What is the practical strength of DSA1024/Elgamal2048 (former GnuPG default)?

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

On 4/25/19 9:20 AM, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> Wikipedia points out a strong  sensitivity of the algorithm to the quality of 
> random number generators and that implementations could deliberately leak 
> information in the signature [3]. This alone probably is a reason to switch 
> keys.

This isn't really a major point given rfc6979 (
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979 ): Deterministic Usage of the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)


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Kristian Fiskerstrand
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