UI terminology for calculated validities

[Hauke Laging]

Am Fr 25.04.2014, 12:47:46 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor:

> > c) I would like to handle that with an generic notation. I see a
> > strong need for an expression about the relation of the signer to
> > the owner of the signed key. It makes a big difference whether I
> > say "This is some foreigner which has shown me some ID (see
> > separate notation for details)" or "This is my sister". Thus I
> > would like to have a notation "relation@" which would in this case
> > have a value like "identity" or "self", maybe with some additional
> > information like "self: business".

> with the possible exception of "self" indications, which i can see as
> useful for key transitions and multi-key-holding individuals, i don't
> want to see any of these other relationships embedded in the network
> of identity certifications which are published.  The social graph
> exposed by the public keyservers is rich enough to be useful for
> networked identity certifications, but no richer.  it should stay
> that way, since rich published social graphs can be used against
> their participants,

That is not a crypto-related argument. I would never suggest to build 
key management software in a way that forces people to reveal this 
information. But I strongly argue against making the decision for the 
users what information they may offer and which not.

I am not a privacy expert but I assume that for most of the Internet 
users it is not difficult to find out who their family members or their 
close friends are. If this information is available anyway then it makes 
little sense to "protect" this information in the OpenPGP area.


> and it's not clear how to use the additional
> relationship information in an effective way.

I am convinced that future crypto software will have to attribute both 
security and authenticity assessments with keys. Currently most users 
are just playing crypto (or rather: playing IT security; crypto is not 
the weak part of it; its organizational handling is). There will be 
limits similar to --min-cert-level which restrict the accepting of 
signatures (for certain security levels).


> let's keep it simple, and minimize the amount of social graph leakage.

Let's not try to protect the users against themselves even in non-
technical contexts. Your opinion about leaking social information is not 
better that that of somebody who likes to leak it. The result should not 
be you making that impossible for him but quite simple: He leaks, you 
don't.


Hauke
-- 
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http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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