Why create offline main key without encryption capabilities
Hauke Laging
mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de
Sun Jun 1 16:17:52 CEST 2014
Am So 01.06.2014, 12:54:30 schrieb Suspekt:
> But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline mainkey
> also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so important that
> subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.
I do :-)
http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/kurzinfo/schluesselqualitaet/#offline
http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/scripte/keygeneration/key-generation.sh
> Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something?
There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and
signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied then
you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back).
There are legal and organizational arguments, too:
1) If you are forced to give a decryption key to the authorities then it
is an advantage if they cannot use this key to forge signatures.
2) If a signature key has expired then you may delete the private part.
You should usually never throw away a decryption key, though, as it can
happen that you have to decrypt data long after the public part has
expired.
I say: Everyone needs keys at different security levels (German):
http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/
E.g. the key which is going to sign this email is not suitable for
handling really important data. But as long as hardly anybody has a
complete high-security key it seems useful to have at least the mainkey
as a last resort.
Technically you could use other subkeys for higher security levels – but
who would understand that? Seems very dangerous to me, more dangerous
than using the mainkey.
Hauke
--
Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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