Impact of ROCA (CVE-2017-15361) in subkey vs. private key?

[Peter Lebbing]

On 31/10/17 11:56, Lachlan Gunn wrote:
> The only difficulty is when the owner doesn't have the secret key
> anymore, and so can't re-revoke it.  Then you might want to keep it from
> being disseminated further.

Revocations are done by the primary key. If the user has lost the secret
primary, they should fetch their revocation certificate, not fool around with
the subkeys ;-). (Incidentally, this is why you don't need revocation
certificates for individual subkeys.)

I'm glad we agree, because I didn't sleep so well and I see I'm making mistakes
:-D. The [1] in:

I suppose a system checking for ROCA might rightfully take offense at a subkey
revoked as "superseded" or "lost"[1], because with ROCA it is actually
"compromised".

should have been a footnote:

[1] Lachlan indicates "lost" is also treated as "signatures before revocation
date remain valid", but I haven't checked myself.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
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