Key management for archives
ndk.clanbo at gmail.com
Tue Jun 6 22:03:09 CEST 2017
Il 06/06/2017 20:13, Konstantin Gribov ha scritto:
> I can think of more simpler approach:
> - generate secure random for symmetrical data encryption key (DEK);
> - encrypt that key for authorized users on their public keys;
> - encrypt data itself with something like ChaCha20 or AES in appropriate
Problem: the symmetric key (DEK) must remain in plaintext on the server.
It's a relatively secure setup, but I prefer *not* to risk. Even if that
means a slightly more involved process. If the server gets compromised,
the attacker can only access new datasets, at most, not the historic
Moreover, with your proposal, once I give an user access to one file,
he'll be able to decrypt *any* other file too.
If I keep track of who can access every dataset and some day I find some
datasets are being used "illegally", I can restrict the suspects.
> Of course, such way doesn't allow you to revoke access to DEK since each
> user could just decrypt his own copy.
Since encrypting to a public key generates a random session key, the
session key gives access only to that single file. Obviously that access
can not be easily revoked (the user could have saved a plaintext copy
anyway, so that's not a big issue).
> A bit more complicated approach is to use two level system:
> - generate data encryption key (DEK);
> - generate key encryption key (KEK) for each authorized user;
> - encrypt each user's KEK on each user's public key;
> - create a table (tsv/csv or any other format) with some user id and DEK
> encrypted with corresponding KEK and store it with data;
> - encrypt data with DEK.
That's the same of encrypting the DEK with multiple public keys.
The problem is that I don't know in advance the users that will need access.
IIRC there was some method to retrieve the session key and replace the
public key part with another recipient...
> Both methods are naive and gives end user DEK, so it's better to
> reencrypt archive after that to rotate DEK.
That would be a big problem: archives must remain static (to avoid
troubles with offsite replication).
> Also, a lot depends on your threat model. Since I don't know what risks
> are you planning to avoid with original scheme I just assumed that
> primary risk is 3rdparty archive storage compromise.
Well, I handle the storage (currently 100TB, going to grow to 150TB
soon). I want to avoid that an attacker could gain access to the whole
archive if he succeeds in compromising the server. Clients are out of my
perimeter (= not my problem).
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