From 0x66726565 at gmail.com Tue Nov 2 16:05:30 2021 From: 0x66726565 at gmail.com (Tadeus Prastowo) Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 16:05:30 +0100 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys Message-ID: Hello, The signature on a Linux kernel can be verified successfully using `--auto-key-retrieve', but the signature on an Emacs cannot be verified in the same manner because gpg is unable to retrieve the needed public key automatically. The GPG version is 2.2.19 (libgcrypt 1.8.5, if that matters) as shipped by Ubuntu 20.04.3. I manage to locate only one post in the GnuPG mailing list archive with respect to this `--auto-key-retrieve' failure. But, as far as I can see it, the post has no response. Perhaps one of you can reproduce the problem by the following steps? 1. Test using Linux kernel. wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.11.tar.xz https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.11.tar.sign unxz < linux-5.11.tar.xz | gpg --keyserver hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:80 --auto-key-retrieve --verify linux-5.11.tar.sign - The output of the last command is as follows: gpg: Signature made Mon 15 Feb 2021 10:11:32 AM CET gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E gpg: requesting key 38DBBDC86092693E from hkp server keyserver.ubuntu.com gpg: key 38DBBDC86092693E: public key "Greg Kroah-Hartman " imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 gpg: Good signature from "Greg Kroah-Hartman " [unknown] gpg: aka "Greg Kroah-Hartman " [unknown] gpg: aka "Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux kernel stable release signing key) " [unknown] gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 647F 2865 4894 E3BD 4571 99BE 38DB BDC8 6092 693E 2. Test using Emacs. wget http://mirror.kumi.systems/gnu/emacs/emacs-27.2.tar.xz.sig http://mirror.kumi.systems/gnu/emacs/emacs-27.2.tar.xz cat emacs-27.2.tar.xz | gpg --keyserver hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:80 --auto-key-retrieve --verify emacs-27.2.tar.xz.sig - The output of the last command is as follows: gpg: Signature made Thu 25 Mar 2021 12:53:08 PM CET gpg: using RSA key 91C1262F01EB8D39 gpg: Can't check signature: No public key The key 0x91C1262F01EB8D39, however, can be retrieved manually just fine as shown below: gpg --keyserver hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:80 --recv-keys 0x91C1262F01EB8D39 gpg: key 91C1262F01EB8D39: public key "Eli Zaretskii (eliz) " imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 Any idea why the --auto-key-retrieve feature fails for some keys? Thank you. -- Best regards, Tadeus From 0x66726565 at gmail.com Tue Nov 2 17:01:18 2021 From: 0x66726565 at gmail.com (Tadeus Prastowo) Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 17:01:18 +0100 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 4:05 PM Tadeus Prastowo <0x66726565 at gmail.com> wrote: > > Hello, > > The signature on a Linux kernel can be verified successfully using > `--auto-key-retrieve', but the signature on an Emacs cannot be > verified in the same manner because gpg is unable to retrieve the > needed public key automatically. > > The GPG version is 2.2.19 (libgcrypt 1.8.5, if that matters) as > shipped by Ubuntu 20.04.3. I manage to locate only one post in the > GnuPG mailing list archive with respect to this `--auto-key-retrieve' > failure. But, as far as I can see it, the post has no response. The post in question is https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2019-October/062940.html > Perhaps one of you can reproduce the problem by the following steps? > > 1. Test using Linux kernel. > wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.11.tar.xz > https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/linux-5.11.tar.sign > unxz < linux-5.11.tar.xz | gpg --keyserver > hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:80 --auto-key-retrieve --verify > linux-5.11.tar.sign - > > The output of the last command is as follows: > gpg: Signature made Mon 15 Feb 2021 10:11:32 AM CET > gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E > gpg: requesting key 38DBBDC86092693E from hkp server keyserver.ubuntu.com > gpg: key 38DBBDC86092693E: public key "Greg Kroah-Hartman > " imported > gpg: Total number processed: 1 > gpg: imported: 1 > gpg: Good signature from "Greg Kroah-Hartman > " [unknown] > gpg: aka "Greg Kroah-Hartman " [unknown] > gpg: aka "Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux kernel stable > release signing key) " [unknown] > gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! > gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. > Primary key fingerprint: 647F 2865 4894 E3BD 4571 99BE 38DB BDC8 6092 693E > > 2. Test using Emacs. > wget http://mirror.kumi.systems/gnu/emacs/emacs-27.2.tar.xz.sig > http://mirror.kumi.systems/gnu/emacs/emacs-27.2.tar.xz > cat emacs-27.2.tar.xz | gpg --keyserver hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:80 > --auto-key-retrieve --verify emacs-27.2.tar.xz.sig - > > The output of the last command is as follows: > gpg: Signature made Thu 25 Mar 2021 12:53:08 PM CET > gpg: using RSA key 91C1262F01EB8D39 > gpg: Can't check signature: No public key > > The key 0x91C1262F01EB8D39, however, can be retrieved manually just > fine as shown below: > gpg --keyserver hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:80 --recv-keys 0x91C1262F01EB8D39 > gpg: key 91C1262F01EB8D39: public key "Eli Zaretskii (eliz) > " imported > gpg: Total number processed: 1 > gpg: imported: 1 > > Any idea why the --auto-key-retrieve feature fails for some keys? > > Thank you. > > -- > Best regards, > Tadeus From kloecker at kde.org Tue Nov 2 18:18:43 2021 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Tue, 02 Nov 2021 18:18:43 +0100 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5102619.cuLIY8HvmI@daneel> On Dienstag, 2. November 2021 16:05:30 CET Tadeus Prastowo via Gnupg-users wrote: > The signature on a Linux kernel can be verified successfully using > `--auto-key-retrieve', but the signature on an Emacs cannot be > verified in the same manner because gpg is unable to retrieve the > needed public key automatically. The important difference is: > gpg: Signature made Mon 15 Feb 2021 10:11:32 AM CET > gpg: using RSA key 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E -> fingerprint of signing key > gpg: requesting key 38DBBDC86092693E from hkp server keyserver.ubuntu.com > gpg: Signature made Thu 25 Mar 2021 12:53:08 PM CET > gpg: using RSA key 91C1262F01EB8D39 -> (long) key id of signing key > gpg: Can't check signature: No public key man gpg tells us: ===== --auto-key-retrieve --no-auto-key-retrieve These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local keyring. The default is --no- auto-key-retrieve. The order of methods tried to lookup the key is: [...] 5. If any keyserver is configured and the Issuer Fingerprint is part of the signature (since GnuPG 2.1.16), the con- figured keyservers are tried. ===== The signature on the Linux kernel contains the Issuer Fingerprint. The signature on Emacs doesn't (probably because a very old version of GnuPG is used to sign Emacs). Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 228 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Nov 2 18:34:16 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 02 Nov 2021 18:34:16 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: (Matthias Apitz's message of "Sat, 30 Oct 2021 15:50:21 +0200") References: Message-ID: <87mtmmqx5z.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sat, 30 Oct 2021 15:50, Matthias Apitz said: > I just withdraw the USB dongle after the operation. I was thinking that > the gpg-agent.conf entry 'max-cache-ttl' will also expire the unlocked > state of the OpenPGP card, which it does not. How could I do this? No, it does not because it is the decision of the card how long the VERIFY command send to the card allows the use of the key. For most cards and keys the keys are unlocked by VERIFY until the card is powered down. The OpenPGP cards allow to limit the VERIFY command for the first key to one signing operation ("forcesig" toggles this). As a workaround use "gpgconf --reload scdaemon" to power down the card. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gnupg-users at spodhuis.org Tue Nov 2 18:35:01 2021 From: gnupg-users at spodhuis.org (Phil Pennock) Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 13:35:01 -0400 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 2021-11-02 at 16:05 +0100, Tadeus Prastowo via Gnupg-users wrote: > The signature on a Linux kernel can be verified successfully using > `--auto-key-retrieve', but the signature on an Emacs cannot be > verified in the same manner because gpg is unable to retrieve the > needed public key automatically. > Any idea why the --auto-key-retrieve feature fails for some keys? % gpg --list-packets < emacs-27.2.tar.xz.sig # off=0 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=284 :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 91C1262F01EB8D39 version 4, created 1616673188, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00 digest algo 2, begin of digest 77 61 hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2021-03-25) subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 91C1262F01EB8D39) data: [2048 bits] % gpg --list-packets < linux-5.11.tar.sign # off=0 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=563 :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 38DBBDC86092693E version 4, created 1613380292, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00 digest algo 8, begin of digest dc ca hashed subpkt 33 len 21 (issuer fpr v4 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E) hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2021-02-15) subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 38DBBDC86092693E) data: [4096 bits] The shorter keyids are known to be spoofable if someone is willing to put enough effort into repeatedly generating keys. So I can well believe that without the full issuer fingerprint, gpg declines to automatically retrieve the key. The only key I can find for 91C1262F01EB8D39 claims to have been made in 2020 and yet is using SHA1 for the self-signature. That is worrying. -Phil From wk at gnupg.org Tue Nov 2 20:26:07 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 02 Nov 2021 20:26:07 +0100 Subject: What are the file in ~/.gnupg ? In-Reply-To: <20211029232040.b6v5wqudryinr2nx@dynein.local.incenp.org> (Damien Goutte-Gattat via Gnupg-users's message of "Sat, 30 Oct 2021 00:20:40 +0100") References: <20211029140411.niqb7apf35gh7y5b@aeredrenLaptop> <20211029232040.b6v5wqudryinr2nx@dynein.local.incenp.org> Message-ID: <87ilxaqrzk.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sat, 30 Oct 2021 00:20, Damien Goutte-Gattat said: > Private key only. I believe the purely ?mathematical? components of > the public key can be derived from it (though I may be wrong here), That is right. Since some releases we also record the creation date of the key so that we can easily derive the OpenPGP fingerprint. Without that creation time we would need to loop over all seconds since about 1997 to figure out the fingerprint. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From neal at walfield.org Tue Nov 2 21:21:13 2021 From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield) Date: Tue, 02 Nov 2021 21:21:13 +0100 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <87a6imb96u.wl-neal@walfield.org> On Tue, 02 Nov 2021 18:35:01 +0100, Phil Pennock via Gnupg-users wrote: > On 2021-11-02 at 16:05 +0100, Tadeus Prastowo via Gnupg-users wrote: > > The signature on a Linux kernel can be verified successfully using > > `--auto-key-retrieve', but the signature on an Emacs cannot be > > verified in the same manner because gpg is unable to retrieve the > > needed public key automatically. > > > Any idea why the --auto-key-retrieve feature fails for some keys? > > % gpg --list-packets < emacs-27.2.tar.xz.sig > # off=0 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=284 > :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 91C1262F01EB8D39 > version 4, created 1616673188, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00 > digest algo 2, begin of digest 77 61 > hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2021-03-25) > subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 91C1262F01EB8D39) > data: [2048 bits] > > % gpg --list-packets < linux-5.11.tar.sign > # off=0 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=563 > :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 38DBBDC86092693E > version 4, created 1613380292, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00 > digest algo 8, begin of digest dc ca > hashed subpkt 33 len 21 (issuer fpr v4 647F28654894E3BD457199BE38DBBDC86092693E) > hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2021-02-15) > subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 38DBBDC86092693E) > data: [4096 bits] > > The shorter keyids are known to be spoofable if someone is willing to > put enough effort into repeatedly generating keys. So I can well > believe that without the full issuer fingerprint, gpg declines to > automatically retrieve the key. This doesn't make sense to me. Sure, someone could do a second pre-image attack on a 64-bit key id. But, when gpg downloads the bad certificate and checks the signature, it will consider the signature bad. At that point, gpg could just throw the downloaded certificate away. But if the signature is good, then gpg can be certain that it has the right certificate for the signature. (Whether the certificate is authentic is another matter, of course.) :) Neal From 0x66726565 at gmail.com Wed Nov 3 04:38:54 2021 From: 0x66726565 at gmail.com (Tadeus Prastowo) Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2021 04:38:54 +0100 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys In-Reply-To: <5102619.cuLIY8HvmI@daneel> References: <5102619.cuLIY8HvmI@daneel> Message-ID: Hi Ingo! On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 6:42 PM Ingo Kl?cker wrote: [...] > The signature on the Linux kernel contains the Issuer Fingerprint. The > signature on Emacs doesn't (probably because a very old version of GnuPG is > used to sign Emacs). Thank you very much for giving me a throughout explanation on the matter. I really appreciate it. > Regards, > Ingo -- Best regards, Tadeus From 0x66726565 at gmail.com Wed Nov 3 04:41:51 2021 From: 0x66726565 at gmail.com (Tadeus Prastowo) Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2021 04:41:51 +0100 Subject: --auto-key-retrieve fails for some keys In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Phil! On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 7:23 PM Phil Pennock via Gnupg-users wrote: [...] > The only key I can find for 91C1262F01EB8D39 claims to have been made in > 2020 and yet is using SHA1 for the self-signature. That is worrying. Thank you very much for showing me the difference between the signature files as well as raising the issue. I will let the Emacs maintainer know. > -Phil -- Best regards, Tadeus From guru at unixarea.de Wed Nov 3 18:55:09 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2021 18:55:09 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: <87mtmmqx5z.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87mtmmqx5z.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: El d?a martes, noviembre 02, 2021 a las 06:34:16p. m. +0100, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users escribi?: > On Sat, 30 Oct 2021 15:50, Matthias Apitz said: > > > I just withdraw the USB dongle after the operation. I was thinking that > > the gpg-agent.conf entry 'max-cache-ttl' will also expire the unlocked > > state of the OpenPGP card, which it does not. How could I do this? > > No, it does not because it is the decision of the card how long the > VERIFY command send to the card allows the use of the key. For most > cards and keys the keys are unlocked by VERIFY until the card is powered > down. The OpenPGP cards allow to limit the VERIFY command for the first > key to one signing operation ("forcesig" toggles this). > > As a workaround use "gpgconf --reload scdaemon" to power down the card. > Thanks. As I will use the card in the phone mostly (only) with the pass command, i've added this to the script to get the card locked after any usage with pass: purism at pureos:~$ tail -8 /usr/bin/pass # power down the OpenPGP card # guru at unixarea.de # gpgconf --reload scdaemon sleep 2 exit 0 I have now my ~330 passwords always with me, encrypted with an OpenPGP card, and available without any laptop or USB dongel, just in my phone -- a big progress. Thanks to Purism to bring this with the L5 to the Linux world! matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From wk at gnupg.org Thu Nov 4 08:31:08 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 04 Nov 2021 08:31:08 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: (Matthias Apitz's message of "Wed, 3 Nov 2021 18:55:09 +0100") References: <87mtmmqx5z.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87v918ml6r.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Wed, 3 Nov 2021 18:55, Matthias Apitz said: > card, and available without any laptop or USB dongel, just in my phone -- a > big progress. Thanks to Purism to bring this with the L5 to the Linux world! You mean the Librem5 has indeed a second slot for a smartcard? I recently received mine but it is more or less unusable to me. It even comes w/o a bluetooth device - at least according to the warning notice I see - for things I can see because the network setting are not fully accessible. It is more or less a brick; the OpenMoko used to be better. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From guru at unixarea.de Thu Nov 4 09:40:40 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 09:40:40 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL Message-ID: El d?a jueves, noviembre 04, 2021 a las 08:31:08a. m. +0100, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users escribi?: > On Wed, 3 Nov 2021 18:55, Matthias Apitz said: > > > card, and available without any laptop or USB dongel, just in my phone -- a > > big progress. Thanks to Purism to bring this with the L5 to the Linux world! > > You mean the Librem5 has indeed a second slot for a smartcard? I > recently received mine but it is more or less unusable to me. It even > comes w/o a bluetooth device - at least according to the warning notice > I see - for things I can see because the network setting are not fully > accessible. It is more or less a brick; the OpenMoko used to be better. Hello Werner, I got mine in early October after exactly 4 years waiting. I do not share your opinions about the L5. I moved my 100++ contacts from the Ubuntu phone E4.5 to the L5 (which was a matter of seconds, export to VCF, SCP over and load; both use the same evolution database for storing them). I bought a SIM, have Internet via G4 on the road, or Wifi. Both do fine, Wifi with any access point until now. I can attach a Bluetooth keyboard with an integrated touchpad. Both work fine, see this foto: http://www.unixarea.de/l5-with-bt-keyboard.jpg The slot for the mini OpenPGP card in behind the battery, just pull the battery out and you will see. I bought the OpenPGP card from Purism for USD 15, I don't know if the small format exist here in Germany. Here you have a small video showing the card insert etc.: https://puri.sm/posts/openpgp-in-your-pocket/ And, I hacked together a Spanish OSK for the terminal app, because I write a lot in Spanish with a command line telegram client. I have and have had some Linux mobiles, also the OpenMoko. The Purism L5 is the most usefull until now for me. You see, I really don't share your opinion. The biggest problem until now is the duration of the battery of 8-10 hours, because the phone until now dows not suspend to RAM. They're working on it... matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From guru at unixarea.de Thu Nov 4 10:13:51 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 10:13:51 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: El d?a jueves, noviembre 04, 2021 a las 09:40:40a. m. +0100, Matthias Apitz escribi?: > ... > > I have and have had some Linux mobiles, also the OpenMoko. The > Purism L5 is the most usefull until now for me. You see, I really don't > share your opinion. The biggest problem until now is the duration of the > battery of 8-10 hours, because the phone until now dows not suspend to > RAM. They're working on it... > I forgot to add a joke. The L5 has 3 hardware kill switches, real kill switches, i.e. the power down is not done by software but by cutting the electrical power line of the respective chips: 1) the modem or 2) Wifi+Bluetooth or 3) cam+micro. When I did the first test voice calls to my family at home, nobody could hear me. Guess why :-) matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From andrewg at andrewg.com Thu Nov 4 10:45:57 2021 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 09:45:57 +0000 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6599ac74-11e5-1fc3-ae5a-ef15e2be48cf@andrewg.com> On 04/11/2021 08:40, Matthias Apitz wrote: > I bought the OpenPGP card from > Purism for USD 15, I don't know if the small format exist here in > Germany. Not Germany, but Cryptoshop in Vienna sells them: https://en.cryptoshop.com/products/smartcards/open-pgp-smartcard-v2-id-000.html -- Andrew Gallagher -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OpenPGP_signature Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 833 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From guru at unixarea.de Thu Nov 4 11:08:00 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 11:08:00 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: <6599ac74-11e5-1fc3-ae5a-ef15e2be48cf@andrewg.com> References: <6599ac74-11e5-1fc3-ae5a-ef15e2be48cf@andrewg.com> Message-ID: El d?a jueves, noviembre 04, 2021 a las 09:45:57a. m. +0000, Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-users escribi?: > On 04/11/2021 08:40, Matthias Apitz wrote: > > I bought the OpenPGP card from > > Purism for USD 15, I don't know if the small format exist here in > > Germany. > > Not Germany, but Cryptoshop in Vienna sells them: > > https://en.cryptoshop.com/products/smartcards/open-pgp-smartcard-v2-id-000.html > I have the above card for some years in an USB dongle. But the one which fits in the L5 is smaller: https://shop.puri.sm/shop/purism-openpgp-card/ matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From wk at gnupg.org Fri Nov 5 08:32:17 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 05 Nov 2021 08:32:17 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: (Matthias Apitz's message of "Thu, 4 Nov 2021 09:40:40 +0100") References: Message-ID: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hi Matthias, On Thu, 4 Nov 2021 09:40, Matthias Apitz said: > I got mine in early October after exactly 4 years waiting. I do not Same here. I actually met with Todd back then and my colleague Gniibe write the driver for their planned card reader. Then we had that long delay. it is good that things work for you. And thanks for the hint with the smartcard. I was probably blind that I didn't noticed it. I put an older card into the slot (cut down with a sharp wire cutter) but I have not seen the device. Even after an OS update there is still no Bluetooth device (regardless of the kill switch position) and the WLAN sometimes needs a reboot. I also wonder why there are no easy accessible teardown images - the long Youtube video is not very helpful because it shows obvious things, > I have and have had some Linux mobiles, also the OpenMoko. The > Purism L5 is the most usefull until now for me. You see, I really don't As long as you do not count the Jollas in. Purism's decision to write yet another software stack is highly questionable. IMHO they should have used the free stuff from SFOS and replace the proprietary UI using Qt instead of GTK+. That would have solved the battery problems instantly, Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From guru at unixarea.de Fri Nov 5 09:01:21 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 09:01:21 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: El d?a viernes, noviembre 05, 2021 a las 08:32:17a. m. +0100, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users escribi?: > it is good that things work for you. And thanks for the hint with the > smartcard. I was probably blind that I didn't noticed it. I put an > older card into the slot (cut down with a sharp wire cutter) but I have > not seen the device. Hello Werner, To get the OpenPGP card working, please follow the steps in my attachment OpenPGP-L5.txt. You must flash some firmware into the device. > Even after an OS update there is still no Bluetooth device (regardless > of the kill switch position) and the WLAN sometimes needs a reboot. I > also wonder why there are no easy accessible teardown images - the long > Youtube video is not very helpful because it shows obvious things, To solve the Bluetooth / WLAN problems, follow the steps here how to load again some other firmware. Esp. change also after this in the file /etc/modprobe.d/librem5-devkit.conf the value dev_oper_mode from 5 to 13 https://forums.puri.sm/t/bluetooth-support-for-librem-5/14965/45 Hope it helps matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... -------------- next part -------------- How to setup the OpenPGP card in the Purism L5 phone guru at unixarea.de, October 2021 https://puri.sm/posts/openpgp-in-your-pocket/ (includes video about inserting the card) https://source.puri.sm/angus.ainslie/ttxs-firmware/-/blob/purism/PURISM.md install and get the software: $ cd ~/guru $ sudo apt install stm32flash git $ git clone https://source.puri.sm/angus.ainslie/ttxs-firmware $ cd ttxs-firmware Upgrade the smart card reader firmware: $ ./scripts/stm_reflash.sh ... stm32flash 0.5 http://stm32flash.sourceforge.net/ Using Parser : Raw BINARY Interface serial_posix: 57600 8E1 Version : 0x31 Option 1 : 0x00 Option 2 : 0x00 Device ID : 0x0435 (STM32L43xxx/44xxx) - RAM : Up to 48KiB (12544b reserved by bootloader) - Flash : Up to 256KiB (size first sector: 1x2048) - Option RAM : 16b - System RAM : 28KiB Write to memory Erasing memory Wrote address 0x08002388 (100.00%) Done. And set up the smart card: $ ./scripts/smartcard_setup.sh There have been issues, see also: https://forums.puri.sm/t/openpgp-card-waiting-for-the-first-reader/15189 https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/OS-issues/-/issues/119 What helped was: # stty -F /dev/ttymxc2 raw cstopb -parenb cs8 115200 # pcscd -f --debug The startup of pcscd is to be configured here and start is via systemctl: # vim /lib/systemd/system/pcscd.service # systemctl status pcscd # systemctl stop pcscd # systemctl start pcscd Setting up the card $ gpg --card-status Reader ...........: TTXS serial 00 00 Application ID ...: D27600012401030400050000A6FE0000 Application type .: OpenPGP Version ..........: 3.4 Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl Serial number ....: 0000A6FE Name of cardholder: [not set] Language prefs ...: de Salutation .......: URL of public key : [not set] Login data .......: [not set] Signature PIN ....: forced Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048 Max. PIN lengths .: 64 64 64 PIN retry counter : 3 0 3 Signature counter : 0 KDF setting ......: off Signature key ....: [none] Encryption key....: [none] Authentication key: [none] General key info..: [none] $ gpg --change-pin # changed the PIN and Admin PIN $ gpg --card-edit # generated the keys $ export GNUPGHOME=/home/guru/.gnupg $ pass init 'CCID L5' Password store initialized for guru at unixarea.de $ pass insert -m test ... $ gpg --with-keygrip -K /home/purism/.gnupg/pubring.kbx ------------------------------- sec> rsa2048 2021-10-30 [SC] 336EB96892FE9FE7F6AD01D6529B7423F3608141 Keygrip = FCBA9E53DF1AF8D6E8D82B0418A01FA33264F704 Card serial no. = 0005 0000A6FE uid [ultimate] Matthias Apitz (GnuPG CCID L5) ssb> rsa2048 2021-10-30 [A] Keygrip = EE34E2B1F932D1567A6E21023F4D65B71CF953FF ssb> rsa2048 2021-10-30 [E] Keygrip = C544F16750F7F55DCEF781CF57C232015DDF1F90 the '>' means that these keys are on the card; export the pub key with: $ gpg --export --armor > ccid-L5-export-key-guru.pub lock the card again: $ gpgconf --reload scdaemon I added this to the pass cmd: $ tail -8 /usr/bin/pass # power down the OpenPGP card # guru at unixarea.de # gpgconf --reload scdaemon sleep 2 exit 0 so the card gets loecked again after each operation with the pass cmd. From guru at unixarea.de Fri Nov 5 17:30:48 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 17:30:48 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: Werner, I have an issue with the 'pinentry' in the L5: /usr/bin/pinentry is as default a symlink to /etc/alternatives/pinentry and pops up on the L5 as somekind graphical application, also when I use the OpenPGP card in the L5 when connected via SSH to the L5, which is not what I wanted have to key in the PIN in the L5 when im using it via SSH (and the L5 sits in some other room). That's why I changed the symlink to point to /usr/bin/pinentry-curses which works fine via SSH, i.e. the PIN is asked in the terminal where I run the SSH session. But, it does not work locally on the L5 in its "terminal app", the "pass" command in the terminal raises an error about no secret provided. The "pass" command is just a shell script and uses "gpg" to decrypt the file containing the requested password for some web access, running so,ething like: $GPG -d "${GPG_OPTS[@]}" "$passfile" What could be the reason for this? I tried /usr/bin/pinentry-curses in the "terminal app" which does work. matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From guru at unixarea.de Sat Nov 6 12:09:59 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Sat, 6 Nov 2021 12:09:59 +0100 Subject: BT -> mutt -> SMTP -> Wifi Message-ID: Hello Werner, This message is typed on a BT keyboard connected to the L5 and sent from mutt on the L5 via SMTP and Wifi to the list while sitting in the sun in a beergarden. Only a short example of useability of the L5 matthias From wk at gnupg.org Sun Nov 7 14:14:59 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2021 14:14:59 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: (Matthias Apitz's message of "Fri, 5 Nov 2021 17:30:48 +0100") References: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87ilx4gl9o.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Fri, 5 Nov 2021 17:30, Matthias Apitz said: > But, it does not work locally on the L5 in its "terminal app", the > "pass" command in the terminal raises an error about no secret provided. You did the gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye thing to tell gpg-agent where it shall pop up the pinentry? Further you can debug thing with adding "-v" to the gpg invocation or by letting gpg-agent create a debug file: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- log-file /foo/bar/gpg-agent.log verbose debug ipc debug-pinentry --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Or use log-file tcp://1.2.3.4:40711 and run "watchgnupg --tcp 40711" on the host with IP 1.2.3.4. Not TLS, so take care. But it is convenient to see what's going on. Thanks for your other mail on thenneed to flush the firmware for the BT device. I have not yet found the time to do that, though. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sun Nov 7 14:17:03 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2021 14:17:03 +0100 Subject: BT -> mutt -> SMTP -> Wifi In-Reply-To: (Matthias Apitz's message of "Sat, 6 Nov 2021 12:09:59 +0100") References: Message-ID: <87ee7sgl68.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sat, 6 Nov 2021 12:09, Matthias Apitz said: > This message is typed on a BT keyboard connected to the L5 and sent > from mutt on the L5 via SMTP and Wifi to the list while sitting > in the sun in a beergarden. Alright. I eventually need to figure out how to turn my Cosmo Communicator into a dump BT keyboard for the L5 ;-) Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From stuartl at longlandclan.id.au Mon Nov 8 05:45:53 2021 From: stuartl at longlandclan.id.au (Stuart Longland) Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 14:45:53 +1000 Subject: Using gpgsm+scute with p11tool Message-ID: <20211108144553.20f70b69@longlandclan.id.au> Hi all, I'm trying to get 2FA HTTP client authentication working with a YubiKey 5 hardware token at my workplace. I currently already have the YubiKey working successfully with GnuPG 2.2 in OpenPGP mode for two-factor SSH authentication and git code signing. Aside from a few niggles (like not being able to use two YubiKeys simultaneously, something GnuPG 2.3 should resolve if I can get it working right), things have been pretty smooth. I had `curl` working via OpenSC's PKCS#11 support, but this clashes with GnuPG, one must re-plug the YubiKey after accessing it via OpenSC, which gets annoying. It's been suggested I look at `scute` instead. The HTTP request I need to perform is this one: https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/auth/cert#via-the-api I tried using Firefox, it can see the certificate presented by `scute`, but it seems Vault isn't designed to authenticate clients that way as best I can tell. Using OpenSC PKCS#11, I can do something like this: $ curl -E 'pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=piv_II;serial=;token=;id=%07;object=;type=cert' --insecure --data '{"name": "me"}' https://tls.server.example.com:8200/v1/auth/cert/login I can see what tokens exist with `p11tool`: $ p11tool --provider=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opensc-pkcs11.so --list-tokens Token 0: URL: pkcs11:model=;token=PIV_II Label: PIV_II Type: Hardware token Flags: RNG, Requires login Manufacturer: piv_II Model: Serial: Module: If I try doing the same with `scute`, I get nothing: $ p11tool --provider=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/scute.so --list-tokens Consequently, I have no idea what hardware token URI to supply to `curl` when authenticating. Is there some trick needed to get `scute` to tell me what tokens are present or how to find out what the URL of my private key is? Regards, -- Stuart Longland (aka Redhatter, VK4MSL) I haven't lost my mind... ...it's backed up on a tape somewhere. From guru at unixarea.de Mon Nov 8 11:18:37 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:18:37 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: <87ilx4gl9o.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <87ilx4gl9o.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: El d?a domingo, noviembre 07, 2021 a las 02:14:59p. m. +0100, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users escribi?: > On Fri, 5 Nov 2021 17:30, Matthias Apitz said: > > > But, it does not work locally on the L5 in its "terminal app", the > > "pass" command in the terminal raises an error about no secret provided. > > You did the > > gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye > > thing to tell gpg-agent where it shall pop up the pinentry? Further > ... Thanks for the hints. Magically it works now by its own after adding this to the ~purism/.bashrc (the terminal app does not source .profile). In a SSH session a 'pass test' asks now inline for the PIN and in the terminal app some Gnome window pops up. See also: https://forums.puri.sm/t/terminal-app-purism-profile/15325 Maybe you want subscribe to this forum (if not already done). It's a pity that Purism uses a "forum" and not a standard mailing-list :-( matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From christoph-klassen at mail.de Mon Nov 8 16:54:35 2021 From: christoph-klassen at mail.de (Christoph Klassen) Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 16:54:35 +0100 Subject: make check -> libgcrypt is too old Message-ID: <9a4bf613-a54a-a16d-1b69-cee4583cb49c@mail.de> Hello everyone, I was trying to build GnuPG 2.3.3. For that reason I downloaded and built npth 1.6, libgpg-error 1.43, libgcrypt 1.9.4, libksba 1.6.0 and libassuan 2.5.5 (in this order). Then I started the build process for GnuPG with ./configure and make && make check. One test failed, saying: "t-recsel: Fatal: libgcrypt is too old (need 1.9.1, have 1.8.8)". Can you please help me? Greetings, Christoph From ostroffjh at users.sourceforge.net Mon Nov 8 17:28:37 2021 From: ostroffjh at users.sourceforge.net (Jack) Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2021 11:28:37 -0500 Subject: make check -> libgcrypt is too old In-Reply-To: <9a4bf613-a54a-a16d-1b69-cee4583cb49c@mail.de> Message-ID: On 2021.11.08 10:54, Christoph Klassen via Gnupg-users wrote: > > I was trying to build GnuPG 2.3.3. For that reason I downloaded and > built npth 1.6, libgpg-error 1.43, libgcrypt 1.9.4, libksba 1.6.0 and > libassuan 2.5.5 (in this order). Then I started the build process for > GnuPG with ./configure and make && make check. One test failed, > saying: "t-recsel: Fatal: libgcrypt is too old (need 1.9.1, have > 1.8.8)". Did that happen during ./configure or during make check? In either case, I would check for any left-over remnants of an older install of libgcrypt, such as a stray pkcgonfig file. From christoph-klassen at mail.de Mon Nov 8 20:30:35 2021 From: christoph-klassen at mail.de (Christoph Klassen) Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 20:30:35 +0100 Subject: make check -> libgcrypt is too old In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 08.11.21 17:28, Jack via Gnupg-users wrote: > In either case, I would check for any left-over remnants of an older > install of libgcrypt, such as a stray pkcgonfig file. I didn't think of old installations, but that was the right clue. On my system the package libgcrypt20 was installed (from the debian repos). The solution was to run first dpkg --purge --force-all libgcrypt20 (couldn't remove it the normal way because of some dependencies). Then I could build GnuPG without errors. But at least one application didn't work, so I reinstalled libgcrypt20. Now both, GnuPG and the other application work and everything is fine! From keine-eile at e-mail.de Tue Nov 9 15:28:27 2021 From: keine-eile at e-mail.de (Keine Eile) Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 15:28:27 +0100 Subject: gpg: Note: secret key [...] expired... Message-ID: <7a3830aa-da78-4845-5568-993bdfed7fa9@e-mail.de> Hi list members, I have a revoked private key in my key ring, which I replaced with new one. I really do not want to discard this old key, for what I think good reasons. Is there a way to let gpg ignore this key or suppress this this? notification? 1) > gpg: Note: secret key [KeyID] expired at [Some day in September] > gpg: Note: key has been revoked From wk at gnupg.org Tue Nov 9 17:30:43 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 09 Nov 2021 17:30:43 +0100 Subject: Too many open files caused by repeated decryption operations via a GPGME API In-Reply-To: (Kazunori Kobayashi's message of "Fri, 29 Oct 2021 16:24:57 +0900") References: Message-ID: <87fss59tqk.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Fri, 29 Oct 2021 16:24, Kazunori Kobayashi said: > On modern Linux, we can change the maximum number of file descriptors > per process in some ways. This feature is a well-known way for long > time operation without reboot in cases such as server machines. That is a known problem we recently raise the priority of the feature request https://dev.gnupg.org/T2385 to high. Thus there is a good chance that this problem will be solved in the not too distant future. > https://github.com/gpg/gpgme/blob/gpgme-1.10.0/src/posix-io.c#L673 Please don't refer to github for gnupg; their copy is out of date. Use our https://dev.gnupg.org instead. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From kloecker at kde.org Tue Nov 9 21:18:40 2021 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Tue, 09 Nov 2021 21:18:40 +0100 Subject: gpg: Note: secret key [...] expired... In-Reply-To: <7a3830aa-da78-4845-5568-993bdfed7fa9@e-mail.de> References: <7a3830aa-da78-4845-5568-993bdfed7fa9@e-mail.de> Message-ID: <2242368.CTkG5fTKkS@breq> On Dienstag, 9. November 2021 15:28:27 CET Keine Eile wrote: > I have a revoked private key in my key ring, which I replaced with new one. > I really do not want to discard this old key, for what I think good > reasons. Is there a way to let gpg ignore this key or suppress this this? > notification? > > > gpg: Note: secret key [KeyID] expired at [Some day in September] > > gpg: Note: key has been revoked As far as I could see in the source code, this is always printed when you decrypt something that was encrypted for this key. There is no option to suppress this except maybe by suppressing all informational messages. --quiet may help. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 195 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From dgouttegattat at incenp.org Tue Nov 9 23:07:26 2021 From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat) Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 22:07:26 +0000 Subject: Using gpgsm+scute with p11tool In-Reply-To: <20211108144553.20f70b69@longlandclan.id.au> References: <20211108144553.20f70b69@longlandclan.id.au> Message-ID: <20211109220726.5gsdna2p4qpgcbco@dynein.local.incenp.org> Hi, On Mon, Nov 08, 2021 at 02:45:53PM +1000, Stuart Longland via Gnupg-users wrote: >The HTTP request I need to perform is this one: >https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/auth/cert#via-the-api > >I tried using Firefox, it can see the certificate presented by `scute`, >but it seems Vault isn't designed to authenticate clients that way as >best I can tell. As long as the server allows certificate-based client authentication, it shouldn?t matter to the server that you are using Scute (or any other way to store your certificate) at your end. However, usage of Scute + Firefox seems broken with TLS 1.3. In my case, it works perfectly fine if I force Firefox to use TLS 1.2 (security.tls.version.max = 3 in about:config), but systematically fails when TLS 1.3 is enabled. I am not sure about the root cause of the failure with TLS 1.3, or even if the root cause is in Scute itself or in Firefox. Could you try temporarily disable TLS 1.3 and try again? If it works with TLS 1.2 only, this would suggest you are running into the same problem as me. >If I try doing the same with `scute`, I get nothing: > >$ p11tool --provider=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/scute.so --list-tokens > >Consequently, I have no idea what hardware token URI to supply to >`curl` when authenticating. > >Is there some trick needed to get `scute` to tell me what tokens are >present or how to find out what the URL of my private key is? I would need to look at how is p11tool generating its output, but I suspect it may be using some PKCS#11 functions that Scute does not currently implement. - Damien -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 228 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Wed Nov 10 08:13:18 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 08:13:18 +0100 Subject: make check -> libgcrypt is too old In-Reply-To: (Christoph Klassen via Gnupg-users's message of "Mon, 8 Nov 2021 20:30:35 +0100") References: Message-ID: <874k8ka3g1.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021 20:30, Christoph Klassen said: > repos). The solution was to run first dpkg --purge --force-all > libgcrypt20 (couldn't remove it the normal way because of some Not a good idea. That may break things. It is better to install libgcrypt and the other libs to /user/local/lib and then set LD_LIBRARY_PATH accordingly (or fix search order in ld.so.conf). > one application didn't work, so I reinstalled libgcrypt20. Now both, Libgcrypt 1.9 is compatible to 1.8 but not vice versa. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Wed Nov 10 08:22:15 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 08:22:15 +0100 Subject: gpg: Note: secret key [...] expired... In-Reply-To: <7a3830aa-da78-4845-5568-993bdfed7fa9@e-mail.de> (Keine Eile's message of "Tue, 9 Nov 2021 15:28:27 +0100") References: <7a3830aa-da78-4845-5568-993bdfed7fa9@e-mail.de> Message-ID: <87zgqc8ogo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Tue, 9 Nov 2021 15:28, Keine Eile said: > I have a revoked private key in my key ring, which I replaced with new > one. I really do not want to discard this old key, for what I think > good reasons. Is there a way to let gpg ignore this key or suppress > this this? notification? You can delete your old key from the keyring. However, you would also lose the ability to decrypt old messages. Thus in general not a good idea. >> gpg: Note: secret key [KeyID] expired at [Some day in September] >> gpg: Note: key has been revoked We can't suppress the latter diagnostic because that is an important information. The former diagnostic is also of some interest. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: From keine-eile at e-mail.de Wed Nov 10 08:05:48 2021 From: keine-eile at e-mail.de (Keine Eile) Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 08:05:48 +0100 Subject: gpg: Note: secret key [...] expired... In-Reply-To: <2242368.CTkG5fTKkS@breq> References: <7a3830aa-da78-4845-5568-993bdfed7fa9@e-mail.de> <2242368.CTkG5fTKkS@breq> Message-ID: <06c9c006-3c63-cdd0-0259-d357f410468d@e-mail.de> Thanks for pointing that out > As far as I could see in the source code, this is always printed when you > decrypt something that was encrypted for this key.[...] Some times is is so simple, just own stupidity. From ineiev at gnu.org Wed Nov 10 18:26:47 2021 From: ineiev at gnu.org (Ineiev) Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 17:26:47 +0000 Subject: make check -> libgcrypt is too old In-Reply-To: <874k8ka3g1.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <874k8ka3g1.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20211110172647.GA27080@manas> On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 08:13:18AM +0100, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users wrote: > > Not a good idea. That may break things. It is better to install > libgcrypt and the other libs to /user/local/lib and then set > LD_LIBRARY_PATH accordingly (or fix search order in ld.so.conf). make install usually says, > Libraries have been installed in: ... > If you ever happen to want to link against installed libraries > in a given directory, LIBDIR, you must either use libtool, and > specify the full pathname of the library, or use the `-LLIBDIR' > flag during linking and do at least one of the following: > - add LIBDIR to the `LD_LIBRARY_PATH' environment variable > during execution > - add LIBDIR to the `LD_RUN_PATH' environment variable > during linking > - use the `-Wl,-rpath -Wl,LIBDIR' linker flag > - have your system administrator add LIBDIR to `/etc/ld.so.conf' > > See any operating system documentation about shared libraries for > more information, such as the ld(1) and ld.so(8) manual pages. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 488 bytes Desc: not available URL: From kkobayashi at edgematrix.com Thu Nov 11 02:35:34 2021 From: kkobayashi at edgematrix.com (Kazunori Kobayashi) Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 10:35:34 +0900 Subject: Too many open files caused by repeated decryption operations via a GPGME API In-Reply-To: <87fss59tqk.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87fss59tqk.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: On 2021/11/10 1:30, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 29 Oct 2021 16:24, Kazunori Kobayashi said: > >> On modern Linux, we can change the maximum number of file descriptors >> per process in some ways. This feature is a well-known way for long >> time operation without reboot in cases such as server machines. > That is a known problem we recently raise the priority of the feature > request https://dev.gnupg.org/T2385 to high. Thus there is a good > chance that this problem will be solved in the not too distant future. > >> https://github.com/gpg/gpgme/blob/gpgme-1.10.0/src/posix-io.c#L673 > Please don't refer to github for gnupg; their copy is out of date. Use > our https://dev.gnupg.org instead. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > I appreciate your reply and I'll watch the issue tracker you told me. I hope that this issue will be improved soon. Kazunori -- Kazunori Kobayashi EDGEMATRIX Inc. https://edgematrix.com From guru at unixarea.de Fri Nov 12 11:15:07 2021 From: guru at unixarea.de (Matthias Apitz) Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 11:15:07 +0100 Subject: OpenPGP card and gpg-agent TTL In-Reply-To: References: <87k0hnjbwe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <87ilx4gl9o.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: El d?a lunes, noviembre 08, 2021 a las 11:18:37a. m. +0100, Matthias Apitz escribi?: > > You did the > > > > gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye > > > > thing to tell gpg-agent where it shall pop up the pinentry? Further > > ... > > Thanks for the hints. Magically it works now by its own after adding > this to the ~purism/.bashrc (the terminal app does not source .profile). > > In a SSH session a 'pass test' asks now inline for the PIN and in the > terminal app some Gnome window pops up. Re/ pinentry there is even more inteligent "magic": The available pinentry pgms are: purism at pureos:~$ which pinentry /usr/bin/pinentry purism at pureos:~$ ls -l /usr/bin/pinentry lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 26 Nov 5 18:05 /usr/bin/pinentry -> /etc/alternatives/pinentry purism at pureos:~$ ls -l /etc/alternatives/pinentry lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 24 Sep 11 08:25 /etc/alternatives/pinentry -> /usr/bin/pinentry-gnome3 purism at pureos:~$ ls -l /usr/bin/pinentr* lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 26 Nov 5 18:05 /usr/bin/pinentry -> /etc/alternatives/pinentry -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 59848 May 8 2020 /usr/bin/pinentry-curses -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 72136 May 8 2020 /usr/bin/pinentry-gnome3 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 30 Sep 11 08:25 /usr/bin/pinentry-x11 -> /etc/alternatives/pinentry-x11 And when the PIN is needed in a SSH session, then the PIN is asked in the SSH session with: ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ? Please unlock the card ? ? ? ? Number: 0005 0000A6FE ? ? Holder: Matthias Apitz ? ? ? ? PIN ________________________________________ ? ? ? ? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? *when* the L5 is locked, when the L5 is not locked the PIN is asked on its screen with the /usr/bin/pinentry-gnome3. Nice! matthias -- Matthias Apitz, ? guru at unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ +49-176-38902045 Public GnuPG key: http://www.unixarea.de/key.pub August 13, 1961: Better a wall than a war. And, while the GDR was still existing, no German troups and bombs have been killed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Afrika... From tlikonen at iki.fi Tue Nov 16 17:20:51 2021 From: tlikonen at iki.fi (Teemu Likonen) Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 18:20:51 +0200 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email Message-ID: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> I have seen a couple of new OpenPGP keys which have only email addresses as user id's. No person's name at all. I also noticed that Notmuch Emacs email client was changed in recent months so that it shows only signer's email when the signature is verified with a valid key, even if key's user id's have person's name. Am I seeing a starting trend here? Do some people think that it is better practice to have only have email address as user id? What might be their reason? Or maybe it's not a trend and doesn't mean anything. I got curious anyway. Add your speculation. :-) -- /// Teemu Likonen - .-.. https://www.iki.fi/tlikonen/ // OpenPGP: 6965F03973F0D4CA22B9410F0F2CAE0E07608462 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 434 bytes Desc: not available URL: From andrewg at andrewg.com Tue Nov 16 18:06:02 2021 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 17:06:02 +0000 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> Message-ID: On Tue, 2021-11-16 at 18:20 +0200, Teemu Likonen wrote: > Am I seeing a starting trend here? Do some people think that it is > better practice to have only have email address as user id? What > might be their reason? Or maybe it's not a trend and doesn't mean > anything. I got curious anyway. Add your speculation. :-) When selecting a key for either encryption or verification purposes, only the email address part is meaningful. "John Smith " and "John David Smith (work email) " are functionally equivalent. The "Real Name" and "Comment" portions of the userID are mere conventions and, if you have an address book, entirely redundant. It is reasonable therefore to take the view that the non-email portion of a userID is cruft at best (and an unnecessary leakage of personal information at worst). A -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 862 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From stefan.vasilev at posteo.ru Wed Nov 17 00:17:58 2021 From: stefan.vasilev at posteo.ru (=?UTF-8?Q?=D0=A1=D1=82=D0=B5=D1=84=D0=B0=D0=BD_=D0=92=D0=B0=D1=81?= =?UTF-8?Q?=D0=B8=D0=BB=D1=8C=D0=B5=D0=B2?=) Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 23:17:58 +0000 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key Message-ID: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> Hello, According to an article on the German site golem.de[1] Germany's BSI[2] had sent its private key instead of it's public key to a user via email, who requested its public key. I am only familiar with GnuPG command line usage and assume that they may use a GUI based program or add-on for an MUA. My question is what can cause this, let's say if you have a busy and stressful day and would accidentally carry out such operation, as security professional knowing such a cryptographic tool for a long time, I assume. If this can happen to professionals then it would tell me that there is a design flaw in the software used. Because this german article does not go into details, has someone of you more details on how this happened? Regards Stefan [1] https://www.golem.de/news/verschluesselung-bsi-verschickt-privaten-pgp-schluessel-2111-161073.html [2] https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Home/home_node.html From christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au Wed Nov 17 02:20:27 2021 From: christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au (Christian Heinrich) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 12:20:27 +1100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> Message-ID: Stefan, On Wed, 17 Nov 2021 at 11:47, ?????? ???????? via Gnupg-users wrote: > If this can happen to professionals then it would > tell me that there is a design flaw in the software > used. https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/r887.html is explicit that it will "export-secret-keys" I haven't confirmed the fingerprint of every Public Key they made available for download on their web pages but it may have just been one Private Key that was compromised rather than many Public Keys but if want use their search function on their web page with "PGP Fingerprint" and "GPG Fingerprint"? -- Regards, Christian Heinrich http://cmlh.id.au/contact From keine-eile at e-mail.de Wed Nov 17 14:26:32 2021 From: keine-eile at e-mail.de (Keine Eile) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 14:26:32 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> Message-ID: <23e87032-3c79-427c-f40f-decdd42e30f2@e-mail.de> Am 17.11.21 um 00:17 schrieb ?????? ???????? via Gnupg-users: [...] > My question is what can cause this, let's say if you > have a busy and stressful day and would accidentally > carry out such operation, as security professional > knowing such a cryptographic tool for a long time, > I assume. > > If this can happen to professionals then it would > tell me that there is a design flaw in the software > used. [...] The folks working at the BSI are -for the most- not professional technicians, they are administrative officers. Don't believe there are a lot of people working, who know much about cryptography. Or how a command line gnupg works. From keine-eile at e-mail.de Wed Nov 17 14:33:49 2021 From: keine-eile at e-mail.de (Keine Eile) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 14:33:49 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <23e87032-3c79-427c-f40f-decdd42e30f2@e-mail.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <23e87032-3c79-427c-f40f-decdd42e30f2@e-mail.de> Message-ID: <6b49d17c-3088-eccb-aa27-14cb8285c131@e-mail.de> Actually, there is a post in the forum Golem article, how this really happened: t.ly/1n0V From bernhard at intevation.de Wed Nov 17 15:59:39 2021 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 15:59:39 +0100 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> Message-ID: <202111171559.45185.bernhard@intevation.de> Am Dienstag 16 November 2021 18:06:02 schrieb Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-users: > On Tue, 2021-11-16 at 18:20 +0200, Teemu Likonen wrote: > > Am I seeing a starting trend here? Do some people think that it is > > better practice to have only have email address as user id? Some email providers offering pubkeys via WKD only accept email-only uids, see the policy flag "mailbox-only" in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service/13/ > It is reasonable therefore to take the view that the non-email portion > of a userID is cruft at best (and an unnecessary leakage of personal > information at worst). There are two potential problems here: a) usability in case of deliberately missleading information madam president b) abuse prevention and responsibility on case of illegal information Mr X is an XXX he lives at Drowning Street YY However an email provider can exclude those ab-use-cases in their terms of service with their users and hold them responsible in case of violation. So it is still okay to use uids which are no email addresses or some uids with more or other information. Just do not expect other services to carry this information, do not fully trust them (just like you do not trust pubkeys by default) and be prepared to take responsibility for the contents you are transmitting. Best Regards, Bernhard -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard ? +49 541 33 508 3-3 Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, DE; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Gesch?ftsf?hrer Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From bernhard at intevation.de Wed Nov 17 16:18:15 2021 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 16:18:15 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> Message-ID: <202111171618.21731.bernhard@intevation.de> Am Mittwoch 17 November 2021 00:17:58 schrieb ?????? ???????? via Gnupg-users: > According to an article on the German site golem.de[1] > Germany's BSI[2] had sent its private key instead of > it's public key to a user via email, who requested its > public key. > https://www.golem.de/news/verschluesselung-bsi-verschickt-privaten-pgp-schluessel-2111-161073.html The article says that is was one private key, password encrypted for one email address (probably a functional address for a team). I have no further information on the incident, and know of no MUA or GUI that makes attaching private key material to an email easy. The most likely scenario would be, that there was a private key in a file somewhere on the system that could be attached to an email manually. As GnuPG itself uses a directory clearly named like .gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/, there is a good chance that it was an exported private key named differently. The BSI says to have 1400 employees, so not all of them will be technical security experts, they were growing a lot. The BSI increasingly seems to use OpenPGP/MIME instead of S/MIME and is getting more accessible this way for encrypted email exchange. Overall a good case for using more WKD in the client and the server, where the pubkey would have been transfered automatically with some basic trust and no need for a manual email attachment. Best Regards, Bernhard -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard ? +49 541 33 508 3-3 Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, DE; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Gesch?ftsf?hrer Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From tlikonen at iki.fi Wed Nov 17 15:40:46 2021 From: tlikonen at iki.fi (Teemu Likonen) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 16:40:46 +0200 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> Message-ID: <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> * 2021-11-16 17:06:02+0000, Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-users wrote: > The "Real Name" and "Comment" portions of the userID are mere > conventions and, if you have an address book, entirely redundant. Thanks. That is rather technical point of view and correct in that sense. In my opinion it is a bit too nerdy because real names are convenient for other people. For example, I have to address books: 1. Actual address books for people, their home addresses, phone numbers and emails. None of these people have OpenPGP key. 2. Second "address book" is my OpenPGP keyring. It groups persons' names, their email and other key data. If many keys don't have name in their user id it could be inconvenience. Computer programs can find keys but often we need also manual "gpg -k" etc. Real names help there. (I understand that some people need to protect their identity and use some random strings in user id's. That is completely different from usual public communication.) But this is nothing important. Key's owner decides. -- /// Teemu Likonen - .-.. https://www.iki.fi/tlikonen/ // OpenPGP: 6965F03973F0D4CA22B9410F0F2CAE0E07608462 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 434 bytes Desc: not available URL: From andrewg at andrewg.com Wed Nov 17 18:11:30 2021 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 17:11:30 +0000 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> Message-ID: <1e1d5c25-094b-2d94-828f-5fef2e862cca@andrewg.com> On 17/11/2021 14:40, Teemu Likonen wrote: > 2. Second "address book" is my OpenPGP keyring. It groups persons' > names, their email and other key data. If many keys don't have name > in their user id it could be inconvenience. Computer programs can > find keys but often we need also manual "gpg -k" etc. Real names > help there. It may sound like a nerdy quibble, but it's a fundamental weakness. Mapping a "Real Name" to an email address is a conceptually different thing from mapping an email address to a public key. Conflating the two introduces confusion about what exactly is being verified by the cryptographic toolchain. If an MUA's address book is not sufficiently user-friendly, then that's a user interface shortcoming that can't be fixed by introducing RFC-822 "Real Names", which were highly questionable long before email encryption was invented... -- Andrew Gallagher -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OpenPGP_signature Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 833 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Nov 17 19:15:17 2021 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 13:15:17 -0500 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: <1e1d5c25-094b-2d94-828f-5fef2e862cca@andrewg.com> References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> <1e1d5c25-094b-2d94-828f-5fef2e862cca@andrewg.com> Message-ID: <2d37f64f51ccf0d46b5b8c8796daf50a@sixdemonbag.org> > Mapping a "Real Name" to an email address is a conceptually different > thing from mapping an email address to a public key. Except that should we be mapping keys to email addresses in the first place? When we sign a certificate we make an assertion that this cryptographic material is controlled by this entity. I control the cryptographic material associated with certificate 0x1DCBDC01B44427C7. rjh at sixdemonbag.org controls nothing -- it's just one of several places I pick up mail. I have long considered mapping keys to email addresses to be a fundamental flaw. It obscures exactly what it is we're trying to assert: that cryptographic material is controlled by *people*. From andrewg at andrewg.com Wed Nov 17 20:04:57 2021 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 19:04:57 +0000 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: <2d37f64f51ccf0d46b5b8c8796daf50a@sixdemonbag.org> References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> <1e1d5c25-094b-2d94-828f-5fef2e862cca@andrewg.com> <2d37f64f51ccf0d46b5b8c8796daf50a@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <76b44a5b-6b4c-afdf-bcbd-64f747687ed6@andrewg.com> On 17/11/2021 18:15, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> Mapping a "Real Name" to an email address is a conceptually different >> thing from mapping an email address to a public key. > > Except that should we be mapping keys to email addresses in the first > place? > > When we sign a certificate we make an assertion that this cryptographic > material is controlled by this entity.? I control the cryptographic > material associated with certificate 0x1DCBDC01B44427C7. > rjh at sixdemonbag.org controls nothing -- it's just one of several places > I pick up mail. A cryptographic signature does not attest that anything belongs to you, the meatspace person - it merely attests a relationship between some cryptographic material and a particular identifier. The interpretation of the identifier is context-dependent and highly subjective. If I want to send an email to you, I have to identify you to my MUA. If I want to encrypt it, I have to ask the MUA to associate the identifier I just gave it with a key. I either select your name from an address book (in which case the unique ID is your email address) or I type in your email address by hand. It doesn't matter how many other identifiers (emails, post boxes, passport numbers) you have - from my POV, and that of my MUA, they are irrelevant because they don't let me identify you any more precisely than I already can with just one. The cryptographic binding is always between key material and a machine-readable identifier. This identifier may or may not be globally unique, but it should be unique in the context of the system within which it is used (e.g. my MUA). The mapping of contextual identifiers onto meatspace is a philosophical question that is beyond the reasoning capability of a computer, and the ability of natural persons to assume and discard identifiers is a feature, not a bug. > I have long considered mapping keys to email addresses to be a > fundamental flaw.? It obscures exactly what it is we're trying to > assert: that cryptographic material is controlled by *people*. Some cryptographic material is created, used and destroyed without any human interaction whatsoever, e.g. TLS session keys. The session key is signed by the server key to state "this session key is controlled by me" (i.e. the server). The server may be controlled by an organisation, and the organisation by people (or the people by the organisation, depending on your point of view!). The point being that there are many layers of abstraction between the cryptographic material and a natural person. Software can only make and test claims about some of those layers at best, and some of those layers may not even be meaningful to the end user, depending on the context. -- Andrew Gallagher -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OpenPGP_signature Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 833 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From stuartl at longlandclan.id.au Wed Nov 17 23:49:53 2021 From: stuartl at longlandclan.id.au (Stuart Longland) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 08:49:53 +1000 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> Message-ID: <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> On Tue, 16 Nov 2021 23:17:58 +0000 ?????? ???????? via Gnupg-users wrote: > [1] > https://www.golem.de/news/verschluesselung-bsi-verschickt-privaten-pgp-schluessel-2111-161073.html Is there an English translation of this article somewhere? I never learned German beyond what made its way into the English language or what I might've picked up from episodes of 'Allo 'Allo or Hogan's Heroes? If I go to the link, I get a rather large pop-up dialogue which doesn't look much like an article at all. Throw the thing at Google Translate, and the JavaScript on the page re-directs me back to the original page in German. -- Stuart Longland (aka Redhatter, VK4MSL) I haven't lost my mind... ...it's backed up on a tape somewhere. From jotoho+mailinglist at jotoho.de Thu Nov 18 00:13:07 2021 From: jotoho+mailinglist at jotoho.de (Jonas Tobias Hopusch) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 00:13:07 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> Message-ID: <20211117231307.nvswqyrgeawyon2m@jotoho.de> > Is there an English translation of this article somewhere? No, I don't think so. To the best of my knowledge Golem.de publishes exclusively in German and I didn't find anything with a search engine. > If I go to the link, I get a rather large pop-up dialogue which doesn't > look much like an article at all. Throw the thing at Google Translate, > and the JavaScript on the page re-directs me back to the original page > in German. That was just a mechanism to force users to either consent to extensive tracking and ads or login with an account that has a paid subscription. -- Jonas Tobias Hopusch From gnupg at raf.org Thu Nov 18 03:22:52 2021 From: gnupg at raf.org (raf) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 13:22:52 +1100 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> Message-ID: On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 04:40:46PM +0200, Teemu Likonen wrote: > * 2021-11-16 17:06:02+0000, Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-users wrote: > > > The "Real Name" and "Comment" portions of the userID are mere > > conventions and, if you have an address book, entirely redundant. > > Thanks. That is rather technical point of view and correct in that > sense. In my opinion it is a bit too nerdy because real names are > convenient for other people. Real names aren't that useful. They're hardly unique, even/especially within a single family. In Australia, voting is mandatory (yay! for now). Someone I know once received a letter from the gorvernment asking why they didn't vote, and at the same time, their father, who had with the same name and address, received a letter asking why they voted twice (or maybe it was the other way around). :-) cheers, raf From tlikonen at iki.fi Thu Nov 18 07:02:06 2021 From: tlikonen at iki.fi (Teemu Likonen) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 08:02:06 +0200 Subject: User id's without person's name, only email In-Reply-To: References: <87sfvwrs0s.fsf@iki.fi> <878rxm26c1.fsf@iki.fi> Message-ID: <878rxmovc1.fsf@iki.fi> * 2021-11-18 13:22:52+1100, raf via Gnupg-users wrote: > Real names aren't that useful. They're hardly unique, > even/especially within a single family. That continues the technical or nerdy point of view. "Real names are not unique. Therefore they are not (that) useful." Sometimes crypto nerds seem to say that if everything is not perfect then all is lost. In practice, real names are very useful for humans. But another thing is that two separate things probably shouldn't be in the same technical information field. Currently we could do this: pub ed25519 2021-11-07 [C] [expires: 2023-11-07] [Not really my key, so fingerprint removed.] uid [...] Teemu Likonen uid [...] uid [...] uid [...] Then other people could more carefully certify different information in user id's. -- /// Teemu Likonen - .-.. https://www.iki.fi/tlikonen/ // OpenPGP: 6965F03973F0D4CA22B9410F0F2CAE0E07608462 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 434 bytes Desc: not available URL: From keine-eile at e-mail.de Thu Nov 18 08:58:05 2021 From: keine-eile at e-mail.de (Keine Eile) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 08:58:05 +0100 Subject: Translation: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> Message-ID: <0b67f980-8289-39a3-7df1-8f8422e31541@e-mail.de> **Translated by Google** BSI sends private PGP keys Public and private keys apparently also confused the BSI. That sent a private key, but with password protection. An exclusive message from Hanno B?ck will be published on November 15, 2021, 2:30 p.m. Is it a public key or a private key? Public key encryption is confusing. The use of mail encryption by means of the OpenPGP standard is often considered to be complicated, which is one of the reasons why it has so far not been able to gain broad acceptance. This was apparently also confusing for the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI): It accidentally sent a private PGP key. Someone had asked the BSI's contact e-mail address for product approval to send them a PGP key in order to be able to communicate with the authorities in encrypted form. In response, however, the person received a private PGP key rather than a public PGP key, as expected. The BSI confirmed the incident to Golem.de: "In fact, a file was sent that contained a corresponding private key." Luck in misfortune: a hopefully secure password PGP-based encryption works with so-called public key cryptography. Different keys are used for encryption and decryption. The public key can be sent to communication partners who can use it to encrypt. You have to keep the private key to yourself, it is used for decryption. Bad luck for the BSI: The private key sent was password-protected. The severity of the incident therefore depends on how secure the password is. Password-protected private keys can sometimes be cracked with a brute force attack, but this is only practicable with rather weak passwords. The BSI informed Golem.de "that the mentioned password protection fulfills a very high level. In addition, attachments requiring protection are also encrypted with chiasmus. The BSI is therefore currently assuming that there is no specific risk to information security." BSI was still using keys months after the incident At first, the incident was not taken seriously at the BSI. The person to whom the key was sent immediately informed the authorities. But the BSI continued to use the key for several months. It was only after a request from Golem.de to the BSI's press office that the key was replaced. "A new PGP key was immediately generated for the mailbox mentioned," replied the BSI. "The associated public key and a revocation certificate for the old PGP key will now be successively distributed to the respective contact person." From jrf at mailbox.org Thu Nov 18 10:48:55 2021 From: jrf at mailbox.org (Rainer Fiebig) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:48:55 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> Message-ID: <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> Am 17.11.21 um 23:49 schrieb Stuart Longland via Gnupg-users: > On Tue, 16 Nov 2021 23:17:58 +0000 > ?????? ???????? via Gnupg-users wrote: > >> [1] >> https://www.golem.de/news/verschluesselung-bsi-verschickt-privaten-pgp-schluessel-2111-161073.html > > Is there an English translation of this article somewhere? I never > learned German beyond what made its way into the English language or > what I might've picked up from episodes of 'Allo 'Allo or Hogan's > Heroes? That's kind of a misconception: as English is a western germanic language it's not that German made its way into English but English is *based* on German. You would be amazed how many words are similar or even pronounced identically - like Haus/house, Maus/mouse, Finger/finger etc. pp. The similarities between English and the dialect spoken in coastal regions of northern Germany ("Plattdeutsch") are even more striking. So you already do speak German - to some extent. In case you don't believe me or wonder where "Anglo-Saxon" comes from, start here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angles. A bit OT, I know. But I couldn't resist. Hope you're not offended. ;) Kind regards! Rainer From ineiev at gnu.org Thu Nov 18 13:27:34 2021 From: ineiev at gnu.org (Ineiev) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 12:27:34 +0000 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> Message-ID: <20211118122734.GB6930@desdichado> On Thu, Nov 18, 2021 at 10:48:55AM +0100, Rainer Fiebig via Gnupg-users wrote: > That's kind of a misconception: as English is a western germanic > language it's not that German made its way into English but English is > *based* on German. To be precise, not on German---it's based on the common ancestor. both English and German deviate considerably from it. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 488 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jrf at mailbox.org Thu Nov 18 14:15:53 2021 From: jrf at mailbox.org (Rainer Fiebig) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 14:15:53 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <20211118122734.GB6930@desdichado> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> <20211118122734.GB6930@desdichado> Message-ID: <1d24c743-c440-6f09-9049-6e70086c5c29@mailbox.org> Am 18.11.21 um 13:27 schrieb Ineiev: > On Thu, Nov 18, 2021 at 10:48:55AM +0100, Rainer Fiebig via Gnupg-users wrote: >> That's kind of a misconception: as English is a western germanic >> language it's not that German made its way into English but English is >> *based* on German. > > To be precise, not on German---it's based on the common ancestor. > both English and German deviate considerably from it. > I guess that saves the day for some. I can almost hear the sigh of relief. ;) From mwood at iupui.edu Thu Nov 18 14:57:37 2021 From: mwood at iupui.edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 08:57:37 -0500 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <1d24c743-c440-6f09-9049-6e70086c5c29@mailbox.org> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> <20211118122734.GB6930@desdichado> <1d24c743-c440-6f09-9049-6e70086c5c29@mailbox.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Nov 18, 2021 at 02:15:53PM +0100, Rainer Fiebig via Gnupg-users wrote: > Am 18.11.21 um 13:27 schrieb Ineiev: > > On Thu, Nov 18, 2021 at 10:48:55AM +0100, Rainer Fiebig via Gnupg-users wrote: > >> That's kind of a misconception: as English is a western germanic > >> language it's not that German made its way into English but English is > >> *based* on German. > > > > To be precise, not on German---it's based on the common ancestor. > > both English and German deviate considerably from it. > > > I guess that saves the day for some. I can almost hear the sigh of > relief. ;) :-) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Story_of_English if anyone finds this interesting. -- Mark H. Wood Lead Technology Analyst University Library Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis 755 W. Michigan Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 317-274-0749 www.ulib.iupui.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 195 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jhs at berklix.com Thu Nov 18 15:40:15 2021 From: jhs at berklix.com (Julian H. Stacey) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 15:40:15 +0100 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: Your message "Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:48:55 +0100." <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> Message-ID: <202111181440.1AIEeFFb080222@fire.js.berklix.net> > Am 17.11.21 um 23:49 schrieb Stuart Longland via Gnupg-users: > > On Tue, 16 Nov 2021 23:17:58 +0000 > > ???????????? ???????????????? via Gnupg-users wrote: > > > >> [1] > >> https://www.golem.de/news/verschluesselung-bsi-verschickt-privaten-pgp-schluessel-2111-161073.html > > > > Is there an English translation of this article somewhere? I never list of translator sites: http://www.berklix.org/trans/ Cheers, -- Julian Stacey http://berklix.com/jhs/ http://stolenvotes.uk From azbigdogs at gmx.com Thu Nov 18 18:01:49 2021 From: azbigdogs at gmx.com (Mark) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:01:49 -0700 Subject: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <20211117231307.nvswqyrgeawyon2m@jotoho.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <20211117231307.nvswqyrgeawyon2m@jotoho.de> Message-ID: I used Edge and it's built in translator function to read it after I got past the page asking regarding the cookies (which Privazer will remove anyway) On 11/17/2021 4:13 PM, Jonas Tobias Hopusch via Gnupg-users wrote: >> Is there an English translation of this article somewhere? > No, I don't think so. To the best of my knowledge Golem.de publishes exclusively > in German and I didn't find anything with a search engine. > >> If I go to the link, I get a rather large pop-up dialogue which doesn't >> look much like an article at all. Throw the thing at Google Translate, >> and the JavaScript on the page re-directs me back to the original page >> in German. > That was just a mechanism to force users to either consent to extensive tracking > and ads or login with an account that has a paid subscription. > -- PGP Key Upon Request From stuartl at longlandclan.id.au Thu Nov 18 22:21:09 2021 From: stuartl at longlandclan.id.au (Stuart Longland) Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 07:21:09 +1000 Subject: [OT] English [was Re: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key] In-Reply-To: <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> Message-ID: <20211119072109.68910959@longlandclan.id.au> On Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:48:55 +0100 Rainer Fiebig via Gnupg-users wrote: > That's kind of a misconception: as English is a western germanic > language it's not that German made its way into English but English is > *based* on German. Ahh true, to the purists, English is not a language? it's a composite of German, French, Italian, Spanish? and lots of others. Some might say English is a "language" that beats up other languages and steals their vocabulary. It doesn't mean the source language is immediately understandable by those that speak its derivative though even if individual words can be identified. :-) -- Stuart Longland (aka Redhatter, VK4MSL) I haven't lost my mind... ...it's backed up on a tape somewhere. From stuartl at longlandclan.id.au Thu Nov 18 22:26:39 2021 From: stuartl at longlandclan.id.au (Stuart Longland) Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 07:26:39 +1000 Subject: Translation: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key In-Reply-To: <0b67f980-8289-39a3-7df1-8f8422e31541@e-mail.de> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <0b67f980-8289-39a3-7df1-8f8422e31541@e-mail.de> Message-ID: <20211119072639.6983c98d@longlandclan.id.au> On Thu, 18 Nov 2021 08:58:05 +0100 Keine Eile wrote: > BSI was still using keys months after the incident > At first, the incident was not taken seriously at the BSI. The person to whom the key was sent immediately informed the authorities. But the BSI continued to use the key for several months. Ouch, that is damning? There's a reason it gets called a "private" key. Many thanks for the translation too. Had Golem.de's site not interfered, I might've gotten past their cookie pop-up (I hate those: EU's privacy laws are not my problem) and read the article via a translator (and they'd have gotten some advertising revenue). -- Stuart Longland (aka Redhatter, VK4MSL) I haven't lost my mind... ...it's backed up on a tape somewhere. From jrf at mailbox.org Thu Nov 18 23:52:49 2021 From: jrf at mailbox.org (Rainer Fiebig) Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 23:52:49 +0100 Subject: [OT] English [was Re: Key Management - BSI had send private key instead of public key] In-Reply-To: <20211119072109.68910959@longlandclan.id.au> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <20211118084953.51e0efb1@longlandclan.id.au> <944acc72-4f7e-7aa4-a8d2-2fdfeb3e8c1a@mailbox.org> <20211119072109.68910959@longlandclan.id.au> Message-ID: Am 18.11.21 um 22:21 schrieb Stuart Longland: > On Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:48:55 +0100 > Rainer Fiebig via Gnupg-users wrote: > >> That's kind of a misconception: as English is a western germanic >> language it's not that German made its way into English but English is >> *based* on German. > > Ahh true, to the purists, English is not a language? it's a composite > of German, French, Italian, Spanish? and lots of others. > > Some might say English is a "language" that beats up other languages > and steals their vocabulary. That seems a bit too harsh to me. As I see it, English is a language that evolved from its base by integrating useful or chic elements of those languages that were present over time. A quite natural thing, I guess. And perhaps one reason why it became so successful. > > It doesn't mean the source language is immediately understandable by > those that speak its derivative though even if individual words can be > identified. :-) > Yeah, that's a pity. But at least you have a head start should you ever decide to go for the real thing. ;) Cheers and good luck! Rainer From bernhard at intevation.de Fri Nov 19 17:42:49 2021 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 17:42:49 +0100 Subject: Translations Popups and Cookiekalypse In-Reply-To: <20211119072639.6983c98d@longlandclan.id.au> References: <0519c4691eb5faa5a2f9ae6d7d08bbcd@posteo.de> <0b67f980-8289-39a3-7df1-8f8422e31541@e-mail.de> <20211119072639.6983c98d@longlandclan.id.au> Message-ID: <202111191742.49696.bernhard@intevation.de> Am Donnerstag 18 November 2021 22:26:39 schrieb Stuart Longland via Gnupg-users: > I might've gotten past their cookie pop-up (I hate those: > EU's privacy laws are not my problem) But your privacy may be your concern. The requirements of the laws have not changed that much with the introduction of the GDPR, they are just more unified over all Europe and more enforced. Because service providers can only process the minimum personal data for providing the service to you, they need to ask you before they can use your data for marketing purposes. So agreeing explicietly to a technical session cookie only is not strictely speaking necessary, it is the web site provider that want you to agree to more, so they can use your personal data to sell your attention to advertisment services. Best, Bernhard -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard ? +49 541 33 508 3-3 Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, DE; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Gesch?ftsf?hrer Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Nov 23 13:22:33 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 13:22:33 +0100 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.2.33 (LTS) released Message-ID: <87pmqr83jq.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new GnuPG LTS release: version 2.2.33. This release fixes a few minor problems and brings a few new options to ease user support and large scale installations. The LTS (long term support) series of GnuPG is guaranteed to be maintained at least until the end of 2024. See https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#end-of-life What is GnuPG ============= The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, GPG) is a complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards. GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key directories. GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications. The separate library GPGME provides a uniform API to use the GnuPG engine by software written in common programming languages. A wealth of frontend applications and libraries making use of GnuPG are available. As an universal crypto engine GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP. GnuPG can be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. Noteworthy changes in version 2.2.33 (2021-11-23) ================================================= * gpg: New option --min-rsa-length. [rG6ee01c1d26] * gpg: New option --forbid-gen-key. [rG985fb25c46] * gpg: New option --override-compliance-check. [T5655] * gpgconf: New command --show-configs. [rG8fe3f57643] * agent,dirmngr: New option --steal-socket. [rG6507c6ab10] * scd: Improve the selection of the default PC/SC reader. [T5644] * gpg: Fix printing of binary notations. [T5667] * gpg: Remove stale ultimately trusted keys from the trustdb. [T5685] * gpgsm: Detect circular chains in --list-chain. [rGc9343bec83] * gpgconf: Create the local option file even if the global file exists. [T5650] * dirmngr: Make reading resolv.conf more robust. [T5657] * gpg-wks-server: Fix created file permissions. [rGf54feb4470] * scd: Support longer data for ssh-agent authentication with openpgp cards. [T5682] * Support gpgconf.ctl for NetBSD and Solaris. [T5656,T5671] * Silence "Garbled console data" warning under Windows in most cases. * Silence warning about the rootdir under Unices w/o a mounted /proc file system. * Fix possible build problems about missing include files. [T5592] * i18n: Replace the term "PIN-Cache" by "Passswort-Cache" in the German translation. [rgf453d52e53] * i18n: Update the Russian translation. Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5641 The provided Windows installer is now build against Libgpg-error 1.43 and thus features versatile meta options for the config file. For example, it is possible to read and use option values from the Registry or from environment variables. More on this is in a not published written blog article. Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at or read on: GnuPG 2.2.33 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from its primary FTP server. The list of mirrors can be found at . Note that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature are available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2 (7068k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2.sig An installer for Windows without any graphical frontend except for a very minimal Pinentry tool is available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.33_20211123.exe (4424k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.33_20211123.exe.sig The source used to build the Windows installer can be found in the same directory with a ".tar.xz" suffix. A new version of Gpg4win 3 will not be published. Gpg4win users may instead install this version on top of 3.1.16 or wait for Gpg4win 4. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply verify the supplied signature. For example to verify the signature of the file gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2 This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys. See the end of this mail for information on the signing keys. * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2, you run the command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the next line: 70053b799a79139e0e7889282805fc889dd22540 gnupg-2.2.33.tar.bz2 6bf876e04ba00bebb64dffe7d2224206521948a7 gnupg-w32-2.2.33_20211123.tar.xz c67151e92fc82bd4138ef441dbeba61e9bf4de5f gnupg-w32-2.2.33_20211123.exe Internationalization ==================== This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese (traditional and simplified), Czech, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost completely translated. Documentation and Support ========================= The file gnupg.info has the complete reference manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well but they miss some of the details available only in thee manual. The manual is also available online at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ or can be downloaded as PDF at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf . You may also want to search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing list for advise on how to solve problems. Most of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public experience is available. https://wiki.gnupg.org has user contributed information around GnuPG and relate software. In case of build problems specific to this release please first check https://dev.gnupg.org/T5641 for updated information. Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug: https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html. We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at https://bugs.gnupg.org. If you need commercial support go to https://gnupg.com or https://gnupg.org/service.html. If you are a developer and you need a certain feature for your project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing list for discussion. Thanks ====== Since 2001 maintenance and development of GnuPG is done by g10 Code GmbH and until this year mostly financed by donations. Three full-time employed developers as well as two contractors exclusively work on GnuPG and closely related software like Libgcrypt, GPGME and Gpg4win. We like to thank all the nice people who are helping the GnuPG project, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, or answering questions on the mailing lists. Many thanks to our numerous financial supporters, both corporate and individuals. Without you it would not have been possible to keep GnuPG in a good and secure shape and to address all the small and larger requests made by our users. Thanks. Happy hacking, Your GnuPG hackers p.s. This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to the gnupg-users'at'gnupg.org mailing list. List of Release Signing Keys: To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more of these keys: rsa3072 2017-03-17 [expires: 2027-03-15] 5B80 C575 4298 F0CB 55D8 ED6A BCEF 7E29 4B09 2E28 Andre Heinecke (Release Signing Key) ed25519 2020-08-24 [expires: 2030-06-30] 6DAA 6E64 A76D 2840 571B 4902 5288 97B8 2640 3ADA Werner Koch (dist signing 2020) ed25519 2021-05-19 [expires: 2027-04-04] AC8E 115B F73E 2D8D 47FA 9908 E98E 9B2D 19C6 C8BD Niibe Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) brainpoolP256r1 2021-10-15 [expires: 2029-12-31] 02F3 8DFF 731F F97C B039 A1DA 549E 695E 905B A208 GnuPG.com (Release Signing Key 2021) The keys are available at https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html and in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg . Note that this mail has been signed by a different key. -- Please read Nils Melzer: Der Fall Julian Assange It is really important to know the background of the Assange case to understand the massive perils to free journalism. The book is right now only available in German: https://dev.gnupg.org/u/melzerassang -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From stephen_j_jeffrey at yahoo.com.au Wed Nov 24 12:39:15 2021 From: stephen_j_jeffrey at yahoo.com.au (Stephen Jeffrey) Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 11:39:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Cannot decrypt file after clearing cache References: <797383010.622093.1637753955849.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <797383010.622093.1637753955849@mail.yahoo.com> Hi all, I wish to encrypt a file with a passphrase, possibly copy the file elsewhere, and decrypt using the same passphrase.? If I encrypt a file (with a passphrase) it can then be decypted without entering a passphrase:> echo "test" > test.txt> gpg -c test.txt> gpg -d test.txt.gpg?gpg: AES256.CFB encrypted datagpg: encrypted with 1 passphrasetest I assume it does not prompt me for a passphrase because it is cached. If I clear the password cache, and then try to decrypt, the decryption fails (it does not prompt for a password):> gpg-connect-agent reloadagent /byeOK> gpg -d test.txt.gpggpg: AES256.CFB encrypted datagpg: problem with the agent: End of filegpg: encrypted with 1 passphrasegpg: decryption failed: Bad session key Rebooting the machine does not fix the problem i.e. if I reboot and try to decrypt the file, it fails with the same error (Bad session key). In this case however it does prompt me for the password. After entering the password it fails. I am using a fresh install of Fedora 35 and gpg2 version 2.3.2. Why is it failing after I clear the cache? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From kloecker at kde.org Wed Nov 24 13:46:24 2021 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 13:46:24 +0100 Subject: Cannot decrypt file after clearing cache In-Reply-To: <797383010.622093.1637753955849@mail.yahoo.com> References: <797383010.622093.1637753955849.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <797383010.622093.1637753955849@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4151779.Exnuk0Oc7e@daneel> On Mittwoch, 24. November 2021 12:39:15 CET Stephen Jeffrey via Gnupg-users wrote: > After entering the > password it fails. I am using a fresh install of Fedora 35 and gpg2 version > 2.3.2. > Why is it failing after I clear the cache? Because symmetric encryption is broken in version 2.3.2. See https://dev.gnupg.org/T5577 for details. Use any other version. Too bad that Fedora 35 seems to have packaged this version. Please file a bug with them so that they can backport the fix or update to 2.3.3. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 228 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From stephen_j_jeffrey at yahoo.com.au Thu Nov 25 11:35:00 2021 From: stephen_j_jeffrey at yahoo.com.au (Stephen Jeffrey) Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 10:35:00 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Cannot decrypt file after clearing cache In-Reply-To: <4151779.Exnuk0Oc7e@daneel> References: <797383010.622093.1637753955849.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <797383010.622093.1637753955849@mail.yahoo.com> <4151779.Exnuk0Oc7e@daneel> Message-ID: <357065736.1218084.1637836500800@mail.yahoo.com> Thanks Ingo. I submitted a bug report, it is here?(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2026617). CheersSteve On Wednesday, 24 November 2021, 10:51:52 pm AEST, Ingo Kl?cker wrote: On Mittwoch, 24. November 2021 12:39:15 CET Stephen Jeffrey via Gnupg-users wrote: > After entering the > password it fails. I am using a fresh install of Fedora 35 and gpg2 version > 2.3.2. > Why is it failing after I clear the cache? Because symmetric encryption is broken in version 2.3.2. See https://dev.gnupg.org/T5577 for details. Use any other version. Too bad that Fedora 35 seems to have packaged this version. Please file a bug with them so that they can backport the fix or update to 2.3.3. Regards, Ingo _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: