461.60206@tgries.de>

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From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Jun 29 12:23:18 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 12:23:18 +0200
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <1D8B6398-91A0-4BBF-90BA-A9D3D98BE6AA@jabberwocky.com> (David
 Shaw's message of "Sat, 28 Jun 2014 09:22:17 -0400")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net> <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net> <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
 <A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3@jabberwocky.com>
 <1139708022.20140628102053@my_localhost>
 <1D8B6398-91A0-4BBF-90BA-A9D3D98BE6AA@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <878uog9fqh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:22, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:

> I put a limited workaround in GnuPG at the time - that's why the
> encryption key is always written to the card after the auth key (so
> the encryption key would always be the "newest".  Of course, that

I have noch checked by I assume that this does not work anymore because
at some point we started to create all keys with the same timestamp.





> didn't handle existing keys.  The real fix was needed in PGP, and it
> was fixed.
>
> David
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Sun Jun 29 15:50:20 2014
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 09:50:20 -0400
Subject: On the advisability of stronger digests than SHA-1 in OpenPGP
 certifications
In-Reply-To: <878uog9fqh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAHeB2Am13rGxt3HTmHcBHgA7CwnyJG1yH3OdOKunv+v4pVmRog@mail.gmail.com>
 <53A960D0.2080106@gmail.com> <53AC6596.4030409@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC945D.2020809@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC9765.6070103@fifthhorseman.net>
 <53AC9996.40605@sixdemonbag.org> <53AD77AB.6060805@riseup.net>
 <53AD8655.4090603@sumptuouscapital.com> <53ADD313.7010600@enigmail.net>
 <A2F8DBA9-1DA7-47A6-BC79-CFAEA3B02BC3@jabberwocky.com>
 <1139708022.20140628102053@my_localhost>
 <1D8B6398-91A0-4BBF-90BA-A9D3D98BE6AA@jabberwocky.com>
 <878uog9fqh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <94C220E9-50D8-4FC0-BE34-5928ED22C5C8@jabberwocky.com>

On Jun 29, 2014, at 6:23 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> On Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:22, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said:
> 
>> I put a limited workaround in GnuPG at the time - that's why the
>> encryption key is always written to the card after the auth key (so
>> the encryption key would always be the "newest".  Of course, that
> 
> I have noch checked by I assume that this does not work anymore because
> at some point we started to create all keys with the same timestamp.

Ha, sure enough.  Looks like that was quite a few years ago.  I won't guess how many people are still using PGP 8, but if they're out there, they're likely not using it to interoperate with people using smartcards.  Given the lack of bug reports since this change way back in 2009, I'll go out on a limb and wager that the intersection between PGP 8 users, if they still exist, and smartcard users isn't exactly large.

David



From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Jun 29 22:20:45 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 22:20:45 +0200
Subject: card reader (was: riseup.net OpenPGP Best Practices article)
In-Reply-To: <A0A264CD-B107-406D-AF1D-1E473A8FD5CC@gmail.com> ("Ville
 =?utf-8?B?TcOkw6R0dMOkIidz?= message of "Sat, 28 Jun 2014 23:47:48 +0300")
References: <20140624035552.GB1419@bacardi.hollandpark.frase.id.au>
 <87bntikdls.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <53A94809.3010706@heypete.com>
 <53A9D37A.605@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <1111873045.20140625205104@my_localhost>
 <53AB37E8.40306@sixdemonbag.org> <53AC0A1C.7080108@enigmail.net>
 <53AC2DA3.1070106@sixdemonbag.org>
 <53AC3B98.1060201@fifthhorseman.net>
 <a481a40f-a433-468c-bae1-5d8cd1ea7280@email.android.com>
 <53AD4B56.6080807@eq.by>
 <93EC2293-B3B7-4852-A4D1-E5FBE35541CC@jabberwocky.com>
 <87ha35a1lj.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAAu18heouOBseHaxZDdaSN3T43FWPtOL+kx=Bdc=dJUgtXHQdw@mail.gmail.com>
 <A0A264CD-B107-406D-AF1D-1E473A8FD5CC@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87mwcv8o2q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 28 Jun 2014 22:47, vmaatta at gmail.com said:
> I'm using the FSFE card [1] with SCR3500 [2]. Ok yeah sure, that?s a
> fellowship card but I actually also wanted to point out the SCR3500

Right.  Some friends told me that this works really well for them.  BTW,
the fellowship card is exactly the same card as the one from
kernelconcepts.  Just a different theme.

This gets me to the question whether it is time for a new theme for the
next print run?


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From emylistsddg at gmail.com  Mon Jun 30 04:32:52 2014
From: emylistsddg at gmail.com (eMyListsDDg)
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 19:32:52 -0700
Subject: "this key has only a public part"
Message-ID: <649434850.20140629193252@gmail.com>

Hello Gnupg-users,

i used gpg4win 2.0.20 gpa 0.9.4 to create a key pair for one of my email accnts.

only it says under tech details, "this key has only a public part". 

i tested an email, it was encrypted but i can't decrypt it.  i thought it would auto create the key pairs pub/priv ?

can i fix this?


-- 
Bill
Key fingerprint = DB4D 251B FE8A BDCD 2BE4  E889 13F1 78D0 A386 B32B



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Jun 30 11:03:28 2014
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 10:03:28 +0100
Subject: How to "regenerate" a key ?
In-Reply-To: <53AFD461.60206@tgries.de>
References: <53AFD461.60206@tgries.de>
Message-ID: <73936022.20140630100328@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Sunday 29 June 2014 at 9:54:57 AM, in
<mid:53AFD461.60206 at tgries.de>, Thomas Gries wrote:


>      Can anyone explain what exactly is meant and
> perhaps improve the     text on the riseup page in the
> sections regarding the md5 and sha1     self-signatures
> ?

The wording means nothing to me, except possibly generate a new key.

But you could also sign the key again with the stronger hash
algorithm. And if you have not published the key, maybe delete the old
self-signature.




- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

To know what we know, and know what we do not know, is wisdom.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun 30 11:58:51 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 11:58:51 +0200
Subject: How to "regenerate" a key ?
In-Reply-To: <53AFD461.60206@tgries.de> (Thomas Gries's message of "Sun, 29
 Jun 2014 11:54:57 +0300")
References: <53AFD461.60206@tgries.de>
Message-ID: <87bnta7m78.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun, 29 Jun 2014 10:54, mail at tgries.de said:

> I do not understand what the authors mean (recreate, i.e. generate a new key?,
> or add a new self-signature??) and think the present formulation is or can be

The author means: add a new self-signature.  I usually do this by
setting a new expiration date.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun 30 18:33:03 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 18:33:03 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.25 released
Message-ID: <87ioni5pds.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

Wer are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2
release: Version 2.0.25.  This release fixes a regression introduced
with the 2.0.24 release.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is the most commonly used tool for OpenPGP
mail and data encryption.  It can be used to encrypt data, create
digital signatures, help authenticating using Secure Shell and to
provide a framework for public key cryptography.  It includes an
advanced key management facility and is compliant with the OpenPGP and
S/MIME standards.

GnuPG-2 has a different architecture than GnuPG-1 (e.g. 1.4.17) in that
it splits up functionality into several modules.  However, both versions
may be installed alongside without any conflict.  In fact, the gpg
version from GnuPG-1 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as included in
GnuPG-2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching.  The advantage of
GnuPG-1 is its smaller size and the lack of dependency on other modules
at run and build time.  We keep maintaining GnuPG-1 versions because
they are useful on very old platforms and for server based applications
requiring only OpenPGP support.

GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License
(GPLv3+).  GnuPG-2 works best on GNU/Linux and *BSD systems but is also
available for other Unices, Microsoft Windows, VMS, and Mac OS X.


What's New in 2.0.24
====================

 * gpg: Fix a regression in 2.0.24 if more than one keyid is given
   to --recv-keys et al.

 * gpg: Cap RSA and Elgamal keysize at 4096 bit also for unattended
   key generation.

 * gpgsm: Fix a DISPLAY related problem with --export-secret-key-p12.

 * scdaemon: Support reader Gemalto IDBridge CT30.


Getting the Software
====================

Please follow the instructions found at https://www.gnupg.org/download/
or read on:

GnuPG 2.0.25 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ .  The list of mirrors
can be found at https://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note that GnuPG
is not available at ftp.gnu.org.

On ftp.gnupg.org and on its mirrors you should find the following new
files in the gnupg/ directory:

  - The GnuPG-2 source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2     (4201k)
    gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2.sig

  - A patch file to upgrade a 2.0.24 GnuPG source tree.  This patch does
    not include updates of the language files.

    gnupg-2.0.24-2.0.25.diff.bz2 (12k)

Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2.
A Windows version will eventually be released at https://gpg4win.org .


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

890d77d89f2d187382f95e83e386f2f7ba789436  gnupg-2.0.25.tar.bz2
fd91161181f1f4cee2827cd2a08c47f382b4059b  gnupg-2.0.24-2.0.25.diff.bz2


Documentation
=============

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/

or in Portable Document Format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Mutt users may want to use
the configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a "set
use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with the
reworked OpenPGP support.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

The driving force behind the development of GnuPG is the company of
its principal author, Werner Koch.  Maintenance and improvement of
GnuPG and related software takes up most of their resources.  To allow
him to continue this work he kindly asks to either purchase a support
contract, engage g10 Code for custom enhancements, or to donate money:

  https://gnupg.org/donate/


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.  Jean-Ren? Reinhard, Olivier Levillain, and Florian Maury of
ANSSI.fr found and reported the compression bug we fixed in 2.0.24.
Jean-Ren? should have been mentioned in the original commit message.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun 30 20:37:29 2014
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 20:37:29 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 1.4.18 released
Message-ID: <87zjgu451y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-1
release: Version 1.4.18.  This release fixes a regression introduced
with the 1.4.17 release.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication and
data storage.  It is a complete and free replacement of PGP and can be
used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures.  It includes an
advanced key management facility, smartcard support and is compliant
with the OpenPGP Internet standard as described by RFC-4880.  GnuPG is
distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPLv3+).

Note that this version is from the GnuPG-1 series and thus smaller than
those from the GnuPG-2 series, easier to build, and also better portable
to ancient platforms.  In contrast to GnuPG-2 (e.g version 2.0.23) it
comes with no support for S/MIME, Secure Shell, or other tools useful
for desktop environments.  Fortunately you may install both versions
alongside on the same system without any conflict.


What's New
===========

 * Fix a regression in 1.4.17 if more than one keyid is given
   to --recv-keys et al.

 * Cap RSA and Elgamal keysize at 4096 bit also for unattended key
   generation.


Getting the Software
====================

First of all, decide whether you really need GnuPG version 1.4.x - most
users are better off with the modern GnuPG 2.0.x version.  Then follow
the instructions found at https://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on:

GnuPG 1.4.18 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/ .  The list of mirrors can be
found at https://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note, that GnuPG is not
available at ftp.gnu.org.

On ftp.gnupg.org and on its mirrors you should find the following new
files in the *gnupg* directory:

  - The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2     (3564k)
    gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2.sig

  - The GnuPG source code compressed using GZIP and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-1.4.18.tar.gz      (4930k)
    gnupg-1.4.18.tar.gz.sig

  - A patch file to upgrade a 1.4.16 GnuPG source tree.  This patch does
    not include updates of the language files.

    gnupg-1.4.17-1.4.18.diff.bz2 (5k)
 
Select one of them. To shorten the download time, you probably want to
get the BZIP2 compressed file.  Please try another mirror if exceptional
your mirror is not yet up to date.

In the *binary* directory, you should find these files:

  - GnuPG compiled for Microsoft Windows and its OpenPGP signature.
    This is a command line only version; the source files are the same
    as above.

    gnupg-w32cli-1.4.18.exe (1575k)
    gnupg-w32cli-1.4.18.exe.sig

Note, that this is a minimal installer and unless you are only in need
for the simple the gpg binary, you are better off using the full
featured installer at https://www.gpg4win.org .


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com | gpg --import

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.  If you get an key expired message, you should retrieve a
   fresh copy as the expiration date might have been prolonged.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

41462d1a97f91abc16a0031b5deadc3095ce88ae  gnupg-1.4.18.tar.bz2
ea7d66c3de7aaf46de9e8678f4fc4a8c329400b2  gnupg-1.4.18.tar.gz
f30571f855b3ff8becff5378a884638da4c3cc9e  gnupg-1.4.17-1.4.18.diff.bz2
579de2464528b436f39c5835e766867a1efa5fee  gnupg-w32cli-1.4.18.exe


Internationalization
====================

GnuPG comes with support for 29 languages.  The Chinese (Simple and
Traditional), Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Norwegian, Polish,
Romanian, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Ukrainian, and Turkish translations
are close to be complete.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at <https://www.gnupg.org/service.html>.

The driving force behind the development of GnuPG is the company of
its principal author, Werner Koch.  Maintenance and improvement of
GnuPG and related software takes up most of their resources.  To allow
him to continue this work he kindly asks to either purchase a support
contract, engage g10 Code for custom enhancements, or to donate money:

  https://gnupg.org/donate/


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, donating money,
spreading the word, or answering questions on the mailing lists.
Jean-Ren? Reinhard, Olivier Levillain, and Florian Maury of ANSSI.fr
found and reported the compression bug we fixed in 2.0.24.  Jean-Ren?
should have been mentioned in the original commit message.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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