Impact of ROCA (CVE-2017-15361) in subkey vs. private key?

[Peter Lebbing]

On 31/10/17 11:39, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> And yes, the subkey should also be revoked with reason "compromised", for the
> reason you state.

And only now the penny drops.

I suppose a system checking for ROCA might rightfully take offense at a subkey
revoked as "superseded" or "lost"[1], because with ROCA it is actually
"compromised". I never checked what GnuPG does with two revocations on a key,
the earlier a "superseded" and the later a "compromised". The only correct thing
would be to treat it as "compromised", especially because the attacker could
generate a "superseded" with an earlier timestamp after the compromise and
create the same situation. So it ought to work.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>

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