Efail or OpenPGP is safer than S/MIME

[Robert J. Hansen]

> Argh, I meant to say 3DES of course, not MD5. Sorry.

It's worth noting, incidentally, the #Efail attack flat-out requires
MIME.  So inline PGP messages are not vulnerable, as there's no MIME
parsing pass which can be exploited.  So you're *still* safe, although
this is still a bug that should be fixed.  ;)

I can recreate the bug; I'll be bringing it up to Patrick soon.

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