key generation: paranoia mode - explicit random input

[Hauke Laging]

Am Sa 01.03.2014, 08:40:56 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor:

> Asking the end users to routinely choose a novel high-entropy seed for
> randomness *without* relying on OS-level feature like /dev/random or
> /dev/urandom seems even worse than the case you're trying to defend
> against.

Probably. But this is not a proposal for "users" but for the kind of 
people who regularly write on this list. People who know what they are 
doing.

Security improvements never(?) come for free.


Hauke
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