German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Hauke Laging]

Am Fr 27.02.2015, 12:27:40 schrieb gnupgpacker:

> Maybe implementation with an opt-in could preserve publishing of faked
> keys on public keyservers?

We need keyservers which are a lot better that today's. IMHO that also 
means that a keyserver should tell a client for each offered certificate 
whether it (or a trusted keyserver) has made such an email verification.

Work in progress by me about that (in German):
http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/keyserver/

In addition to that I will soon publish a description of my idea how 
crypto life can become much easier (especially for those non-cryotp 
loving people) by using a keyserver proxy (one software suitable for all 
clients instead of improving all clients separately or GnuPG itself 
which is rather not going to happen) which can be configured for key 
selection policies.


Hauke
-- 
Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 603 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part.
URL: </pipermail/attachments/20150227/e2de63d5/attachment.sig>