What is the practical strength of DSA1024/Elgamal2048 (former GnuPG default)?

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

On 30.08.2019 01:02, Brian Minton wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 11:19:15AM +0200, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> On 4/25/19 9:20 AM, Bernhard Reiter wrote:
>>> Wikipedia points out a strong  sensitivity of the algorithm to the quality of 
>>> random number generators and that implementations could deliberately leak 
>>> information in the signature [3]. This alone probably is a reason to switch 
>>> keys.
>> This isn't really a major point given rfc6979 (
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979 ): Deterministic Usage of the
>> Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
>> Algorithm (ECDSA)
>>
> Does GnuPG use deterministic DSA / ECDSA?
> 

Yes (at least for modern versions, iirc it was introduced in libgcrypt
1.6.0, but it has been used for 6 or so years)

-- 
----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
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