[Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 2.2.8 released (CVE-2018-12020)
Juergen Bruckner
juergen at bruckner.tk
Sun Jun 10 19:25:16 CEST 2018
Hello Werner,
i Use Linux Mint 18.3 with GnuPG 2.1.11; which is the easiest way to
Update it to 2.2.8?
I'm pretty new to the Linux-World, but as far i know i have NOT included
a "own" GnuPG Repo in my Repo-List.
best regards
Juergen
Am 2018-06-08 um 15:40 schrieb Werner Koch:
> Hello!
>
> We are pleased to announce the availability of a new GnuPG release:
> version 2.2.8. This version fixes a critical security bug and comes
> with some other minor changes.
>
>
> Impact
> ======
>
> All current GnuPG versions are affected on all platforms.
>
> All mail clients and other applications which make use of GPG but are
> not utilizing the GPGME library might be affected.
>
> The OpenPGP protocol allows to include the file name of the original
> input file into a signed or encrypted message. During decryption and
> verification the GPG tool can display a notice with that file name. The
> displayed file name is not sanitized and as such may include line feeds
> or other control characters. This can be used inject terminal control
> sequences into the out and, worse, to fake the so-called status
> messages. These status messages are parsed by programs to get
> information from gpg about the validity of a signature and an other
> parameters. Status messages are created with the option "--status-fd N"
> where N is a file descriptor. Now if N is 2 the status messages and the
> regular diagnostic messages share the stderr output channel. By using a
> made up file name in the message it is possible to fake status messages.
> Using this technique it is for example possible to fake the verification
> status of a signed mail.
>
> Although GnuPG takes great care to sanitize all diagnostic and status
> output, the case at hand was missed but finally found and reported by
> Marcus Brinkmann. CVE-2018-12020 was assigned to this bug; GnuPG tracks
> it at <https://dev/gnupg.org/T4012>.
>
>
> Solution
> ========
>
> If your application uses GPGME your application is safe. Fortunately
> most modern mail readers use GPGME, including GpgOL and KMail. Mutt
> users should make sure to use "set crypt_use_gpgme".
>
> If you are parsing GnuPG status output and you use a dedicated file
> descriptor with --status-fd you are safe. A dedicated file descriptor
> is one that is not shared with the log output. The log output defaults
> to stderr (2) but may be a different if the option --logger-fd is used.
>
> If you are not using --verbose you are safe. But take care: --verbose
> might be specified in the config file. As a short term mitigation or if
> you can't immediately upgrade to the latest versions, you can add
> --no-verbose to the invocation of gpg.
>
> Another short term mitigation is to redirect the log output to a
> different file: For example "--log-file /dev/null".
>
> The suggested solution is to update to GnuPG 2.2.8 or a vendor provided
> update of their GnuPG version.
>
> To check whether the bug has been fixed you may use the simple test at
> the end of this mail [1].
>
>
> About GnuPG
> ===========
>
> The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is a complete and free implementation
> of the OpenPGP standard which is commonly abbreviated as PGP.
>
> GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a
> versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key
> directories. GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy
> integration with other applications. A wealth of frontend applications
> and libraries making use of GnuPG are available. As an Universal Crypto
> Engine GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to
> OpenPGP.
>
> GnuPG is Free Software (meaning that it respects your freedom). It can
> be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU
> General Public License.
>
>
> Noteworthy changes in version 2.2.8
> ===================================
>
> * gpg: Decryption of messages not using the MDC mode will now lead
> to a hard failure even if a legacy cipher algorithm was used. The
> option --ignore-mdc-error can be used to turn this failure into a
> warning. Take care: Never use that option unconditionally or
> without a prior warning.
>
> * gpg: The MDC encryption mode is now always used regardless of the
> cipher algorithm or any preferences. For testing --rfc2440 can be
> used to create a message without an MDC.
>
> * gpg: Sanitize the diagnostic output of the original file name in
> verbose mode. [#4012,CVE-2018-12020]
>
> * gpg: Detect suspicious multiple plaintext packets in a more
> reliable way. [#4000]
>
> * gpg: Fix the duplicate key signature detection code. [#3994]
>
> * gpg: The options --no-mdc-warn, --force-mdc, --no-force-mdc,
> --disable-mdc and --no-disable-mdc have no more effect.
>
> * agent: Add DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS and a few other envvars to the
> list of startup environment variables. [#3947]
>
>
> Getting the Software
> ====================
>
> Please follow the instructions found at <https://gnupg.org/download/> or
> read on:
>
> GnuPG 2.2.8 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
> direct from its primary FTP server. The list of mirrors can be found at
> <https://gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html>. Note that GnuPG is not
> available at ftp.gnu.org.
>
> The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature
> are available here:
>
> https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2 (6477k)
> https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2.sig
>
> An installer for Windows without any graphical frontend except for a
> very minimal Pinentry tool is available here:
>
> https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.8_20180608.exe (3916k)
> https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.8_20180608.exe.sig
>
> The source used to build the Windows installer can be found in the same
> directory with a ".tar.xz" suffix. A new Gpg4win installer featuring
> this version of GnuPG will be available soon.
>
>
> Checking the Integrity
> ======================
>
> In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
> install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
> the following ways:
>
> * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply
> verify the supplied signature. For example to verify the signature
> of the file gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2 you would use this command:
>
> gpg --verify gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2
>
> This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
> You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
> made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that
> this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint
> against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by
> checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys.
> See the end of this mail for information on the signing keys.
>
> * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have
> to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do
> this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the
> file gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2, you run the command like this:
>
> sha1sum gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2
>
> and check that the output matches the next line:
>
> d87553a125832ea90e8aeb3ceeecf24f88de56fb gnupg-2.2.8.tar.bz2
> 3126ec2b7005063cbff95792208796dfa42c2a22 gnupg-w32-2.2.8_20180608.tar.xz
> 231b29631647328934a35f8c6baa483e7594e26a gnupg-w32-2.2.8_20180608.exe
>
>
> Internationalization
> ====================
>
> This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese, Czech,
> French, German, Japanese, Norwegian, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost
> completely translated.
>
>
> Documentation and Support
> =========================
>
> If you used GnuPG in the past you should read the description of
> changes and new features at doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt or online at
>
> https://gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html
>
> The file gnupg.info has the complete reference manual of the system.
> Separate man pages are included as well but they miss some of the
> details availabale only in thee manual. The manual is also available
> online at
>
> https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/
>
> or can be downloaded as PDF at
>
> https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .
>
> The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how to
> set up the whole thing. You may also want to search the GnuPG mailing
> list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing list for advise on how
> to solve problems. Most of the new features are around for several
> years and thus enough public experience is available.
>
> Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
> reporting a bug: <https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
> We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
> of filing a bug at <https://bugs.gnupg.org>. If you need commercial
> support check out <https://gnupg.org/service.html>.
>
> If you are a developer and you need a certain feature for your project,
> please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing list for
> discussion.
>
>
> Thanks
> ======
>
> Maintenance and development of GnuPG is mostly financed by donations.
> The GnuPG project currently employs one full-time developer and one
> contractor. Both work exclusively on GnuPG and closely related software
> like Libgcrypt, GPGME, and GPA. We are planning to extend our team
> again and to help developers to improve integration of crypto in their
> applications.
>
> We have to thank all the people who helped the GnuPG project, be it
> testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
> servers, spreading the word, and answering questions on the mailing
> lists.
>
> Many thanks to our numerous financial supporters, both corporate and
> individuals. Without you it would not be possible to keep GnuPG in a
> good shape and address all the small and larger requests made by our
> users. Thanks.
>
>
> Happy hacking,
>
> Your GnuPG hackers
>
>
>
> p.s.
> This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to
> the gnupg-users'at'gnupg.org mailing list.
>
> p.p.s
> List of Release Signing Keys:
>
> To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by
> malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and
> binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of
> their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more
> of these four keys:
>
> rsa2048 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
> Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
> Werner Koch (dist sig)
>
> rsa2048 2014-10-29 [expires: 2019-12-31]
> Key fingerprint = 46CC 7308 65BB 5C78 EBAB ADCF 0437 6F3E E085 6959
> David Shaw (GnuPG Release Signing Key) <dshaw 'at' jabberwocky.com>
>
> rsa2048 2014-10-29 [expires: 2020-10-30]
> Key fingerprint = 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286 A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06
> NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe 'at' fsij.org>
>
> rsa3072 2017-03-17 [expires: 2027-03-15]
> Key fingerprint = 5B80 C575 4298 F0CB 55D8 ED6A BCEF 7E29 4B09 2E28
> Andre Heinecke (Release Signing Key)
>
> The keys are available at <https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html> and
> in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg .
> Note that this mail has been signed by a different key.
> ===========
>
> [1] If you want to test whether you are affected by this bug, remove the
> indentation from the following block
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
>
> jA0EBwMC1pW2pqoYvbXl0p4Bo5z/v7PXy7T1BY/KQxWaE9uTBRbf4no64/+5YYzX
> +BVNqP+82aBFYXEsD9x1vGuYwofQ4m/q/WcQDEPXhRyzU+4yiT3EOuG7sTTaQR3b
> 8xAn2Qtpyq5tO7k9CN6dasaXKSduXVmFUqzgU+W9WaTLOKNDFw6FYV3lnOoPtFcX
> rzhh2opkX9Oh/5DUkZ6YmUIX3j/A0z+59/qNO1i2hQ==
> =zswl
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
>
> and pass to this pipeline
>
> gpg --no-options -vd 2>&1 | grep '^\[GNUPG:] INJECTED'
>
> If you get some output you are using a non-fixed version.
>
>
>
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> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce
>
>
>
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> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
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>
--
Juergen M. Bruckner
juergen at bruckner.tk
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