[Enigmail] Future OpenPGP Support in Thunderbird

Dmitry Alexandrov 321942 at gmail.com
Tue Oct 8 20:39:24 CEST 2019

"Hernâni Marques (p≡p foundation)" <hernani.marques at pep.foundation> wrote:
> On 08.10.19 18:37, Dmitry Alexandrov wrote:
>> Pity, but I hope it will be better that way.  In particular I hope, that Mozilla will not follow your example and won’t entice users to proprietary isolated keyserver [0] instead of distributed SKS network thus splitting the keybase.  And won’t promote standards [1] that suspiciously resemble embrace-extend-and-extinguish tactics employed against PGP either.
>> [0] https://keys.openpgp.org 
>> [1] https://pep.security
> pEp is not against PGP it's just PGP-supporting as much as it makes sense for interop reasons

Well, I’m glad to hear that, but it’s really a pity, that supporting Autocrypt does not make sense for you.

> and goes beyond email already today; and it's designed from the very beginning on to support other crypto[formats] as well (agnosticism on messaging & crypto[format])

A double pity in light of your decision to not only support but actually _prefer_ other cryptoformats over PGP whenever possible for the sake of ‘forward secrecy’ [1] — that’s when Autocrypt is exactly the extension to PGP that can provide forward secrecy, if needed.

| How does p≡p select the most secure way of sending an email or a message?
| When a p≡p user is communicating with another p≡p user:
| 1. if online communication available: OTR through GNUnet.
| 2. if online communication not available:
| a. if anonymizing platform available, OpenPGP through anonymizing platform (i.e. Qabel),
| b. if anonymizing platform not available, fallback to OpenPGP.
| When a p≡p user is communicating with a non-p≡p user then depending on the capabilities of the non-p≡p user:
| 1. if anonymizing and forward secrecy is possible, use that (i.e. OTR over GNUnet).
| 2. if anonymizing but no forward secrecy is possible, use that (i.e. OpenPGP over Qabel).
| 3. if forward secrecy is possible, use that (i.e. OTR).
| 4. if hard cryptography but no forward secrecy is possible, use that (i.e. OpenPGP)
| 5. if only weak cryptography is possible, use that (i.e. S/MIME with commercial CAs)
| 6. send unencrypted.
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