From gniibe at fsij.org  Mon Jun  1 07:05:33 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 14:05:33 +0900
Subject: OpenPGP card: ERR 100663351 Invalid value <SCD>
In-Reply-To: <CAE+8KM08wJT1x94wEby5ZA-Q2WTC7MVoFAi2oPM3PwPA9JkuUA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAE+8KM2+hf8CebZWVF2hHJkrD3+R0N3DdK6NXca-MBLThwwb=g@mail.gmail.com>
 <556861C1.5090606@fsij.org>
 <CAE+8KM08wJT1x94wEby5ZA-Q2WTC7MVoFAi2oPM3PwPA9JkuUA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <556BE81D.20301@fsij.org>

On 05/29/2015 10:27 PM, Johann Kl?hn wrote:
> I have an external card reader with a pin pad  (CHERRY ST-2000 USB),
> so that is what I use. If I enter a wrong PIN the pin retry counter is
> reduced, so I guess it's working?

I understand your situation.

I think that the problem is pinpad related code in GnuPG.

Debug information is needed to identify the issue and fix the bug (if
any).

Could you please put following configuration and test again?

------------------------- .gnupg/scdaemon.conf
debug-level guru
debug-all
log-file /tmp/scd.log
debug-ccid-driver
-------------------------
-- 


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Jun  1 16:30:59 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 10:30:59 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
Message-ID: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>

Facebook has just this morning announced limited support for OpenPGP.
At present, it's limited to allowing users to upload an OpenPGP
certificate, and Facebook using that certificate to encrypt all email
communications between Facebook and the user.

It's a small step forwards, but an exceptionally welcome one.

Also, thanks to the individual in Facebook's security team[*] who tipped
me off to this minutes after the release was official.  I had no advance
notice of it, but the very instant it got rolled out FB made contact --
with the expectation, I think, that I would spread the word, although no
one asked me to do anything.

Thanks, Facebook.  We really appreciate not just the new feature, but
your reaching out to make sure the people who would most love this new
feature know about it.  :)



[*] This individual has requested his affiliation with Facebook not be
published, lest he start getting 50,000 emails a day from people asking
him to reset their passwords.  If you know or have figured out who he
is, please honor his request.  They've done us a favor: the least we can
do is return it.


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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Mon Jun  1 18:18:46 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 12:18:46 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <556C85E6.50205@sixdemonbag.org>

Apparently, some people are having trouble finding Facebook's public
announcement.  See the following:

https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/securing-email-communications-from-facebook/1611941762379302

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From melvincarvalho at gmail.com  Mon Jun  1 18:17:23 2015
From: melvincarvalho at gmail.com (Melvin Carvalho)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 18:17:23 +0200
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <CAKaEYh+Xk9-Lujbx_kXcZEKKmS==grcnQ9csT7SKLmjjMicPsw@mail.gmail.com>

On 1 June 2015 at 16:30, Robert J. Hansen <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

> Facebook has just this morning announced limited support for OpenPGP.
> At present, it's limited to allowing users to upload an OpenPGP
> certificate, and Facebook using that certificate to encrypt all email
> communications between Facebook and the user.
>
> It's a small step forwards, but an exceptionally welcome one.
>
> Also, thanks to the individual in Facebook's security team[*] who tipped
> me off to this minutes after the release was official.  I had no advance
> notice of it, but the very instant it got rolled out FB made contact --
> with the expectation, I think, that I would spread the word, although no
> one asked me to do anything.
>
> Thanks, Facebook.  We really appreciate not just the new feature, but
> your reaching out to make sure the people who would most love this new
> feature know about it.  :)
>

Great news!

Now we just need a facebook app to generate keys ...


>
>
>
> [*] This individual has requested his affiliation with Facebook not be
> published, lest he start getting 50,000 emails a day from people asking
> him to reset their passwords.  If you know or have figured out who he
> is, please honor his request.  They've done us a favor: the least we can
> do is return it.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
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From gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org  Mon Jun  1 18:37:33 2015
From: gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org (gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 18:37:33 +0200
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>

Hi

On Mon, 01 Jun 2015 10:30:59 -0400
"Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

> Facebook has just this morning announced limited support for OpenPGP.
> At present, it's limited to allowing users to upload an OpenPGP
> certificate, and Facebook using that certificate to encrypt all email
> communications between Facebook and the user.
> 
> It's a small step forwards, but an exceptionally welcome one.

A comment worth reading in case one does not see it oneself IMHO:
https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/

henk

-- 
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
A: Top-posting.
Q: What is the most annoying thing in e-mail?
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From alexanderino at gmail.com  Mon Jun  1 19:18:52 2015
From: alexanderino at gmail.com (Jason Antony)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 03:18:52 +1000
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <CAKaEYh+Xk9-Lujbx_kXcZEKKmS==grcnQ9csT7SKLmjjMicPsw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <CAKaEYh+Xk9-Lujbx_kXcZEKKmS==grcnQ9csT7SKLmjjMicPsw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <556C93FC.5080404@gmail.com>

On 2015-06-02 02:17, Melvin Carvalho wrote:

> Now we just need a facebook app to generate keys ...

But would you trust that app? :-)

-- Jason


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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Jun  1 21:22:23 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 20:22:23 +0100
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
Message-ID: <31041656.20150601202223@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Monday 1 June 2015 at 5:37:33 PM, in
<mid:20150601183733.3fc5b0c6 at frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>,
gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org wrote:


> A comment worth reading in case one does not see it
> oneself IMHO:
> https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/

Whatever Facebook's motivation, doesn't anything that increases the
proportion of emails that are encrypted during transit count as a Good
Thing?

- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Wisdom is a companion to age; yet age may travel alone.
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Jun  1 21:28:03 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 20:28:03 +0100
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <556C93FC.5080404@gmail.com>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <CAKaEYh+Xk9-Lujbx_kXcZEKKmS==grcnQ9csT7SKLmjjMicPsw@mail.gmail.com>
 <556C93FC.5080404@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1542412881.20150601202803@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Monday 1 June 2015 at 6:18:52 PM, in
<mid:556C93FC.5080404 at gmail.com>, Jason Antony wrote:


> But would you trust that app? :-)

Not convinced I would trust such an app on *any* website.

Would the suggestion be to upload a plain vanilla key not used
elsewhere, that has made and gathered no certifications?

- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Dreams come true on this side of the Rainbow too!
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From dan+gpg at pasteur.fr  Mon Jun  1 17:01:40 2015
From: dan+gpg at pasteur.fr (daniel Azuelos)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 17:01:40 +0200
Subject: Install of GnuPG beside a production version
Message-ID: <20150601150139.GA42287@pasteur.fr>

  I already have a working GnuPG which is under the subtree /usr/local.

I would like to build and test the last one (2.0.27) starting on an
independant subtree:
	/local/gpg2

I have started by downloading libgpg-error-1.19

	cd libgpg-error-1.19
	./configure --prefix=/local/gpg2
	make
	make install

then downloaded libgcrypt-1.6.3

	cd libgcrypt-1.6.3
	./configure --prefix=/local/gpg2

and I get an error message:
	configure: error: libgpg-error is needed.
                See ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/ .
when the correct library was correctly installed:
	$ cd /local/gpg2/lib
	$ ls -al
	total 200
	drwxr-xr-x  2 dan  admin    170 Jun  1 16:19 .
	drwxr-xr-x  6 dan  admin    204 Jun  1 16:19 ..
	-rwxr-xr-x  1 dan  admin  92176 Jun  1 16:19 libgpg-error.0.dylib
	lrwxr-xr-x  1 dan  admin     20 Jun  1 16:19 libgpg-error.dylib -> libgpg-error.0.dylib
	-rwxr-xr-x  1 dan  admin    944 Jun  1 16:19 libgpg-error.la
	$
and when configure correctly definedl ibdir:

	libdir='${exec_prefix}/lib'

Moreover:

	./configure --prefix=/local/gpg2 --libdir=/local/gpg2/lib

does produce the same error.



Did I forget a step?
Should I read another documentation?
Should I modify configure to correctly use the libray installed during the
1st step?

Thank you for your help.
-- 
Please, don't bulk quote old messages, above all when they are
confidentials. Professionnal tools don't need this historical
workaround to compensate for Outlook lack of E-mail history managment.
--------
daniel Azuelos            R.S.S.I. - C.I.S.O.       - Institut Pasteur


From einarr at pvv.org  Mon Jun  1 22:17:33 2015
From: einarr at pvv.org (Einar Ryeng)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 22:17:33 +0200
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
Message-ID: <20150601201733.GF10562@pvv.ntnu.no>

On Mon, Jun 01, 2015 at 06:37:33PM +0200, gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org wrote:
> 
> A comment worth reading in case one does not see it oneself IMHO:
> https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/

Well, that comment seems to identify the two main groups you want to hide
information from as being Facebook and the US government. If that was true, you
probably wouldn't be on FB in the first place.

As I see it, the good stuff is:

- First and foremost: other websites might copy this. I'd love to see banks,
  insurance companies and anyone sending me invoices on email pick up on the
  idea.

- It will definately stop your local network administrator, your boss etc.
  from snooping your emails. Likely, it's also making it harder for any _other_
  government than the US to read your communications. 

- FB will be able to sign emails to the users who are interested in this
  security. Granted, people who know how to use encryption probably aren't
  easily fooled by phishing, but in some cases it may do targeted hacking
  just that tiny bit harder.

- The total flow of encrypted email will increase, hopefully eventually making
  intelligence agencies a bit more relaxed to the whole concept.

... and the bad stuff is next to nothing. Anyone not actively enabling this
option will likely never be bothered by it. Which would be the first step to
convincing other sites that this is a safe thing to do.

-- 
Einar Ryeng



From jerry at seibercom.net  Mon Jun  1 23:43:10 2015
From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 17:43:10 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <20150601201733.GF10562@pvv.ntnu.no>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
 <20150601201733.GF10562@pvv.ntnu.no>
Message-ID: <20150601174310.751b431b@seibercom.net>

On Mon, 1 Jun 2015 22:17:33 +0200, Einar Ryeng stated:

> > A comment worth reading in case one does not see it oneself IMHO:
> > https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/  
> 
> Well, that comment seems to identify the two main groups you want to hide
> information from as being Facebook and the US government. If that was true,
> you probably wouldn't be on FB in the first place.

Honestly, the only email I ever get from FB is a notification that someone
posted on my page or left me a message. I fail to see any point whatsoever in
bothering to encrypt this nonsense. However, each to their own.

-- 
Jerry


From antony at blazrsoft.com  Tue Jun  2 01:14:00 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (antony at blazrsoft.com)
Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 19:14:00 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <20150601174310.751b431b@seibercom.net>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
 <20150601201733.GF10562@pvv.ntnu.no> <20150601174310.751b431b@seibercom.net>
Message-ID: <F2376175-FBFD-4470-AFE6-1587B26F9EB7@blazrsoft.com>



On June 1, 2015 5:43:10 PM EDT, Jerry <jerry at seibercom.net> wrote:
>On Mon, 1 Jun 2015 22:17:33 +0200, Einar Ryeng stated:
>
>> > A comment worth reading in case one does not see it oneself IMHO:
>> >
>https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/
> 
>> 
>> Well, that comment seems to identify the two main groups you want to
>hide
>> information from as being Facebook and the US government. If that was
>true,
>> you probably wouldn't be on FB in the first place.
>
>Honestly, the only email I ever get from FB is a notification that
>someone
>posted on my page or left me a message. I fail to see any point
>whatsoever in
>bothering to encrypt this nonsense. However, each to their own.
>
>-- 
>Jerry
>
>_______________________________________________
>Gnupg-users mailing list
>Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

-- 
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
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From antony at blazrsoft.com  Tue Jun  2 01:20:33 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (antony at blazrsoft.com)
Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 19:20:33 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <20150601174310.751b431b@seibercom.net>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
 <20150601201733.GF10562@pvv.ntnu.no> <20150601174310.751b431b@seibercom.net>
Message-ID: <CB2A1341-C3BC-4F7D-A446-F56D86DAB317@blazrsoft.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

I don't see any harm in it. I uploaded my public key and they verified that I could decrypt it by a link in an encrypted email. 5 whole seconds out of my day to get encrypted emails from Facebook. They now have information that was publicly available on any sks keyserver already. Good for them for integrating any kind of encryption into their contact preferences. Use it, don't use it, I really don't think it makes much of a difference overall. Just good to see any kind of widespread adoption of encryption from a major influence among some people as Facebook.

On June 1, 2015 5:43:10 PM EDT, Jerry <jerry at seibercom.net> wrote:
>On Mon, 1 Jun 2015 22:17:33 +0200, Einar Ryeng stated:
>
>> > A comment worth reading in case one does not see it oneself IMHO:
>> >
>https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/
>
>>
>> Well, that comment seems to identify the two main groups you want to
>hide
>> information from as being Facebook and the US government. If that was
>true,
>> you probably wouldn't be on FB in the first place.
>
>Honestly, the only email I ever get from FB is a notification that
>someone
>posted on my page or left me a message. I fail to see any point
>whatsoever in
>bothering to encrypt this nonsense. However, each to their own.
>
>--
>Jerry
>
>_______________________________________________
>Gnupg-users mailing list
>Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

- --
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
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2OAUA2018PM9CnPlM6pOJG+TSYJdi3MvlPBqpNu6Ljp0evHG4yQbEbxAY7XeaJU0
PGtNkqo=
=RQiH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From antony at blazrsoft.com  Tue Jun  2 01:29:11 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (antony at blazrsoft.com)
Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2015 19:29:11 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <CB2A1341-C3BC-4F7D-A446-F56D86DAB317@blazrsoft.com>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
 <20150601201733.GF10562@pvv.ntnu.no> <20150601174310.751b431b@seibercom.net>
 <CB2A1341-C3BC-4F7D-A446-F56D86DAB317@blazrsoft.com>
Message-ID: <DC258C52-8FD8-423D-99AA-6B85304E41FD@blazrsoft.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On June 1, 2015 7:20:33 PM EDT, antony at blazrsoft.com wrote:
>I don't see any harm in it. I uploaded my public key and they verified
>that I could decrypt it by a link in an encrypted email. 5 whole
>seconds out of my day to get encrypted emails from Facebook. They now
>have information that was publicly available on any sks keyserver
>already. Good for them for integrating any kind of encryption into
>their contact preferences. Use it, don't use it, I really don't think
>it makes much of a difference overall. Just good to see any kind of
>widespread adoption of encryption from a major influence among some
>people as Facebook.

Also, sorry for the blank response and top posting. Forgot to verify my settings since a phone OS upgrade. *facepalm*
- --
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: APG v1.1.1

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From alexanderino at gmail.com  Tue Jun  2 02:44:59 2015
From: alexanderino at gmail.com (Jason Antony)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 10:44:59 +1000
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <1542412881.20150601202803@my_localhost>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <CAKaEYh+Xk9-Lujbx_kXcZEKKmS==grcnQ9csT7SKLmjjMicPsw@mail.gmail.com>
 <556C93FC.5080404@gmail.com> <1542412881.20150601202803@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <556CFC8B.7040505@gmail.com>

On 2015-06-02 05:28, MFPA wrote:

> Not convinced I would trust such an app on *any* website.

It would be rather na?ve to do so, indeed.


> Would the suggestion be to upload a plain vanilla key not used
> elsewhere, that has made and gathered no certifications?

This is exactly what I have done in this instance -- a Facebook-only key
was created and uploaded. I do not feel too comfortable associating my
general key with my Facebook account in such a manner.

I would love to hear others' take on this matter.

-- Jason

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From fanjiang at thoughtworks.com  Mon Jun  1 22:50:31 2015
From: fanjiang at thoughtworks.com (Fan Jiang)
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 15:50:31 -0500
Subject: [Enigmail] Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <556C93FC.5080404@gmail.com>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <CAKaEYh+Xk9-Lujbx_kXcZEKKmS==grcnQ9csT7SKLmjjMicPsw@mail.gmail.com>
 <556C93FC.5080404@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CACEw4nCEjCufVem_kUDUxW3Fws60mMQZ6qsWraG4aKxp2m7hGg@mail.gmail.com>

You've been trusting FB by using this function, before you trust that app
:-)

On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 12:18 PM, Jason Antony <alexanderino at gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 2015-06-02 02:17, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
>
> > Now we just need a facebook app to generate keys ...
>
> But would you trust that app? :-)
>
> -- Jason
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> enigmail-users mailing list
> enigmail-users at enigmail.net
> To unsubscribe or make changes to your subscription click here:
> https://admin.hostpoint.ch/mailman/listinfo/enigmail-users_enigmail.net
>
>


-- 
____


Fan Jiang ??
Developer
Thoughtworks, Inc.
mobile +86-150-9189-3714
skype fan at torchz.net
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun  2 15:23:06 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 15:23:06 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.28 "stable" released
Message-ID: <87zj4ip7lx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2.0
release: Version 2.0.28.  This is a maintenance release which fixes a
couple of bugs.  Update to this version is suggested.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is a complete and free implementation of
the OpenPGP standard as defined by RFC-4880 and better known as PGP.

GnuPG, also known as GPG, allows to encrypt and sign data and
communication, features a versatile key management system as well as
access modules for public key directories.  GnuPG itself is a command
line tool with features for easy integration with other applications.
A wealth of frontend applications and libraries making use of GnuPG
are available.  Since version 2 GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and
Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP.

GnuPG is Free Software (meaning that it respects your freedom). It can
be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU
General Public License.

Three different versions of GnuPG are actively maintained:

- GnuPG "modern" (2.1) is the latest development with a lot of new
  features including support for ECC.

- GnuPG "stable" (2.0) - which this is about - is the current stable
  version for general use.  This is what most users are currently using.

- GnuPG "classic" (1.4) is the old standalone version which is most
  suitable for older or embedded platforms.

You may not install "modern" (2.1) and "stable" (2.0) at the same
time.  However, it is possible to install "classic" (1.4) along with
any of the other versions.


What's New in 2.0.28
====================

 * agent: Added support for an external password manager.

 * gpg: New command --list-gcrypt-config.

 * gpg: Issue NEWSIG status lines during signature verification.

 * gpgsm: The default hash algo for a CSR is now SHA-256 and the
   default encryption algo is AES-128.

 * scdaemon: Allow PC/SC reader selection by partial name match.

 * gpgtar: Fix extracting files with a size of a multiple of 512.

 * Fixed several other bugs.

 * Libgcrypt 1.5 is now required.


Getting the Software
====================

Please follow the instructions found at https://gnupg.org/download/
or read on:

GnuPG 2.0.28 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from <ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/>.  The list of mirrors
can be found at <https://gnupg.org/mirrors.html>.  Note that GnuPG is
not available at ftp.gnu.org.

On ftp.gnupg.org and on its mirrors you should find the following new
files in the gnupg/ directory:

  - The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP
    signature:

    gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2     (4332k)
    gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2.sig

Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2.
A Windows version will eventually be released at https://gpg4win.org .

If you are new to GnuPG please consider to use the "modern" version
2.1.4.


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply
   verify the supplied signature.  For example to verify the signature
   of the file gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by one or more of the release signing keys.  Make sure that
   this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint
   against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by
   checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys.
   See below for information on the signing keys.

 * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have
   to verify the SHA-1 checksum.  On Unix systems the command to do
   this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum".  Assuming you downloaded the
   file gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2, you would run the command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the next line:

9a1050f72b6c9afe2b4a0a3f2e9dca2abba8e4ef  gnupg-2.0.28.tar.bz2


Release Signing Keys
====================

To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by
malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and
binary versions.  The keys are also signed by the long term keys of
their respective owners.  Current releases are signed by one or more
of these four keys:

  2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
  Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
  Werner Koch (dist sig)

  rsa2048/E0856959 2014-10-29 [expires: 2019-12-31]
  Key fingerprint = 46CC 7308 65BB 5C78 EBAB  ADCF 0437 6F3E E085 6959
  David Shaw (GnuPG Release Signing Key) <dshaw 'at' jabberwocky.com>

  rsa2048/33BD3F06 2014-10-29 [expires: 2016-10-28]
  Key fingerprint = 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286  A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06
  NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe 'at' fsij.org>

  rsa2048/7EFD60D9 2014-10-19 [expires: 2020-12-31]
  Key fingerprint = D238 EA65 D64C 67ED 4C30  73F2 8A86 1B1C 7EFD 60D9
  Werner Koch (Release Signing Key)

You may retrieve these files from the keyservers using this command

  gpg --recv-keys 249B39D24F25E3B6 04376F3EE0856959 \
                  2071B08A33BD3F06 8A861B1C7EFD60D9

using an already installed version of gpg.  Remeber to check the
fingerprints against the above list (which you also find on the flip
side of our printed visit cards).  The keys are also available at
<https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html> and in the released GnuPG tarball
in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg .  Note that this mail has been signed
using my standard PGP key.


Documentation
=============

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/

or in Portable Document Format at

  https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  https://www.gnupg.org/service.html

If you are a developer and you may need a certain feature for your
project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing
list for discussion.


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.  Maintenance and development of GnuPG is possible due to many
individual and corporate donations; for a list of non-anonymous donors
see <https://gnupg.org/donate/kudos.html>.


For the GnuPG hackers,

   Werner


p.s.
This is an announcement only mailing list.  Please send replies only to
the gnupg-users 'at' gnupg.org mailing list.

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Jun  2 16:43:36 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 10:43:36 -0400
Subject: man page refers to "conventional encryption" -- does this mean
 symmetric?
Message-ID: <87fv6a9nmv.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

Hi GnuPG folks--

I just noticed that a couple places in doc/DETAILS and doc/gpg.texi
refer to "conventional encryption".  Does this mean "symmetric
encryption" or something else?

More concretely, i'm assuming it refers to "SKESK[0]-prefixed SEIPD[1]
packets".  Is this correct?

In 2015, i'm not sure whether this is any more "conventional" than
PKESK-prefixed SEIPD packets.  Should the term be explained somewhere?

   --dkg

[0] Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets
    https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.3

[1] Symmetrically-Encrypted Integrity Protected Data packets
    https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.13
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun  2 17:55:58 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 17:55:58 +0200
Subject: man page refers to "conventional encryption" -- does this mean
 symmetric?
In-Reply-To: <87fv6a9nmv.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's
 message of "Tue, 02 Jun 2015 10:43:36 -0400")
References: <87fv6a9nmv.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <87r3pum7e9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  2 Jun 2015 16:43, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said:

> I just noticed that a couple places in doc/DETAILS and doc/gpg.texi
> refer to "conventional encryption".  Does this mean "symmetric
> encryption" or something else?

Yes.  I changed it to read "symmetricc encryption with passphrase",

> More concretely, i'm assuming it refers to "SKESK[0]-prefixed SEIPD[1]
> packets".  Is this correct?

Yes.



Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun  2 18:41:40 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 12:41:40 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org>

> Peers that do not support AES256 are either extremely rare or
> hopelessly out of date.  Reducing the strength of the ciphers in use
> for the sake of preserving interop with these peers seems like a bad
> tradeoff.
> 
> What do folks think about making this change to the defaults?

At present I'm against it, but my mind's not made up.

Right now pretty much everyone is content with RSA-3072, which has an
estimated work factor comparable to AES-128.  So if 128-bit crypto is
enough, I don't understand the motivation behind jumping to AES-256.
There needs to be something motivating this besides "bigger is better".

Let me turn the question around, dkg.  (Completely serious here, not
snark.)  What problem do we have with AES-128 that switching to AES-256
will solve?


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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Jun  2 19:29:42 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 13:29:42 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-06-02 12:41:40 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Right now pretty much everyone is content with RSA-3072, which has an
> estimated work factor comparable to AES-128.  So if 128-bit crypto is
> enough, I don't understand the motivation behind jumping to AES-256.
> There needs to be something motivating this besides "bigger is better".

I agree with you that these comparisons are a decent rough estimate when
considering attacking a single ciphertext.  But i don't think the
argument holds looking at the bigger picture.

Let's consider an adversary that can store as many OpenPGP-encrypted
messages as it has access to.  Maybe it sniffs SMTP traffic as well?  If
the attacker is interested in breaking the crypto of any *one* of these
messages, it can reduce the amount of work it has to do significantly.

As djb put it:

>> There are standard attacks that break _all_ of 2^50 AES-128 keys using a
>> _total_ of 2^128 easy computations. Even worse, there are standard
>> attacks that find _at least one_ of the keys using just 2^78 easy
>> computations, a feasible computation today.

 -- http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.irtf.cfrg/3427

Note that he's describing a known-plaintext attack; this might be
relevant, for example, if there is a standard prefix of the data being
encrypted (perhaps a common MIME header?  or if you're doing regular
backups of a standard filesystem, the beginning of the tar format?).

Of course, there aren't 2^50 AES-128-encrypted known-plaintext OpenPGP
messages today that such an attack would work on.  but why would we want
to leave users open to this?

> Let me turn the question around, dkg.  (Completely serious here, not
> snark.)  What problem do we have with AES-128 that switching to AES-256
> will solve?

Is the above argument enough for you?  Remember that these AES128
ciphertexts are likely to exist well into the future, and attacks only
get better with time.

Regards,

            --dkg
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun  2 20:26:39 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 14:26:39 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>

> Let's consider an adversary that can store as many OpenPGP-encrypted 
> messages as it has access to.  Maybe it sniffs SMTP traffic as well?
> If the attacker is interested in breaking the crypto of any *one* of
> these messages, it can reduce the amount of work it has to do
> significantly.

I think this is a pretty unrealistic thought experiment.  It requires
two conditions to be met:

	1.  A very large number of intercepted OpenPGP messages
	2.  An extremely well-funded adversary who only needs to
	    break one message, chosen at random, out of the very
	    large ingestion set, in order for the entire endeavor
	    to be considered a ringing success that justifies the
	    billions of dollars spent collecting #1

We don't have #1, but in the (oft-forlorn) hope we'll see more OpenPGP
adoption I'll give it to you.  But #2 isn't the description of any
real-world organization I've ever heard of.  Honestly, it sounds more
like a James Bond-style evil organization like SPECTRE or QUANTUM than
like anything that exists in the world.

(Quoting you quoting djb)

> There are standard attacks that break _all_ of 2^50 AES-128 keys 
> using a _total_ of 2^128 easy computations.

In other words, the likelihood of choosing one of the weak set by random
is 10**-53.  That's a one-in-
100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
chance.

I'll take those odds.  Happily.  Twice on a Sunday.

(Still quoting you quoting djb)

> Even worse, there are standard attacks that find _at least one_ of 
> the keys using just 2^78 easy computations, a feasible computation 
> today.

So there's a 10**-88 chance that one of my keys can be broken in 10**53
computations?  Sign me up.

I have a lot of respect for djb, but on this one he's just way off in
left field.

> Of course, there aren't 2^50 AES-128-encrypted known-plaintext 
> OpenPGP messages today that such an attack would work on.  but why 
> would we want to leave users open to this?

(Meant as humor, not snark:)

I am much more concerned with the possibility of landing a hot date with
Claudia Schiffer[*], which is rudely interrupted by the eruption of the
Yellowstone Caldera that wipes out all life in North America, than I am
with any AES-128 weakness.  Landing a hot date with Claudia Schiffer and
the end of the world happening before I pick her up for our night out is
considerably more likely to happen.  It would also probably make me
considerably unhappier than a random AES key, somewhere, being broken.

Given I've spent about half an hour of my time calmly considering the
possibilities of your hypothetical, perhaps I might trouble you to spend
a minute or two coming up with a plan for how I might enjoy an evening
with Claudia even as the world ends?  I will understand if your reaction
is hysterical laughter.  :)






[*] You youngsters who have no idea who Claudia Schiffer is... when I
was your age, she was The Awesomeness.  Had a soft spot for her in my
heart for about the last twenty-five years.


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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Jun  2 20:37:29 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 14:37:29 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-06-02 14:26:39 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Even worse, there are standard attacks that find _at least one_ of 
>> the keys using just 2^78 easy computations, a feasible computation 
>> today.
>
> So there's a 10**-88 chance that one of my keys can be broken in 10**53
> computations?  Sign me up.

To be clear, it's not "one of my keys" in the asymmetric key sense,
where you, rjh, have only a handful over your lifetime.  Every time you
send an encrypted message, GnuPG generates a new AES key to encrypt that
message with.  So "one of my messages' keys" is more accurate.

And (sorry Rob) i don't care only about your keys (or your messages'
keys).  I care about all the messages ever generated by GnuPG.  If an
attacker can do 2^78 computations, I'd prefer it if they couldn't
break even one of the messages ever created by GnuPG.  I don't get to
decide which of our users to throw under the bus in that case.  But if
we move to AES-256, we remove this attack, which means that none of our
users get thrown under this particular bus.

Given that these calculations are not a bottleneck for users, we should
move them all to the stronger cipher by default.

[ note that the argument here is now heading toward "what should the
  default cipher be?", though i started with "what should the default
  s2k cipher mode be?" -- I still want to focus on the s2k mode
  question, because it protects secret key material, and i think that's
  higher priority and an even more-obvious win; i'm happy to broaden the
  discussion as long as it doesn't distract from the s2k-cipher-mode
  question ]

> I have a lot of respect for djb, but on this one he's just way off in
> left field.

I don't think so.  He is thinking about the whole field, though, rather
than thinking about "what are the chances that a baseball will happen to
land right where i'm standing right now?"  I also care about the whole
field.

Regards,

        --dkg
        
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Jun  2 21:46:18 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 15:46:18 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <556E080A.6070309@sixdemonbag.org>

> To be clear, it's not "one of my keys" in the asymmetric key sense, 
> where you, rjh, have only a handful over your lifetime.  Every time 
> you send an encrypted message, GnuPG generates a new AES key to 
> encrypt that message with.  So "one of my messages' keys" is more 
> accurate.

Yes, I understood that.  I think maybe you're misunderstanding: if it
was a case of my asymmetric key being compromised, I'd take it more
seriously.  (Not much more seriously: it's still far out there.)

If an asymmetric key is compromised then past and future traffic gets
revealed, people can forge new signatures, the WoT can be abused and
misused... it gets very nasty very quickly.  But looking through my
sent-mail folder, the last encrypted email I sent was to a friend
offering to buy him a drink when we met up at a science fiction
convention in Baltimore.

The likelihood of a compromised asymmetric key leading to terrible
consequences is high.  The likelihood of a compromised symmetric key
leading to terrible consequences... not so much.  If someone breaks my
RSA key I'm going to be extraordinarily upset.  If someone learns I
offered to buy a friend a drink in Baltimore, I'm going to be annoyed.

I'm just fine with the per-message risk.

> And (sorry Rob) i don't care only about your keys (or your messages'
> keys).  I care about all the messages ever generated by GnuPG.  If
> an attacker can do 2^78 computations, I'd prefer it if they couldn't
> break even one of the messages ever created by GnuPG.

Daniel, seriously: sit down and run the math.  If you don't have a copy
of Mathematica handy, Wolfram Alpha can do the arbitrary-precision math
needed so you can be sure I'm not misleading you.

Each message has a 10**-53 chance of being part of the weak set.  The
likelihood of a message being part of the strong set is (1 - 10**-53).
Raise that to a power N and you get the probability of *all* keys being
part of the strong set.

Here's the takeaway: after 10^50 keys there's still a 99.9% chance all
the keys are strong.

[Note for UK/European readers: 'million' here denotes an American
million: 1,000,000.]

Do you think GnuPG will ever generate 10^50 keys?  I certainly don't.
Assuming there are a million GnuPG installations generating a million
AES-128 keys a second, running continuously, that's only about 10^19
keys per year.  You'd have to run these million machines for
substantially longer than the lifetime of the universe to even have a
statistically significant chance of generating a weak key.

At this point the conversation is bikeshedding.  IMO, there's absolutely
no reason to think your scenario is likely, and many reasons to think
it's not.

	1.  We can't generate 10^50 messages.
	2.  An adversary can't store 10^50 messages.
	3.  An adversary who has 10^50 messages will not be
	    satisfied with a 0.1% chance of breaking just one
	    of them.

djb is a smart guy and I have no doubt that what he's talking about is
real.  It's also such an incredibly theoretical attack that it really
doesn't deserve to be brought up in a conversation about real-world
cryptography.

Given this, I would feel much better if Werner were to spend his time
reviewing the code for exploitable bugs than spending even five minutes
changing the s2k default from AES-128 to AES-256.  The five minutes
spent reviewing code stand a very small chance of discovering something
exploitable -- call it one in a billion -- but that's still so much more
productive a use of time than using those same five minutes to defend
against an attack of such vanishing small probability that we have to
break out Mathematica to talk about it.

> I don't think so.  He is thinking about the whole field, though, 
> rather than thinking about "what are the chances that a baseball
> will happen to land right where i'm standing right now?"  I also
> care about the whole field.

I suggest you worry about the Yellowstone Caldera while you're at it.
That has a far greater likelihood of taking out your entire baseball
stadium.  :)



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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Jun  2 23:50:33 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 22:50:33 +0100
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556E080A.6070309@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556E080A.6070309@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <1507446364.20150602225033@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 2 June 2015 at 8:46:18 PM, in
<mid:556E080A.6070309 at sixdemonbag.org>, Robert J. Hansen wrote:


> [Note for UK/European readers: 'million' here denotes
> an American million: 1,000,000.]


10^6 is a million both sides of the pond, n'est-ce pas? The long and
short scales only diverge from 10^9 upwards.



- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

I hit the CTRL key but I'm still not in control!
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From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Tue Jun  2 23:51:50 2015
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 17:51:50 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556E080A.6070309@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556E080A.6070309@sixdemonbag.org> 
Message-ID: <20150602215150.47A0E4013B@smtp.hushmail.com>

On 6/2/2015 at 3:49 PM, "Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

>Given this, I would feel much better if Werner were to spend his 
>time reviewing the code for exploitable bugs than spending even five 
>minutes changing the s2k default from AES-128 to AES-256.

=====

Agreed,
but here's a consequence you might want to consider adding into your FAQ :

The s2k default is also the default for symmetrically encrypted messages
(which is fine, as long as people know about it).

If a person wants to symmetrically encrypt a message or file with AES 256,
or any other symmetric algorithm,
then the user will need to specify the option either in gnupg.conf or on the command line.


vedaal




From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun  3 00:44:00 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 18:44:00 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <20150602215150.47A0E4013B@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556E080A.6070309@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150602215150.47A0E4013B@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <878uc191e7.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-06-02 17:51:50 -0400, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
> The s2k default is also the default for symmetrically encrypted messages
> (which is fine, as long as people know about it).

I mentioned the possible interoperability concern in my first post on
this thread.

> If a person wants to symmetrically encrypt a message or file with AES 256,
> or any other symmetric algorithm,
> then the user will need to specify the option either in gnupg.conf or on the command line.

This is not true.  symmetric algorithm selection during decryption is
done based on the metadata parameters stored in the SKESK packet, which
indicate which cipher to use.  As long as the peer can do AES256 (and
all reasonably modern OpenPGP implementations can), no additional
configuration is needed:

0 dkg at alice:~$ echo test | gpg2 --symmetric | pgpdump
Old: Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet(tag 3)(13 bytes)
	New version(4)
	Sym alg - AES with 256-bit key(sym 9)
	Iterated and salted string-to-key(s2k 3):
		Hash alg - SHA1(hash 2)
		Salt - a1 bf fd 74 8e a4 07 7a 
		Count - 23068672(coded count 230)
New: Symmetrically Encrypted and MDC Packet(tag 18)(58 bytes)
	Ver 1
	Encrypted data [sym alg is specified in sym-key encrypted session key]
		(plain text + MDC SHA1(20 bytes))
0 dkg at alice:~$ 


Regards,

        --dkg


From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com  Wed Jun  3 00:15:21 2015
From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK)
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 00:15:21 +0200
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <556E2AF9.3080007@gmail.com>

Il 02/06/2015 20:37, Daniel Kahn Gillmor ha scritto:

> But if we move to AES-256, we remove this attack, which means
> that none of our users get thrown under this particular bus.
What if by changing to AES-256 you end up saving one from the bus by
throwing all users under the train?

IIRC, I read (some years ago...) that AES-256 could be *weaker* than
AES-128 because some mathematical structures express some properties
only with the longer keys. I don't have the paper handy ATM, but I
vaguely remember that shocking conclusion.

BYtE,
 Diego.


From ilf at zeromail.org  Wed Jun  3 11:00:36 2015
From: ilf at zeromail.org (ilf)
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 11:00:36 +0200
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20150603090036.GB28531@zeromail.org>

I agree with dkg.

Robert J. Hansen:
> I think this is a pretty unrealistic thought experiment.  It requires 
> two conditions to be met:
> 	1.  A very large number of intercepted OpenPGP messages
> We don't have #1

We're Post-Snowden, right?

"Show me all PGP usage in Iran"
"Can perform this kind of retrospective query, then simply pull content 
of interest from site as required"

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/743252/nsa-pdfs-redacted-ed.pdf

-- 
ilf

?ber 80 Millionen Deutsche benutzen keine Konsole. Klick dich nicht weg!
		-- Eine Initiative des Bundesamtes f?r Tastaturbenutzung
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun  3 14:58:00 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 08:58:00 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <20150603090036.GB28531@zeromail.org>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <20150603090036.GB28531@zeromail.org>
Message-ID: <556EF9D8.9020909@sixdemonbag.org>

>> 1.  A very large number of intercepted OpenPGP messages We don't
>> have #1
> 
> We're Post-Snowden, right?

Not 10**50 messages worth, we're not.

> "Show me all PGP usage in Iran"

Maybe 10**9.  *Maybe*.  Multiply that by a factor of
100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 and we'll talk.

No, I'm not kidding.  Do the math yourself.

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun  3 16:01:27 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 10:01:27 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556E2AF9.3080007@gmail.com>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org> <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org> <87wpzm7y8m.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556E2AF9.3080007@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87zj4g7ux4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-06-02 18:15:21 -0400, NdK wrote:

> IIRC, I read (some years ago...) that AES-256 could be *weaker* than
> AES-128 because some mathematical structures express some properties
> only with the longer keys. I don't have the paper handy ATM, but I
> vaguely remember that shocking conclusion.

I think you're referring to:

  http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/374

  https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/new_attack_on_a.html

and

  http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/374

  https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/another_new_aes.html


These describe so-called "related-key" attacks, where the attacker knows
that two AES keys are related to one another in a specific way
(e.g. they know the XOR of the two keys), and can force operation of the
cipher with these two keys:

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Related-key_attack

OpenPGP in general (and GnuPG in specific) does not have any mechanism
whereby an attacker can force a user to use two symmetric keys that it
knows to be related to one another.  I don't think these attacks are
relevant.

Regards,

        --dkg
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From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun  3 15:56:57 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 15:56:57 +0200
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <556EF9D8.9020909@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Wed, 03 Jun 2015 08:58:00 -0400")
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150603090036.GB28531@zeromail.org>
 <556EF9D8.9020909@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87eglski8m.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  3 Jun 2015 14:58, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> No, I'm not kidding.  Do the math yourself.

Right.  I's also suggest that everyone doing this math should also look
up examples of large numbers.  Applied Cryptography prints a list right
after the introduction (page 18 in my edition) for a good reason.  For
example:

Age of our planet .: 10**9  years
Age of the Universe: 10**10 years
Our planet has ....: 10**51 atoms
Our sun has .......: 10**57 atoms
Our galaxy has ....: 10**67 atoms

And now consider the 10**50 messages djb assumes.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun  3 17:37:41 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 11:37:41 -0400
Subject: s2k-cipher-mode default
In-Reply-To: <87eglski8m.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87d21e9lbo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>	<556DDCC4.2030002@sixdemonbag.org>	<87zj4i81dl.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>	<556DF55F.2060306@sixdemonbag.org>	<20150603090036.GB28531@zeromail.org>	<556EF9D8.9020909@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87eglski8m.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <556F1F45.2080805@sixdemonbag.org>

> And now consider the 10**50 messages djb assumes.

Time for me to put out a big "I screwed up" message.  I screwed up: my
math is, in fact, wrong.  I was in a boring meeting today and was
mentally reviewing my math and realized, "wait, there's no way a 2**-78
chance of picking a weak key by accident corresponds to a 10**-53 chance."

I was right.

There are a few different ways you can convert between log bases, but
like many mathematically-inclined people I have an affinity for base e.
 Conversions into and out of base e are really simple.  To convert a
logarithm in base N into base e, multiply by ln(N).  To convert a
logarithm in base e into base N, divide by ln(N).  And so on.

The binary logarithm of 2**-78 is -78.  Multiply that by ln 2 and you
get -53.  2**-78 is e**-53.

You guys see the problem, right?  I converted it into base e, but
neglected to convert it into base 10.  ln(10) is about 2.3.

So 2**-78 = e**-53 = 10**-23.

Yowch.  It's not every day you create an error of thirty orders of
magnitude, but ... there you have it.  (I'm still an amateur, though.
The physics community has an error of 120 orders of magnitude in their
computed value for the cosmological constant, and they still have no
idea where they're screwing up.)

This changes the math slightly.  You now need about 10^20 messages to
have a very small chance of one message being encrypted with a weak key,
not 10^50.  That's still a *huge* number, though, and is greater than
the number of GnuPG messages I expect to ever be encrypted.

I'm still not worried, the conclusion is still sound.  Still, an error
of thirty orders of magnitude should be noted -- and if anyone wants to
point at me and laugh, I definitely deserve it.  :)


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From michael.gordon at emc.com  Wed Jun  3 14:15:16 2015
From: michael.gordon at emc.com (Gordon, Michael)
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 12:15:16 +0000
Subject: Libksba Release notes
Message-ID: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>

I am trying to understand the new functionality added to release GnuPG 1.0.5 for Windows.  The release noted states "This is a binary release for Windows".  What does this statement mean?
Thanks.

Michael Gordon


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From svelar at outlook.com  Wed Jun  3 17:41:37 2015
From: svelar at outlook.com (Sven Larsson)
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 17:41:37 +0200
Subject: Problem compiling gnupg on Ubuntu 14-04
Message-ID: <BLU436-SMTP1612FFF579C43F81110BE06C3B40@phx.gbl>

It's a problem which has come up before, but I can't find a search
engine for the archives, so I'll have to ask again.

When making gnupg-2.0.28 I get the following error message:

../../g10/gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libgcrypt.so.20:
cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

I've seen this in various places on the net, but not yet found one with
a solution.  I'd appreciate help.

Thanks in advance.
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun  3 23:08:02 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 17:08:02 -0400
Subject: Problem compiling gnupg on Ubuntu 14-04
In-Reply-To: <BLU436-SMTP1612FFF579C43F81110BE06C3B40@phx.gbl>
References: <BLU436-SMTP1612FFF579C43F81110BE06C3B40@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <87d21c5wlp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Wed 2015-06-03 11:41:37 -0400, Sven Larsson wrote:
> It's a problem which has come up before, but I can't find a search
> engine for the archives, so I'll have to ask again.
>
> When making gnupg-2.0.28 I get the following error message:
>
> ../../g10/gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libgcrypt.so.20:
> cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
>
> I've seen this in various places on the net, but not yet found one with
> a solution.  I'd appreciate help.

You haven't described how you set up your build environment, or how
you're approaching the build process at all.

Do you have libgcrypt20-dev installed? [0]

On debian-derived systems, i'd expect a build to look something like:

as root, get the expected build dependencies:

  # apt-get build-dep gnupg2
  
as a normal user:

  $ tar xzf gnupg-2.0.28.tar.gz
  $ cd gnupg-2.0.28/
  $ ./configure # your options here...
  $ make
  $ make check

is this what you're doing, or are you doing something else?

hth,

   --dkg


[0] http://packages.ubuntu.com/search?keywords=libgcrypt20-dev&searchon=names&suite=all&section=all


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun  4 10:49:24 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2015 10:49:24 +0200
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 (Michael Gordon's message of "Wed, 3 Jun 2015 12:15:16 +0000")
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
Message-ID: <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  3 Jun 2015 14:15, michael.gordon at emc.com said:
> I am trying to understand the new functionality added to release GnuPG
> 1.0.5 for Windows.  The release noted states "This is a binary release
> for Windows".  What does this statement mean?

I can't find the word "Windows" in the NEWS entry for GnuPG 1.0.5 nor in
the release annoucement for it (from April 2001).  Same for libksba
1.0.5 (from 2009).

What are you referring to?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dfalko at digiflak.com  Thu Jun  4 11:06:42 2015
From: dfalko at digiflak.com (Dmitry Falko)
Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2015 12:06:42 +0300
Subject: Parse LISTKEYS output
Message-ID: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com>

Hi!

Is there a common way to parse data returned from LISTKEYS command. 
Callback function receives buffer with colon-separated information about 
certificate,
i need fingerprint to use it with IMPORT --re-import command.

-- 
Best Regards!



From neal at walfield.org  Thu Jun  4 18:06:19 2015
From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield)
Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2015 18:06:19 +0200
Subject: Parse LISTKEYS output
In-Reply-To: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com>
References: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com>
Message-ID: <87y4jzqwzo.wl-neal@walfield.org>

Hi,

At Thu, 04 Jun 2015 12:06:42 +0300,
Dmitry Falko wrote:
> Is there a common way to parse data returned from LISTKEYS
> command. Callback function receives buffer with colon-separated
> information about certificate,
> i need fingerprint to use it with IMPORT --re-import command.

Are you running:

  gpg --list-keys --with-colons

or doing something else?

If you are doing this from C then you should use gpgme rather than try
and parse the output yourself.  (If you aren't using C, then look to
see if there are any bindings to gpgme.)

If this isn't helpful, please try to describe your problem more
thoroughly.


:) Neal


From hans at guardianproject.info  Thu Jun  4 18:45:08 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2015 12:45:08 -0400
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <31041656.20150601202223@my_localhost>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
 <31041656.20150601202223@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <55708094.3070505@guardianproject.info>



MFPA:
> 
> 
> On Monday 1 June 2015 at 5:37:33 PM, in
> <mid:20150601183733.3fc5b0c6 at frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>,
> gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org wrote:
> 
> 
>> A comment worth reading in case one does not see it
>> oneself IMHO:
>> https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you-encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/
> 
> Whatever Facebook's motivation, doesn't anything that increases the
> proportion of emails that are encrypted during transit count as a Good
> Thing?

Yeah, I think it sets a great precedent for other large organizations to
follow.  Plus it increases the amount of PGP-encrypted email flowing around,
which reduces PGP as a marker for "secret messages".

.hc


-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From sbutler at fchn.com  Thu Jun  4 19:21:12 2015
From: sbutler at fchn.com (Steve Butler)
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 17:21:12 +0000
Subject: Facebook and OpenPGP
In-Reply-To: <55708094.3070505@guardianproject.info>
References: <556C6CA3.3050303@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150601183733.3fc5b0c6@frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>
 <31041656.20150601202223@my_localhost>
 <55708094.3070505@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <6e42b1c99a26404c9d2efac26a693a33@t1l1exchmbs-01.fchn.com>


MFPA:
> 
> 
> On Monday 1 June 2015 at 5:37:33 PM, in 
> <mid:20150601183733.3fc5b0c6 at frustcomp.home.hnjs.ch>,
> gnupg-users at henk.geekmail.org wrote:
> 
> 
>> A comment worth reading in case one does not see it oneself IMHO:
>> https://blogs.fsfe.org/gerloff/2015/06/01/facebook-offers-to-send-you
>> -encrypted-emails-this-wont-help-you/
> 
> Whatever Facebook's motivation, doesn't anything that increases the 
> proportion of emails that are encrypted during transit count as a Good 
> Thing?

Yeah, I think it sets a great precedent for other large organizations to follow.  Plus it increases the amount of PGP-encrypted email flowing around, which reduces PGP as a marker for "secret messages".

.hc

======
One thing I learned in college, if all inbound mail came in the same color (pink) and scented then nobody knew which one came from the girl-friend.  It was easier to get her to use a brown non-descript envelope though!


-- 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including any attachments, 
is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain 
confidential 
and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or 
distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please 
contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original 
message.


From manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com  Thu Jun  4 09:04:59 2015
From: manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com (manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com)
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 07:04:59 +0000
Subject: Facing issue while installing GnuPG 2.0.27 on AIX 7.1
Message-ID: <0b421b1066e8482491ea4a06308d61b2@CO2PR42MB076.048d.mgd.msft.net>

Hi Team,

We are trying to install GnuPG 2.0.27 in our SAP ECC systems.

Below are the OS level details:

[cid:image006.png at 01D09EBE.3BD6EBA0]

We have downloaded the GnuPG 2.0.27 software and started with the installation with root user.

Initially we fired below command and got below output:

./configure; make; make install

[cid:image001.png at 01D09EBC.C8081EC0]

After getting above output we tried with the below command:

./configure CC=c99 CFLAGS=-g LIBS=-lposix

[cid:image002.png at 01D09EBC.C8081EC0]

But still we are facing Error as C compiler cannot create executables

Checked the Integrity:

[cid:image004.png at 01D09EBD.1D8000C0]

Also, we tried to check C compiler in our system with below command:

[cid:image005.png at 01D09EBD.7E992E40]

Kindly let us know the path forward.

Herewith I am attaching "config.log" for your ready reference.

Please let us know if you need any further details.

If you have 24X7 support help line number then kindly share the details.

[cid:image003.png at 01D09EBC.C8081EC0]


________________________________

This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise confidential information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any other use of the e-mail by you is prohibited. Where allowed by local law, electronic communications with Accenture and its affiliates, including e-mail and instant messaging (including content), may be scanned by our systems for the purposes of information security and assessment of internal compliance with Accenture policy.
______________________________________________________________________________________

www.accenture.com
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From michael.gordon at emc.com  Thu Jun  4 14:58:31 2015
From: michael.gordon at emc.com (Gordon, Michael)
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 12:58:31 +0000
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>

I am not sure if this helps. (see attached)
Thanks, 
Mike 


-----Original Message-----
From: Werner Koch [mailto:wk at gnupg.org] 
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 2015 4:49 AM
To: Gordon, Michael
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: Libksba Release notes

On Wed,  3 Jun 2015 14:15, michael.gordon at emc.com said:
> I am trying to understand the new functionality added to release GnuPG
> 1.0.5 for Windows.  The release noted states "This is a binary release 
> for Windows".  What does this statement mean?

I can't find the word "Windows" in the NEWS entry for GnuPG 1.0.5 nor in the release annoucement for it (from April 2001).  Same for libksba
1.0.5 (from 2009).

What are you referring to?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


--
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  5 10:22:13 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 10:22:13 +0200
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 (Michael Gordon's message of "Thu, 4 Jun 2015 12:58:31 +0000")
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
Message-ID: <87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  4 Jun 2015 14:58, michael.gordon at emc.com said:
> I am not sure if this helps. (see attached)

I still don't know the origin from the screenshot but it indicates that
this is about the 1.0.5 binary release for Windows (an installer) which
was done a few days after the source code release of 1.0.5.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  5 10:33:00 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 10:33:00 +0200
Subject: Facing issue while installing GnuPG 2.0.27 on AIX 7.1
In-Reply-To: <0b421b1066e8482491ea4a06308d61b2@CO2PR42MB076.048d.mgd.msft.net>
 (manan navin mehta's message of "Thu, 4 Jun 2015 07:04:59 +0000")
References: <0b421b1066e8482491ea4a06308d61b2@CO2PR42MB076.048d.mgd.msft.net>
Message-ID: <87eglqftc3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  4 Jun 2015 09:04, manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com said:

> Below are the OS level details:
>
> [cid:image006.png at 01D09EBE.3BD6EBA0]

Sorry, I can't view the images as they are only available in the HTML
rendered version.  Please always transcript con5tents from screenshots
so that it is possible to search for the content.  Anyway, the attached
config.log has all the details of your system.

> But still we are facing Error as C compiler cannot create executables

The configure run and the config.log show

> configure:3875: checking whether the C compiler works
> configure:3897: c99 -g   conftest.c -lposix >&5
> ./configure[3899]: c99:  not found

Thus you don't have a compiler installed.  You need to have a compiler
and all related tools (the toolchain) to build software.

> If you have 24X7 support help line number then kindly share the
> details.

This is a public mailing list.  If you need commercial support please
see http://gnupg.org/service.html .


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun  5 10:44:47 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 10:44:47 +0200
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5571617F.2050709@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/05/2015 10:22 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu,  4 Jun 2015 14:58, michael.gordon at emc.com said:
>> I am not sure if this helps. (see attached)
> 
> I still don't know the origin from the screenshot but it indicates
> that

Seems to be from https://www.gnupg.org/download/release_notes.en.html

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Primum ego, tum ego, deinde ego
First I, then I, thereafter I.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVcWF6AAoJECULev7WN52FlHkH/RyqSsS7yr2XGj0sLnuEVRYk
/R+qhFRT6pGEaJw8W7GfNAvbf86/PQRAneHBSVLAjZehaSGhdUlU3bGEtYeeD9lf
0T985AEIIu/E8DSJI5M+sf1jDAZMMsWGQ5gSzSyAN53IIRAVr+OR2VR6MjPlTWCO
wBTio8/COkdgq5rHimN1y1q/Ooq4sQGF/DPJzvzZ9O7HGL224aPI6F5J9q5kStQd
1GDgZA/OU84UJ3f9/kbW7yGlkDogJ+6xq0+IQkQzcIqdS8Nev7aQIK8tPIGPi6Vs
Gpe0IhsrPKAKYhdhxxv0ksMYmTucgwb9Xk8MHzGAf342TMJ52CLmkZxHhuzu5ng=
=awgH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From dfalko at digiflak.com  Fri Jun  5 11:29:45 2015
From: dfalko at digiflak.com (Dmitry Falko)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 12:29:45 +0300
Subject: Parse LISTKEYS output
In-Reply-To: <87y4jzqwzo.wl-neal@walfield.org>
References: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com> <87y4jzqwzo.wl-neal@walfield.org>
Message-ID: <55716C09.9090208@digiflak.com>

I can't use gpgme, because it doesn't have(or I couldn't find) specific 
functions.
I need IMPORT key function with --re-import flag.  I do it from C and 
use libassuan.
I do something like this:
gpgsm --server
OPTION list-mode=3
LISTKEYS test at example.com <-- this command return colon-separated 
information about certificate
IMPORT --re-import <fingerprint from previous command >

04.06.2015 19:06, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> Hi,
>
> At Thu, 04 Jun 2015 12:06:42 +0300,
> Dmitry Falko wrote:
>> Is there a common way to parse data returned from LISTKEYS
>> command. Callback function receives buffer with colon-separated
>> information about certificate,
>> i need fingerprint to use it with IMPORT --re-import command.
> Are you running:
>
>    gpg --list-keys --with-colons
>
> or doing something else?
>
> If you are doing this from C then you should use gpgme rather than try
> and parse the output yourself.  (If you aren't using C, then look to
> see if there are any bindings to gpgme.)
>
> If this isn't helpful, please try to describe your problem more
> thoroughly.
>
>
> :) Neal
>

-- 
Best Regards!



From dfalko at digiflak.com  Fri Jun  5 11:39:32 2015
From: dfalko at digiflak.com (Dmitry Falko)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 12:39:32 +0300
Subject: Parse LISTKEYS output
In-Reply-To: <55716C09.9090208@digiflak.com>
References: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com> <87y4jzqwzo.wl-neal@walfield.org>
 <55716C09.9090208@digiflak.com>
Message-ID: <55716E54.3060803@digiflak.com>

Sorry, I read gpgme manual one more time, and find all i need.

05.06.2015 12:29, Dmitry Falko ?????:
> I can't use gpgme, because it doesn't have(or I couldn't find) 
> specific functions.
> I need IMPORT key function with --re-import flag.  I do it from C and 
> use libassuan.
> I do something like this:
> gpgsm --server
> OPTION list-mode=3
> LISTKEYS test at example.com <-- this command return colon-separated 
> information about certificate
> IMPORT --re-import <fingerprint from previous command >
>
> 04.06.2015 19:06, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> At Thu, 04 Jun 2015 12:06:42 +0300,
>> Dmitry Falko wrote:
>>> Is there a common way to parse data returned from LISTKEYS
>>> command. Callback function receives buffer with colon-separated
>>> information about certificate,
>>> i need fingerprint to use it with IMPORT --re-import command.
>> Are you running:
>>
>>    gpg --list-keys --with-colons
>>
>> or doing something else?
>>
>> If you are doing this from C then you should use gpgme rather than try
>> and parse the output yourself.  (If you aren't using C, then look to
>> see if there are any bindings to gpgme.)
>>
>> If this isn't helpful, please try to describe your problem more
>> thoroughly.
>>
>>
>> :) Neal
>>
>

-- 
C ?????????, ???????!



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  5 12:05:52 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 12:05:52 +0200
Subject: Parse LISTKEYS output
In-Reply-To: <55716E54.3060803@digiflak.com> (Dmitry Falko's message of "Fri, 
 05 Jun 2015 12:39:32 +0300")
References: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com> <87y4jzqwzo.wl-neal@walfield.org>
 <55716C09.9090208@digiflak.com> <55716E54.3060803@digiflak.com>
Message-ID: <87sia6eagv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  5 Jun 2015 11:39, dfalko at digiflak.com said:
> Sorry, I read gpgme manual one more time, and find all i need.

For reference: The following GPGME fucntion can be used:

 -- Function: gpgme_error_t gpgme_op_import_keys (gpgme_ctx_t CTX,
          gpgme_key_t *KEYS)
     The function ?gpgme_op_import_keys? adds the keys described by the
     ?NULL? terminated array KEYS to the key ring of the crypto engine
     used by CTX.  This function is the general interface to move a key
     from one crypto engine to another as long as they are compatible.
     In particular it is used to actually import and make keys permanent
     which have been retrieved from an external source (i.e.  using
     ?GPGME_KEYLIST_MODE_EXTERN?).  (1)

     Only keys of the the currently selected protocol of CTX are
     considered for import.  Other keys specified by the KEYS are
     ignored.  As of now all considered keys must have been retrieved
     using the same method, that is the used key listing mode must be
     identical.

     After the operation completed successfully, the result can be
     retrieved with ?gpgme_op_import_result?.

     The function returns the error code ?GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR? if the
     import was completed successfully, ?GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE? if KEYDATA
     if CTX or KEYDATA is not a valid pointer, ?GPG_ERR_CONFLICT? if the
     key listing mode does not match, and ?GPG_ERR_NO_DATA? if no keys
     are considered for export.

Note that this works only for GPGSM (GPGME_PROTOCOL_CMS) because there
is no need for this with GPG (GPGME_PROTOCOL_OPENPGP).


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun  5 12:14:32 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 12:14:32 +0200
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <5571617F.2050709@sumptuouscapital.com> (Kristian Fiskerstrand's
 message of "Fri, 05 Jun 2015 10:44:47 +0200")
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5571617F.2050709@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <87oakuea2f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  5 Jun 2015 10:44, kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com
said:

> Seems to be from https://www.gnupg.org/download/release_notes.en.html

I forgot about this.  The page needs some work.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Fri Jun  5 14:54:07 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 14:54:07 +0200
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C085BE@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>	<874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>	<87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<5571617F.2050709@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <87oakuea2f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C085BE@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
Message-ID: <55719BEF.5050000@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/05/2015 02:48 PM, Gordon, Michael wrote:
> So the entry is unknown, correct?

"Unknown" is likely incorrect. However I fail to understand the original
question.

On 06/03/2015 02:15 PM, Gordon, Michael wrote:
> I am trying to understand the new functionality added to release 
> GnuPG 1.0.5 for Windows.  The release noted states ?This is a
> binary release for Windows?.  What does this statement mean?

As Werner wrote in ..
On 06/05/2015 10:22 AM, Werner Koch wrote:

> I still don't know the origin from the screenshot but it indicates 
> that this is about the 1.0.5 binary release for Windows (an 
> installer) which was done a few days after the source code release
> of 1.0.5.
> 

i.e. there is no new functionality to that per se, just a binary being
provided of the source code version of the same name.

Can you try to elaborate on what you're trying to achieve (and for
that matter why what happened so long ago matter to any extent, and
whether it is worthwhile to look into)


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"We all die. The goal isn't to live forever, the goal is to create
something that will."
(Chuck Palahniuk)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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From dfalko at digiflak.com  Fri Jun  5 15:08:08 2015
From: dfalko at digiflak.com (Dmitry Falko)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2015 16:08:08 +0300
Subject: Parse LISTKEYS output
In-Reply-To: <87sia6eagv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <55701522.6020306@digiflak.com>
 <87y4jzqwzo.wl-neal@walfield.org>	<55716C09.9090208@digiflak.com>
 <55716E54.3060803@digiflak.com> <87sia6eagv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <55719F38.9080008@digiflak.com>

Thanks to all who responded!

05.06.2015 13:05, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri,  5 Jun 2015 11:39, dfalko at digiflak.com said:
>> Sorry, I read gpgme manual one more time, and find all i need.
> For reference: The following GPGME fucntion can be used:
>
>   -- Function: gpgme_error_t gpgme_op_import_keys (gpgme_ctx_t CTX,
>            gpgme_key_t *KEYS)
>       The function ?gpgme_op_import_keys? adds the keys described by the
>       ?NULL? terminated array KEYS to the key ring of the crypto engine
>       used by CTX.  This function is the general interface to move a key
>       from one crypto engine to another as long as they are compatible.
>       In particular it is used to actually import and make keys permanent
>       which have been retrieved from an external source (i.e.  using
>       ?GPGME_KEYLIST_MODE_EXTERN?).  (1)
>
>       Only keys of the the currently selected protocol of CTX are
>       considered for import.  Other keys specified by the KEYS are
>       ignored.  As of now all considered keys must have been retrieved
>       using the same method, that is the used key listing mode must be
>       identical.
>
>       After the operation completed successfully, the result can be
>       retrieved with ?gpgme_op_import_result?.
>
>       The function returns the error code ?GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR? if the
>       import was completed successfully, ?GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE? if KEYDATA
>       if CTX or KEYDATA is not a valid pointer, ?GPG_ERR_CONFLICT? if the
>       key listing mode does not match, and ?GPG_ERR_NO_DATA? if no keys
>       are considered for export.
>
> Note that this works only for GPGSM (GPGME_PROTOCOL_CMS) because there
> is no need for this with GPG (GPGME_PROTOCOL_OPENPGP).
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>     Werner
>

-- 
Best Regards!



From manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com  Fri Jun  5 11:45:46 2015
From: manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com (manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com)
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2015 09:45:46 +0000
Subject: Facing issue while installing GnuPG 2.0.27 on AIX 7.1
In-Reply-To: <87eglqftc3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <0b421b1066e8482491ea4a06308d61b2@CO2PR42MB076.048d.mgd.msft.net>
 <87eglqftc3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <8269a798a00b4296b6d06e29bf3aa3bf@CO2PR42MB076.048d.mgd.msft.net>

Hi Werner,



Thanks for your reply.



Sure, we will check with our Unix team for the availability of the C compiler and get it installed.



Request you to address one more query:

? As you have mentioned in the trail mail that "You need to have a compiler and all related tools (the toolchain) to build software" , can you please give more details on "toolchain" ?

What all other tools will be required (other than installing C compiler) for successful installation of GnuPG software.



Thanks again :)



Thanks,

Manan N Mehta

Accenture | SAP BASIS Admin

Email: manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com<mailto:manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com>



-----Original Message-----
From: Werner Koch [mailto:wk at gnupg.org]
Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 2:03 PM
To: Navin Mehta, Manan
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org; gnupg-devel at gnupg.org; DiEnno, Michael F.; Dawane, Shailendra S.; Sharma, Pramod; Zingade, Swati; Karmakar, Sanjiv
Subject: Re: Facing issue while installing GnuPG 2.0.27 on AIX 7.1



On Thu,  4 Jun 2015 09:04, manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com<mailto:manan.navin.mehta at accenture.com> said:



> Below are the OS level details:

>

> [cid:image006.png at 01D09EBE.3BD6EBA0]



Sorry, I can't view the images as they are only available in the HTML rendered version.  Please always transcript con5tents from screenshots so that it is possible to search for the content.  Anyway, the attached config.log has all the details of your system.



> But still we are facing Error as C compiler cannot create executables



The configure run and the config.log show



> configure:3875: checking whether the C compiler works

> configure:3897: c99 -g   conftest.c -lposix >&5

> ./configure[3899]: c99:  not found



Thus you don't have a compiler installed.  You need to have a compiler and all related tools (the toolchain) to build software.



> If you have 24X7 support help line number then kindly share the

> details.



This is a public mailing list.  If you need commercial support please see http://gnupg.org/service.html .





Shalom-Salam,



   Werner



--

Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



________________________________

This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise confidential information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any other use of the e-mail by you is prohibited. Where allowed by local law, electronic communications with Accenture and its affiliates, including e-mail and instant messaging (including content), may be scanned by our systems for the purposes of information security and assessment of internal compliance with Accenture policy.
______________________________________________________________________________________

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From michael.gordon at emc.com  Fri Jun  5 14:48:47 2015
From: michael.gordon at emc.com (Gordon, Michael)
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2015 12:48:47 +0000
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <87oakuea2f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<5571617F.2050709@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <87oakuea2f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C085BE@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>

So the entry is unknown, correct?

-----Original Message-----
From: Werner Koch [mailto:wk at gnupg.org] 
Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 5:15 AM
To: Kristian Fiskerstrand
Cc: Gordon, Michael; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: Libksba Release notes

On Fri,  5 Jun 2015 10:44, kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com
said:

> Seems to be from https://www.gnupg.org/download/release_notes.en.html

I forgot about this.  The page needs some work.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Jun  6 13:06:22 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2015 12:06:22 +0100
Subject: Libksba Release notes
In-Reply-To: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C085BE@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
References: <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C045CF@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <874mmnj1t7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C05B01@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
 <87iob2ftu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5571617F.2050709@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <87oakuea2f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C085BE@MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>
Message-ID: <158855795.20150606120622@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 5 June 2015 at 1:48:47 PM, in
<mid:583728BB8EFCEC4D82E215924EA22F6108C085BE at MX107CL01.corp.emc.com>,
Gordon, Michael wrote:


> So the entry is unknown, correct?

Firstly, your top-posting makes it really difficult to follow the
discussion. Please consider quoting the relevant part from the
previous post, followed by your comment or question. For reference,
look at the way almost everybody else does it.

And to answer your question, the change in functionality from "GnuPG
1.0.4 for Windows (2000-10-23)" to "GnuPG 1.0.5 for Windows
(2001-05-02)" would have been the same as the list of changes shown
under "GnuPG 1.0.5 (2001-04-29)".


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Of course it's a good idea - it's mine!
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From jcea at jcea.es  Sun Jun  7 01:46:04 2015
From: jcea at jcea.es (Jesus Cea)
Date: Sun, 07 Jun 2015 01:46:04 +0200
Subject: gpg 2.0.27 is updating the trustdb constantly, and taking minutes
 to do it
In-Reply-To: <5518393B.4090704@jcea.es>
References: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es> <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5518393B.4090704@jcea.es>
Message-ID: <5573863C.1000204@jcea.es>

Upgraded to 2.0.28. No improvements in this area.

Any hint?.

I am surprised and dissapointed that 1.4.19 does this in 7 seconds and
2.0.27/2.0.28 are taking minutes. I am sure there is something "fishy"
going on.

Please, advice/hints.



On 29/03/15 19:41, Jesus Cea wrote:
> On 28/03/15 11:48, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Fri, 27 Mar 2015 17:07, jcea at jcea.es said:
>>
>>> My problem is that any change to the pubring, like downloading a new
>>> key, refreshing, adding a new local signature with "--lsign", etc., will
>>> force a trustdb update (in the next execution. For instance, decrypting
>>
>> A new key signature may chnage rthe entire WoT thus it needs to be
>> re-computed.  I have
>>
>>   no-auto-check-trustdb
>>
>> in my gpg.conf and 
>>
>>   30   1 * * *   /usr/local/bin/gpg --batch --check-trustdb 2>/dev/null
>>
>> in my crontab.  Thus tehre will be only one re-computation a day.
> 
> I understand that, nice hack, but I used 1.4.19 until a week ago and
> this recalculation was taking a few seconds. Now it is taking minutes.
> 
> Same configuration, same keyring files:
> 
> With 1.4 GPG:
> 
> """
> jcea at ubuntu:~/video$ time gpg.OLD --update-trustdb
> gpg: public key FBBB8AB1 is 58138 seconds newer than the signature
> gpg: public key D3A42C61 is 2009 seconds newer than the signature
> gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
> gpg: depth: 0  valid:  21  signed:  96  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 21u
> gpg: depth: 1  valid:  96  signed: 116  trust: 0-, 96q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
> gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-04-08
> 
> real	0m7.570s
> user	0m6.800s
> sys	0m0.440s
> """
> 
> With 2.0.27 GPG:
> 
> """
> jcea at ubuntu:~/video$ time gpg2 --update-trustdb
> gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected
> gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
> gpg: depth: 0  valid:  21  signed:  96  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 21u
> gpg: depth: 1  valid:  96  signed: 106  trust: 0-, 96q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
> gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-04-08
> 
> real	1m27.370s
> user	1m10.240s
> sys	0m13.950s
> """
> 
> Trustdb rebuild time has skyrocketed. Unless GPG 1.4 has a serious bug,
> 2.0.17 is doing something wrong. The sys time is interesting, looks like
> GPG 2.0.27 is doing a lot of syscalls. I wonder if it is doing the
> calculations several times, or what.
> 
>>> As I said, my pubring.gpg is 34MB long. With gnupg 1.4.x it would take a
>>> few seconds only.
>>
>> Which 1.4 version is this?
> 
> """
> jcea at ubuntu:~/video$ gpg.OLD --version
> gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.19
> Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
> License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later
> <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
> There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
> 
> Home: ~/.gnupg
> Supported algorithms:
> Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA
> Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH,
>         CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
> Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
> Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2
> """
> 
>>> PS: Bonus: how to get rid of
>>>
>>> """
>>> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A BEGIN
>>
>> Sorry for this.  It has already been fixed in the repo, see below.
> 
> Great. Thanks.
> 
> PS: Thanks for GNUPG!.
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 

-- 
Jes?s Cea Avi?n                         _/_/      _/_/_/        _/_/_/
jcea at jcea.es - http://www.jcea.es/     _/_/    _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/
Twitter: @jcea                        _/_/    _/_/          _/_/_/_/_/
jabber / xmpp:jcea at jabber.org  _/_/  _/_/    _/_/          _/_/  _/_/
"Things are not so easy"      _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/
"My name is Dump, Core Dump"   _/_/_/        _/_/_/      _/_/  _/_/
"El amor es poner tu felicidad en la felicidad de otro" - Leibniz

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From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Jun  7 11:24:26 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 07 Jun 2015 11:24:26 +0200
Subject: GnuPG News for May
Message-ID: <87d217dg6t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hi,

this is a text version of Neal's news posting 

  https://gnupg.org/blog/20150607-gnupg-in-may.html


============================================================

                         20150607-GNUPG-IN-MAY


                                  Neal


                             June 7th, 2015

A lot happened during May.

My focus was on Pinentry.  My primary goal was to fix the GNOME
Keyring issue, but along the way I also made various improvements and
closed a bunch of outstanding issues.

The GNOME Keyring issue is that GNOME Keyring proxies all traffic to
GPG Agent so that it can cache any passphrases and display its own
pinentry dialogs, which have a GNOME3 aesthetic.  Unfortunately, the
proxy's implementation of the GPG Agent protocol is not complete and
this breaks a lot of GnuPG's functionality.  Working with Stef
Walters, the maintainer of GNOME Keyring, we came up with a plan to
resolve the situation.  The basic idea is to add support for external
password managers to GnuPG, modify the pinentry programs to deal with
an external password manager and add a GNOME3 pinentry.  The changes
for GnuPG have been added to the 2.1 branch and backported to the 2.0
branch.  The pinentry work is also done.  The remaining bit of work is
to get distributions to disable the GNOME Keyring proxy and distribute
the new changes.  (A summary of changes required by distributions can
be found here [1].)  To this end, Werner released new version of GnuPG
stable (the 2.0 line), GnuPG modern (the 2.1 line) and Pinentry.
Distributions immediately began to integrate the changes.  In
particular, Daniel Kahn Gillmor already uploaded packages to Debian
Unstable.  This uncovered a few minor bugs, which we quickly fixed.

  [1] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029835.html

Ben McGinnes announced new Python 3 bindings for GPGME based on PyME
0.9.0 [2].  Ben noted that PyME is for Python 2 and will continue to
be maintained separately by Martin Albrecht.  Ben has tested the
library on Mac OS X, but seeks more testers.

  [2] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029844.html

Daniel Kahn Gillmore announced initial Python 3 bindings for
libassuan, GnuPG's IPC library [3].  The library is not yet complete
and Daniel is looking for feedback regarding the API as well as more
general contributions.

  [3] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029786.html

Daiki Ueno sent patches to add an emacs-based pinentry.  This pinentry
talks to the running emacs using a communication mechanism similar to
emacsclient.  Unlike the other pinentry's, this pinentry isn't
normally used by default.  Instead, all of the pinentries have been
modified to (optionally) detect whether they are run from emacs (by
checking for the INSIDE_EMACS environment variable).  If so, they use
the new pinentry functionality.  Otherwise, they display their usual
frontend.

  [4] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029875.html

NIIBE Yutaka and Werner spent time triaging a number of bugs.  This
work is not very sexy, but this is what most improves the quality of
the code base.

Daniel Kahn Gillmor also reported a number of bugs and did significant
work helping to triage them.

Werner released GnuPG versions 2.1.4 [5] and 2.0.28 [6] and Pinentry
version 0.9.3 and 0.9.4.

  [5] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029817.html
  [6] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-June/029892.html

Werner has also been actively improving the OpenPGP specificantion,
RFC4880.  This effort is occuring within the context of the IETF [7].
The new specification is currently called RFC4880bis and a working
group is in the process of being chartered.  The goal is to have a new
version of the specification by July 2016.

  [7] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/

In additional to the development, there were also several interesting
discussions on the mailing lists.

On gnupg-devel, Daniel Kahn Gillmor observed that GnuPG reads 300
bytes from /dev/random when it generates a long-term key, which, he
observed, is a lot given /dev/random's limited entropy [8].  Werner
explained that GnuPG has always done this.  In particular, GnuPG
maintains a 600-byte persistent seed file and every time a key is
generated it stirs in an additional 300 bytes.  Daniel pointed out an
interesting blog post by DJB explaining that a proper CSPRNG should
never need more than about 32 bytes of entropy.  Peter Gutmann chimed
in and noted that a 2048-bit RSA key needs about about 103 bits of
entropy and a 4096-bit RSA key needs about 142 bits, but, in practice,
128-bits is enough.  Based on this, Werner proposed a patch for
Libgcrypt that reduces the amount of seeding to just 128-bits.

During this discussion, Werner also noted that to avoid reusing
entropy and thereby weakening any derived keys, it is important to
never backup or restore GnuPG's random seed file
(~/.gnupg/random_seed) [9].

  [8] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-April/029750.html
  [9] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029782.html

Werner proposed adding an option to the GTK+ pinentry to show/hide the
passphrase.  This is useful when entering very long passphrases (and
when the user knows that he or she is not being observed).

  [10] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-May/029790.html

On gnupg-users, there was an interesting discussion about using
external sources of entropy, such as the results of rolling dice.
Niibe replied that no person can beat the unbiasedness of modern
HWRNG, which are aggressively tested using modern empirical statistics
over gigabytes or terabytes of random data.  The only real question is
whether the entropy source has been backdoored.

  [11] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-May/053676.html

The Facebook announcement for OpenPGP was also mentioned [12].  The
reactions are mixed.  Personally, I think this is a positive
development.  It's true that Facebook is probably not working towards
end-to-end encryption, but if they encourage other big sites, such as
banks and e-commerce sites, to encrypt their email communication with
their users, we may have a meaningful increase in security.

  [12] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-June/053709.html

============================================================



From freebooter2015 at gmail.com  Mon Jun  8 01:04:33 2015
From: freebooter2015 at gmail.com (Rex Kneisley)
Date: Sun, 07 Jun 2015 16:04:33 -0700
Subject: Installing GnuPG 2.1.4 in Debian Experimental
Message-ID: <1433718273.18943.22.camel@gmail.com>

Hello Group,

Well here I go again. I'm forever tweaking my OS. I was using a dual
boot Kali/Debian Jessie (encrypted). Somehow (I think when I updated
Debian) my Kali partition became corrupted. I tried to reinstall Kali
and destroyed my Debian partition. Live and learn. That is just
background.

Unfortunately, the experimental version of GnuPG 2.1.4 that I had
bungled my way into (with much help from this group) was wiped clean as
well.

So I figured I would start fresh. I added experimental to my sources
list and then attempted:(as per dkg's weblog on Debian Administration)

sudo apt install -t experimental gnupg2 gnupg-agent dirmngr gpgsm gpgv2
scdaemon

This worked for me before, but now I was getting a lot of dependency
related errors. I recalled that the first time I had tried
unsuccessfully to install 2.1.4 from scratch (before being directed to
experimental). So I figured I would install all of the latest libraries
and try again. So I downloaded all of the libraries, verified them, and
installed them, in order, with ./configure; make; make install:

as Per Warner in the read me:
                         BUILD INSTRUCTIONS
                        
                          GnuPG 2.1 depends on the following GnuPG
                        related packages:
                        
                            npth
                        (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/npth/)
                            libgpg-error
                        (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error/)
                            libgcrypt
                        (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/)
                            libksba
                        (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/)
                            libassuan
                        (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libassuan/)
                        
                          You should get the latest versions of course,
                        the GnuPG configure
                          script complains if a version is not
                        sufficient.
                        
After that I attempted:
apt install -t experimental gnupg2 gnupg-agent dirmngr gpgsm gpgv2
scdaemon

I was already su

here are my error messages:
                        root at debian-rig:/home/rexk# apt-get install -t
                        experimental gnupg2 gnupg-agent dirmngr gpgsm
                        gpgv2 scdaemon
                        Reading package lists... Done
                        Building dependency tree       
                        Reading state information... Done
                        Some packages could not be installed. This may
                        mean that you have
                        requested an impossible situation or if you are
                        using the unstable
                        distribution that some required packages have
                        not yet been created
                        or been moved out of Incoming.
                        The following information may help to resolve
                        the situation:
                        
                        The following packages have unmet dependencies:
                         dirmngr : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0) but
                        2.1.2-2 is to be installed
                         gnupg-agent : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0)
                        but 2.1.2-2 is to be installed
                         scdaemon : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0) but
                        2.1.2-2 is to be installed
                        E: Unable to correct problems, you have held
                        broken packages.
                        
I also attempted:

                        root at debian-rig:/home/rexk/Software# apt-get -t
                        experimental install gnupg2
                        Reading package lists... Done
                        Building dependency tree       
                        Reading state information... Done
                        Some packages could not be installed. This may
                        mean that you have
                        requested an impossible situation or if you are
                        using the unstable
                        distribution that some required packages have
                        not yet been created
                        or been moved out of Incoming.
                        The following information may help to resolve
                        the situation:
                        
                        The following packages have unmet dependencies:
                         gnupg2 : Depends: gnupg-agent (= 2.1.4-2) but
                        2.0.26-6 is to be installed
                                  Recommends: dirmngr (>= 2.1.0~) but it
                        is not going to be installed
                        E: Unable to correct problems, you have held
                        broken packages.
                        
I'm not sure what "is to be installed" means. Any help would be
appreciated.

Rex 
                        





From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Jun  8 15:29:59 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 15:29:59 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GPGME 1.5.5 released
Message-ID: <87fv62ba5j.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce version 1.5.5 of GPGME.

  GnuPG Made Easy (GPGME) is a C language library that allows to add
  support for cryptography to a program.  It is designed to make access
  to public key crypto engines as included in GnuPG easier for
  applications.  GPGME provides a high-level crypto API for encryption,
  decryption, signing, signature verification, and key management.
  

* Noteworthy changes in version 1.5.5

  - Fixed crash in key listings for user ids with a backslash.  This bug
    was not exploitable except for a DoS (see commit 0d28a69).
  
  - Fixed regression for GPGSM use with GnuPG < 2.1.

  - Properly set signature summary for revoked OpenPGP keys.


* Download

  You may download this library and its OpenPGP signature from:

    ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpgme/gpgme-1.5.5.tar.bz2 (953k)
    ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpgme/gpgme-1.5.5.tar.bz2.sig
  
  
  The SHA-1 checksum is
  
  88476d72cb099e179de4040760502886f7a54926  gpgme-1.5.5.tar.bz2


* Support

  Please send questions regarding the use of GPGME to the gnupg-devel
  mailing list:

    https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel/

  If you need commercial support, you may want to consult this listing:

    https://gnupg.org/service.html



For the GnuPG team,


  Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From michard.antoine at gmail.com  Tue Jun  9 10:19:42 2015
From: michard.antoine at gmail.com (Antoine Michard)
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 10:19:42 +0200
Subject: Hardware Keyring
Message-ID: <CADw6Qk479DT+DbXZYVckmJvYy=p5R4+cNE2v1FiL3oMGXw3bSg@mail.gmail.com>

Hi All,

I would like to buy a hardware keyring to store my futur subkey and for
beter security.
I haven't got keys now, but with my futur email address and server I would
like to use more GPG system. For sign all my outgoing mail, to connect
though my ssh server, maybe to encrypt file, etc...

I found a lot of this but It's hard to choose witch one.
Here my choice, please add yours:

- OpenPGP Card <http://www.g10code.de/p-card.html>: cheap, secure, need a
smartcard reader (or USB Key). Can't use on smartphone but easily store in
a wallet. And of course it's Open Hardware. Can use Smartcard Pageant for
Windows <http://smartcard-auth.de/ssh-en.html>
- Yubikey Neo
<https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey-neo/>: multiple
usage, NFC (for smartphone) and U2F, NOT OPEN SOURCE (and security breach
recently)
- FST-01 <http://www.seeedstudio.com/wiki/FST-01>: Can be entropy device (
NeuG <http://www.gniibe.org/memo/development/gnuk/rng/neug>), can be
upgraded (need ST-LINK/V2), Only one enclosure with no attach. And Open
Source Too
- NitroKey <https://www.nitrokey.com/>: Best of all I think but not
availaible yet

I want to use my device at work, at home and on travel with my netbook. If
I can, I would like to use it with my smartphone but I can live without. I
love OpenSource and OpenHardware, I think it's the futur for better device
and transparency. But I'm not a developper so I trust people who read the
code...

So, what's your advice about hardware keyring ?? Did you know other ??
What's your keyring ???
Thanks for reply

-- 
Antoine Michard
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Jun  9 13:49:22 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2015 13:49:22 +0200
Subject: Hardware Keyring
In-Reply-To: <CADw6Qk479DT+DbXZYVckmJvYy=p5R4+cNE2v1FiL3oMGXw3bSg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CADw6Qk479DT+DbXZYVckmJvYy=p5R4+cNE2v1FiL3oMGXw3bSg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5576D2C2.2010001@digitalbrains.com>

On 09/06/15 10:19, Antoine Michard wrote:
> Hi All,

Hello,

Just a quick scribble, not an extensive answer.

> - OpenPGP Card <http://www.g10code.de/p-card.html>: cheap, secure, need
> a smartcard reader (or USB Key). Can't use on smartphone but easily
> store in a wallet. And of course it's Open Hardware. Can use Smartcard
> Pageant for Windows <http://smartcard-auth.de/ssh-en.html>

It's *not* open hardware. Only the specification is open. If you've
found the claim somehwere that it is open hardware, I think it would be
interesting to know where, so the webpage owner can be notified of the
mistake, or something.

It can be very difficult to make an open source crypto smartcard because
you usually have to sign NDA's and things to be able to use one. Open
hardware /with/ a crypto accelerator is definitely even more difficult.
Plus, how far do you go with "open"? Do you want the design of the chip
in the Hardware Description Language it was designed in? ("the preferred
form of the work for making modifications to it").

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com  Tue Jun  9 15:38:39 2015
From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK)
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2015 15:38:39 +0200
Subject: Hardware Keyring
In-Reply-To: <CADw6Qk479DT+DbXZYVckmJvYy=p5R4+cNE2v1FiL3oMGXw3bSg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CADw6Qk479DT+DbXZYVckmJvYy=p5R4+cNE2v1FiL3oMGXw3bSg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5576EC5F.8090904@gmail.com>

Il 09/06/2015 10:19, Antoine Michard ha scritto:

> - FST-01 <http://www.seeedstudio.com/wiki/FST-01>: Can be entropy device
> (NeuG <http://www.gniibe.org/memo/development/gnuk/rng/neug>), can be
> upgraded (need ST-LINK/V2), Only one enclosure with no attach. And Open
> Source Too
That's the one I like most, given my security needs. Remember that it's
not as hardened as a smartcard if the attacker gains unsupervised
physical access to it for a long enough time. But it uses ommodity
hardware you can source where you prefer, so a backdoor is really *much*
less probable!

And the creator reads this list, too! :)

The only thing I really miss is that the trust db is not in the token,
but integrating it would require changes/extensions to the protocol.

BYtE,
 Diego.


From simon at josefsson.org  Tue Jun  9 15:21:08 2015
From: simon at josefsson.org (Simon Josefsson)
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2015 15:21:08 +0200
Subject: State-of-the-art way to setup a shared security@ email with
 hardware-backed keys?
Message-ID: <87zj49ow57.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>

I want to setup a security at example.com contact email address that should
accept OpenPGP encrypted emails.  The purpose is to notify us of
security incidents.  The decryption key needs to be shared by several
people who are authorized to read and reply to such emails.  Naturally I
don't want soft keys laying around on everyone's disk.

Is anyone doing this for some organization?  What is the best way to
achieve this?

My current idea is to generate a security at example.com master PGP key and
keep that offline, and to generate one decryption sub-key, and load that
onto a couple of OpenPGP Card smartcards.

This would allow authorized people to decrypt emails properly, by using
the "security team smartcard".  To respond to the emails, they would
need to use their own smartcard which is a nauisance but workable.

Dealing with revocation (if someone quits or loses their smartcard)
seems feasible: just revoke the subkey and generate a new one, loading
that onto everyone's smartcards.

One alternative I can think of is to setup a server that receives the
email, decrypts it and encrypts it to all people who should receive it.
Then they can use only their personal smartcard and don't need to carry
another smartcard around.  The disadvantage with this is that the server
will become an easy attack target.

What we currently use is to publish the individal PGP keys for all
security team members, so people can encrypt to all of us and email
directly, but that is rather unfriendly to people sending us reports.

Thoughts?

/Simon
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From michard.antoine at gmail.com  Tue Jun  9 22:39:37 2015
From: michard.antoine at gmail.com (Antoine Michard)
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 22:39:37 +0200
Subject: Hardware Keyring
In-Reply-To: <5576EC5F.8090904@gmail.com>
References: <CADw6Qk479DT+DbXZYVckmJvYy=p5R4+cNE2v1FiL3oMGXw3bSg@mail.gmail.com>
 <5576EC5F.8090904@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CADw6Qk6700E0zqt=RRap1H-fwGi8tRbLvBsJ9xGbRQCOhBtkwQ@mail.gmail.com>

Sorry Peter to get mixed up OpenHardware and Open Spec...

Diego, like you I like very much FST-01 and I really wanna try.
And private key is protected to SWD port and encrypted inside memory so...
I think to safe enough for me :)

Thanks for the reply !!

2015-06-09 15:38 GMT+02:00 NdK <ndk.clanbo at gmail.com>:

> Il 09/06/2015 10:19, Antoine Michard ha scritto:
>
> > - FST-01 <http://www.seeedstudio.com/wiki/FST-01>: Can be entropy device
> > (NeuG <http://www.gniibe.org/memo/development/gnuk/rng/neug>), can be
> > upgraded (need ST-LINK/V2), Only one enclosure with no attach. And Open
> > Source Too
> That's the one I like most, given my security needs. Remember that it's
> not as hardened as a smartcard if the attacker gains unsupervised
> physical access to it for a long enough time. But it uses ommodity
> hardware you can source where you prefer, so a backdoor is really *much*
> less probable!
>
> And the creator reads this list, too! :)
>
> The only thing I really miss is that the trust db is not in the token,
> but integrating it would require changes/extensions to the protocol.
>
> BYtE,
>  Diego.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>



-- 
Antoine Michard
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Jun 10 21:27:10 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 15:27:10 -0400
Subject: Installing GnuPG 2.1.4 in Debian Experimental
In-Reply-To: <1433718273.18943.22.camel@gmail.com>
References: <1433718273.18943.22.camel@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87pp53pdo1.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Sun 2015-06-07 19:04:33 -0400, Rex Kneisley wrote:
>                         root at debian-rig:/home/rexk# apt-get install -t
>                         experimental gnupg2 gnupg-agent dirmngr gpgsm
>                         gpgv2 scdaemon
>                         Reading package lists... Done
>                         Building dependency tree       
>                         Reading state information... Done
>                         Some packages could not be installed. This may
>                         mean that you have
>                         requested an impossible situation or if you are
>                         using the unstable
>                         distribution that some required packages have
>                         not yet been created
>                         or been moved out of Incoming.
>                         The following information may help to resolve
>                         the situation:
>                         
>                         The following packages have unmet dependencies:
>                          dirmngr : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0) but
>                         2.1.2-2 is to be installed
>                          gnupg-agent : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0)
>                         but 2.1.2-2 is to be installed
>                          scdaemon : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0) but
>                         2.1.2-2 is to be installed
>                         E: Unable to correct problems, you have held
>                         broken packages.

So this is a dependency issue: jessie is debian stable, but gnupg2 is
built against unstable, which has changed since jessie was released.

In particular, gpg-agent, dirmngr, and scdaemon all use
assuan_sock_set_sockaddr_un() if available, which was only introduced in
assuan 2.2.0, which is only available since assuan 2.1.4; jessie only
has 2.1.2.

This can be addressed for jessie in one of two ways:

 0) we can create a backport for more a modern version of libassuan,
    which should allow installation of the experimental package directly

 1) we can create a backport for gnupg 2.1.x direclty, using jessie's
    version of libassuan.

approach (1) won't work right now because jessie-backports only allows
packages that are already in testing, and 2.1.x is only in experimental.

I'm cc'ing the pkg-gnupg-maint team in debian to see whether Eric
Dorland (the team member who has been most responsible for assuan in
debian) thinks there are any problems with approach (0).  If not, maybe
he'd be up for maintaining a jessie-backports version of the more recent
libassuan, which should let all debian jessie users install gnupg2 2.1.x
from experimental.

     --dkg


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Jun 11 06:01:07 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 00:01:07 -0400
Subject: State-of-the-art way to setup a shared security@ email with
 hardware-backed keys?
In-Reply-To: <87zj49ow57.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
References: <87zj49ow57.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
Message-ID: <87oakmopvg.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

Hi Simon--

Thanks for the interesting use case.

On Tue 2015-06-09 09:21:08 -0400, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> My current idea is to generate a security at example.com master PGP key and
> keep that offline, and to generate one decryption sub-key, and load that
> onto a couple of OpenPGP Card smartcards.
>
> This would allow authorized people to decrypt emails properly, by using
> the "security team smartcard".  To respond to the emails, they would
> need to use their own smartcard which is a nauisance but workable.

I like this approach for encryption to the team; i think it's definitely
better than the server that does decryption/reencryption.

Another (much weirder) remailer approach that doesn't expose the content
to the remailer itself uses El Gamal keys that have a known relationship
to each other.  The remailer can transform the PKESK in such a way that
it is readable to each peer, without being able to recover the
cleartext.

This is the approach used in PSELS:

   http://www.ncsa.illinois.edu/People/hkhurana/ICICS.pdf

This still has the awkward key distribution step when new members join
the team -- you have to generate their encryption-capable secret key and
get it to them.

But for revocation for user X in this case, you'd just tell the server
to stop PKESK translation for the corresponding offset for user X -- no
certificate update is necessary, and no redistribution to every
remaining team member.


-----------

I note that you're asking here only about the encryption-capable
subkeys, and not signing subkeys -- it's quite possible that your
correspondents would like to be cryptographically confident that the
reply messages come from the team, and not from an imposter.

Interestingly, the case for signing-capable subkeys is not symmetric
with the case for encryption-capable subkeys.  It should be possible for
each of your members to contribute a distinct signing-capable subkey,
and you'd attach all of them to the primary key.

There are two approaches to this:

 a) you could have each person generate their own signing capable
    subkey, create the binding cross-sig with it to the primary key, and
    send the public part + the cross-sig to the team keyring maintainer,
    who would bind it as a subkey and publish the updated cert.

 b) during generation of the per-person encryption-capable subkey, you
    could go ahead and generate a separate signing-capable subkey for
    that user and pre-install it on the smartcard.

the advantages of this individualized signing-subkey scheme (using
either approach above) over a single-shared-signing-subkey are:

 0) you can do individualized revocation without reissuing new
    signing-capable subkeys for everyone else.

 1) you don't have to keep the signing-capable subkey on hand at the
    keyring management site in order to enroll new team members.

 2) when a message coming from the team is signed, you can identify
    which team member made the signature.


hth,

        --dkg


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun 11 16:00:49 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 16:00:49 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
Message-ID: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

The GnuPG Project is pleased to announce the availability of a new
release of GnuPG modern: Version 2.1.5.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is a complete and free implementation
of the OpenPGP standard which is commonly abbreviated as PGP.

GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a
versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key
directories.  GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy
integration with other applications.  A wealth of frontend applications
and libraries making use of GnuPG are available.  Since version 2 GnuPG
provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP.

GnuPG is Free Software (meaning that it respects your freedom). It can
be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU
General Public License.

Three different branches of GnuPG are actively maintained:

- GnuPG "modern" (2.1) is the latest development with a lot of new
  features.  This announcement is about this branch.

- GnuPG "stable" (2.0) is the current stable version for general use.
  This is what most users are currently using.

- GnuPG "classic" (1.4) is the old standalone version which is most
  suitable for older or embedded platforms.

You may not install "modern" (2.1) and "stable" (2.0) at the same
time.  However, it is possible to install "classic" (1.4) along with
any of the other versions.


Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.5
===================================

 * Support for an external passphrase cache.

 * Support for the forthcoming version 3 OpenPGP smartcard.

 * Manuals now show the actual used file names.

 * Prepared for improved integration with Emacs.

 * Code cleanups and minor bug fixes.

A detailed description of the changes found in the 2.1 branch can be
found at <https://gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html>.

This version fixes some bugs found after the release of 2.1.4.  Please
be aware that there are still known bugs which we are working on.  Check
the the bug tracker, https://wiki.gnupg.org, or the mailing list
archives for known problems and workarounds.


Getting the Software
====================

Please follow the instructions found at https://gnupg.org/download/ or
read on:

GnuPG 2.1.5 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from its primary FTP server.  The list of mirrors can be found
at <https://gnupg.org/mirrors.html>.  Note that GnuPG is not available
at ftp.gnu.org.

On ftp.gnupg.org you find these files:

 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2  (4791k)
 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2.sig

This is the GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP
signature.

 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.1.5_20150611.exe  (2567k)
 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.1.5_20150611.exe.sig

This is an installer for Windows without graphical frontends except for
a basic Pinentry tool.  Please de-install an installed Gpg4win version
before trying this installer.  Note, that TLS access to keyservers is
not yet available.  The sources used to build the installer can be found
in the same directory with an ".tar.xz" suffix.


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply
   verify the supplied signature.  For example to verify the signature
   of the file gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by one or more of the release signing keys.  Make sure that
   this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint
   against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by
   checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys.
   See below for information on the signing keys.

 * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have
   to verify the SHA-1 checksum.  On Unix systems the command to do
   this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum".  Assuming you downloaded the
   file gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2, you would run the command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the next line:

02bbe32e1ef3b06b3ae3c60c955fb767a1aa0f2f  gnupg-2.1.5.tar.bz2
f705fb6ae7612428b33cc51e23e006cdbf958e5d  gnupg-w32-2.1.5_20150611.exe
9ee6959be57c32bddeb2a855724a9080d1820079  gnupg-w32-2.1.5_20150611.tar.xz


Release Signing Keys
====================

To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by
malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and
binary versions.  The keys are also signed by the long term keys of
their respective owners.  Current releases are signed by one or more
of these four keys:

  2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
  Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
  Werner Koch (dist sig)

  rsa2048/E0856959 2014-10-29 [expires: 2019-12-31]
  Key fingerprint = 46CC 7308 65BB 5C78 EBAB  ADCF 0437 6F3E E085 6959
  David Shaw (GnuPG Release Signing Key) <dshaw 'at' jabberwocky.com>

  rsa2048/33BD3F06 2014-10-29 [expires: 2016-10-28]
  Key fingerprint = 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286  A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06
  NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe 'at' fsij.org>

  rsa2048/7EFD60D9 2014-10-19 [expires: 2020-12-31]
  Key fingerprint = D238 EA65 D64C 67ED 4C30  73F2 8A86 1B1C 7EFD 60D9
  Werner Koch (Release Signing Key)

You may retrieve these files from a keyserver using this command

  gpg --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-keys  \
                  249B39D24F25E3B6 04376F3EE0856959 \
                  2071B08A33BD3F06 8A861B1C7EFD60D9

The keys are also available at https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html and
in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg .
Note that this mail has been signed using by a different key.


Internationalization
====================

This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese,
Czech, French, German, Japanese, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost
completely translated (2071 different strings).


Documentation
=============

If you used GnuPG in the past you should read the description of
changes and new features at doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt or online at

  https://gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html

The file gnupg.info has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well but they have not all the
details available as are the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/

or in Portable Document Format at

  https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

You may also want to follow postings at https://gnupg.org/blob/.


Support
========

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>.  For commercial support
requests we keep a list of known service companies at:

  https://gnupg.org/service.html

If you are a developer and you may need a certain feature for your
project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing
list for discussion.


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
lists.  Maintenance and development of GnuPG is possible due to many
individual and corporate donations; for a list of non-anonymous donors
see <https://gnupg.org/donate/kudos.html>.


For the GnuPG hackers,

   Werner


p.s.
This is a announcement only mailing list.  Please send replies only to
the gnupg-users at gnupg.org mailing list.

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From mailinglist at krebs.uno  Thu Jun 11 18:05:57 2015
From: mailinglist at krebs.uno (Daniel Krebs)
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 18:05:57 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
In-Reply-To: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5579B1E5.5060106@krebs.uno>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Thanks for the new release,

> * Support for the forthcoming version 3 OpenPGP smartcard.

Is there any further information you can provide regarding version 3
of the smartcard? Searching the web didn't give me any useful results.

Thanks

DK
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
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=GU5C
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From gniibe at fsij.org  Fri Jun 12 02:34:26 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 09:34:26 +0900
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
In-Reply-To: <5579B1E5.5060106@krebs.uno>
References: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5579B1E5.5060106@krebs.uno>
Message-ID: <557A2912.5040904@fsij.org>

On 06/12/2015 01:05 AM, Daniel Krebs wrote:
> Is there any further information you can provide regarding version 3
> of the smartcard? Searching the web didn't give me any useful results.

Please visit: http://www.g10code.com/p-card.html

And please follow the link "OpenPGP Card version 3.0", then you can
get the specification.

	http://www.g10code.com/docs/openpgp-card-3.0.pdf

That's all I know of.

For ECC implementation of NIST P-256 curve, you can refer:

    http://git.gniibe.org/gitweb/?p=gnuk/gnuk.git;a=summary
-- 


From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com  Fri Jun 12 19:32:50 2015
From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK)
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 19:32:50 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
In-Reply-To: <557A2912.5040904@fsij.org>
References: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5579B1E5.5060106@krebs.uno>
 <557A2912.5040904@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <557B17C2.9050704@gmail.com>

Il 12/06/2015 02:34, NIIBE Yutaka ha scritto:

> 	http://www.g10code.com/docs/openpgp-card-3.0.pdf
Really interesting!

Especially section 4.1.3: IIUC, that allows for out of band
authorization of the crypto ops.

I'll have to study better the code for GnuK and how to make that little
beast^H^H^H^H^H ARM handle inputs... :) Or maybe a display + buttons via
i2c (as the "display" capability is announced by b8 in sec 4.1.3.2 .

Too bad it seems still limited to the "standard set" of keys. No way to
store old dec keys (to keep using a single card to read all the old
mails, even if generating a new key every year).
A possible workaround would be a "parallel" application on the card that
when called changes the active DEC key together with the card serial no,
corresponding fingerprint in C5 DO and gentime in CD DO).

BYtE,
 Diego.


From mmercer at ct-unlimited.com  Thu Jun 11 03:10:25 2015
From: mmercer at ct-unlimited.com (Marc Mercer)
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 18:10:25 -0700
Subject: gpg-agent in 2.1
Message-ID: <CAFTrunjWnQh5noFf--579+th6+k77VncyX5ngQSecX8YXK+13A@mail.gmail.com>

Fellow Users,
I have read through all changes regarding the behavior in 2.1 vs the old
behavior in 2.0.27, which still allowed for --write-env-file
($GPG_AGENT_INFO), as well as tested several things, and seem to have some
issues, or perhaps misunderstandings regarding proper invocation and usage
now.

With the old setup, I had my GAI configured, tty exported, etc, and
autostart worked with --enable-ssh-support all defined in conf.

Now I have managed to get it to work so that I can start the agent
initially with ssh-support, I attach to the socket, et cetera, however, two
scenarios break things --

1.) If the agent launches without ssh-support (as seen with ssh-add -l;  I
am a yubikey user, I should see the yubikey in the trusted list), I have to
kill the agent, and restart it.   -- When doing so, it does *not*
automatically export the SSH_AUTH_SOCK.  I have to recopy and paste that
output for the value to be set.

2.) In the old days, you could plug and unplug the card, and the agent
would reload the card (yes, you had to re-enter the pin, that is expected
behavior and how it is supposed to work).  Now, it no longer supports
plug/unplug behavior -- If you unplug, you are forced to kill the agent,
and then restart it (and this is also where I have to copy/paste the
SSH_AUTH_SOCK variable so that it knows where to attach).

Does anyone else use a pgp secure key with gpg2?  If so, how have you
managed to handle the gpg-agent behavior?  It seems to have more or less
broken the usability for secure card users, which I would consider a
regression.

Thanks for any input/info.


/* Marc Mercer
 * Owner, CT-Unlimited LLC
 * mmercer at ct-unlimited.com
 * Skype: Daemoen
 * Office: (408) 384-8858
 * http://www.ct-unlimited.com
 */
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From jmw at fastmail.com  Thu Jun 11 18:11:16 2015
From: jmw at fastmail.com (James Wilson)
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 09:11:16 -0700
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
In-Reply-To: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5579B324.2000209@fastmail.com>

On 06/11/2015 07:00 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.5
> ===================================
> 
>  * Support for the forthcoming version 3 OpenPGP smartcard.
> 

Is there a contact for this, or a draft of the standard available?


From mailinglist at krebs.uno  Fri Jun 12 23:12:23 2015
From: mailinglist at krebs.uno (Daniel Krebs)
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 23:12:23 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
In-Reply-To: <557A2912.5040904@fsij.org>
References: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5579B1E5.5060106@krebs.uno>
 <557A2912.5040904@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <557B4B37.70609@krebs.uno>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Am 12.06.2015 um 02:34 schrieb NIIBE Yutaka:

> And please follow the link "OpenPGP Card version 3.0", then you
> can get the specification.
> 
> http://www.g10code.com/docs/openpgp-card-3.0.pdf
> 
> That's all I know of.

Thanks for pointing me there. Really interesting. I wonder if "RSA
1024 is removed" means that they can't be generated on card or also
that they can't be transferred from an external device to the card.

DK
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)

iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVe0sjAAoJEA7irlPqaBCOPnUQAJ2L0cKWBttYVChjgHEtuUPx
ZP8qa8eZ4sDgqzYKFZboV//Rsm7CpjBNNeeyUhn7GcCdT6pKiXy+0zCvFkX/uQws
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E8eiZOznSQAzmAgaGoKgE4Ceb83Esqy885gXE5bDlVL3l65HdMoK0lwFuwKr2D+Z
JraOKbTZBuGqKPPq1QtnTcf3rmXDji7vT9zVssOJw03J5lDQGMTBYqvrDvwDEs5f
t7Vb9k/eDee63ImUmp7m4w4MXg8lCGl+mUUKvdMJgMHY0JIuKZPdvvhjF61kmbxw
1T/kH9JR+LET5kP6qx0eWsAruBc8ZxbvntxcNy8YoFJLpRvBt4vwakj8A9tHKzk5
rlArhVz2ngsXeEzgM40+eaZuQ8M7/I99543MtZrsCrZm4qkj7dNFd/5XO/7jXKsT
fA2v9gbAEH06SKgRCQ1SakWG5pAO4CxeKfQGjZo66lL4JNTHdR65LVWlpO1rL6DQ
csnXuKQDtHvSiz6my8Cn5yGuPVpZ0V2Igxf2nkDJeTG0OOHBnZrWaSakxh6TLsvf
WBOuXXbMM09PlWCkG0Oz
=YSgA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From freebooter2015 at gmail.com  Sat Jun 13 05:37:30 2015
From: freebooter2015 at gmail.com (Rex Kneisley)
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 20:37:30 -0700
Subject: Installing GnuPG 2.1.4 in Debian Experimental
In-Reply-To: <87lhfqoomp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <1433718273.18943.22.camel@gmail.com>
 <87pp53pdo1.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <1433984357.17461.9.camel@gmail.com>
 <87lhfqoomp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <F2131FE3-5A50-4DCD-8A75-CCB16D32E67C@gmail.com>


> 
> 
> On Wed 2015-06-10 20:59:17 -0400, Rex Kneisley wrote:
>> gnupg-agent : Depends: libassuan0 (>= 2.2.0)
>>>>                        but 2.1.2-2 is to be installed
>> Call me crazy but I looked at the error message a bit more closely and
>> noticed that libassuan0 needed to be greater than 2.2.0 go I "googled
>> it" and stumbled on the Debian package for stretch
>> https://packages.debian.org/stretch/libassuan0
> 
> Yes, if you were running debian testing (currently "stretch"), then
> things would Just Work for you to add gnupg2 from experimental.
> 
> You indicated you were running stable (currently "jessie"), so i was
> trying to address a way to resolve the dependencies there (using
> "jessie-backports").  My goal was to provide you with a path that you
> could maintain within jessie -- once you start mixing packages from
> stretch, it becomes harder to maintain the difference.
> 
>> After I downloaded it, I installed the package with
>> "./configure;make;make install"
> 
> This is *not* the normal way to install debian packages.

It is my understanding that the best way to install Debian packages is indirectly using apt-get install. However, when I tried that with:
"apt-get install libassuan0? It kept telling me ?package is up to date? and my attempt to install GnuPG from experimental continued to fail.

> What did you
> download?  how did you verify the download cryptographically?



Although I downloaded and verified all of the original packages from the GnuPG website:
https://gnupg.org/download/index.html <https://gnupg.org/download/index.html>

in my haste, I dowloaded the libassuan0 (2.2.1-1) package directly from
the Debian Package website:
https://packages.debian.org/stretch/libassuan0 <https://packages.debian.org/stretch/libassuan0>

I blatantly disregarded their warning:
?if you are running Debian, it is strongly suggested to use a package manager like aptitude <https://packages.debian.org/jessie/aptitude> or synaptic <https://packages.debian.org/jessie/synaptic> to download and install packages, instead of doing so manually via this website."

I addition to that, although the site is ?https? and looks ?official? enough,
there are no hashes or signatures provided.

>> In particular, gpg-agent, dirmngr, and scdaemon all use
>> assuan_sock_set_sockaddr_un() if available, which was only introduced in
>> assuan 2.2.0, which is only available since assuan 2.1.4; jessie only
>> has 2.1.2.

So essentially I solved my problem in the short term by installing assuan 2.2.1-1

At this point my concern is:
1) I have dowloaded and installed software that I was unable to verify.
2) I have taken a shortcut with my Debian release(stable) that might cause issues if I run an update.

> Yes, if you were running debian testing (currently "stretch"), then
> things would Just Work for you to add gnupg2 from experimental.

Moving to ?stretch? seems the most strait-forward
way of achieving my goal of running GnuPG version 2.1.x. But doen't that also automatically download and install ?testing? versions of other packages that I am not interested in?

Will running "apt-get install update && apt-get install dist-upgrade?
on my system, in it?s current state, overwrite libassuan0 with an earlier version?

Is it too late to try to move to ?stretch??

Thank you for all of your help in this matter. I know we are drifting in to territory that would be more appropriate in a delian-users mailing list.

Rex
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From cloos at jhcloos.com  Mon Jun 15 07:01:42 2015
From: cloos at jhcloos.com (James Cloos)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 01:01:42 -0400
Subject: dirmngr vs ip addresses in keyserver URIs
Message-ID: <m3h9q9bm4p.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org>

I've just noticed that since I've upgraded to gpg 2.1 it has been unable
to retrieve keys from the keyservers.

My gpg.conf still has 'keyserver hkp://127.0.0.1', and I've tried adding
that also to dirmngr.conf, but it always fails.

Strace(8)ing dirmngr showed that it cannot handle ip addresses in the
URI.  Switching to hkp://localhost worked.

Typing is still quite challenging, so please excuse that I'm not
offering a patch.

I'm currently using 2.1.5 via the gentoo ebuild.

-JimC
-- 
James Cloos <cloos at jhcloos.com>         OpenPGP: 0x997A9F17ED7DAEA6


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Mon Jun 15 19:33:06 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 13:33:06 -0400
Subject: Installing GnuPG 2.1.4 in Debian Experimental
In-Reply-To: <F2131FE3-5A50-4DCD-8A75-CCB16D32E67C@gmail.com>
References: <1433718273.18943.22.camel@gmail.com>
 <87pp53pdo1.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <1433984357.17461.9.camel@gmail.com>
 <87lhfqoomp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <F2131FE3-5A50-4DCD-8A75-CCB16D32E67C@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87a8w0khbh.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Fri 2015-06-12 23:37:30 -0400, Rex Kneisley wrote:
> I blatantly disregarded their warning: ?if you are running Debian, it
> is strongly suggested to use a package manager like aptitude
> <https://packages.debian.org/jessie/aptitude> or synaptic
> <https://packages.debian.org/jessie/synaptic> to download and install
> packages, instead of doing so manually via this website."
>
> I addition to that, although the site is ?https? and looks ?official?
> enough, there are no hashes or signatures provided.

while https://packages.debian.org/ is https, the mirrors it points to
are cleartext http.  And indeed, debian has little control over the
mirrors we link to, since they're provided by (hopefully friendly) third
parties.

the recommended way to verify packages is by using apt.

> Moving to ?stretch? seems the most strait-forward way of achieving my
> goal of running GnuPG version 2.1.x. But doen't that also
> automatically download and install ?testing? versions of other
> packages that I am not interested in?

yes, it would.  This is a tradeoff between running "stable" and running
"testing"

> Will running "apt-get install update && apt-get install dist-upgrade?
> on my system, in it?s current state, overwrite libassuan0 with an earlier version?

no, apt does not downgrade by default.

> Is it too late to try to move to ?stretch??

no, upgrades from stable to testing are usually something that works
fine (with the caveat being the lower stability of the testing distro).

> Thank you for all of your help in this matter. I know we are drifting
> in to territory that would be more appropriate in a debian-users
> mailing list.

yeah, we're probably off-topic here by now.  hopefully these general
outlines are useful to others reading the list or the archives, though.

         --dkg


From theoneandonly at tuta.io  Mon Jun 15 20:05:35 2015
From: theoneandonly at tuta.io (theoneandonly at tuta.io)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 18:05:35 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: OpenPGP based SSH authentification
Message-ID: <JrsOStU----0@tuta.io>

Hello GnuPG users,

is there a way of OpenPGP based SSH authentification?
I mean, there's a way with the gnupg ssh-auth-agent if I remember correctly.

I was wondering if there's some kind of PAM module or something like this.
I'd like to login to my SSH server with my YubiKey most likely without any 
other software (except PuTTy (for Win) or the Terminal (on Linux, Mac OS X).

Someone who can share experience in here?

Thanks in advance and best regards
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From cloos at jhcloos.com  Mon Jun 15 22:30:23 2015
From: cloos at jhcloos.com (James Cloos)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 16:30:23 -0400
Subject: dirmngr vs ip addresses in keyserver URIs
In-Reply-To: <m3h9q9bm4p.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org> (James Cloos's message of
 "Mon, 15 Jun 2015 01:01:42 -0400")
References: <m3h9q9bm4p.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org>
Message-ID: <m3fv5saf4w.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org>

JC> Strace(8)ing dirmngr showed that it cannot handle ip addresses in the
JC> URI.  Switching [from hkp://127.0.0.1] to hkp://localhost worked.

I should note explicitly that this is a regression from 2.0; ip
addresses in the uri used to work fine.

-JimC
-- 
James Cloos <cloos at jhcloos.com>         OpenPGP: 0x997A9F17ED7DAEA6


From mike at confidantmail.org  Mon Jun 15 21:54:09 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 12:54:09 -0700
Subject: OpenPGP based SSH authentification
In-Reply-To: <JrsOStU----0@tuta.io>
References: <JrsOStU----0@tuta.io>
Message-ID: <557F2D61.1040009@confidantmail.org>

You can use the gpg-agent for ssh auth.
In gpg-agent.conf you put:
enable-putty-support

Than you can run the agent like this:
"c:\Program Files (x86)\GNU\GnuPG.v2\bin\gpg-agent.exe" --daemon 
--enable-ssh-support
[assuming that is where your GPG is installed]

Putty will then login using the key. I have this working with a PGP 
smartcard.


On 6/15/2015 11:05 AM, theoneandonly at tuta.io wrote:
> Hello GnuPG users,
>
> is there a way of OpenPGP based SSH authentification?
> I mean, there's a way with the gnupg ssh-auth-agent if I remember 
> correctly.
>
> I was wondering if there's some kind of PAM module or something like this.
> I'd like to login to my SSH server with my YubiKey most likely without 
> any other software (except PuTTy (for Win) or the Terminal (on Linux, 
> Mac OS X).
>
> Someone who can share experience in here?
>
> Thanks in advance and best regards
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>   



From simon at josefsson.org  Tue Jun 16 10:28:34 2015
From: simon at josefsson.org (Simon Josefsson)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 10:28:34 +0200
Subject: State-of-the-art way to setup a shared security@ email with
 hardware-backed keys?
In-Reply-To: <87oakmopvg.fsf__49987.3946690515$1433995902$gmane$org@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Thu, 11 Jun 2015 00:01:07 -0400")
References: <87zj49ow57.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
 <87oakmopvg.fsf__49987.3946690515$1433995902$gmane$org@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <87lhfkhxal.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> writes:

> Hi Simon--
>
> Thanks for the interesting use case.
>
> On Tue 2015-06-09 09:21:08 -0400, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>> My current idea is to generate a security at example.com master PGP key and
>> keep that offline, and to generate one decryption sub-key, and load that
>> onto a couple of OpenPGP Card smartcards.
>>
>> This would allow authorized people to decrypt emails properly, by using
>> the "security team smartcard".  To respond to the emails, they would
>> need to use their own smartcard which is a nauisance but workable.
>
> I like this approach for encryption to the team; i think it's definitely
> better than the server that does decryption/reencryption.

Hi.  Thanks for confirmation.  I'm going to write this up and implement
it in the organization I had in mind.

> Another (much weirder) remailer approach that doesn't expose the content
> to the remailer itself uses El Gamal keys that have a known relationship
> to each other.  The remailer can transform the PKESK in such a way that
> it is readable to each peer, without being able to recover the
> cleartext.

Is this implemented?  I wan't to use standard stuff, anything
experimental is likely to be difficult to deploy.  Further, having an
online remailer creates an attack surface that is costly to secure.

> This still has the awkward key distribution step when new members join
> the team -- you have to generate their encryption-capable secret key and
> get it to them.

I don't think key distribution is a significant problem for me -- I
could generate the decryption keys for the members of the security team.

> But for revocation for user X in this case, you'd just tell the server
> to stop PKESK translation for the corresponding offset for user X -- no
> certificate update is necessary, and no redistribution to every
> remaining team member.

Revocation is possible in my scheme -- just revoke the decryption key,
create a new decryption sub-key and distribute it to all members that
should have it.  Perhaps not scalable to a large team, but quite
feasible on my level of scale (<10 people).

> I note that you're asking here only about the encryption-capable
> subkeys, and not signing subkeys -- it's quite possible that your
> correspondents would like to be cryptographically confident that the
> reply messages come from the team, and not from an imposter.

My plan was that people responding would sign their emails using their
personal keys.  While a shared signing key is possible, I'm not sure I
see what the advantage is?  I think I would prefer making communication
going direct and end-to-end instead of continuing using the security@
address all the time.

> Interestingly, the case for signing-capable subkeys is not symmetric
> with the case for encryption-capable subkeys.  It should be possible for
> each of your members to contribute a distinct signing-capable subkey,
> and you'd attach all of them to the primary key.

Right, that could be interesting.

> There are two approaches to this:
>
>  a) you could have each person generate their own signing capable
>     subkey, create the binding cross-sig with it to the primary key, and
>     send the public part + the cross-sig to the team keyring maintainer,
>     who would bind it as a subkey and publish the updated cert.

Sounds like figuring out the work-flow here will take some time.

>  b) during generation of the per-person encryption-capable subkey, you
>     could go ahead and generate a separate signing-capable subkey for
>     that user and pre-install it on the smartcard.

Yeah.

> the advantages of this individualized signing-subkey scheme (using
> either approach above) over a single-shared-signing-subkey are:
>
>  0) you can do individualized revocation without reissuing new
>     signing-capable subkeys for everyone else.
>
>  1) you don't have to keep the signing-capable subkey on hand at the
>     keyring management site in order to enroll new team members.
>
>  2) when a message coming from the team is signed, you can identify
>     which team member made the signature.

Is there really any advantage in this scheme compared to all members
having two smartcards -- one contains their personal user@ keys and one
contains the security@ decryption key?

The only point I see with your scheme(s) is that people receiving
responses will see that they are signed by security at example.com but I
don't see what that improves over having see the response being signed
by user at example.com.  The latter invites direct end-to-end secure
communication, bypassing the security@ alias if needed.

I think my use-case is to allow people to REACH us with encrypted emails
using a well-established alias like security at example.com, but not
necessarily have the security at example.com key SIGN outgoing emails.

/Simon
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 16 10:39:58 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 10:39:58 +0200
Subject: dirmngr vs ip addresses in keyserver URIs
In-Reply-To: <m3h9q9bm4p.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org> (James Cloos's message of
 "Mon, 15 Jun 2015 01:01:42 -0400")
References: <m3h9q9bm4p.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org>
Message-ID: <87pp4w11y9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 15 Jun 2015 07:01, cloos at jhcloos.com said:

> My gpg.conf still has 'keyserver hkp://127.0.0.1', and I've tried adding
> that also to dirmngr.conf, but it always fails.

Right, this is a regression.  The reason is that now the dirmngr daemon
takes care of keyservers and it handles keyserver pools internally: A
host name is expected which is resolved to check whether there are
several AAAA or A records decribing a pool of servers.  Then one of the
AAAA or A records are selected and that server is tried.

It seems that I did not implemented the case of a plain IP address
without considering a pool.  Tracking in
https://bugs.gnupg.org/gnupg/issue2012 .


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 16 10:42:52 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 10:42:52 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.1.5 released
In-Reply-To: <5579B324.2000209@fastmail.com> (James Wilson's message of "Thu, 
 11 Jun 2015 09:11:16 -0700")
References: <874mme73am.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5579B324.2000209@fastmail.com>
Message-ID: <87lhfk11tf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 11 Jun 2015 18:11, jmw at fastmail.com said:

>>  * Support for the forthcoming version 3 OpenPGP smartcard.
>> 
>
> Is there a contact for this, or a draft of the standard available?

You find the specs at the bottom of the page
   http://g10code.com/p-card.html

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From jupelluri at riseup.net  Tue Jun 16 15:50:00 2015
From: jupelluri at riseup.net (A.T. Leibson)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 13:50:00 +0000
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
Message-ID: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>

Hi everyone,

What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to use
GnuPG properly? What are common pitfalls on the part of the instructor?
What aspects are the most challenging for new users to understand?

Lastly, what's your favorite noob-friendly guide, and why?

Thanks,
Adamh


From sbutler at fchn.com  Tue Jun 16 17:22:01 2015
From: sbutler at fchn.com (Steve Butler)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 15:22:01 +0000
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <02dc0df3c62c4c3ebaff63751386c7e0@t1l1exchmbs-01.fchn.com>

Biggest pitfall -- new users sending me both their public and private keys. Most have a mental block on how these are used.

I generated a set of documents about a decade ago that someone asked permission to post on the web.  Just did a search and could not find.  I'll try to dig through my thumb drive at home to see if they are buried someplace there.

--Steve 


-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of A.T. Leibson
Sent: Tuesday, June 16, 2015 6:50 AM
To: Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs

Hi everyone,

What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to use GnuPG properly? What are common pitfalls on the part of the instructor?
What aspects are the most challenging for new users to understand?

Lastly, what's your favorite noob-friendly guide, and why?

Thanks,
Adamh

_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

-- 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including any attachments, 
is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain 
confidential 
and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or 
distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please 
contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original 
message.


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Jun 16 20:18:43 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 19:18:43 +0100
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <02dc0df3c62c4c3ebaff63751386c7e0@t1l1exchmbs-01.fchn.com>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
 <02dc0df3c62c4c3ebaff63751386c7e0@t1l1exchmbs-01.fchn.com>
Message-ID: <1581822640.20150616191843@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 16 June 2015 at 4:22:01 PM, in
<mid:02dc0df3c62c4c3ebaff63751386c7e0 at t1l1exchmbs-01.fchn.com>, Steve
Butler wrote:


> I generated a set of documents about a decade ago that
> someone asked permission to post on the web.  Just did
> a search and could not find.  I'll try to dig through
> my thumb drive at home to see if they are buried
> someplace there.

Maybe some of the docs linked from
<http://pages.infinit.net/carbo1/pgp.html> but you will need to use an
archive such as <https://archive.org/web/web.php> to actually read
them?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Maybe YOU have nothing to hide;
 that still leaves plenty you want to hide from!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=
=oxyy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From theoneandonly at tuta.io  Tue Jun 16 20:58:43 2015
From: theoneandonly at tuta.io (theoneandonly at tuta.io)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 18:58:43 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: OpenPGP based SSH authentification
In-Reply-To: <557F2D61.1040009@confidantmail.org>
References: <JrsOStU----0@tuta.io> <<JrsOStU----0@tuta.io>>
 <557F2D61.1040009@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <JrxjD5e----0@tuta.io>

thx for your answer.
What kind of PGP smartcard are you using?


15. Jun 2015 19:54 by mike at confidantmail.org:


> You can use the gpg-agent for ssh auth.
> In gpg-agent.conf you put:
> enable-putty-support
>
> Than you can run the agent like this:
> "c:\Program Files (x86)\GNU\GnuPG.v2\bin\gpg-agent.exe" --daemon 
> --enable-ssh-support
> [assuming that is where your GPG is installed]
>
> Putty will then login using the key. I have this working with a PGP 
> smartcard.
>
>
> On 6/15/2015 11:05 AM, > theoneandonly at tuta.io>  wrote:
>> Hello GnuPG users,
>>
>> is there a way of OpenPGP based SSH authentification?
>> I mean, there's a way with the gnupg ssh-auth-agent if I remember 
>> correctly.
>>
>> I was wondering if there's some kind of PAM module or something like this.
>> I'd like to login to my SSH server with my YubiKey most likely without any 
>> other software (except PuTTy (for Win) or the Terminal (on Linux, Mac OS 
>> X).
>>
>> Someone who can share experience in here?
>>
>> Thanks in advance and best regards
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>   
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From dgouttegattat at incenp.org  Wed Jun 17 00:30:26 2015
From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 00:30:26 +0200
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <5580A382.1080407@incenp.org>

On 06/16/2015 03:50 PM, A.T. Leibson wrote:
> What aspects are the most challenging for new users to understand?

I would say: all the stuff related to the concepts of "key validity" and 
"owner trust".

Particularly, the fact that the validity of a given key is automatically 
determined by looking at the key's signatures.

I have seen several new users complaining that they could not find how 
to set the validity of a key, because they didn't understand that you do 
that indirectly by *signing* the key.

Typically, the user would ask me something like this: "OK, I got your 
public key, I have checked the fingerprint you gave me so I'm sure it's 
your key. But Enigmail says that the validity and ownertrust are both 
'unknown'. How do I set the validity to something else? There is a 'Set 
Owner Trust' button, but no 'Set Validity' button..."


Damien

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From jimoe at sohnen-moe.com  Wed Jun 17 00:28:54 2015
From: jimoe at sohnen-moe.com (James Moe)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 15:28:54 -0700
Subject: General brute force attack question
Message-ID: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>

Hello,
  My understanding of en-/decryption is that there is no indication of
progress toward finding a successful key match of a given encryption.
Only when the key is exactly correct will the encrypted data be revealed.
  I have seen numerous TV and movie stories where someone is
frantically attempting to decrypt something and there is a progress
meter to indicate the current degree of success. Every time I see this
I think "That is total BS! It is all or nothing."
  Related to this is the oft-repeated request to avoid identifiable
information (initials, birth date, etc.) in a cryptographic key. I
presume this gives an attacker a preferred set of characters to
attempt before moving on to truly random combinations.
  Finally, a brute force attack requires potentially billions of
attempts. Obviously this cannot be done by trying the usual log in
screens or prompts; there are delays between attempts, and a limited
number of attempts per some interval. How does an attacker then
perform a brute force attack? Does he cadge a block of encrypted text
and hammer on that until success?

  Is this a correct interpretation?

-- 
James Moe
moe dot james at sohnen-moe dot com
520.743.3936

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From lance at lrvick.net  Wed Jun 17 00:41:43 2015
From: lance at lrvick.net (Lance R. Vick)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 15:41:43 -0700
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
Message-ID: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>

Very confused by this. Every time I insert my yubikey into a system I must
do 'gpg --card-status' to make gpg-agent aware it exists again.

Using: gpg/gpg-agent 2.1.4

Expected Results:

1. Insert yubikey
2. Issue version command to gpg agent
3. Version is reported
4. Remove and re-insert key
5. Issue version command to gpg agent
6. version is reported

Actual Results:

1. Insert yubikey
2. Issue version command to gpg agent
3. Version is reported
4. Remove and re-insert key
5. Issue version command to gpg agent
6. "Card not present" error

Current workaround when error is reached:

1. Issue 'gpg --card-status'
2. Issue version command to gpg agent
3. Version is reported

Stock gpg configs other than 'enable-ssh-support' in .gnupg/gpg-agent.conf

I have the following in my .zlogin to setup ssh env:

```
    envfile="$HOME/.gnupg/gpg-agent.env"
    if [[ ! -e "$envfile" ]] || [[ ! -e "$HOME/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent" ]]; then
        gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support > $envfile
    fi
    eval "$(cat "$envfile")"
    export SSH_AUTH_SOCK   # enable gpg-agent for ssh

```

Output of me reproducing this issue:

```
[lrvick at tsar ~]$ # key inserted
[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg-connect-agent --hex "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" /bye
D[0000]  01 00 08 90 00                                     .....
OK

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg --card-status

Application ID ...: D2760001240102000006033646440000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: Yubico
Serial number ....: 03364644
Name of cardholder: Lance Vick
Language prefs ...: en
Sex ..............: male
URL of public key :
http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xE90A401336C8AAA9
Login data .......: lrvick
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 6
Signature key ....: 387A 3684 2D5A A336 0A05  193E 8D5B 2F41 F664 44E5
      created ....: 2015-03-19 08:41:47
Encryption key....: 1F43 D8C3 9A32 F33A EC7A  6527 5301 06BD D94A 0B8A
      created ....: 2015-03-19 08:43:20
Authentication key: 7FDA 0082 EF1E 9A5B 9EB6  B63F D362 694A F189 271D
      created ....: 2015-03-19 08:45:19
General key info..: sub  rsa2048/F66444E5 2015-03-19 Lance R. Vick
(Personal) <lance at lrvick.net>
sec#  rsa4096/36C8AAA9  created: 2009-05-09  expires: never
ssb>  rsa2048/F66444E5  created: 2015-03-19  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 03364644
ssb>  rsa2048/D94A0B8A  created: 2015-03-19  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 03364644
ssb>  rsa2048/F189271D  created: 2015-03-19  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 03364644
ssb#  rsa4096/A649FFDA  created: 2009-05-09  expires: never
ssb#  rsa4096/4D08A9A6  created: 2015-02-01  expires: never

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ # key removed
[lrvick at tsar ~]$ # key inserted

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg-connect-agent --hex "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" /bye
ERR 100663408 Card not present <SCD>

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg --card-status

Application ID ...: D2760001240102000006033646440000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: Yubico
Serial number ....: 03364644
Name of cardholder: Lance Vick
Language prefs ...: en
Sex ..............: male
URL of public key :
http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xE90A401336C8AAA9
Login data .......: lrvick
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 6
Signature key ....: 387A 3684 2D5A A336 0A05  193E 8D5B 2F41 F664 44E5
      created ....: 2015-03-19 08:41:47
Encryption key....: 1F43 D8C3 9A32 F33A EC7A  6527 5301 06BD D94A 0B8A
      created ....: 2015-03-19 08:43:20
Authentication key: 7FDA 0082 EF1E 9A5B 9EB6  B63F D362 694A F189 271D
      created ....: 2015-03-19 08:45:19
General key info..: sub  rsa2048/F66444E5 2015-03-19 Lance R. Vick
(Personal) <lance at lrvick.net>
sec#  rsa4096/36C8AAA9  created: 2009-05-09  expires: never
ssb>  rsa2048/F66444E5  created: 2015-03-19  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 03364644
ssb>  rsa2048/D94A0B8A  created: 2015-03-19  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 03364644
ssb>  rsa2048/F189271D  created: 2015-03-19  expires: never
                        card-no: 0006 03364644
ssb#  rsa4096/A649FFDA  created: 2009-05-09  expires: never
ssb#  rsa4096/4D08A9A6  created: 2015-02-01  expires: never

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg-connect-agent --hex "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" /bye
D[0000]  01 00 08 90 00                                     .....
OK

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.4
libgcrypt 1.6.3
Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Home: ~/.gnupg
Supported algorithms:
Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA
Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH,
        CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
Hash: SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2

[lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg-connect-agent
> getinfo version
D 2.1.4
OK
>
```

-- 
Lance R. Vick
__________________________________________________
Cell      -  407.283.7596
Gtalk     -  lance at lrvick.net
Website   -  http://lrvick.net
PGP Key   -  http://lrvick.net/0x36C8AAA9.asc
keyserver -  subkeys.pgp.net
__________________________________________________
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun 17 01:45:57 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 19:45:57 -0400
Subject: General brute force attack question
In-Reply-To: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>
References: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>
Message-ID: <5580B535.5000102@sixdemonbag.org>

> Is this a correct interpretation?

Pretty close.

> My understanding of en-/decryption is that there is no indication of 
> progress toward finding a successful key match of a given
> encryption.

Not quite.  If you're doing a brute-force attack it's easy to figure out
what fraction of the possible number of keys you've tried, and to
present that as a progress bar -- when the progress bar is half done,
you've searched half the possible keys, and thus there's a 50% chance of
finding the key by then.  So yes, it's possible to come up with a pretty
good estimate of how long it'll take to brute-force a cipher, and that
lets you do things like status bars... it's just that the amount of time
is, for any good system, ludicrously big.

> Related to this is the oft-repeated request to avoid identifiable 
> information (initials, birth date, etc.) in a cryptographic key. I 
> presume this gives an attacker a preferred set of characters to 
> attempt before moving on to truly random combinations.

Called "cribs", yes.  Even then, this is rarely used in the key itself.
 Usually it's used as the input to a key derivation function, which
accepts something nice and English-like as input and yields a garbled
mess for output.

> Finally, a brute force attack requires potentially billions of 
> attempts.

Add *many* more zeroes on to this.  :)

> How does an attacker then perform a brute force attack? Does he cadge
> a block of encrypted text and hammer on that until success?

Without getting into high levels of detail, all I can say is "it will
vary from system to system."

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From jeandavid8 at verizon.net  Wed Jun 17 03:47:34 2015
From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 21:47:34 -0400
Subject: General brute force attack question
In-Reply-To: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>
References: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>
Message-ID: <5580D1B6.2050808@verizon.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 06/16/2015 06:28 PM, James Moe wrote:
> Hello, My understanding of en-/decryption is that there is no 
> indication of progress toward finding a successful key match of a 
> given encryption. Only when the key is exactly correct will the 
> encrypted data be revealed. I have seen numerous TV and movie 
> stories where someone is frantically attempting to decrypt 
> something and there is a progress meter to indicate the current 
> degree of success. Every time I see this I think "That is total BS!
> It is all or nothing." Related to this is the oft-repeated request
> to avoid identifiable information (initials, birth date, etc.) in a
> cryptographic key. I presume this gives an attacker a preferred set
> of characters to attempt before moving on to truly random
> combinations. Finally, a brute force attack requires potentially
> billions of attempts. Obviously this cannot be done by trying the
> usual log in screens or prompts; there are delays between attempts,
> and a limited number of attempts per some interval. How does an
> attacker then perform a brute force attack? Does he cadge a block
> of encrypted text and hammer on that until success?
> 
> Is this a correct interpretation?
> 

I do not know what people do now, but in the old days, the black hat
team obtained a copy of the password file, /etc/passwd in UNIX and
Linux systems. This file was owned by the super-user but had to be
readable by anyone else.

The password file did not and does not contain the passwords at all.
It contains a string that is obtained by using the password to encrypt
a constant string (typically a bunch of blanks) and the encrypted
result is stored in that file. This scheme was quite effective when
the bad guys were trying to dial up and login from outside. First of
all, it was slow to log in so you could not try that many passwords
per hour.
Furthermore, I had a system where the delay for a new prompt increased
with every failure, and even then after a while, the system hung up on
the attacker.

When it became possible to just export that file, he could do so, and
then work much faster on a faster dedicate machine. To get around
that, there was a shadow file (/etc/shadow) that could only be read or
written by the super user and no one else. It was sometimes hidden
somewhere else, but I doubt that helped security much. But that file
could not be taken except if actually present in the machine room.

My information on what is done these days ends about 1990, so they may
be more sophisticated now. For one thing, for Linux systems, one can
run SELinux, where even the super-user could have a difficult time
getting at that shadow file.


- -- 
  .~.  Jean-David Beyer          Registered Linux User 85642.
  /V\  PGP-Key:166D840A 0C610C8B Registered Machine  1935521.
 /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey    http://linuxcounter.net
 ^^-^^ 21:25:01 up 7 days, 19 min, 2 users, load average: 4.81, 4.91, 4.
80
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aBu+3w54ASktnAcGAk/C7miKlFdI+Wa+WCiZBocq6JhvumqAshetdZihZnO/6U8=
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From mailinglist at krebs.uno  Wed Jun 17 10:48:32 2015
From: mailinglist at krebs.uno (Daniel Krebs)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 10:48:32 +0200
Subject: General brute force attack question
In-Reply-To: <5580B535.5000102@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>
 <5580B535.5000102@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55813460.7090008@krebs.uno>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Am 17.06.2015 um 01:45 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
>> Is this a correct interpretation?
> 
> Pretty close.
> 
>> My understanding of en-/decryption is that there is no
>> indication of progress toward finding a successful key match of a
>> given encryption.
> 
> Not quite.  If you're doing a brute-force attack it's easy to 
> figure out what fraction of the possible number of keys you've 
> tried, and to present that as a progress bar -- when the progress 
> bar is half done, you've searched half the possible keys, and thus 
> there's a 50% chance of finding the key by then.  So yes, it's 
> possible to come up with a pretty good estimate of how long it'll 
> take to brute-force a cipher, and that lets you do things like 
> status bars... it's just that the amount of time is, for any good 
> system, ludicrously big.

I think you can't *really* estimate the time to crack a password, all
you can show is the maximum time it will take to try out all possible
combinations. But when you tried 20% of all possible combinations
there is a chance that the next guess will be right. The /typical
Hollywood progress bar/ allways counts up to 100% (or to 00:00 time)
at least in my memory.
Correct me if I'm wrong.

Sincerely
DK
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From gniibe at fsij.org  Wed Jun 17 10:55:02 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 17:55:02 +0900
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>

Hello,

On 06/17/2015 07:41 AM, Lance R. Vick wrote:
> Every time I insert my yubikey into a system I must do 'gpg
> --card-status' to make gpg-agent aware it exists again.

Please pardon my ignorance, I don't have Yubikey at hand.

Is the following common use cases of Yubikey?

> Using: gpg/gpg-agent 2.1.4
> 
> Expected Results:
> 
> 1. Insert yubikey
> 2. Issue version command to gpg agent
> 3. Version is reported
> 4. Remove and re-insert key
> 5. Issue version command to gpg agent
> 6. version is reported

And... is the following to get version of Yubikey?

> [lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg-connect-agent --hex "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" /bye
> D[0000]  01 00 08 90 00                                     .....           
> OK

Yes, it only works after gpg --card-status or something.

In the current implementation, gpg-agent invokes scdaemon on demand.
(gpg-agent doesn't detect insertion of device or card.)

I don't understand from where "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" came.

Could you please share the reason why you consider it works well?
-- 


From lance at lrvick.net  Wed Jun 17 11:41:35 2015
From: lance at lrvick.net (Lance R. Vick)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 05:41:35 -0400
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>

"scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" is just a way to return a version number from a
Yubikey GPG smartcard. Any other GPG commands fail as well, such as
sign/encrypt/auth, until 'gpg --card-status'  is run to wake the card back
up.

I would expect that when I perform a gpg command, it should query
gpg-agent, which sees the stub of my key, then starts up/refreshes
scdaemon/gpg-agent as needed, detects card, executes my action against the
card.This works on a first insertion as-is, just not on a
removal/re-insertion.

Is there no way for a running gpg-agent to check for smartcard presence on
the fly?


On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 4:55 AM, NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe at fsij.org> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> On 06/17/2015 07:41 AM, Lance R. Vick wrote:
> > Every time I insert my yubikey into a system I must do 'gpg
> > --card-status' to make gpg-agent aware it exists again.
>
> Please pardon my ignorance, I don't have Yubikey at hand.
>
> Is the following common use cases of Yubikey?
>
> > Using: gpg/gpg-agent 2.1.4
> >
> > Expected Results:
> >
> > 1. Insert yubikey
> > 2. Issue version command to gpg agent
> > 3. Version is reported
> > 4. Remove and re-insert key
> > 5. Issue version command to gpg agent
> > 6. version is reported
>
> And... is the following to get version of Yubikey?
>
> > [lrvick at tsar ~]$ gpg-connect-agent --hex "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" /bye
> > D[0000]  01 00 08 90 00                                     .....
> > OK
>
> Yes, it only works after gpg --card-status or something.
>
> In the current implementation, gpg-agent invokes scdaemon on demand.
> (gpg-agent doesn't detect insertion of device or card.)
>
> I don't understand from where "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" came.
>
> Could you please share the reason why you consider it works well?
> --
>



-- 
Lance R. Vick
__________________________________________________
Cell      -  407.283.7596
Gtalk     -  lance at lrvick.net
Website   -  http://lrvick.net
PGP Key   -  http://lrvick.net/0x36C8AAA9.asc
keyserver -  subkeys.pgp.net
__________________________________________________
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From gniibe at fsij.org  Wed Jun 17 13:36:21 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 20:36:21 +0900
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>	<558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org>

On 06/17/2015 06:41 PM, Lance R. Vick wrote:
> "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" is just a way to return a version number from
> a Yubikey GPG smartcard.

Thank you for clarification.  In that case, I think that adding
"learn" works.  Like:

  $ gpg-connect-agent --hex "learn" "scd apdu 00 f1 00 00" /bye

The "learn" command is something equivalent of "gpg --card-status"
internally.

> Any other GPG commands fail as well, such as sign/encrypt/auth,
> until 'gpg --card-status' is run to wake the card back up.

I think you mean any direct commands of gpg-agent.  Or there is some
confusion.

Gpg frontend certainly works well for --sign, --decrypt after you
remove your token and insert it again.  Please try:

(1) Insert token
(2) Run "gpg --card-status"
(3) Remove token
(4) Run "gpg --sign" or "gpg --decrypt"

SSH authentication also works well after removal/insertion.

Note that it all works for me with Gnuk Token or OpenPGPcard with a
card reader.

> I would expect that when I perform a gpg command, it should query
> gpg-agent, which sees the stub of my key, then starts up/refreshes
> scdaemon/gpg-agent as needed, detects card, executes my action
> against the card.

Yes, it does.

> Is there no way for a running gpg-agent to check for smartcard
> presence on the fly?

You can use "learn" command.  It fails if there's no smartcard/token.
-- 


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun 17 16:02:35 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 10:02:35 -0400
Subject: General brute force attack question
In-Reply-To: <55813460.7090008@krebs.uno>
References: <sig.16098939b8.5580A326.6040406@sohnen-moe.com>
 <5580B535.5000102@sixdemonbag.org> <55813460.7090008@krebs.uno>
Message-ID: <55817DFB.7030304@sixdemonbag.org>

> I think you can't *really* estimate the time to crack a password, all
> you can show is the maximum time it will take to try out all possible
> combinations.

Yes.  And that's what lets you make a statistical model: "there's a 25%
chance it'll take this long, a 50% chance it'll take this long," etc.,
etc.  You're confusing a lack of certainty with a lack of accuracy.  :)

Yes, Hollywood is awful about progress bars.  But that doesn't mean you
couldn't do one in an intelligent manner -- it just means Hollywood
doesn't do them intelligently.

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Jun 17 16:15:07 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 10:15:07 -0400
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>

> What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to use
> GnuPG properly?

Varies between extremely good and extremely bad with very little
in-between.  When addressing people who have the motivation to learn and
the ability to think analytically, it's been great.  When addressing
people who lack one or the other it's frustrating, and when addressing
people who lack both it makes me prefer dental surgery.

> What are common pitfalls on the part of the instructor?

The most common one I've found is not understanding the material as well
as they think.  This tends to come through most in the metaphors an
instructor uses.  For instance, I frequently encounter instructors who
tell the class to imagine a lock with two keys, one that locks it and
one that unlocks it, and they proceed to use that lock metaphor to
explain crypto.

It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys, one
that locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous: the
locks the students are familiar with require *no* keys to lock and only
one key to unlock.

When I see an instructor use inappropriate metaphors, who doesn't
understand that these metaphors are inappropriate, it makes me think the
instructor has a superficial and fragile understanding of the material.
 And frankly, there are a lot of those people out there.

(One metaphor I've been playing with lately, but haven't decided yet
whether it's a good one, involves magical sealing wax.  This magical
sealing wax can only be cut or shaped by one person -- the person who
owns it.  If you seal a message with this person's magical sealing wax,
only that message recipient can open it.  And if you see that someone
has pressed a signet ring into it, you know the person who owns the wax
did it, since only they could shape it.  So if Alice were to affix her
magical sealing wax to a message and press her signet ring into it, and
then fold the letter and seal it with Bob's magical sealing wax, only
Bob could cut the magical sealing wax to read the message and he would
know that only Alice could have put her signet on the blob of wax at the
end of the letter.

Is magical sealing wax a better metaphor than a lock with two keys?
Yes.  Is it better *enough*?  I don't know yet.)

> What aspects are the most challenging for new users to understand?

Anything that gets explained with a poorly chosen metaphor.

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From simon at josefsson.org  Wed Jun 17 18:17:51 2015
From: simon at josefsson.org (Simon Josefsson)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:17:51 +0200
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org> (NIIBE Yutaka's message of "Wed, 17 Jun
 2015 20:36:21 +0900")
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>

NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe at fsij.org> writes:

> Gpg frontend certainly works well for --sign, --decrypt after you
> remove your token and insert it again.  Please try:
>
> (1) Insert token
> (2) Run "gpg --card-status"
> (3) Remove token
> (4) Run "gpg --sign" or "gpg --decrypt"
>
> SSH authentication also works well after removal/insertion.
>
> Note that it all works for me with Gnuk Token or OpenPGPcard with a
> card reader.

Removing/inserting YubiKey NEO works fine for me with GnuPG 2.0.x from
Jessie.  Could this be a GnuPG 2.1.x issue?  Lance, did this work with
older GnuPG versions?

I've seen the error many times, also when I used a g10code smartcard,
but lately things have been smooth.  I think there have been a couple of
gpg-agent/scdaemon fixes going in to make unplug/insert resume fine.

/Simon
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Jun 17 18:44:22 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:44:22 +0200
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org> <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
Message-ID: <5581A3E6.9010009@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 06/17/2015 06:17 PM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe at fsij.org> writes:
> 
>> Gpg frontend certainly works well for --sign, --decrypt after
>> you remove your token and insert it again.  Please try:
>> 
>> (1) Insert token (2) Run "gpg --card-status" (3) Remove token (4)
>> Run "gpg --sign" or "gpg --decrypt"
>> 
>> SSH authentication also works well after removal/insertion.
>> 
>> Note that it all works for me with Gnuk Token or OpenPGPcard with
>> a card reader.
> 
> Removing/inserting YubiKey NEO works fine for me with GnuPG 2.0.x
> from Jessie.  Could this be a GnuPG 2.1.x issue?  Lance, did this
> work with older GnuPG versions?
> 

No issue here at least using Gentoo's gnupg-2.1.5 ebuild with
IUSE:{smartcard,usb} using either yubikey or openpgp smartcard,


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Dura necessitas
Necessity is harsh
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From robertc at broadcom.com  Wed Jun 17 19:55:42 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 17:55:42 +0000
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D426B6E@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Hi All,
This is an interesting thread and I want to share my experience. Part of what I do is train people for a secure position. When I am explaining compartmentalization, I use a two-key lock metaphor to help describe classification levels and need-to-know. The metaphor only deals with 'opening' the lock. I think that may be where the inappropriate use  got 'appropriated'.

Bear in mind that my noobs are generally at least technically conversant. I first describe that the public and private key are calculated together and are mathematically linked. Depending on the audience I don't go over the modulus formulae but I do then describe what can be encrypted with one key can be decrypted with the other. Then I talk about the actual mechanism for doing so. I find that if they have a least a cursory understanding of what they are trying to do, it helps a lot in understanding the actual command line/GUI sequence

I leave signing until after I describe the public key/private key encryption paradigm. I find that combining the two topics leads to a lot of confusion. Once they understand assymetric encryption then I go on to digital signatures and why they are important (Man in the Middle is an excellent way to introduce this topic).

HTH

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of
> Robert J. Hansen
> Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2015 7:15 AM
> To: A.T. Leibson; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> Subject: Re: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
> 
> > What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to use
> > GnuPG properly?
> 
> Varies between extremely good and extremely bad with very little in-
> between.  When addressing people who have the motivation to learn and
> the ability to think analytically, it's been great.  When addressing people who
> lack one or the other it's frustrating, and when addressing people who lack
> both it makes me prefer dental surgery.
> 
> > What are common pitfalls on the part of the instructor?
> 
> The most common one I've found is not understanding the material as well
> as they think.  This tends to come through most in the metaphors an
> instructor uses.  For instance, I frequently encounter instructors who tell the
> class to imagine a lock with two keys, one that locks it and one that unlocks it,
> and they proceed to use that lock metaphor to explain crypto.
> 
> It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys, one that
> locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous: the locks the
> students are familiar with require *no* keys to lock and only one key to
> unlock.
> 
> When I see an instructor use inappropriate metaphors, who doesn't
> understand that these metaphors are inappropriate, it makes me think the
> instructor has a superficial and fragile understanding of the material.
>  And frankly, there are a lot of those people out there.
> 
> (One metaphor I've been playing with lately, but haven't decided yet
> whether it's a good one, involves magical sealing wax.  This magical sealing
> wax can only be cut or shaped by one person -- the person who owns it.  If
> you seal a message with this person's magical sealing wax, only that message
> recipient can open it.  And if you see that someone has pressed a signet ring
> into it, you know the person who owns the wax did it, since only they could
> shape it.  So if Alice were to affix her magical sealing wax to a message and
> press her signet ring into it, and then fold the letter and seal it with Bob's
> magical sealing wax, only Bob could cut the magical sealing wax to read the
> message and he would know that only Alice could have put her signet on the
> blob of wax at the end of the letter.
> 
> Is magical sealing wax a better metaphor than a lock with two keys?
> Yes.  Is it better *enough*?  I don't know yet.)
> 
> > What aspects are the most challenging for new users to understand?
> 
> Anything that gets explained with a poorly chosen metaphor.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Jun 17 21:39:27 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 21:39:27 +0200
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Wed, 17 Jun 2015 10:15:07 -0400")
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87fv5qxgy8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 17 Jun 2015 16:15, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys, one
> that locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous: the

Much better is a spring lock.  Bob stores several identical copies of a
spring lock at a public place, Alice takes Bob's (open) spring lock from
the public place, locks a chest with it, sends the chest to Bob, and Bob
uses his key to open the lock and thus the chest.

Now add seals to the spring lock so that Alice is able to verify that a
lock really belongs to Bob. (With PKIX she would take it from a trusted
place instead.)


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From cspitzer at godaddy.com  Wed Jun 17 21:24:53 2015
From: cspitzer at godaddy.com (Charles Spitzer)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 19:24:53 +0000
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D426B6E@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D426B6E@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <BY1PR02MB1180AF480C15D773647A67B4D1A60@BY1PR02MB1180.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>



Regards,
Charlie
602.420.4123

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of 
> Robert J. Hansen
> Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2015 7:15 AM
> To: A.T. Leibson; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> Subject: Re: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
> 
> > What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to 
> > use GnuPG properly?

..snip..
> It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys, one 
> that locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous: the 
> locks the students are familiar with require *no* keys to lock and 
> only one key to unlock

..snip..

There are locks in common use that require a key on both sides, and need a single key to lock and unlock. They can also be changed such that the inside and outside keys are different.

For example:
http://www.sears.com/schlage-b62n625-deadbolt-keyed-2-sides-bright-chrome/p-SPM7705846522?prdNo=11&blockNo=11&blockType=G11

However, your analogy of a lock and unlock key for the same lock still holds. I'm not sure I've ever heard about one of those.

Regards,
Charlie


From brian at minton.name  Thu Jun 18 01:24:19 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 23:24:19 +0000
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <BY1PR02MB1180AF480C15D773647A67B4D1A60@BY1PR02MB1180.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D426B6E@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <BY1PR02MB1180AF480C15D773647A67B4D1A60@BY1PR02MB1180.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <CANyOob3XLeeaHd1_ijvb9AW1rUR2t3dgaXmdr-Y4So7mupdrtQ@mail.gmail.com>

I've never heard of a spring lock, but I looked it up. It is a lock that
anyone can momentarily be unlocked by a key, but when it is not being held
open, shuts and locks itself.

On Wed, Jun 17, 2015, 5:00 PM Charles Spitzer <cspitzer at godaddy.com> wrote:

>
>
> Regards,
> Charlie
> 602.420.4123
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of
> > Robert J. Hansen
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2015 7:15 AM
> > To: A.T. Leibson; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> > Subject: Re: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
> >
> > > What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to
> > > use GnuPG properly?
>
> ..snip..
> > It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys, one
> > that locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous: the
> > locks the students are familiar with require *no* keys to lock and
> > only one key to unlock
>
> ..snip..
>
> There are locks in common use that require a key on both sides, and need a
> single key to lock and unlock. They can also be changed such that the
> inside and outside keys are different.
>
> For example:
>
> http://www.sears.com/schlage-b62n625-deadbolt-keyed-2-sides-bright-chrome/p-SPM7705846522?prdNo=11&blockNo=11&blockType=G11
>
> However, your analogy of a lock and unlock key for the same lock still
> holds. I'm not sure I've ever heard about one of those.
>
> Regards,
> Charlie
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
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From steve at sawczyn.com  Thu Jun 18 02:07:51 2015
From: steve at sawczyn.com (Steven M. Sawczyn)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 19:07:51 -0500
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <87fv5qxgy8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87fv5qxgy8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <03d601d0a95a$d17d6070$74782150$@Sawczyn.com>

In addition to explaining concepts, the biggest issue for me is simply the
steps one has to go through to get it working, steps that don't always
result in success.  This seems especially problematic for Outlook users, I
have yet to find a free solution for Outlook that works reliably.  And I do
try to find free solutions as even if they lack some advanced features
because getting people to pay for something that they're on the fence about
is itself problematic.

Steve




From avi.wiki at gmail.com  Thu Jun 18 02:44:56 2015
From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 20:44:56 -0400
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob3XLeeaHd1_ijvb9AW1rUR2t3dgaXmdr-Y4So7mupdrtQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D426B6E@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <BY1PR02MB1180AF480C15D773647A67B4D1A60@BY1PR02MB1180.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
 <CANyOob3XLeeaHd1_ijvb9AW1rUR2t3dgaXmdr-Y4So7mupdrtQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAF5O_jzuN76ezzKJ7gmX4nHguGeEG=D=E5y7D+mBopp_tj+v0Q@mail.gmail.com>

Ran across this which may help in allegories/examples: <
http://www.mul-t-lockusa.com/res/USA/Keying_Options/OneWayCylinder_Concept_Sheet.pdf>.
It can handle keys which only lock, only unlock, or both.

Avi

----
User:Avraham

pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) <avi.wiki at gmail.com
>
   Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E
29F9

On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 7:24 PM, Brian Minton <brian at minton.name> wrote:

> I've never heard of a spring lock, but I looked it up. It is a lock that
> anyone can momentarily be unlocked by a key, but when it is not being held
> open, shuts and locks itself.
>
> On Wed, Jun 17, 2015, 5:00 PM Charles Spitzer <cspitzer at godaddy.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Charlie
>> 602.420.4123
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of
>> > Robert J. Hansen
>> > Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2015 7:15 AM
>> > To: A.T. Leibson; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> > Subject: Re: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
>> >
>> > > What has your experience been teaching inexperienced users how to
>> > > use GnuPG properly?
>>
>> ..snip..
>> > It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys, one
>> > that locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous: the
>> > locks the students are familiar with require *no* keys to lock and
>> > only one key to unlock
>>
>> ..snip..
>>
>> There are locks in common use that require a key on both sides, and need
>> a single key to lock and unlock. They can also be changed such that the
>> inside and outside keys are different.
>>
>> For example:
>>
>> http://www.sears.com/schlage-b62n625-deadbolt-keyed-2-sides-bright-chrome/p-SPM7705846522?prdNo=11&blockNo=11&blockType=G11
>>
>> However, your analogy of a lock and unlock key for the same lock still
>> holds. I'm not sure I've ever heard about one of those.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Charlie
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun 18 10:28:33 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:28:33 +0200
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob3XLeeaHd1_ijvb9AW1rUR2t3dgaXmdr-Y4So7mupdrtQ@mail.gmail.com>
 (Brian Minton's message of "Wed, 17 Jun 2015 23:24:19 +0000")
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D426B6E@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <BY1PR02MB1180AF480C15D773647A67B4D1A60@BY1PR02MB1180.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
 <CANyOob3XLeeaHd1_ijvb9AW1rUR2t3dgaXmdr-Y4So7mupdrtQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <871th9xvwu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 18 Jun 2015 01:24, brian at minton.name said:
> I've never heard of a spring lock, but I looked it up. It is a lock that
> anyone can momentarily be unlocked by a key, but when it is not being held
> open, shuts and locks itself.

According to my translator the German term "Schappschloss" means "spring
lock" in English.  The spring is used to push the U-bolt up when
not-locked.  At least in Germany the most common type of a padlock is a
a spring lock:

   https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/5/59/Padlock.svg

Cable locks for bicycles also work this way.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner



ps.
Somet people (deliberately) forget their passphrases:

  <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/Liebesschl%C3%B6sser_an_der_Passerelle_de_Solferino_Paris.jpg>

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Jun 18 10:32:28 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:32:28 +0200
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> (Simon Josefsson's message
 of "Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:17:51 +0200")
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org> <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
Message-ID: <87wpz1wh5v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:17, simon at josefsson.org said:

> I've seen the error many times, also when I used a g10code smartcard,
> but lately things have been smooth.  I think there have been a couple of

Old versions of GnuPG assumed that there is a card reader which can tell
you whether a card has been removed or inserted.  However USB tokens are
different in that you insert/remove the entire reader.  gniibe fixed
these problems some time ago.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From stebe at mailbox.org  Thu Jun 18 10:43:57 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:43:57 +0200
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <558284CD.9040107@mailbox.org>

Hi,

Am 16.06.2015 um 15:50 schrieb A.T. Leibson:

> Lastly, what's your favorite noob-friendly guide, and why?

I think that the guide available at (1)


(1) https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/


is the most suitable for noobs (as far as I know), because it's straightforward
and short. I would not bother too much about more or less suitable metaphors, as
the most frightening (more or less suitable?) metaphor is BIG BROTHER ('s
surveillance state/s).
Well, I am not an instructor, but someone who is still learning and studying.
The leaflet available at the same address is visually attractive and explains
the absolute beginner's basics quite well.

Cheers,

Stephan





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From lance at lrvick.net  Thu Jun 18 19:56:33 2015
From: lance at lrvick.net (Lance R. Vick)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:56:33 -0700
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <87wpz1wh5v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org> <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
 <87wpz1wh5v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAKNki==gnNn2g_hB0MhwVZmptukyimjfpq5VqAeNuGHr7i+fPw@mail.gmail.com>

I only ever tried this on 2.0.0 as far as older versions go, and that was
similarly broken. I didn't bother documenting as I saw there were some
smartcard updates in 2.1.4 so I upgraded.

Just now had another variation (on 2.1.4):

1. start gpg-agent
2. populate SSH_AUTH_SOCK
3. ssh successfully
4. remove yubikey
5. insert yubikey
6. attempt to ssh -> "Permission Denied (Publickey)"
7. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
8. `gpg --card status` (again) -> Got usual card output
9. ssh successfully again


On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> On Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:17, simon at josefsson.org said:
>
> > I've seen the error many times, also when I used a g10code smartcard,
> > but lately things have been smooth.  I think there have been a couple of
>
> Old versions of GnuPG assumed that there is a card reader which can tell
> you whether a card has been removed or inserted.  However USB tokens are
> different in that you insert/remove the entire reader.  gniibe fixed
> these problems some time ago.
>
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>    Werner
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>



-- 
Lance R. Vick
__________________________________________________
Cell      -  407.283.7596
Gtalk     -  lance at lrvick.net
Website   -  http://lrvick.net
PGP Key   -  http://lrvick.net/0x36C8AAA9.asc
keyserver -  subkeys.pgp.net
__________________________________________________
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From cp at axs.org  Thu Jun 18 21:37:53 2015
From: cp at axs.org (Chuck Peters)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 19:37:53 +0000
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <558284CD.9040107@mailbox.org>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net>
 <558284CD.9040107@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <20150618193753.GA25872@xen.axs.org>

Stephan Beck said:
> Am 16.06.2015 um 15:50 schrieb A.T. Leibson:
> 
> > Lastly, what's your favorite noob-friendly guide, and why?
> 
> I think that the guide available at (1)
> 
> (1) https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/

Potential instructors: please explain subkeys and how it might be best to primarily use subkeys on your computer, tablet etc...

#5 USE IT WELL
...
IMPORTANT:
ACT SWIFTLY IF SOMEONE GETS YOUR PRIVATE KEY
If you lose your private key or someone else gets ahold of it (say, by stealing or cracking your computer), it's important to revoke it immediately before someone else uses it to read your encrypted email. This guide doesn't cover how to revoke a key, but you can follow the instructions on the GnuPG site. After you're done revoking, send an email to everyone with whom you usually use your key to make sure they know.
The text links to https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN305


If I were to use the instructions and followed the link, I would say, what are subkeys?  And have no clue about keeping which keys or subkeys where...

Proper training should include the processes to recover a loss of a private subkey without losing all your key signings.

The best HowTo on subkeys I have seen, but not really noob-friendly if you want to avoid the command line:
https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys


Thanks,
Chuck   



From listofactor at mail.ru  Thu Jun 18 20:21:33 2015
From: listofactor at mail.ru (listo factor)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 18:21:33 +0000
Subject: two-lock mailbox analogy
In-Reply-To: <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55830C2D.1040808@mail.ru>

FWIW, I use the following analogy:

I have a secure steel mailbox, located on a street corner - just
like the Post Office does - that I visit occasionally to collect
the mail that my correspondents have deposited there. The only
difference between my box and those owned and operated by the
Post Office is that on my box, there is a second lock and key,
one that is required to open the slot by which the letters are
deposited into the mailbox. Copies of that key I give freely to
all that want to securely send me a message. This is the public
key: it is useless for retrieving the messages from the box, it
can be used only to deposit them.

Just like the Post Office, I have another, private key, which is in
my possession only, and which I must keep protected. This one opens
the back cover of the steel box, one through which I, just like the
post office collection truck operator, retrieve all the letters
from the mailbox.

The set of two keys, private and public, are mathematically related
in a unique way. The public key is thus also useful to confirm
that the message is deposited in my box, as opposed to somebody
else's box that happens to be located on the same street corner.

I advise those that I teach how to use GPG to completely ignore
WOT and key-signing, and to rely on rigorous out-of-channel key
fingerprint verification. If they don't, they could be depositing
their messages into an imposter's box, who could read them, and
(since he, like everybody else, is likely to be in the possession
of my public key) afterward deposit them in my mailbox. Neither
I, nor the message sender would know that such message has been
read by the imposter.

Teaching those that don't have a very concrete idea of the cost to
themselves and/or to their correspondents in case the content of
their communication is compromised is a waste of time: they lack
the motivation to put in the considerable effort that is necessary
to effectively use (as opposed to just "go through the motions")
of something as complex as GPG.

Advocating for the adoption of encrypted communication as a matter
of personal policy or principle, in conjunction with teaching the
use of a complex software system necessary to do it is, IMHO,
a big mistake.

Listo Factor




From dpc at ucore.info  Thu Jun 18 21:03:44 2015
From: dpc at ucore.info (dpc at ucore.info)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 12:03:44 -0700
Subject: gpg2 --card-status does not create key stubs
Message-ID: <CAHzZGExB+JzL57et9VKuj6KQO59-dUync8PckXVa2eu=TuW-uA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
It used to work just fine, and on a new machine, after importing publikey
subkeys, `gpg --card-status` would just create secure stubs so that the gpg
smartcard can be used.

Now it is not happening. How to debug what is the issue?


Regards,
-- 
Dawid Ci??arkiewicz
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From lance at lrvick.net  Thu Jun 18 23:57:36 2015
From: lance at lrvick.net (Lance R. Vick)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 14:57:36 -0700
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <CAKNki==gnNn2g_hB0MhwVZmptukyimjfpq5VqAeNuGHr7i+fPw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org> <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
 <87wpz1wh5v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAKNki==gnNn2g_hB0MhwVZmptukyimjfpq5VqAeNuGHr7i+fPw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAKNki=n6U_hHUjuV9_X0R=Eiyb_uLw4_MHmpRh3K33phFwh71g@mail.gmail.com>

Another example I just had happen:

1. start gpg-agent
2. populate SSH_AUTH_SOCK
3. ssh successfully
4. remove yubikey
5. insert yubikey
6. attempt to ssh -> "Permission Denied (Publickey)"
7. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
8. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
9. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
11. (...etc. it refused to come back this time)
12. killall gpg-agent
13. `gpg --card status` (again) -> Got usual card output
14. ssh successfully again

On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 10:56 AM, Lance R. Vick <lance at lrvick.net> wrote:

> I only ever tried this on 2.0.0 as far as older versions go, and that was
> similarly broken. I didn't bother documenting as I saw there were some
> smartcard updates in 2.1.4 so I upgraded.
>
> Just now had another variation (on 2.1.4):
>
> 1. start gpg-agent
> 2. populate SSH_AUTH_SOCK
> 3. ssh successfully
> 4. remove yubikey
> 5. insert yubikey
> 6. attempt to ssh -> "Permission Denied (Publickey)"
> 7. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
> 8. `gpg --card status` (again) -> Got usual card output
> 9. ssh successfully again
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:17, simon at josefsson.org said:
>>
>> > I've seen the error many times, also when I used a g10code smartcard,
>> > but lately things have been smooth.  I think there have been a couple of
>>
>> Old versions of GnuPG assumed that there is a card reader which can tell
>> you whether a card has been removed or inserted.  However USB tokens are
>> different in that you insert/remove the entire reader.  gniibe fixed
>> these problems some time ago.
>>
>>
>> Salam-Shalom,
>>
>>    Werner
>>
>> --
>> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Lance R. Vick
> __________________________________________________
> Cell      -  407.283.7596
> Gtalk     -  lance at lrvick.net
> Website   -  http://lrvick.net
> PGP Key   -  http://lrvick.net/0x36C8AAA9.asc
> keyserver -  subkeys.pgp.net
> __________________________________________________
>



-- 
Lance R. Vick
__________________________________________________
Cell      -  407.283.7596
Gtalk     -  lance at lrvick.net
Website   -  http://lrvick.net
PGP Key   -  http://lrvick.net/0x36C8AAA9.asc
keyserver -  subkeys.pgp.net
__________________________________________________
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From gniibe at fsij.org  Fri Jun 19 03:10:02 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 10:10:02 +0900
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <CAKNki=n6U_hHUjuV9_X0R=Eiyb_uLw4_MHmpRh3K33phFwh71g@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>	<558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>	<CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>	<55815BB5.80902@fsij.org>	<87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>	<87wpz1wh5v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<CAKNki==gnNn2g_hB0MhwVZmptukyimjfpq5VqAeNuGHr7i+fPw@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAKNki=n6U_hHUjuV9_X0R=Eiyb_uLw4_MHmpRh3K33phFwh71g@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55836BEA.7070004@fsij.org>

Hello,

Thank you for more information.

On 06/19/2015 06:57 AM, Lance R. Vick wrote:
> Another example I just had happen:
> 
> 1. start gpg-agent
> 2. populate SSH_AUTH_SOCK
> 3. ssh successfully
> 4. remove yubikey
> 5. insert yubikey
> 6. attempt to ssh -> "Permission Denied (Publickey)"
> 7. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
> 8. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
> 9. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
> 11. (...etc. it refused to come back this time)
> 12. killall gpg-agent
> 13. `gpg --card status` (again) -> Got usual card output
> 14. ssh successfully again

This is not reproducible here.  The second SSH (#6) just works.

My environment is GnuPG 2.1.5 on Debian GNU/Linux, and I use in-stock
CCID driver (I don't install PC/SC service).

Please let me know if you have PC/SC service or not.  If yes, could
you please let me know the version of pcscd and libccid (if you are
using GNU system or Mac OS).

Are there any other programs which might access Yubikey?  Or, do you
have multiple gpg-agent(s) / scdaemon(s), by chance, when you get such
an error?
-- 


From faramir.cl at gmail.com  Fri Jun 19 03:18:23 2015
From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 22:18:23 -0300
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558180EB.8000705@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55836DDF.3050005@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

El 17-06-2015 a las 11:15, Robert J. Hansen escribi?:
...
> The most common one I've found is not understanding the material as
> well as they think.  This tends to come through most in the
> metaphors an instructor uses.  For instance, I frequently encounter
> instructors who tell the class to imagine a lock with two keys, one
> that locks it and one that unlocks it, and they proceed to use that
> lock metaphor to explain crypto.
> 
> It's absurd.  Who in the class has ever seen a lock with two keys,
> one that locks it and one that unlocks?  The metaphor's ridiculous:
> the locks the students are familiar with require *no* keys to lock
> and only one key to unlock.

  I remember a tutorial that compared it to a lock and 1 key. I keep
the key, and send the lock to the person that will send messages to
me. The person writes the message, put it in a box, and locks the box
with the lock.
  I think that is very accurate, because I can encrypt messages to
your public key, even if I don't have a key of my own (of course, in
that case I can't sign the message, but that is a different operation).

  Maybe the magical wax could be useful to explain signatures? Or... I
can send you a sample of my DNA. Then I write a message, and sign it
using my blood as ink (ouch!), you get the message, run a DNA test...
The only way somebody can fake my signature would involve stealing a
sample of my blood, but then, it would be like stealing my private key.

  Best Regards

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVg23fAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAhWkH/2oOKNgGU76BEf4Mo4xNZOIJ
n/tVzzIRX5Oygjk//RRe9qwWCXSAU7CCOuqqy2xDyHcrVCxgI1lwhd6KBFx6uNOe
g1xSkhHRDyJxd/67etgo0BaV4g0MrB0/LZHp5LXxUDXJjWOg3zpdS8X+TECIh2TA
pFyfr+aL2Tu0BhylcOoZYvK7WDp7QCDgAW+jOHciwvTK3WfY1ArXrJ8dTxPNT1qn
VlpgxrzbVoyZ/hD707qMdvjYjf9vUI5DNBZ6vPVcHBFIcwMsjzWSzeZHwSx8nbu2
zD7Z1UyvIBHN5cyProuBQJFmiIbzyNZ+m5R5kSSQZzX+rkA9g7tkQSla1Rr+PYo=
=usmm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From sbeck at mailbox.org  Sat Jun 20 02:58:22 2015
From: sbeck at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2015 02:58:22 +0200
Subject: Teaching GnuPG to noobs
In-Reply-To: <20150618193753.GA25872@xen.axs.org>
References: <55802988.40507@riseup.net> <558284CD.9040107@mailbox.org>
 <20150618193753.GA25872@xen.axs.org>
Message-ID: <5584BAAE.2010504@mailbox.org>

Am 18.06.2015 um 21:37 schrieb Chuck Peters:
> Stephan Beck said:
>> Am 16.06.2015 um 15:50 schrieb A.T. Leibson:
>>
>>> Lastly, what's your favorite noob-friendly guide, and why?
>>
>> I think that the guide available at (1)
>>
>> (1) https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/en/
> 
> Potential instructors: [snip]

Thanks, I got your message. I am not an instructor, though, and I don't even
have the potential to be one. I'll leave your comment (hint) to be commented by
someone else who might tell you more about that particular issue. ;-)

Cheers,

Stephan


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am a lazy son, I never get things done ... (VU, 1969)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From trickyboy at leet.la  Sun Jun 21 19:53:13 2015
From: trickyboy at leet.la (trickyboy at leet.la)
Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2015 19:53:13 +0200
Subject: Problem: Several selfsig
Message-ID: <53172C21-07D3-40A5-83C1-0D2C531906A4@leet.la>

Hi everybody,

I generated a GnuPG certificate but I see that I have two self-signatures for each of my userID:

gpg> check
uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain1.blah>
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain2.blah>
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain3.blah>
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]

Here is how I proceeded: 
I generated a key (which generated an encryption subkey automatically).
I added 2 userID.
I added a signature subkey. So I let only my 2 subkeys (so, E and S) on my laptop as recommended on a website I read.
(I also added an authentification subkey because I?d like to test a ssh/gpg setting later).

So my questions are:
Did I proceed correctly or did I miss a recommended step ?
Why I have 2 self-sig on each of my userID and is it a problem ? And, if so, how to proceed to remove one of them ?
I think that maybe I see two self-signature because I created two signature keys: The main key which is for signature and certification (SC), plus the signature subkey I added. 

Thank you for your help,

Tboy.




From trickyboy at leet.la  Sun Jun 21 21:19:06 2015
From: trickyboy at leet.la (trickyboy at leet.la)
Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2015 21:19:06 +0200
Subject: Several selfsig
Message-ID: <53147C24-73C2-461D-B1F9-63FAEE0E6DD8@leet.la>

Hi everybody,

I generated a GnuPG certificate but I see that I have two self-signatures for each of my userID:

gpg> check
uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain1.blah <mailto:john.doe at domain1.blah>>
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain2.blah <mailto:john.doe at domain2.blah>>
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain3.blah <mailto:john.doe at domain3.blah>>
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]

Here is how I proceeded: 
I generated a key (which generated an encryption subkey automatically).
I added 2 userID.
I added a signature subkey. So I let only my 2 subkeys (so, E and S) on my laptop as recommended on a website I read.
(I also added an authentification subkey because I?d like to test a ssh/gpg setting later).

So my questions are:
Did I proceed correctly or did I miss a recommended step ?
Why I have 2 self-sig on each of my userID and is it a problem ? And, if so, how to proceed to remove one of them ?
I think that maybe I see two self-signature because I created two signature keys: The main key which is for signature and certification (SC), plus the signature subkey I added. 

Thank you for your help,

Tboy.
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From tboy at leet.la  Mon Jun 22 13:11:14 2015
From: tboy at leet.la (tboy at leet.la)
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 13:11:14 +0200
Subject: Problem: Several selfsig
In-Reply-To: <CACpWn9RiW1LH1yq8GG6Ly9dJTPEzSb7VmZ+yW5+pd5OZ9Kn5Jg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <53172C21-07D3-40A5-83C1-0D2C531906A4@leet.la>
 <CACpWn9RiW1LH1yq8GG6Ly9dJTPEzSb7VmZ+yW5+pd5OZ9Kn5Jg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <E3984015-AB81-478D-8FAE-1EA12D704376@leet.la>

It?s the same key with 3 different userID.

Tboy

?
> On 21 Jun 2015, at 22:12, Schlacta, Christ <aarcane at aarcane.org> wrote:
> 
> I'm more interested how two different keys have the same keyid ABCD1234.. How'd you get that keyid?
> 
> On Jun 21, 2015 1:07 PM, <trickyboy at leet.la> wrote:
> Hi everybody,
> 
> I generated a GnuPG certificate but I see that I have two self-signatures for each of my userID:
> 
> gpg> check
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain1.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain2.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain3.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> 
> Here is how I proceeded:
> I generated a key (which generated an encryption subkey automatically).
> I added 2 userID.
> I added a signature subkey. So I let only my 2 subkeys (so, E and S) on my laptop as recommended on a website I read.
> (I also added an authentification subkey because I?d like to test a ssh/gpg setting later).
> 
> So my questions are:
> Did I proceed correctly or did I miss a recommended step ?
> Why I have 2 self-sig on each of my userID and is it a problem ? And, if so, how to proceed to remove one of them ?
> I think that maybe I see two self-signature because I created two signature keys: The main key which is for signature and certification (SC), plus the signature subkey I added.
> 
> Thank you for your help,
> 
> Tboy.
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From tboy at leet.la  Mon Jun 22 19:19:41 2015
From: tboy at leet.la (tboy at leet.la)
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 19:19:41 +0200
Subject: Problem: Several selfsig
In-Reply-To: <a17334a66cb918832abe1cc5f836c7fa@dizum.com>
References: <a17334a66cb918832abe1cc5f836c7fa@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <10135B24-D6D9-42AC-BC60-C37DB5C4199A@leet.la>

It works perfectly and so simple. Thank you Nomen Nescio !

> On 22 Jun 2015, at 18:33, Nomen Nescio <nobody at dizum.com> wrote:
> 
> trickyboy wrote:
> 
>> I generated a GnuPG certificate but I see that I have two
>> self-signatures for each of my userID: 
>> 
>> gpg> check
>> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain1.blah>
>> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
>> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
>> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain2.blah>
>> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
>> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
>> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain3.blah>
>> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
>> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
>> 
> 
> 
> gpg --edit-key ABCD1234
> clean
> save
> 
> 



From trickyboy at leet.la  Mon Jun 22 12:47:46 2015
From: trickyboy at leet.la (trickyboy at leet.la)
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 12:47:46 +0200
Subject: Problem: Several selfsig
In-Reply-To: <CACpWn9RiW1LH1yq8GG6Ly9dJTPEzSb7VmZ+yW5+pd5OZ9Kn5Jg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <53172C21-07D3-40A5-83C1-0D2C531906A4@leet.la>
 <CACpWn9RiW1LH1yq8GG6Ly9dJTPEzSb7VmZ+yW5+pd5OZ9Kn5Jg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2050C631-B936-4D16-8D2B-AE6BB368BA65@leet.la>

It?s the same key with 3 different userID. 


> On 21 Jun 2015, at 22:12, Schlacta, Christ <aarcane at aarcane.org> wrote:
> 
> I'm more interested how two different keys have the same keyid ABCD1234.. How'd you get that keyid?
> 
> On Jun 21, 2015 1:07 PM, <trickyboy at leet.la> wrote:
> Hi everybody,
> 
> I generated a GnuPG certificate but I see that I have two self-signatures for each of my userID:
> 
> gpg> check
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain1.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain2.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain3.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> 
> Here is how I proceeded:
> I generated a key (which generated an encryption subkey automatically).
> I added 2 userID.
> I added a signature subkey. So I let only my 2 subkeys (so, E and S) on my laptop as recommended on a website I read.
> (I also added an authentification subkey because I?d like to test a ssh/gpg setting later).
> 
> So my questions are:
> Did I proceed correctly or did I miss a recommended step ?
> Why I have 2 self-sig on each of my userID and is it a problem ? And, if so, how to proceed to remove one of them ?
> I think that maybe I see two self-signature because I created two signature keys: The main key which is for signature and certification (SC), plus the signature subkey I added.
> 
> Thank you for your help,
> 
> Tboy.
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From nobody at dizum.com  Mon Jun 22 19:53:40 2015
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 19:53:40 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: Problem: Several selfsig
Message-ID: <a17334a66cb918832abe1cc5f836c7fa@dizum.com>

trickyboy wrote:

> I generated a GnuPG certificate but I see that I have two
> self-signatures for each of my userID: 
>
> gpg> check
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain1.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain2.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> uid  John Doe <john.doe at domain3.blah>
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-18  [self-signature]
> sig!3        ABCD1234 2015-06-14  [self-signature]
> 


gpg --edit-key ABCD1234
clean
save




From bozho at kset.org  Thu Jun 25 15:36:41 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 14:36:41 +0100
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
Message-ID: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org>

Hi all,

Apologies for a long post :)

I haven't used gpg in years and recently I've picked it up with renewed
interest for many different reasons.

My initial goal would be to use gpg for ssh and github authentication
(currently covered by ssh keyfiles and putty pageant). The intermediate goal
would be to use duplicity for secure cloud backup of personal data and my end
goal would be to use a physical token (yubikey or something similar) to handle
my keyrings, passwords, etc...

I've started working on the initial goal of having gpg-agent replace putty
pageant and ssh-agent (for Cygwin's OpenSSH, which I prefer to putty) on my
Windows machines. It's been nearly impossible to find all of the information I
need in one place, but I think I've managed to piece together enough bits(ha!)

Gpg on Windows should work with putty out of the box - if I understood
correctly, Gpg4Win for 2.0.X and the official 2.1.x builds support putty
interop. ssh-pageant provides a "bridge" that enables OpenSSH to talk to
gpg-agent on Windows.

Now, there is one bit I don't quite understand why things work the way they
do... I've reduced the process to these steps (on 2.0.X):

1. create a master S, C key, 4096 RSA
2. create an A subkey, 4099 RSA
3. configure gpg-agent to run with putty support
4. run gpg-agent
-> run Cygwin bash
5. start ssh-pageant (using dev's instructions)
6. running 'ssh-add -l' returns no identities

At this point, I would expect gpg-agent to serve my authentication pubkey as
an identity. I haven't tried using gpg-agent as an ssh-agent on Linux yet, but
I don't suspect this is a Windows-specific issue/thing, since I can make
gpg-agent serve my pubkey using following steps:

7. export my subkey
8. use monkeysphere's openpgp2ssh to convert the key to SSH format (this one
is inconvenient if you're on a Windows machine since there is no Win port of
monkeysphere)
9. while pgp-agent and ssh-pagenat are running, run ssh-add <subkey_file> to
add the key to gpg-agent.
10. as a result, the key is imported into private-keys-v1.d directory and
added to sshcontrol file.
11. running ssh-add -l after that produces the desired output

My question is basically: what are the reasons that make these additional
steps necessary? Why is it necessary to export my authentication key and
import it into slightly different location in order for it to get serverd by
gpg-agent? It only makes subkey management more difficult.

I did find writeups with people mentioning that the things work with steps 1-6
if a smartcard is used to store the keyring, but the additional steps (7-11)
are needed if keyrings are stored on a disk, but nobody explains why.

Or am I doing something wrong? :)


Thnak you,
-- 
Marko



From gniibe at fsij.org  Fri Jun 26 03:32:59 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 10:32:59 +0900
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
In-Reply-To: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org>
References: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org>
Message-ID: <558CABCB.7000208@fsij.org>

On 06/25/2015 10:36 PM, Marko Bo?ikovi? wrote:
> Gpg on Windows should work with putty out of the box - if I understood
> correctly, Gpg4Win for 2.0.X and the official 2.1.x builds support putty
> interop. ssh-pageant provides a "bridge" that enables OpenSSH to talk to
> gpg-agent on Windows.
> 
> Now, there is one bit I don't quite understand why things work the way they
> do... I've reduced the process to these steps (on 2.0.X):
[...]
> My question is basically: what are the reasons that make these additional
> steps necessary? Why is it necessary to export my authentication key and
> import it into slightly different location in order for it to get serverd by
> gpg-agent? It only makes subkey management more difficult.
> 
> I did find writeups with people mentioning that the things work with steps 1-6
> if a smartcard is used to store the keyring, but the additional steps (7-11)
> are needed if keyrings are stored on a disk, but nobody explains why.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, I am not a user of Gpg4win.
And... since I'm promoting use of card/token, my major use case is
card/token.

In GnuPG 2.0.x, yes, the steps are required.  Well, I admit it's
complicated.  When done, private key material (I mean, RSA data) is
both in secring.gpg and in the private-keys-v1.d directory.  One is
used by gpg frontend for OpenPGP operation and another is used by
gpg-agent for ssh, S/MIME, and gpg-connect-agent.

In GnuPG 2.1.x, private key is under control of gpg-agent, and it's
(only) in the private-keys-v1.d directory.  And IIUC, those additional
steps are not required with GnuPG 2.1.x.

That's because the design of programs were changed, so that the GnuPG
suite can provide better user's control of operations.

The reason why the steps is not required for smartcard in 2.0.x is
that private key is not on the host and gpg frontend of 2.0.x has to
talk to gpg-agent to access smartcard.  It was a kind of side effect.

In short, there were major design change from 2.0.x to 2.1.x.
-- 


From bozho at kset.org  Fri Jun 26 10:44:55 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 09:44:55 +0100
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
In-Reply-To: <558CABCB.7000208@fsij.org>
References: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org> <558CABCB.7000208@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <558D1107.6090801@kset.org>

On 26/06/2015 02:32, NIIBE Yutaka wrote:
> 
> Please correct me if I'm wrong, I am not a user of Gpg4win.
> And... since I'm promoting use of card/token, my major use case is
> card/token.
> 
> In GnuPG 2.0.x, yes, the steps are required.  Well, I admit it's
> complicated.  When done, private key material (I mean, RSA data) is
> both in secring.gpg and in the private-keys-v1.d directory.  One is
> used by gpg frontend for OpenPGP operation and another is used by
> gpg-agent for ssh, S/MIME, and gpg-connect-agent.
> 
> In GnuPG 2.1.x, private key is under control of gpg-agent, and it's
> (only) in the private-keys-v1.d directory.  And IIUC, those additional
> steps are not required with GnuPG 2.1.x.
> 
> That's because the design of programs were changed, so that the GnuPG
> suite can provide better user's control of operations.
> 
> The reason why the steps is not required for smartcard in 2.0.x is
> that private key is not on the host and gpg frontend of 2.0.x has to
> talk to gpg-agent to access smartcard.  It was a kind of side effect.
> 
> In short, there were major design change from 2.0.x to 2.1.x.

Yup, the main reason why I wanted to try 2.1.x is because of that (Gpg4Win
uses 2.0.x) Reading your comment gave me a brainwave... It seems that even
though all the keys reside in private-keys-v1.d directory, you still need to
manually add a keygrip to the sshcontrol file for it to be served through
gpg-agent.

It kind of makes sense, but it's not very well documented (if at all :)

Thank you,
-- 
Marko



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 26 11:41:59 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 11:41:59 +0200
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
In-Reply-To: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org> ("Marko =?utf-8?B?Qm/Fvmlrb3Zp?=
 =?utf-8?B?xIciJ3M=?= message of "Thu, 25 Jun 2015 14:36:41 +0100")
References: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org>
Message-ID: <87twtuq00o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 25 Jun 2015 15:36, bozho at kset.org said:

> interop. ssh-pageant provides a "bridge" that enables OpenSSH to talk to
> gpg-agent on Windows.

This reminds me of an idea we had some time ago: If there is a real user
base for OpenSSH/Cygwin on Windows, we should support it directly.

IIRC, Cygwin's way of emulating Unix Domain sockets is similar to the
way we do it with GnuPG but different in detail.  Now with the socket
redirect features (see https://bugs.gnupg.org/gnupg/msg6568 ) we have a
mechanism in place which should allow us to support different types of
socket emulation.  Right now the socket emulation is an ad-hoc thing but
the plan is to make it similar to the redirect feature and thus
libassuan would be able to detect whether the GnuPG emulation scheme is
in use or a foreign (Cygwin) one.

Shall we open a feature request for this?


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From bozho at kset.org  Fri Jun 26 12:45:25 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 11:45:25 +0100
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
In-Reply-To: <87twtuq00o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org> <87twtuq00o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <558D2D45.8080506@kset.org>

On 26/06/2015 10:41, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 25 Jun 2015 15:36, bozho at kset.org said:
> 
>> interop. ssh-pageant provides a "bridge" that enables OpenSSH to talk to
>> gpg-agent on Windows.
> 
> This reminds me of an idea we had some time ago: If there is a real user
> base for OpenSSH/Cygwin on Windows, we should support it directly.
> -snip-
> 
> Shall we open a feature request for this?

I'd definitely be interested in something like this... I primarily use
Windows, but Cygwin is irreplacable for me and when I need SSH, I prefer
staying in cmd line.

Would it be possible to have both types of socket emulation (SSH and putty)
running at the same time? Git on Windows uses putty's pagenat a key agent...

Thank you,
-- 
Marko



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Jun 26 15:03:02 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 15:03:02 +0200
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
In-Reply-To: <558D2D45.8080506@kset.org> ("Marko =?utf-8?B?Qm/Fvmlrb3Zp?=
 =?utf-8?B?xIciJ3M=?= message of "Fri, 26 Jun 2015 11:45:25 +0100")
References: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org> <87twtuq00o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <558D2D45.8080506@kset.org>
Message-ID: <87k2uqoc55.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 26 Jun 2015 12:45, bozho at kset.org said:

> Would it be possible to have both types of socket emulation (SSH and putty)
> running at the same time? Git on Windows uses putty's pagenat a key agent...

Putty uses Windows's WM_COPYDATA message along with a mapped file to
encapsulate the standard ssh-agent protocol.  OpenSSH uses the Cygwin
Socket emulation to directly convey the ssh-agent protocol.  Thus the
rough idea is to implement --enable-ssh-support on Windows and allow
that in addition to --enable-putty-support.  gpg-agent 2.1 already
support multiple sockets for the same connection type.  The main work is
to let Libassuan detect an Cygwin style socket.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From robertc at broadcom.com  Fri Jun 26 19:41:48 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 17:41:48 +0000
Subject: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
In-Reply-To: <558D2D45.8080506@kset.org>
References: <558C03E9.5000203@kset.org> <87twtuq00o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <558D2D45.8080506@kset.org>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D42AD7F@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Hi Werner,
I use Cygwin all the time and would be very interested in this feature.

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of
> Marko Bo?ikovic
> Sent: Friday, June 26, 2015 3:45 AM
> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> Subject: Re: Windows, GnuPG, ssh, github, ...
> 
> On 26/06/2015 10:41, Werner Koch wrote:
> > On Thu, 25 Jun 2015 15:36, bozho at kset.org said:
> >
> >> interop. ssh-pageant provides a "bridge" that enables OpenSSH to talk
> >> to gpg-agent on Windows.
> >
> > This reminds me of an idea we had some time ago: If there is a real
> > user base for OpenSSH/Cygwin on Windows, we should support it directly.
> > -snip-
> >
> > Shall we open a feature request for this?
> 
> I'd definitely be interested in something like this... I primarily use Windows,
> but Cygwin is irreplacable for me and when I need SSH, I prefer staying in
> cmd line.
> 
> Would it be possible to have both types of socket emulation (SSH and putty)
> running at the same time? Git on Windows uses putty's pagenat a key
> agent...
> 
> Thank you,
> --
> Marko
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From bozho at kset.org  Mon Jun 29 00:56:42 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2015 23:56:42 +0100
Subject: gpg-agent and putty/ssh agent bug
Message-ID: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org>

Hi all,

I think I've found a bug with gpg-agent acting as a putty pageant.

System details
==============
Windows 7 x64 Ultimate
UAC disabled
logged in as a member of Administrators

GnuPG details
=============
a primary 4096 bit RSA key, with SC capabilities
3 2048 bit RSA keys - one for each: S, E, A
A key's keygrip added to the sshcontrol file, with TTL set to 0 and no
additional flags

options file
------------
cipher-algo AES256
digest-algo SHA512
s2k-cipher-algo AES256
s2k-digest-algo SHA512

no-comments
no-emit-version


gpg-agent.conf file
-------------------
enable-putty-support
debug-level expert


gpg-agent command line
----------------------
gpg-agent.exe --homedir F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg --use-standard-socket --daemon



Steps to reproduce
------------------
1. Start gpg-agent (either directly, or using gpg-connect-agent, makes no
difference). No other instance of gpg-agent is running.

2. Start putty, enter server IP address. When asked for the login, enter it
and press ENTER. After a bit, a default pinetry dialog pops up. Enter key
password and click OK. After some time, putty shows an error dialog with the
message: "Server unexpectedly closed network connection."

3. Close putty, start it again. Enter the server IP address again and connect.
Enter the login when asked. The pientry dialog pops up *again*. Enter key
password and click OK. Putty connects normally.

4. Every subsequent putty connection attempt works as expected (no pinentry,
connects to the server fine)

5. Restarting gpg-agent reproduces steps 1-4 every time.


Using ssh-pageant as an ssh-agent "bridge" exhibits a similar behaviour:

1. Set an environment variable SSH_AUTH_SOCK to "/tmp/.ssh-pageant-bozho"

2. Start gpg-agent as before

3. start ssh-pagenat: ssh-pageant.exe -r -a /tmp/.ssh-pageant-bozho

4. Try to connect to the server using Cygwin's ssh

5. Pinentry dialog pops up, enter password.

6. After a while, ssh reports an error and exits:
Error reading response length from authentication socket.
Permission denied (publickey).

7. ssh-pageant has crashed.

8. Restart ssh-pagenat.

9. Run ssh again, enter the password in the pinentry dialog, ssh connects fine.


Additional notes
----------------
I have attached gpg-agent's debug log (gpg-agent.log)

I have also used Spy++ to log WM_COPYDATA messages from gpg-agent
(gpg-agent-messages.log)

The first four lines (2 WM_COPYDATA messages) are from the unsuccessful
attempt (notice that fProcessed is False in the second message)

The last four lines are from the second, successful attempt.

Additionally, all four messages seem to have the same message parameters:
wParam: 00000000
lParam: 028CFE84
   dwData: 804E50BA
   cbData: 23
   lpData: 0039E7C0


I hope this helps in locating the bug :)


Thank you,
-- 
Marko
-------------- next part --------------
2015-06-28 23:07:04 gpg-agent[7576] listening on socket 'F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.gpg-agent'
2015-06-28 23:07:04 gpg-agent[7576] listening on socket 'F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.gpg-agent.ssh'
2015-06-28 23:07:04 gpg-agent[7576] gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.1.5 started
2015-06-28 23:07:04 gpg-agent[7576] putty message loop thread started
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest00002418'
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000140
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025c0000
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) started
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] no running SCdaemon - starting it
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK GNU Privacy Guard's Smartcard server ready
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: first connection to SCdaemon established
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C -> GETINFO socket_name
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- D F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.scdaemon
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: additional connections at 'F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.scdaemon'
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C -> OPTION event-signal=110
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C -> GETATTR $AUTHKEYID
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- ERR 100663404 Card error <SCD>
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] no authentication key for ssh on card: Card error
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) ready
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C -> RESTART
2015-06-28 23:07:15 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest00002418'
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000140
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025c0000
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for sign_request (13) started
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: agent_get_cache '3F8FFAB15E8B51DF57F1274CEDEE8E8FF3D77E5A' (mode 4) ...
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ... miss
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] starting a new PIN Entry
2015-06-28 23:07:26 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: connection to PIN entry established
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest00001eac'
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000188
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025d0000
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) started
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] new connection to SCdaemon established (reusing)
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C -> GETATTR $AUTHKEYID
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- ERR 100663404 Card error <SCD>
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] no authentication key for ssh on card: Card error
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) ready
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C -> RESTART
2015-06-28 23:12:29 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest00001eac'
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000188
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025d0000
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for sign_request (13) started
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: agent_get_cache '3F8FFAB15E8B51DF57F1274CEDEE8E8FF3D77E5A' (mode 4) ...
2015-06-28 23:12:40 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: ... miss
2015-06-28 23:12:48 gpg-agent[7576] DBG: agent_put_cache '3F8FFAB15E8B51DF57F1274CEDEE8E8FF3D77E5A' (mode 4) requested ttl=0
2015-06-28 23:12:48 gpg-agent[7576] ssh request handler for sign_request (13) ready
-------------- next part --------------
?
<000001> 004D0794 S WM_COPYDATA hwndFrom:(null) pcds:028CFE84
<000002> 004D0794 R WM_COPYDATA fProcessed:True
<000003> 004D0794 S WM_COPYDATA hwndFrom:(null) pcds:028CFE84
<000004> 004D0794 R WM_COPYDATA fProcessed:False
<000005> 004D0794 S WM_COPYDATA hwndFrom:(null) pcds:028CFE84
<000006> 004D0794 R WM_COPYDATA fProcessed:True
<000007> 004D0794 S WM_COPYDATA hwndFrom:(null) pcds:028CFE84
<000008> 004D0794 R WM_COPYDATA fProcessed:True

From bozho at kset.org  Mon Jun 29 01:48:27 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 00:48:27 +0100
Subject: gpg-agent and putty/ssh agent bug
In-Reply-To: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org>
References: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org>
Message-ID: <559087CB.9070705@kset.org>

On 28/06/2015 23:56, Marko Bo?ikovi? wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> I think I've found a bug with gpg-agent acting as a putty pageant.
> -snip-

Aaand... The gpg version is 2.1.5 :)


-- 
Marko



From simon at josefsson.org  Mon Jun 29 10:23:24 2015
From: simon at josefsson.org (Simon Josefsson)
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 10:23:24 +0200
Subject: gpg-agent unable to see yubikey until manually re-running `gpg
 --card-status`
In-Reply-To: <CAKNki==gnNn2g_hB0MhwVZmptukyimjfpq5VqAeNuGHr7i+fPw__41975.7867268801$1434650329$gmane$org@mail.gmail.com>
 (Lance R. Vick's message of "Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:56:33 -0700")
References: <CAKNki=kxGgf8BcBeWD6ubQ-_2Q6cCbqHd==N35j3NEfCc_-uMg@mail.gmail.com>
 <558135E6.3070107@fsij.org>
 <CAKNki=kySq6jX_HwYTbe17OmySbm0gnXQUtm3Zwa__=jjo2pOw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55815BB5.80902@fsij.org> <87twu6jols.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
 <87wpz1wh5v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAKNki==gnNn2g_hB0MhwVZmptukyimjfpq5VqAeNuGHr7i+fPw__41975.7867268801$1434650329$gmane$org@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87a8vic48z.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>

"Lance R. Vick" <lance at lrvick.net> writes:

> I only ever tried this on 2.0.0 as far as older versions go, and that was
> similarly broken. I didn't bother documenting as I saw there were some
> smartcard updates in 2.1.4 so I upgraded.
>
> Just now had another variation (on 2.1.4):
>
> 1. start gpg-agent
> 2. populate SSH_AUTH_SOCK
> 3. ssh successfully
> 4. remove yubikey
> 5. insert yubikey
> 6. attempt to ssh -> "Permission Denied (Publickey)"
> 7. `gpg --card status` -> "no card present"
> 8. `gpg --card status` (again) -> Got usual card output
> 9. ssh successfully again

What mode is your YubiKey NEO in?  If it is in the OTP/CCID combo mode,
and you touch it, it will eject the CCID interface, issue an OTP, and
then re-insert itself to CCID after a small timeout.  Just an idea.

Can you always reproduce the above, or is it timing dependent?  Does the
problem occur if you wait 20 seconds before doing every step?

Being able to reproduce this on someone else's system would be a good
step towards fixing it.

/Simon

>
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 1:32 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 17 Jun 2015 18:17, simon at josefsson.org said:
>>
>> > I've seen the error many times, also when I used a g10code smartcard,
>> > but lately things have been smooth.  I think there have been a couple of
>>
>> Old versions of GnuPG assumed that there is a card reader which can tell
>> you whether a card has been removed or inserted.  However USB tokens are
>> different in that you insert/remove the entire reader.  gniibe fixed
>> these problems some time ago.
>>
>>
>> Salam-Shalom,
>>
>>    Werner
>>
>> --
>> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>>
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From bozho at kset.org  Mon Jun 29 17:33:35 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 16:33:35 +0100
Subject: Adding a subkey notation
Message-ID: <5591654F.6020007@kset.org>

Hi,

I've looked for a way to add some sort of comments on subkeys - I'd like to
have multiple authentication subkeys and easily distinguish among them.

>From what I've read, notations seem to be the way to go, but I was unable to
find a way to set them on already existing subkeys...

In general, I haven't found a comprihensive documentation on notations
anywhere. Is there some kind of guide/best practices documentation for them?

Thank you,
-- 
Marko


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Mon Jun 29 18:45:34 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 12:45:34 -0400
Subject: Adding a subkey notation
In-Reply-To: <5591654F.6020007@kset.org>
References: <5591654F.6020007@kset.org>
Message-ID: <87a8vi1n0x.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Mon 2015-06-29 11:33:35 -0400, Marko Bo?ikovi? wrote:

> I've looked for a way to add some sort of comments on subkeys - I'd like to
> have multiple authentication subkeys and easily distinguish among them.

i've done this myself by clearing all the usage flags and using
--cert-notation.  But see the gnupg-devel thread from 2013 starting at
Message-Id: 87obeo2vg7.fsf at alice.fifthhorseman.net for some bugs i ran
into.   Hopefully they're all fixed by now, but external verification
would be welcome.

> From what I've read, notations seem to be the way to go, but I was unable to
> find a way to set them on already existing subkeys...

you generally don't want to change already-existing subkeys.  You can
just create a new subkey and set the notations on it.

> In general, I haven't found a comprihensive documentation on notations
> anywhere. Is there some kind of guide/best practices documentation for them?

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.16

The IANA registry currently contains no entries:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/pgp-parameters/pgp-parameters.xhtml#pgp-parameters-6

        --dkg


From gnupgpacker at on.yourweb.de  Tue Jun 30 08:52:04 2015
From: gnupgpacker at on.yourweb.de (gnupgpacker)
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 08:52:04 +0200
Subject: Multithreaded gpg encryption of files
Message-ID: <000801d0b301$463768c0$d2a63a40$@on.yourweb.de>

Hello,
if encrypting big files (500 Mb...) with gpg-1.x, only one core of Intels
multicore processors is used. Is there an enhancement for using more than
one core while de-/encrypting files?

Thanks + regards, Chris



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 30 14:30:07 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 14:30:07 +0200
Subject: Multithreaded gpg encryption of files
In-Reply-To: <000801d0b301$463768c0$d2a63a40$@on.yourweb.de>
 (gnupgpacker@on.yourweb.de's message of "Tue, 30 Jun 2015 08:52:04
 +0200")
References: <000801d0b301$463768c0$d2a63a40$@on.yourweb.de>
Message-ID: <87y4j1js4w.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 30 Jun 2015 08:52, gnupgpacker at on.yourweb.de said:

> multicore processors is used. Is there an enhancement for using more than
> one core while de-/encrypting files?

OpenPGP uses CFB mode and thus the encryption cannot be parallelized.

However, with a modern Intel processor featuring the AES-NI instructions
the encryption is not the bottleneck anymore.  Make sure to use GnuPG
2.x with Libgcrypt >= 1.6.0 to employ the AES-NI speedup. 

You _may_ be able to speed I/O up a little by changing

  #define IOBUF_BUFFER_SIZE  8192

in gnupg/common/iobuf.c to larger power of 2.  Disabling encryption (-z
0) and running a separate gzip will also make use of more that one core.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Jun 30 14:38:26 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 14:38:26 +0200
Subject: gpg-agent and putty/ssh agent bug
In-Reply-To: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org> ("Marko =?utf-8?B?Qm/Fvmlrb3Zp?=
 =?utf-8?B?xIciJ3M=?= message of "Sun, 28 Jun 2015 23:56:42 +0100")
References: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org>
Message-ID: <87twtpjrr1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 29 Jun 2015 00:56, bozho at kset.org said:

> I have attached gpg-agent's debug log (gpg-agent.log)

Can you please add

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
verbose
verbose
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

to gpg-agent.conf, run the test again, and send the log?


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From bozho at kset.org  Tue Jun 30 14:57:50 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 13:57:50 +0100
Subject: gpg-agent and putty/ssh agent bug
In-Reply-To: <87twtpjrr1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org> <87twtpjrr1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5592924E.9080402@kset.org>

On 30/06/2015 13:38, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Jun 2015 00:56, bozho at kset.org said:
> 
>> I have attached gpg-agent's debug log (gpg-agent.log)
> 
> Can you please add
> 
> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
> verbose
> verbose
> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
> 
> to gpg-agent.conf, run the test again, and send the log?
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 

Sure, I'll try to do it tonight...

Also, last night I *think* gpg-agent worked fine after being started by gpg (I
was testing notations). Then, after some time I started ssh-pagenat and
OpenSSH connectect on the first try. I'll try to see if I can replicate this
as well..


-- 
Marko



From bozho at kset.org  Tue Jun 30 22:07:45 2015
From: bozho at kset.org (=?UTF-8?B?TWFya28gQm/Fvmlrb3ZpxIc=?=)
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 21:07:45 +0100
Subject: gpg-agent and putty/ssh agent bug
In-Reply-To: <87twtpjrr1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <55907BAA.6040802@kset.org> <87twtpjrr1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5592F711.8020608@kset.org>

On 30/06/2015 13:38, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Jun 2015 00:56, bozho at kset.org said:
> 
>> I have attached gpg-agent's debug log (gpg-agent.log)
> 
> Can you please add
> 
> --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
> verbose
> verbose
> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
> 
> to gpg-agent.conf, run the test again, and send the log?

Here we go...


-- 
Marko

-------------- next part --------------
2015-06-30 20:28:16 gpg-agent[8912] listening on socket 'F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.gpg-agent'
2015-06-30 20:28:16 gpg-agent[8912] listening on socket 'F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.gpg-agent.ssh'
2015-06-30 20:28:16 gpg-agent[8912] gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.1.5 started
2015-06-30 20:28:16 gpg-agent[8912] putty message loop thread started
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest00001c88'
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000140
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025b0000
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) started
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] no running SCdaemon - starting it
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK GNU Privacy Guard's Smartcard server ready
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: first connection to SCdaemon established
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C -> GETINFO socket_name
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- D F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.scdaemon
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: additional connections at 'F:\Users\bozho\.gnupg\S.scdaemon'
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C -> OPTION event-signal=110
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C -> GETATTR $AUTHKEYID
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- ERR 100663404 Card error <SCD>
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] no authentication key for ssh on card: Card error
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) ready
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] sending ssh response of length 591
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C -> RESTART
2015-06-30 20:28:26 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest00001c88'
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000140
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025b0000
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for sign_request (13) started
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: agent_get_cache '063CADD3BA3D11C35A055104772E6D55B8DB998B' (mode 4) ...
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ... miss
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] starting a new PIN Entry
2015-06-30 20:28:37 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: connection to PIN entry established
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest000028b0'
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000188
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025c0000
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) started
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] new connection to SCdaemon established (reusing)
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C -> GETATTR $AUTHKEYID
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- ERR 100663404 Card error <SCD>
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] no authentication key for ssh on card: Card error
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for request_identities (11) ready
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] sending ssh response of length 591
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C -> RESTART
2015-06-30 20:30:50 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: chan_0000016C <- OK
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file 'PageantRequest000028b0'
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map handle 0x00000188
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG:           my sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh map file sid: 'S-1-5-21-1972494145-3003797530-3302421020-1000'
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ssh IPC buffer at 0x025c0000
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for sign_request (13) started
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: agent_get_cache '063CADD3BA3D11C35A055104772E6D55B8DB998B' (mode 4) ...
2015-06-30 20:31:01 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: ... miss
2015-06-30 20:31:06 gpg-agent[8912] DBG: agent_put_cache '063CADD3BA3D11C35A055104772E6D55B8DB998B' (mode 4) requested ttl=0
2015-06-30 20:31:06 gpg-agent[8912] ssh request handler for sign_request (13) ready
2015-06-30 20:31:06 gpg-agent[8912] sending ssh response of length 276

From cspitzer at godaddy.com  Tue Jun 30 23:57:55 2015
From: cspitzer at godaddy.com (Charles Spitzer)
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 21:57:55 +0000
Subject: operating on remote files (Windows) using a UNC
Message-ID: <BY1PR02MB11802A0A45074BB0EE825B50D1A90@BY1PR02MB1180.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>

Greetings

Whenever I attempt to operate upon a remote file using a UNC, it doesn't seem to find the file.

C:\Users\cspitzer>gpg --decrypt "\\remote.machine.com\data\Vendor File Transfers\Archive\Input.2015-06-15.045720.csv.pgp"
gpg: can't open `\\\\remote.machine.com\\data \\Vendor File Transfers \\Archive\\Input.2015-06-15.045720.csv.pgp': No such file or directory
gpg: decrypt_message failed: No such file or directory

Regards,
Charlie Spitzer
602.420.4123
[GDLogo2]

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