Impact of ROCA (CVE-2017-15361) in subkey vs. private key?

[Lachlan Gunn]

2017-10-30 23:44 GMT+10:30 Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com>:

> But, I agree that the reverse is not true: a compromised subkey does not
> compromise the primary key in any way I can think of. And systems
> checking for ROCA should not reject a certificate because there is
> something wrong with an already revoked key.
>

I'm not sure that this is 100% correct.  The first part is true, but
signatures of a key that has been revoked because it was superseded or lost
are valid up to the revocation date, whereas ROCA-affected keys are
compromised to some degree and so all signatures are suspect; the
revocation status should, ideally, reflect this.

Thanks,
Lachlan
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