FAQ: seeking consensus

[Vincent Breitmoser]

> It would be nice if you can add to the keyserver list also the
> mailvelope.com keyserver,

I concur keys.mailvelope.com is a fine keyserver today. However, you might want
to consider:

> because it requires users to authenticate their keys against the keyserver
> with an received encrypted email

An "encrypted" verification email in no way, shape or form "authenticates"
a key any more than an unencrypted email.  It may seem like it should at first
glance, but it really doesn't if you think through the attack scenarios.

> and it also allows keeping third party signatures, compared to Hagrid.

This property also makes it susceptible to flooding attacks, and Mailvelope
doesn't make use of third party sigs itself.

I talked to Thomas (from Mailvelope) the other day, and he said he would either
want to make their implementation more abuse resistant (which I assume means
dropping third party sigs as well), or decommissioning it altogether in favor of
Hagrid.

Cheers

 - V