From gniibe at fsij.org  Thu Nov  9 01:58:12 2023
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Thu, 09 Nov 2023 09:58:12 +0900
Subject: libgcrypt 1.10.2 compile on AIX POWER
In-Reply-To: <970069812.12433.1697462722695@email.df.eu>
References: <1291647865.5178.1697457730690@email.df.eu>
 <970069812.12433.1697462722695@email.df.eu>
Message-ID: <87y1f7eo9n.fsf@akagi.fsij.org>

Hello,

Frank Lindner <gnupg at shoran-und-alira.de> wrote:
> For 1.10.2 I now run into the following:
>>---- start ---<
>         /opt/freeware/bin/bash ../libtool --tag=CC --mode=link cc
>         -I/opt/freeware/include -qmaxmem=16384 -qlanglvl=extc99 -DSYSV
>         -D_AIX -D_AIX32 -D_AIX41 -D_AIX43 -D_AIX51 -D_AIX52 -D_AIX53
>         -D_AIX61 -D_AIX71 -D_AIX72 -D_ALL_SOURCE -DFUNCPROTO=15 -O2
>         -I/opt/freeware/include -no-install -L/opt/freeware/lib64
>         -L/opt/freeware/lib
>         -Wl,-blibpath:/opt/freeware/lib64:/opt/freeware/lib:/usr/lib:/lib
>         -Wl,-bmaxdata:0x80000000 -o hashtest hashtest.o
>         ../src/libgcrypt.la ../compat/libcompat.la -L/opt/freeware/lib
>         -lgpg-error -lpthread

(line is wrapped by me)

IIUC, you manually supplied LDFLAGS (at configure or make), which
doesn't work well in this particular case (since LDFLAGS has a
precedence over locally specified ../src, compiler finds **installed**
version of libgcrypt, instead of currently building one).

Please check gpgrt-config from libgpg-error is installed correctly.
Possibly, in your case, it might be /opt/freeware/bin.  Then, make sure
/opt/freeware/bin in PATH, and run configure.

This way, configure script should find correct value for -L, by
gpgrt-config (no need to manually supply LDFLAGS).
-- 


From dan.list at brilhante.top  Fri Nov 10 09:47:52 2023
From: dan.list at brilhante.top (Daniel Cerqueira)
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 08:47:52 +0000
Subject: How to send a signed git patch
Message-ID: <874jhu0zbb.fsf@brilhante.top>

Hi everyone.

I want to send my po translation of GnuPG.

Werner told me to send a signed git patch to a list.

So, I signed my git commit with my GnuPG key. And when I do
`git format-patch master` the created patch does not have this signature.

How can I create a git patch with a GnuPG signature?
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 832 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231110/31e4f89a/attachment-0001.sig>

From mcr at sandelman.ca  Fri Nov 10 14:09:01 2023
From: mcr at sandelman.ca (Michael Richardson)
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 14:09:01 +0100
Subject: How to send a signed git patch
In-Reply-To: <874jhu0zbb.fsf@brilhante.top>
References: <874jhu0zbb.fsf@brilhante.top>
Message-ID: <3737517.1699621741@dyas>


Daniel Cerqueira via Gnupg-users <gnupg-users at gnupg.org> wrote:
    > I want to send my po translation of GnuPG.

    > Werner told me to send a signed git patch to a list.

    > So, I signed my git commit with my GnuPG key. And when I do `git
    > format-patch master` the created patch does not have this signature.

I think: include that patch in an email (not an attachment), and sign it.
A signed git commit does not get transfered by email, alas.
You'd have to use git:// or https:// or.. to transfer the git signature.

    > How can I create a git patch with a GnuPG signature?

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 658 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231110/bb633742/attachment.sig>

From dan.list at brilhante.top  Fri Nov 10 14:32:24 2023
From: dan.list at brilhante.top (Daniel Cerqueira)
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 13:32:24 +0000
Subject: How to avoid weird mestage on file deciphering
Message-ID: <878r75zqc7.fsf@brilhante.top>

Hi.

I am trying to do a script that has `gpg --decrypt`.
This is what I am getting:

LC_ALL=C gpg --decrypt ~/file.gpg 
gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID 0x0000000000000000
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key 0x2D3C49A28079BBBD ...
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key 0xB8A344FF3684F216 ...
gpg: anonymous recipient; trying secret key 0x60E8A97AEB2F2DB9 ...
gpg: okay, we are the anonymous recipient.
asdf

I want to avoid all the messages and only output "asdf" (the content of
the file). How can I do this with gpg?

I have tried some variations, but I always get this "gpg: anonumous
recipient" message (that I want to avoid).

My key is on a Yubikey. Don't know if this matters for this issue.

Thanks.



From verbuecheln at posteo.de  Fri Nov 10 14:48:04 2023
From: verbuecheln at posteo.de (Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Verb=FCcheln?=)
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 13:48:04 +0000
Subject: How to avoid weird mestage on file deciphering
In-Reply-To: <878r75zqc7.fsf@brilhante.top>
References: <878r75zqc7.fsf@brilhante.top>
Message-ID: <4fbbf31c98c410078ac99884cab3afdc8a045e84.camel@posteo.de>

Notifications, warnings and errors are sent to stderr (rather than
stdout), so the solution for bash would be:

$ gpg --decrypt file.txt.gpg 2> /dev/null

Regards
Stephan
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 260 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231110/1e5707ab/attachment.sig>

From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Sat Nov 11 03:48:18 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 20:48:18 -0600
Subject: How to send a signed git patch
In-Reply-To: <874jhu0zbb.fsf@brilhante.top>
References: <874jhu0zbb.fsf@brilhante.top>
Message-ID: <654EEB72.5030403@gmail.com>

Daniel Cerqueira via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Hi everyone.
>
> I want to send my po translation of GnuPG.
>
> Werner told me to send a signed git patch to a list.
>
> So, I signed my git commit with my GnuPG key. And when I do
> `git format-patch master` the created patch does not have this signature.
>
> How can I create a git patch with a GnuPG signature?
>   

You would have to sign the output of `git format-patch` separately.

Git signatures are stored in tag objects which refer to the signed 
commit.  An exported patch is only part of a commit and therefore does 
not carry the commit ID, which is what Git signs, if I recall correctly.

Another option would be to attach a Git bundle to an email, generated 
using `git bundle create origin/master..SIGNED-TAG-FOR-PATCH` although 
this would be less easily reviewed.


-- Jacob



From jsbiff at weldingengineering.com  Sun Nov 12 15:50:07 2023
From: jsbiff at weldingengineering.com (Jeff Schmidt)
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 09:50:07 -0500
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key management/security
Message-ID: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>

Hi,

 ?? So, I want to start using Gnupg more to sign things. Right now, in 
addition to GnuPG having access to my private key, to use 
signing/encryption in my email client, requires allowing the openpgp 
implementation in the email client to access my private key. Which, I 
think I'm OK with as it's a local client, but, I got to thinking about 
the problem of access to the private key.

Of course, the whole premise of public key encryption is that your 
private key is a closely guarded secret. Which raises the question, how 
does one USE the private key, without risking exposing it.

There are multiple problems, it seems to me, and I'm sure as I'm about 
20 years late to the party, that others have identified these and more, 
so I wonder if I can get recommendations to articles/blog posts online, 
or books, or any wisdom the subscribers of this list can impart.

But, the problems that have occurred to me:

* Even if one only uses the key locally on one or two 'trusted' devices, 
there is still the problem of multiplying how many different apps might 
have access to your private key - and the more apps, the more points of 
potential failure/leakage of your key. Any app that has been maliciously 
trojaned by some bad actor, could steal your private key, and transmit 
it to some third party, or even allow a third party to simply sign or 
encrypt data using the local app, that isn't yours, as if it came from you.

* The problem gets worse when you think about things like online 
services - if you are using an online email or messaging provider, or 
photo sharing service, document/file sharing service, online social 
media service, it seems like it would be a really bad idea to upload 
your private key to those services and trust them with that. Now, maybe 
you might use subkeys are a sort of partial solution to that - 
generating service-specific and revocable subkeys for each specific 
service, and never providing the master private key, but that still 
presents a risk that any of those subkeys might be stolen.

* Using a strong password to encrypt and protect the private key, while 
a good idea, doesn't really solve the problem, because at some point, to 
use the private key, you have to provide the password so it can be 
decrypted to be used, and every time you provide the password, it 
presents an opportunity for the key to be stolen.

It seems to me that maybe the best way to resolve many of these risks, 
at least, to reduce the 'surface area' of the risk, is to only have ONE 
app (ideally, gnupg) that EVER accesses the private key, and that ALL 
other requests to encrypt or sign data be brokered through a 'gnupg 
server' running on my trusted device, where connections to the server 
are encrypted, and when I want data to be signed or encrypted with my 
private key, whatever app I'm using to originate the data connects to 
gnupg and requests signing or encryption as a service from the server. 
Then, gnupg could present the data to me for verification that no 
man-in-the-middle or malicious app has altered the data before 
submitting it for signing/encryption, then I provide my password just to 
gnupg, which would sign or encrypt the payload and pass it back to the 
original app or web service.

Is there an easy way to use gnupg like this? It would be lovely if, for 
example, when I'm posting on a social media platform, if I could 
configure the social media app to connect to my local 'gnupg server' and 
have all my posts and shared photos/videos signed. Of course, this would 
require support in those third party apps to have the necessary code to 
make that connection to gnupg, but, as a starting point, I'm not clear 
if there is even any standard protocol for such a service, or if gnupg 
implements it?

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: OpenPGP_0x566331566E95AC02.asc
Type: application/pgp-keys
Size: 677 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP public key
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231112/eb0f707e/attachment.key>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: OpenPGP_signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 236 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231112/eb0f707e/attachment.sig>

From dan.list at brilhante.top  Sun Nov 12 20:21:44 2023
From: dan.list at brilhante.top (Daniel Cerqueira)
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 19:21:44 +0000
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 (Jeff Schmidt's message of "Sun, 12 Nov 2023 09:50:07 -0500")
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
Message-ID: <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top>

Jeff Schmidt <jsbiff at weldingengineering.com> writes:

> Hi,
>
> ?? So, I want to start using Gnupg more to sign things. Right now, in
> addition to GnuPG having access to my private key, to use
> signing/encryption in my email client, requires allowing the openpgp
> implementation in the email client to access my private key. Which, I
> think I'm OK with as it's a local client, but, I got to thinking about
> the problem of access to the private key.
>
> Of course, the whole premise of public key encryption is that your
> private key is a closely guarded secret. Which raises the question,
> how does one USE the private key, without risking exposing it.
>
> There are multiple problems, it seems to me, and I'm sure as I'm about
> 20 years late to the party, that others have identified these and
> more, so I wonder if I can get recommendations to articles/blog posts
> online, or books, or any wisdom the subscribers of this list can
> impart.
>
> But, the problems that have occurred to me:
>
> * Even if one only uses the key locally on one or two 'trusted'
>   devices, there is still the problem of multiplying how many
>   different apps might have access to your private key - and the more
>   apps, the more points of potential failure/leakage of your key. Any
>   app that has been maliciously trojaned by some bad actor, could
>   steal your private key, and transmit it to some third party, or even
>   allow a third party to simply sign or encrypt data using the local
>  app, that isn't yours, as if it came from you.
>
> * The problem gets worse when you think about things like online
>   services - if you are using an online email or messaging provider,
>   or photo sharing service, document/file sharing service, online
>   social media service, it seems like it would be a really bad idea to
>   upload your private key to those services and trust them with that.
>   Now, maybe you might use subkeys are a sort of partial solution to
>   that - generating service-specific and revocable subkeys for each
>   specific service, and never providing the master private key, but
>   that still presents a risk that any of those subkeys might be
>  stolen.
>
> * Using a strong password to encrypt and protect the private key,
>   while a good idea, doesn't really solve the problem, because at some
>   point, to use the private key, you have to provide the password so
>   it can be decrypted to be used, and every time you provide the
>   password, it presents an opportunity for the key to be stolen.
>
> It seems to me that maybe the best way to resolve many of these risks,
> at least, to reduce the 'surface area' of the risk, is to only have
> ONE app (ideally, gnupg) that EVER accesses the private key, and that
> ALL other requests to encrypt or sign data be brokered through a
> 'gnupg server' running on my trusted device, where connections to the
> server are encrypted, and when I want data to be signed or encrypted
> with my private key, whatever app I'm using to originate the data
> connects to gnupg and requests signing or encryption as a service from
> the server. Then, gnupg could present the data to me for verification
> that no man-in-the-middle or malicious app has altered the data before
> submitting it for signing/encryption, then I provide my password just
> to gnupg, which would sign or encrypt the payload and pass it back to
> the original app or web service.
>
> Is there an easy way to use gnupg like this? It would be lovely if,
> for example, when I'm posting on a social media platform, if I could
> configure the social media app to connect to my local 'gnupg server'
> and have all my posts and shared photos/videos signed. Of course, this
> would require support in those third party apps to have the necessary
> code to make that connection to gnupg, but, as a starting point, I'm
> not clear if there is even any standard protocol for such a service,
> or if gnupg implements it?

You may want to consider using an OpenPGP smartcard (for example, a
Yubikey). Seems that you are a good fit.

Using a OpenPGP smartcard, the private key never leaves the smartcard.
The smartcard can also be used on a smartphone that has NFC support.

Cheers


From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Mon Nov 13 02:46:42 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 19:46:42 -0600
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top>
Message-ID: <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>

Daniel Cerqueira via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Jeff Schmidt <jsbiff at weldingengineering.com> writes:
>
> [...]
> You may want to consider using an OpenPGP smartcard (for example, a
> Yubikey). Seems that you are a good fit.
>
> Using a OpenPGP smartcard, the private key never leaves the smartcard.
> The smartcard can also be used on a smartphone that has NFC support.
>   

The problem here is that, while the key never leaves the smartcard, the 
/entire/ device that accesses the smartcard must be trusted, as a 
backdoor on the device could steal plaintext or submit extra items for 
signing.  A PIN does not solve the problem, since the PIN is entered on 
the device, which could be backdoored to store the PIN and submit it 
along with Mallory's messages for the smartcard to sign---and the card 
will sign it, since the PIN checks out...

Smartcards make silently duplicating the key difficult (supposedly 
infeasible) but do not solve the general problems with network-connected 
devices.


-- Jacob



From verbuecheln at posteo.de  Mon Nov 13 07:09:14 2023
From: verbuecheln at posteo.de (Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Verb=FCcheln?=)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 06:09:14 +0000
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <d629a372c52438459e52c374530c6cca4d75e940.camel@posteo.de>

On Sun, 2023-11-12 at 19:46 -0600, Jacob Bachmeyer wrote:
> A PIN does not solve the problem, since the PIN is entered on
> the device, which could be backdoored to store the PIN

That's why card readers with pinpads were invented, and GnuPG also
supports that:
https://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/ch02s02.html

Other ideas to improve isolation:
* If you trust your Linux distribution in general but not every single
desktop app, you can use a separate Linux user for sensitive
activities.
* You can use GnuPG Agent Forwarding via SSH to sign a file on a less
trusted server from a more trusted client. This way your PIN is entered
on the more trusted client machine.

Regards
Stephan
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 260 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231113/f95689f1/attachment.sig>

From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Nov 12 20:41:28 2023
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 20:41:28 +0100
Subject: How to avoid weird mestage on file deciphering
In-Reply-To: <4fbbf31c98c410078ac99884cab3afdc8a045e84.camel@posteo.de>
 ("Stephan =?utf-8?Q?Verb=C3=BCcheln?= via Gnupg-users"'s message of "Fri,
 10 Nov 2023 13:48:04 +0000")
References: <878r75zqc7.fsf@brilhante.top>
 <4fbbf31c98c410078ac99884cab3afdc8a045e84.camel@posteo.de>
Message-ID: <87bkbyiwt3.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>

On Fri, 10 Nov 2023 13:48, Stephan Verb?cheln said:
> Notifications, warnings and errors are sent to stderr (rather than
> stdout), so the solution for bash would be:
>
> $ gpg --decrypt file.txt.gpg 2> /dev/null

Or to suppress the specific diagnostics mentioned but still show
important error message use

  gpg -q ...

or

  gpg --quiet ...
  


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
The pioneers of a warless world are the youth that
refuse military service.             - A. Einstein
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: openpgp-digital-signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 247 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231112/93472dbc/attachment.sig>

From Alexander at Leidinger.net  Mon Nov 13 09:04:26 2023
From: Alexander at Leidinger.net (Alexander Leidinger)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 09:04:26 +0100
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <d629a372c52438459e52c374530c6cca4d75e940.camel@posteo.de>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
 <d629a372c52438459e52c374530c6cca4d75e940.camel@posteo.de>
Message-ID: <25c690ecf3787e4d88ff5f938c242f7d@Leidinger.net>

Am 2023-11-13 07:09, schrieb Stephan Verb?cheln via Gnupg-users:
> On Sun, 2023-11-12 at 19:46 -0600, Jacob Bachmeyer wrote:
>> A PIN does not solve the problem, since the PIN is entered on
>> the device, which could be backdoored to store the PIN
> 
> That's why card readers with pinpads were invented, and GnuPG also
> supports that:
> https://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/ch02s02.html
> 
> Other ideas to improve isolation:
> * If you trust your Linux distribution in general but not every single
> desktop app, you can use a separate Linux user for sensitive
> activities.
> * You can use GnuPG Agent Forwarding via SSH to sign a file on a less
> trusted server from a more trusted client. This way your PIN is entered
> on the more trusted client machine.

What can you sign?
Non-complete answer:
  - git commits
  - files
  - emails

How can you sign emails?
Non-complete answer:
  - webmail interface
  - MUA with pgp support

 From which systems can you use such email signatures?
Non-complete answer:
  - Android
  - iOS
  - Windows
  - MacOS
  - Linux
  - FreeBSD
  - your TV (e.g. if it has a web browser)

Yubikey or similar and agent forwarding can't be used when I am not at 
home and access my webmail interface (I want to have a big screen for 
certain emails), typically this is not supported by a webmail interface.
Agent forwarding can't be used for this use case too.
I'm interested to hear about a Android App which supports yubikeys, but 
this is curiosity, as it doesn't help with the above case of a webmail 
interface.

Right now, there is no solution which allows an android app, a webmail 
interface from the work-PC and a MUA or webmail interface on/from your 
PC at home (no matter which OS) to use _1_ central location of your 
private key (so far you may be able to have it stored in your webmail 
solution, and on your yubikey for apps/git/files but the last part 
depends on something which is able to forward it to remote locations, 
which doesn't work if you need to use a web-interface based ssh gateway 
solution instead of direct ssh access). Feel free to prove me wrong, I 
would love to have a solution for this.

Note, while looking up something related, I found an old German overview 
about the email-apps situation from the authors of GPG for the German 
ministry of information security:
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/Studien/OpenPGP/openpgpandroid.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
I have fast-read some parts and it looks like the situation hasn't 
really changed in the last 8 years.

If you think about it (I just invested 1 minute), you would need:
  - some server with your private key which is reachable from everywhere
  - a safe authentication possibility to it
  - a remote signing protocol
  - support in all apps/MUAs/...

One could argue, that you put OIDC in front of gnupg-agent on a network 
socket and you have covered the 3 first items (but I would bet it is not 
as simple as that). Then it would be simply support in all the 
apps/MUAs/... (webmail interfaces which use gnupg-agent already, would 
be simple to convert if gnupg-agent would have a proxy feature which 
would connect to the remote agent).

Bye,
Alexander.

-- 
http://www.Leidinger.net Alexander at Leidinger.net: PGP 0x8F31830F9F2772BF
http://www.FreeBSD.org    netchild at FreeBSD.org  : PGP 0x8F31830F9F2772BF
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 833 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231113/6b9e874c/attachment.sig>

From verbuecheln at posteo.de  Mon Nov 13 10:29:40 2023
From: verbuecheln at posteo.de (Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Verb=FCcheln?=)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 09:29:40 +0000
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <25c690ecf3787e4d88ff5f938c242f7d@Leidinger.net>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
 <d629a372c52438459e52c374530c6cca4d75e940.camel@posteo.de>
 <25c690ecf3787e4d88ff5f938c242f7d@Leidinger.net>
Message-ID: <52ac17585c279d2b68666c883ac38195c9168eb2.camel@posteo.de>

His original post was about signing files, not reading encrypted mails.
Of course, everything gets complicated when you want to read the same
mails from many devices.

What would be the point of such a server? Having a server like that
appears dangerous to me. How is it protecting the key better than a
smartcard?
The smartcard is convenient for precisely that scenario, you can carry
it in your pocket and use it on any device. And the Agent Forwarding
allows you to use the key on servers without physical access.

On Mon, 2023-11-13 at 09:04 +0100, Alexander Leidinger wrote:
> I'm interested to hear about a Android App which supports yubikeys

I rarely read (encrypted) mails on my phone. However, K-9 Mail plus
OpenKeychain (each available in Google Play and F-Droid) support
Yubikey (and probably any other OpenPGP smartcard) via both USB and NFC
on my Samsung phone.

https://docs.k9mail.app/en/6.400/security/pgp/

I do not like webmail, but as far as I know there are various browser
addons for PGP in webmail.

https://mailvelope.com/

Regards
Stephan

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 260 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231113/5d95e019/attachment.sig>

From juergen at bruckner.email  Mon Nov 13 11:40:42 2023
From: juergen at bruckner.email (Juergen M. Bruckner)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 11:40:42 +0100
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <25c690ecf3787e4d88ff5f938c242f7d@Leidinger.net>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
 <d629a372c52438459e52c374530c6cca4d75e940.camel@posteo.de>
 <25c690ecf3787e4d88ff5f938c242f7d@Leidinger.net>
Message-ID: <9b1027e5-3157-46fe-b59e-9478e2655b24@bruckner.email>

Hello Alexander,

Am 13.11.23 um 09:04 schrieb Alexander Leidinger via Gnupg-users:
> I'm interested to hear about a Android App which supports yubikeys, but 
> this is curiosity, as it doesn't help with the above case of a webmail 
> interface.

As far I know 'Openkeychain' supports OpenPGP smartcards (Yubikey and 
Nitrokey) via USB and NFC.

best regards
Juergen

-- 
/?\   No  |
\ /  HTML |    Juergen Bruckner
  X    in  |    juergen at bruckner.email
/ \  Mail |
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 3482 bytes
Desc: Kryptografische S/MIME-Signatur
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231113/255da486/attachment-0001.bin>

From dan.list at brilhante.top  Mon Nov 13 12:46:19 2023
From: dan.list at brilhante.top (Daniel Cerqueira)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 11:46:19 +0000
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <65518002.5050809@gmail.com> (Jacob Bachmeyer's message of "Sun, 
 12 Nov 2023 19:46:42 -0600")
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top>

Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 at gmail.com> writes:

> The problem here is that, while the key never leaves the smartcard,
> the /entire/ device that accesses the smartcard must be trusted, as a
> backdoor on the device could steal plaintext or submit extra items for
> signing.  A PIN does not solve the problem, since the PIN is entered
> on the device, which could be backdoored to store the PIN and submit
> it along with Mallory's messages for the smartcard to sign---and the
> card will sign it, since the PIN checks out...
>
> Smartcards make silently duplicating the key difficult (supposedly
> infeasible) but do not solve the general problems with
> network-connected devices.

If you don't trust pinentry, maybe you should also not trust gnupg. They
are from the same project (gnupg.org).

I believe is best for you not to use gnupg and pinentry, until you
review it.


From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Tue Nov 14 05:23:16 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 22:23:16 -0600
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>	<87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top>
 <65518002.5050809@gmail.com> <87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top>
Message-ID: <6552F634.7050705@gmail.com>

Daniel Cerqueira wrote:
> Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 at gmail.com> writes:
>
>   
>> The problem here is that, while the key never leaves the smartcard,
>> the /entire/ device that accesses the smartcard must be trusted, as a
>> backdoor on the device could steal plaintext or submit extra items for
>> signing.  A PIN does not solve the problem, since the PIN is entered
>> on the device, which could be backdoored to store the PIN and submit
>> it along with Mallory's messages for the smartcard to sign---and the
>> card will sign it, since the PIN checks out...
>>
>> Smartcards make silently duplicating the key difficult (supposedly
>> infeasible) but do not solve the general problems with
>> network-connected devices.
>>     
>
> If you don't trust pinentry, maybe you should also not trust gnupg. They
> are from the same project (gnupg.org).
>
> I believe is best for you not to use gnupg and pinentry, until you
> review it.

My point is that smartcards do not magically increase security beyond 
the private key wrapping encryption built in to GPG, and provide little 
actual security benefit unless less-common steps (such as using a card 
reader with its own PIN pad) are taken.  (The convenience of being able 
to simply move the card between devices may be useful for some users.)

The issue here is not GPG or its associated pinentry program or any 
question of their integrity.  The issue is the possibility of the 
computer being tampered while I am away from it, or potentially, via the 
network, right under my nose.  (Consider the overall security of the 
typical Android device.)  So far, smartcards do not seem to provide any 
better protection in this case than GPG's own security features.  Such 
tampering would enable the theft of the GPG key passphrase or card PIN 
in either case.  In other words, the same attacks that can effectively 
break GPG's built in security also effectively break a smartcard by 
enabling the unauthorized use of the key on the card.

That is ignoring the additional risk that few if any smartcards use Free 
firmware, and are, by design, nearly impossible to verify.  A secret 
backdoor on the smartcard cannot be categorically ruled out, although 
such a violation of trust would be expected to effectively remove the 
card's manufacturer from the market should it come to light.


-- Jacob



From hfollmann at itcfollmann.com  Tue Nov 14 07:12:20 2023
From: hfollmann at itcfollmann.com (Henning Follmann)
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 01:12:20 -0500
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <6552F634.7050705@gmail.com>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
 <87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top> <6552F634.7050705@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ZVMPxHp1-AwUTZqe@oppenheimer.itcfollmann.com>

On Mon, Nov 13, 2023 at 10:23:16PM -0600, Jacob Bachmeyer via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Daniel Cerqueira wrote:
> > Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 at gmail.com> writes:
> > 
> 
[...]

> My point is that smartcards do not magically increase security beyond the
> private key wrapping encryption built in to GPG, and provide little actual
> security benefit unless less-common steps (such as using a card reader with
> its own PIN pad) are taken.  (The convenience of being able to simply move
> the card between devices may be useful for some users.)
> 
> The issue here is not GPG or its associated pinentry program or any question
> of their integrity.  The issue is the possibility of the computer being
> tampered while I am away from it, or potentially, via the network, right
> under my nose.  (Consider the overall security of the typical Android
> device.)  So far, smartcards do not seem to provide any better protection in
> this case than GPG's own security features.  Such tampering would enable the

Yes it does. The key can't be copied and taken away from the device. This
is an advantage.


> theft of the GPG key passphrase or card PIN in either case.  In other words,
> the same attacks that can effectively break GPG's built in security also
> effectively break a smartcard by enabling the unauthorized use of the key on
> the card.
> 
> That is ignoring the additional risk that few if any smartcards use Free
> firmware, and are, by design, nearly impossible to verify.  A secret
> backdoor on the smartcard cannot be categorically ruled out, although such a
> violation of trust would be expected to effectively remove the card's
> manufacturer from the market should it come to light.

nitrokey publishes its card firmware and it can be updated and
independently audited.
There is also the OpenPGP card. IIRC the firmware is also available.

Yubikey does not publish the key firmware but they have an independent
auditing process in place IIRC.

-H

-- 
Henning Follmann           | hfollmann at itcfollmann.com



From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Wed Nov 15 03:52:07 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:52:07 -0600
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <ZVMPxHp1-AwUTZqe@oppenheimer.itcfollmann.com>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
 <87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top> <6552F634.7050705@gmail.com>
 <ZVMPxHp1-AwUTZqe@oppenheimer.itcfollmann.com>
Message-ID: <65543257.4000905@gmail.com>

Henning Follmann wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 13, 2023 at 10:23:16PM -0600, Jacob Bachmeyer via Gnupg-users wrote:
>   
>> Daniel Cerqueira wrote:
>>     
>>> Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 at gmail.com> writes:
>>>       
> [...]
>   
>
> Yes it does. The key can't be copied and taken away from the device. This
> is an advantage.
>   

It is an advantage that is not relevant to network-connected 
general-purpose computing devices.

In both cases, the key is secure when not in use.  An encrypted private 
key is useless without the passphrase and a card is useless without the 
PIN.  In both cases the key can be further secured by physical 
isolation, storing the encrypted key on removable media or keeping the 
card out of the reader when not in use.  In both cases a "smash and 
grab" attack yields nothing of value, either an encrypted key or nothing 
at all (smartcard or removable media).  That means an intelligent 
attacker will attempt to place persistent malware to backdoor the 
device.  While the theft of both encrypted key and passphrase enables 
Mallory to forge signatures at his leisure, persistent malware could 
just as easily submit Mallory's messages to the smartcard for signing 
after locally stealing the PIN and simply waiting for the unsuspecting 
user to insert the card (or bring the token into NFC range... how many 
people would put phone and token into the same pocket without a second 
thought?).

Once the conditions necessary for an attacker to break GPG's built in 
private key security are met, the use of a smartcard is merely an 
inconvenience to an attacker.  In both cases, the attacker must wait for 
the key to be unlocked to produce a legitimate signature and can then, 
having stolen the authentication token (passphrase or PIN) used to 
unlock the key, produce additional (illegitimate) signatures.  The 
smartcard adds the minor inconvenience of having to wait for the user to 
insert the card, but this does not actually raise the bar for a 
successful attack, which is the forging of at least one signature, after 
which the key must be revoked.

Note that assuring the integrity of the device at all times that the 
card is connected generalizes to "at all times the key is used" for the 
GPG built in security case.  (If the integrity of the device is assured, 
then there can be no malware waiting to steal the passphrase and store 
it for later.)  If this condition is met, no attack can succeed in 
either case.  If this condition is not met, Mallory will eventually be 
able to forge a signature.  Therefore, smartcards do not actually 
provide additional security in the typical PGP usage.

Where smartcards are useful is protocols that require an untrusted or 
marginally trusted device that does not belong to the user to be able to 
produce a signature with the user's key for a short period of time but 
not afterwards.  Modern payment card systems supposedly are an example 
of this, but the EMV protocol has several less-secure legacy modes that 
may or may not still be in use.  (I do not know if the magstripe 
emulation mode has actually been phased out, for example.)


>> [...]
>>
>> That is ignoring the additional risk that few if any smartcards use Free
>> firmware, and are, by design, nearly impossible to verify.  A secret
>> backdoor on the smartcard cannot be categorically ruled out, although such a
>> violation of trust would be expected to effectively remove the card's
>> manufacturer from the market should it come to light.
>>     
>
> nitrokey publishes its card firmware and it can be updated and
> independently audited.
> There is also the OpenPGP card. IIRC the firmware is also available.
>
> Yubikey does not publish the key firmware but they have an independent
> auditing process in place IIRC.
>   

Those are improvements in the field since I had last checked, although 
those are still two suppliers out of an entire industry.  Thank you for 
that information.


-- Jacob


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Nov 15 11:03:08 2023
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 11:03:08 +0100
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <65543257.4000905@gmail.com> (Jacob Bachmeyer via Gnupg-users's
 message of "Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:52:07 -0600")
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>
 <87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top> <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>
 <87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top> <6552F634.7050705@gmail.com>
 <ZVMPxHp1-AwUTZqe@oppenheimer.itcfollmann.com>
 <65543257.4000905@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87cywbgwpv.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>

On Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:52, Jacob Bachmeyer said:

> succeed in either case.  If this condition is not met, Mallory will
> eventually be able to forge a signature.  Therefore, smartcards do not
> actually provide additional security in the typical PGP usage.

In all environments you have the advantage that you don't need to
re-deploy your public keys after a compromise of your signing box.
Sure, there are signatures on software/data out there which are not
legitimate but this is not different from the easier attack of modifying
the software/data before doing the signature.

Further, by inserting the smartcard only when required you limit the
exposure time of the key and hinder attackers to do a lot of
illegitimate signatures or decryption.

The OpenPGP cards feature a signature counter which can give you a hint
on whether it was used by something else than you.  It is not a perfect
solution but raises the hurdle for the attacker.  By using the smartcard
on different machines you can even avoid malware which fakes the
displaying of the signature counter.

For a policy POV having the key material securely locked away is also an
advantage - even if the data can be decrypted/signed using a smartcard
by malware.  The security of the key material and the ability to use the
key material are different topics in a security policy.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
The pioneers of a warless world are the youth that
refuse military service.             - A. Einstein
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: openpgp-digital-signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 247 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231115/1818640f/attachment.sig>

From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Thu Nov 16 06:18:40 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 23:18:40 -0600
Subject: gnupg 'signing server'? Looking for advice on key
 management/security
In-Reply-To: <87cywbgwpv.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
References: <4a79afa9-5c28-4b78-812a-7070145efbbb@weldingengineering.com>	<87a5rird4n.fsf@brilhante.top>
 <65518002.5050809@gmail.com>	<87pm0dq3jo.fsf@brilhante.top>
 <6552F634.7050705@gmail.com>	<ZVMPxHp1-AwUTZqe@oppenheimer.itcfollmann.com>	<65543257.4000905@gmail.com>
 <87cywbgwpv.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <6555A630.7020103@gmail.com>

Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:52, Jacob Bachmeyer said:
>   
>> succeed in either case.  If this condition is not met, Mallory will
>> eventually be able to forge a signature.  Therefore, smartcards do not
>> actually provide additional security in the typical PGP usage.
>>     
>
> In all environments you have the advantage that you don't need to
> re-deploy your public keys after a compromise of your signing box.
> Sure, there are signatures on software/data out there which are not
> legitimate but this is not different from the easier attack of modifying
> the software/data before doing the signature.
>   

This can vary with policy; I consider the known existence of an 
illegitimate signature to require the revocation of the signing key.

The easier attack you mention requires the same condition as breaking 
GPG's built in security or abusing the user's smartcard:  Mallory must 
plant persistent malware on the device that would have an opportunity to 
modify the item to be signed before GPG reads it and builds the signature.

> Further, by inserting the smartcard only when required you limit the
> exposure time of the key and hinder attackers to do a lot of
> illegitimate signatures or decryption.
>   

Yes; that is the "physical isolation" I mentioned as a further layer of 
security.

> The OpenPGP cards feature a signature counter which can give you a hint
> on whether it was used by something else than you.  It is not a perfect
> solution but raises the hurdle for the attacker.  By using the smartcard
> on different machines you can even avoid malware which fakes the
> displaying of the signature counter.
>   

The convenience of easily using multiple machines is one of the use 
cases for smartcards.  While I do not believe that it further 
/increases/ security, using a smartcard if keys are used on multiple 
machines certainly /preserves/ security while increasing convenience.

On a related note, the easier attack you mention of modifying the item 
to be signed would evade checks of the signature counter, since only the 
authorized signing event occurred, but the item signed had been tampered 
and was not the item the user intended to sign.

> For a policy POV having the key material securely locked away is also an
> advantage - even if the data can be decrypted/signed using a smartcard
> by malware.  The security of the key material and the ability to use the
> key material are different topics in a security policy.

Fair enough, although in my security model, the ability for an attacker 
to use the key material is the critical failure; insecurity of the key 
material implies that failure but the illegitimate use is the problem.


-- Jacob



From herbert at gojira.at  Thu Nov 16 11:55:54 2023
From: herbert at gojira.at (Herbert J. Skuhra)
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 11:55:54 +0100
Subject: epg-encrypt-string in Emacs seems to be incompatible with GnuPG
 2.4.1 on macOS, 2.4.0 works
In-Reply-To: <CAJUyYjourONojWUtPo4faLk-EQvY6MPAosbowGRj=TmSA3v40Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAJUyYjourONojWUtPo4faLk-EQvY6MPAosbowGRj=TmSA3v40Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87r0kqx8zp.wl-herbert@gojira.at>

On Sat, 20 May 2023 02:38:15 +0200, Robert Irelan wrote:
> 
> I'm not sure what info will be most useful for debugging this, but the
> `epg-encrypt-string` function seems not to work with GnuPG 2.4.1 on
> macOS, while GnuPG 2.4.0 works (both on x86_64, macOS 13.3.1, Macports
> used to install both).
> 
> This is the command line that seems to hang with 2.4.1:
> 
> ```
> /opt/local/bin/gpg2 --no-tty --status-fd 1 --yes
> --enable-progress-filter --command-fd 0 --output
> /var/folders/gc/73c5zcp918z9dssx8k1sybh00000gn/T/epg-output2zVC4K
> --pinentry-mode ask --decrypt --
> /var/folders/gc/73c5zcp918z9dssx8k1sybh00000gn/T/epg-inputMnF1UG
> ```
> 
> No settings in common.conf, gpg-agent.conf, or gpg.conf seem to affect
> this hanging command. Let me know what info I can provide to help
> debug this further

This issue (bug id: T6481) is obviously fixed on master (commit
2f872fa68c6576724b9dabee9fb0844266f55d0d):

https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=2f872fa68c6576724b9dabee9fb0844266f55d0d

Will this be merged to STABLE-BRANCH-2-4 and part of the next release
(2.4.4?)?

Thanks.

--
Herbert


From gniibe at fsij.org  Fri Nov 17 00:44:45 2023
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2023 08:44:45 +0900
Subject: epg-encrypt-string in Emacs seems to be incompatible with GnuPG
 2.4.1 on macOS, 2.4.0 works
In-Reply-To: <87r0kqx8zp.wl-herbert@gojira.at>
References: <CAJUyYjourONojWUtPo4faLk-EQvY6MPAosbowGRj=TmSA3v40Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <87r0kqx8zp.wl-herbert@gojira.at>
Message-ID: <87wmuhfeky.fsf@akagi.fsij.org>

Hello,

I'm sorry that I didn't have time yesterday.

"Herbert J. Skuhra" <herbert at gojira.at> wrote:
> This issue (bug id: T6481) is obviously fixed on master (commit
> 2f872fa68c6576724b9dabee9fb0844266f55d0d):
>
> https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=2f872fa68c6576724b9dabee9fb0844266f55d0d
>
> Will this be merged to STABLE-BRANCH-2-4 and part of the next release
> (2.4.4?)?

Yes.  It's pushed now.  If you see any regressions due to this patch,
please let us know.
-- 


From felix.klee at inka.de  Mon Nov 20 09:24:32 2023
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 16:24:32 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>

I added an authentication key to my existing key <yubikey at f76.eu>.

    $ gpg --edit-key --expert yubikey at f76.eu
    > addkey

I selected:

    8: RSA (set your own capabilities)
    S: disable sign capability
    E: disable encrypt capability
    A: enable authenticate capability
    4096: key size
    0: expiry (never)

However, I cannot export it for SSH:

    $ gpg --list-keys --keyid-format SHORT yubikey at f76.eu
    pub   rsa4096/1B6ED589 2023-06-29 [SC]
          7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
    uid         [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey at f76.eu>
    sub   rsa4096/D2E31736 2023-06-29 [E]
    sub   rsa4096/FBA5B1E5 2023-11-20 [A]

    $ gpg --export-ssh-key FBA5B1E5
    gpg: key "FBA5B1E5" not found: Unusable public key
    gpg: export as ssh key failed: Unusable public key

GnuPG version:

    $ gpg --version
    gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27
    libgcrypt 1.9.4
    Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    License GNU GPL-3.0-or-later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
    This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
    There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

    Home: /home/felix/.gnupg
    Supported algorithms:
    Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA, ECDH, ECDSA, EDDSA
    Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH,
            CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
    Hash: SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
    Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2

What?s wrong here?


From kloecker at kde.org  Mon Nov 20 17:36:29 2023
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 17:36:29 +0100
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>

On Montag, 20. November 2023 09:24:32 CET Felix E. Klee wrote:
>     $ gpg --list-keys --keyid-format SHORT yubikey at f76.eu
>     pub   rsa4096/1B6ED589 2023-06-29 [SC]
>           7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
>     uid         [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey at f76.eu>
>     sub   rsa4096/D2E31736 2023-06-29 [E]
>     sub   rsa4096/FBA5B1E5 2023-11-20 [A]
> 
>     $ gpg --export-ssh-key FBA5B1E5
>     gpg: key "FBA5B1E5" not found: Unusable public key
>     gpg: export as ssh key failed: Unusable public key

Try
$ gpg --export-ssh-key FBA5B1E5!
(note the exclamation mark which indicates a subkey to gpg)
or
$ gpg --export-ssh-key 1B6ED589
(which makes gpg export the latest valid subkey which has an authentication 
capability)

Regards,
Ingo
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part.
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231120/0e239754/attachment.sig>

From alec at alec.pl  Tue Nov 21 12:05:39 2023
From: alec at alec.pl (Aleksander Machniak)
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 12:05:39 +0100
Subject: NO_SECKEY difference between 2.2 and 2.3
Message-ID: <9564dbe1-059d-4084-a9c0-15a46141e61c@alec.pl>

I just noticed a difference on how NO_SECKEY status is used between 
2.2.x and 2.3.3.

When I do --decrypt on an encrypted email message (having only 
recipient's private+public key in the keyring):
- v2.2 outputs one NO_SECKEY line referring the recipient's key
- v2.3 outputs two NO_SECKEY lines referring both recipient's and 
sender's keys.

Is this expected behavior change?

-- 
Aleksander Machniak
Kolab Groupware Developer        [https://kolab.org]
Roundcube Webmail Developer  [https://roundcube.net]
----------------------------------------------------
PGP: 19359DC1 # Blog: https://kolabian.wordpress.com


From kloecker at kde.org  Tue Nov 21 14:59:44 2023
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 14:59:44 +0100
Subject: NO_SECKEY difference between 2.2 and 2.3
In-Reply-To: <9564dbe1-059d-4084-a9c0-15a46141e61c@alec.pl>
References: <9564dbe1-059d-4084-a9c0-15a46141e61c@alec.pl>
Message-ID: <5733125.DvuYhMxLoT@daneel>

On Dienstag, 21. November 2023 12:05:39 CET Aleksander Machniak wrote:
> I just noticed a difference on how NO_SECKEY status is used between
> 2.2.x and 2.3.3.
> 
> When I do --decrypt on an encrypted email message (having only
> recipient's private+public key in the keyring):
> - v2.2 outputs one NO_SECKEY line referring the recipient's key

Referring to the recipient's key? I understood that you do have the 
recipient's key but that you lack the sender's key.

> - v2.3 outputs two NO_SECKEY lines referring both recipient's and
> sender's keys.
> 
> Is this expected behavior change?

Maybe not, but 2.3.3 is more than 2 years old. Current is 2.4.3.

Regards,
Ingo
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part.
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231121/b5d194cf/attachment.sig>

From alec at alec.pl  Tue Nov 21 15:28:46 2023
From: alec at alec.pl (Aleksander Machniak)
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 15:28:46 +0100
Subject: NO_SECKEY difference between 2.2 and 2.3
In-Reply-To: <5733125.DvuYhMxLoT@daneel>
References: <9564dbe1-059d-4084-a9c0-15a46141e61c@alec.pl>
 <5733125.DvuYhMxLoT@daneel>
Message-ID: <af2c91cc-e82f-428e-8e18-23d40bec375e@alec.pl>

On 21.11.2023 14:59, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
>> When I do --decrypt on an encrypted email message (having only
>> recipient's private+public key in the keyring):
>> - v2.2 outputs one NO_SECKEY line referring the recipient's key
> 
> Referring to the recipient's key? I understood that you do have the
> recipient's key but that you lack the sender's key.

Yes, that's right. I don't need a sender's key to decrypt a message.

>> - v2.3 outputs two NO_SECKEY lines referring both recipient's and
>> sender's keys.
>>
>> Is this expected behavior change?
> 
> Maybe not, but 2.3.3 is more than 2 years old. Current is 2.4.3.

That's what I have on Alma Linux 9 by default. I'll take a look for an 
update.

-- 
Aleksander Machniak
Kolab Groupware Developer        [https://kolab.org]
Roundcube Webmail Developer  [https://roundcube.net]
----------------------------------------------------
PGP: 19359DC1 # Blog: https://kolabian.wordpress.com



From bernhard at intevation.de  Wed Nov 22 09:18:11 2023
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:18:11 +0100
Subject: NO_SECKEY difference between 2.2 and 2.3
In-Reply-To: <af2c91cc-e82f-428e-8e18-23d40bec375e@alec.pl>
References: <9564dbe1-059d-4084-a9c0-15a46141e61c@alec.pl>
 <5733125.DvuYhMxLoT@daneel> <af2c91cc-e82f-428e-8e18-23d40bec375e@alec.pl>
Message-ID: <202311220918.11512.bernhard@intevation.de>

Am Dienstag 21 November 2023 15:28:46 schrieb Aleksander Machniak:
> >> - v2.3 outputs two NO_SECKEY lines referring both recipient's and
> >> sender's keys.

Potentially the sender has encrypted the message for themselves, this would 
explain why there are two potential decryption keys that you both do not 
have. Try an additional -v to see more about the message structure.

Maybe v2.3 is just more informative here.


-- 
https://intevation.de/~bernhard ? +49 541 33 508 3-3
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, DE; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Gesch?ftsf?hrer: Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 659 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part.
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231122/f985446b/attachment-0001.sig>

From felix.klee at inka.de  Wed Nov 22 12:39:30 2023
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 19:39:30 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 12:38?AM Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org> wrote:
> $ gpg --export-ssh-key 1B6ED589

Thanks, this worked! I then added the key on the remote system to:

    ~/.ssh/authorized_keys

However, I could not log in.  SSH reports:

    Permission denied (publickey).

I then tried exporting the key using `ssh-add`:

    ssh-add -L >~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub

If I add this key to `authorized_keys`, I can log in, after unlocking my
Yubikey with a PIN. Great! Or not, read on.

Now it gets a bit weird: Apparently the key exported by `ssh-add` is not
tied to my authentication key! I noticed this because I replaced the
authentication key. They key exported by `ssh-add` did not change. I can
still log in using that key. So I assume that key is based on the my
signature key `1B6ED589`:

    $ gpg --list-keys --keyid-format SHORT yubikey at f76.eu
    pub   rsa4096/1B6ED589 2023-06-29 [SC]
          7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
    uid         [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey at f76.eu>
    sub   rsa4096/D2E31736 2023-06-29 [E]
    sub   rsa4096/877CC64B 2023-11-22 [A]

Should I better use the authentication key exported by GPG for SSH? But
how to make that work?


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Nov 22 13:57:03 2023
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 13:57:03 +0100
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
 (Felix E. Klee's message of "Wed, 22 Nov 2023 19:39:30 +0800")
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
 <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>

On Wed, 22 Nov 2023 19:39, Felix E. Klee said:

> However, I could not log in.  SSH reports:
>
>     Permission denied (publickey).

You need to make sure that the gpg-agent is running and the
SSH_AUTH_SOCK envvar is set correctly.  Here is the snippet from by
~/.bashrc

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
# Setup information required by GnuPG and ssh.  We use the
# standard socket in GnuPG's homedir, thus there is no need for an
# environment variable.  We reset any left over envvar.
# SSH_AGENT_PID should not be set either because it is only used
# to kill ssh-agent (option -k) but we don't want this to kill
# gpg-agent.  Because ssh does not know about GnuPG's homedir we
# need to set its envvar to the standard gpg-agent.  GPG_TTY needs
# to be set to the current TTY.  The extra test is used to avoid
# setting SSH_AUTH_SOCK if gpg-agent has been started with a
# shell on the command line (often used for testing).
unset GPG_AGENT_INFO
unset SSH_AGENT_PID
if [ "${gnupg_SSH_AUTH_SOCK_by:-0}" -ne $$ ]; then
  export SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$(gpgconf --list-dirs agent-ssh-socket)"
fi
export GPG_TTY=$(tty)
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

In case you are switching to a different X server etc, you may need to
run

  gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye

once.  This will also make sure that the agent is launched.

Although gpg-agent by default creates the socket for the ssh-agent
protocol, some distros have a pecularity that they look into
~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf and check whether there is a
"enable-ssh-support" option set.  If not they don't set the envvar (as
above) or do their necessary systemd stuff to create the socket.

> I then tried exporting the key using `ssh-add`:
>
>     ssh-add -L >~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub

ssh-add should have connected to gpg-agent and exported the ssh public
keys it knows.  You don't need to put this into id_rsa.pub.  I use 

> Now it gets a bit weird: Apparently the key exported by `ssh-add` is not
> tied to my authentication key! I noticed this because I replaced the
> authentication key. They key exported by `ssh-add` did not change. I can

What is in your ~/.gnupg/sshcontrol file?  It should list the keygrips
of the keys to be used for ssh.

  gpg -k --with-keygrip yubikey at f76.eu

Instead of putting this into sshcontrol you may also put them into the
private-keys-v1.d/<KEYGRIP>.key file with a line:

  Use-for-ssh: yes

FWIW, you may also use

  Label: My pink token

to have a nicer prompt.

> Should I better use the authentication key exported by GPG for SSH? But
> how to make that work?

  gpg --export-ssh-key

Adds a comment with the keyid - is that one correct?  Does it match what
you see with

  ssh-add -L

(or ssh-add -l)?


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
The pioneers of a warless world are the youth that
refuse military service.             - A. Einstein
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: openpgp-digital-signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 247 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231122/0b356487/attachment.sig>

From felix at f76.eu  Wed Nov 22 09:17:44 2023
From: felix at f76.eu (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 16:17:44 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J3ijneiu09x3JerggeQvv2ikKu6doOW4TFT0yh9fJVpjQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 12:38?AM Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org> wrote:
> $ gpg --export-ssh-key 1B6ED589

Thanks, this worked! I then added the key on the remote system to:

    ~/.ssh/authorized_keys

However, I could not log in.  SSH reports:

    Permission denied (publickey).

I then tried exporting the key using `ssh-add`:

    ssh-add -L >~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub

If I add this key to `authorized_keys`, I can log in, after unlocking my
Yubikey with a PIN. Great! Or not, read on.

Now it gets a bit weird: Apparently the key exported by `ssh-add` is not
tied to my authentication key! I noticed this because I replaced the
authentication key. They key exported by `ssh-add` did not change. I can
still log in using that key. So I assume that key is based on the my
signature key `1B6ED589`:

    $ gpg --list-keys --keyid-format SHORT yubikey at f76.eu
    pub   rsa4096/1B6ED589 2023-06-29 [SC]
          7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
    uid         [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey at f76.eu>
    sub   rsa4096/D2E31736 2023-06-29 [E]
    sub   rsa4096/877CC64B 2023-11-22 [A]

Should I better use the authentication key exported by GPG for SSH? But
how to make that work?


From felix.klee at inka.de  Thu Nov 23 03:17:04 2023
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 10:17:04 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
 <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
 <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 22, 2023 at 8:57?PM Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> Here is the snippet from by ~/.bashrc

I have a similar config. Thank you for the detailed explanation!

Only the following line does not work right after autologin (default
with Ubuntu / WSL2), seems like something is not ready yet.

    gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye

> What is in your ~/.gnupg/sshcontrol file?

It?s empty, with only comments at the top. I left it that way, and
proceeded as follows:

> Instead of putting this into sshcontrol you may also put them into the
> private-keys-v1.d/<KEYGRIP>.key file with a line:
>
>   Use-for-ssh: yes

I added that to 0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786.key, which is
my master key.  But it still doesn?t work, see below.

Should I add a file with the authentication key instead?

>   gpg --export-ssh-key
>
> Adds a comment with the keyid - is that one correct?  Does it match what
> you see with
>
>   ssh-add -L

Output:

    $ gpg -k --with-keygrip yubikey at f76.eu
    pub   rsa4096 2023-06-29 [SC]
          7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
          Keygrip = 0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786
    uid           [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey at f76.eu>
    sub   rsa4096 2023-06-29 [E]
          Keygrip = 07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2
    sub   rsa4096 2023-11-22 [A]
          Keygrip = 9C67E5BBB72EF0BF2625792F8F134CE4FD961FF5
    $ gpg --export-ssh-key yubikey at f76.eu
    ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAACAQC1jJSXxnM4iR3F16Yd5FEjrOo6sbGF
    rkvVVoqUt9iyL5Z+Lz1ElpyUoKcGRRtU8NNueI8RpJT7ipIxubMiefDHVU7FRhk809jQ
    vlTu8YDezdIZ0BWJ3W9+CCCQkD9JNmr5LsUnqD5KKUP4v0rwN6zLsXARGjpv1Jj61vJe
    o3+B9CGpe8cIFvbdVw7QEi5t1hW9ghRrHDREXhIYkc51rzK4htBBdlX7E4yFuiuPZC/2
    Q2lUelBrHP+bwgC+GzliHUIseuGAGEpSjJadtuSC2gUZbgv7PN6jM7WzaSdJ22spoFlP
    XoIimu4hSOpEgK/txOuB+ge3MrpXEQPYW1tN0nD1RZF39uGbGdQrk9s6MARbZ+1APTJh
    H6oi9fPfOp7EEkmZsm1ojwGoIN+RoYQ23KMVqI915SNn5CaRySQNenVyAJ7Skl2Q3bdK
    ENW7lkGFXZ/DxpA8dQITZGBJEGhVppj2Pfp4uANDcdqUUGCN3i0srmkb7XaNn3U9qyIB
    KEgnFupkNfMVB48AQu1PYxoEoO/zIyTVlPn0iSAl64zA27u5RXlikEbx0ePvPSYuMTL4
    ZaDk2vNvKNmPvXBi6dZvXIPx2ROrqBrLMNx19EHDVSSVT+R3Qf1f/4TwRdHPb6ZliSFv
    FF6eygY40y5whHNy7Q8zxrj5Py56Cp+Alus3jr6UNw== openpgp:0x877CC64B
    $ ssh-add -L
    ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAACAQCpsX4nQnLh3SJDdIDkdX0DFY4c2uFu
    6QJRPrXyub32Ae5SX+3rQnhj/7U8PGFG5LbRT8NVHMyxmoXAHda3wZ1Za3mTC8oWUPSz
    dIlSgB7HrVNvmP0fvk0b1V9BOkBJrV6RMMNLEssiD9PCiI95z1+uEbxr9tZAJO/lDYnU
    jhEK6PykBhQiJISHpWnWmE0qj+84wQ+/cEPJYnt4tgqLuFH+COFGBVuN6DDi6ubbDlCy
    693UqQjWSNi1A34JmUKFOw5Kt0It3Qj3nNVdm8/hRiVZ84qPVbF1Vvp0gZ9k1sFg+3O9
    LZYo0vZ73gLMx6AjO1A+Cqcef/e6O+aT+CVgINQ6oaDMyKtHkD7caflg8nPrmiVASxTe
    nn51W3Uiu1wksrtEH2HCUcLXpMWKNTjjwpUUTSmMy4m069K5SENsjzsMsHiN2cTxdNu5
    CufP1Q3XtGI4VCdW5ql0vgZMCPHIuXHLyFpz9scc2I68B8YnoMzzH0CDyLpjudBRlup+
    BZD1g2xlCWB9f+43Oy+Ibf5wAW8/gjk5ly6fhQwB712GTHXNKpPl2ymXgtP2v0K48TE7
    OsIfR0sBk2LbwuXr2tLB1WYgrNYs8YY83u/HC6RWHskrcIRq75ahcdeTu8Ukdz1VhAdL
    sk25F529lMjW0CgshB9xvFxCwFzcGMmHniuMjoFN6Q== cardno:18 698 015
    $ ssh-add -l
    4096 SHA256:Pun8mwtl04HFOK8Z1LbCRZ/oQLgZDpkgNHU5/E1MM8I cardno:18 69
    8 015 (RSA)

As you see, the public keys are different. `ssh-add -L` does not add the
key ID. So I?ve no idea what is going on.

The key exported by `ssh-add -L` works. I get asked for the PIN, the
Yubikey blinks, and then I?m in:

    $ ssh user at example.com
    [user at example ~]$

The key exported by `gpg --export-ssh-key yubikey at f76.eu` does not work:

    $ ssh user at example.com
    user at example.com: Permission denied (publickey).

As it works with the key exported with `ssh-add -L`, maybe I should not
complain. However what confuses me is that the output of `ssh-add -L`
does not change after I replaced the authentication subkey.

Can you explain why the output of `ssh-add -L` did not change? Also why
is it not the same as the output from `gpg --export-ssh-key
yubikey at f76.eu`?

(Background: I replaced the authentication subkey because the first time
I added it, I forgot to make a backup of the updated secret key.)


From verbuecheln at posteo.de  Thu Nov 23 07:19:37 2023
From: verbuecheln at posteo.de (Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Verb=FCcheln?=)
Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 06:19:37 +0000
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
 <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
 <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
 <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2f37ba49338c0858e9dfbb6f8396d202d2091ac0.camel@posteo.de>

Another convenient way is to use ?~/.config/ssh?. This allows different
configurations per host without changing your global environment.

Example:

Host gitlab.com
    HostName gitlab.com
    User git
    IdentityAgent ${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh

Regards
Stephan
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 260 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231123/94c43152/attachment.sig>

From dan.list at brilhante.top  Thu Nov 23 22:09:23 2023
From: dan.list at brilhante.top (Daniel Cerqueira)
Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 21:09:23 +0000
Subject: Learning about authentication
Message-ID: <87msv42n3w.fsf@brilhante.top>

I want to know a bit, on how authentication and authorization works in
GnuPG.

I know that for encryption, GnuPG creates a session key with the public
key, that is then used with symmetric encryption. For decryption, the
private key is used to recover that session key, in which then, the
ciphertext get's symmetrically decrypted, using that session key.

I know that for signing, a hash of the content is produced, that,
afterwards, gets encrypted with the private key. For verification, the
public key is used to recover the original hash, and then that gets
compared with the content hashing.

I don't understand how authentication and authorization works. Can
someone clarify this for me?

Thanks.


From felix.klee at inka.de  Fri Nov 24 09:09:29 2023
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 16:09:29 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <2f37ba49338c0858e9dfbb6f8396d202d2091ac0.camel@posteo.de>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
 <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
 <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
 <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <2f37ba49338c0858e9dfbb6f8396d202d2091ac0.camel@posteo.de>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J0w_EcpJ+ai7sUVCfncP6br_4cF8aiyLJiKRgjR1z8p8Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 2:19?PM Stephan Verb?cheln via Gnupg-users
<gnupg-users at gnupg.org> wrote:
> Host gitlab.com
>     HostName gitlab.com
>     User git
>     IdentityAgent ${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh

Thanks, that works. Even the variable is expanded.

In addition, I need:

    gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye


From gniibe at fsij.org  Sat Nov 25 02:19:39 2023
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 10:19:39 +0900
Subject: Learning about authentication
In-Reply-To: <87msv42n3w.fsf@brilhante.top>
References: <87msv42n3w.fsf@brilhante.top>
Message-ID: <87a5r2634k.fsf@akagi.fsij.org>

Hello,

Daniel Cerqueira wrote:
> I want to know a bit, on how authentication and authorization works in
> GnuPG.

Do you mean authentication subkey in GnuPG?  It's basically
user-defined;  It's up to user how it is used.

Usually, it means use with OpenSSH.  For example, I have an
authentication subkey as my OpenPGP key.  I use it with GnuPG, when I
accesss git repo with OpenSSH.  SSH authentication is done by OpenSSH
and ssh-agent emulation of gpg-agent.  It means that the key is under
control of GnuPG, actually.

(Other possible use case is use with Scute for X.509 client certificate
authentication, together with Web browser.  This is not that
common/popular, though.)

FYI, I wrote this ten years ago:

    Using GPG's authentication key for SSH access:
    https://www.gniibe.org/memo/software/ssh/using-gpgkey-for-ssh.html

Hope this helps,
-- 
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 251 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231125/cf6428b0/attachment-0001.sig>

From rjmx at rjmx.net  Sat Nov 25 04:15:28 2023
From: rjmx at rjmx.net (Ron Murray)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 03:15:28 +0000
Subject: Problems with [Q]GpgME and Qt6
Message-ID: <80ce2a923d8e6.ef451379bc9b@rjmx.net>

(Crossposting to Qt Forum)
I have an app that works fine in Qt5. I use QGpgME to encrypt/decrypt 
messages and handle key usage. I'm trying to upgrade the app to Qt6, and, 
naturally, expected problems, but this one beats me.
Here, for example, is the code I use to retrieve my secret key list:
QGpgME::KeyListJob *job = QGpgME::openpgp()->keyListJob(false, false, 
false);
// Prepare result vector
std::vector<GpgME::Key> keys;
// Execute it synchronously
GpgME::KeyListResult result = job->exec(QStringList() <<
QStringLiteral(""), // No pattern: get all
true, keys); // Only secret keys
delete job;
Now, this is straight out of the "t-keylist.cpp" test file that comes with 
the GpgME source. It works perfectly well under Qt5. but under Qt6, it 
segfaults at the "job->exec" line. 
Anyone have a clue why it crashes under Qt6?
Thanks,
-- 
Ron Murray <rjmx at rjmx.net <mailto:rjmx at rjmx.net> >
PGP Fingerprint: 4D99 70E3 2317 334B 141E 7B63 12F7 E865 B5E2 E761
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231125/d6e6e113/attachment.html>

From t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me  Sat Nov 25 10:02:22 2023
From: t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me (Thomas)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 10:02:22 +0100
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
Message-ID: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>

Hello,
I'm trying to configure a solution for this use case:
SSH??? ??? ??? ??? ? SSH
Client??? ??? ??? ??? ---->??? Jumphost??? ---->??? Server
(Windows 11)??? ??? ???? ????? (Linux)?? ??? ??? ?? (Linux)

I connect a Nitrokey security-token (that is comparable to Yubikey) with 
OpenPGP keys to my client.
And I want to use this Nitrokey for SSH login to remote servers.

For this I installed GPG4Win on my client and configured file 
gpg-agent.conf:
enable-ssh-support
To Enable support for PuTTY
enable-putty-support
To Enable support for the native Microsoft OpenSSH binaries (requires 
gpg 2.4.0 / Gpg4win 4.1.0 or higher)
enable-win32-openssh-support
use-standard-socket
default-cache-ttl 600
max-cache-ttl 7200

Then I? (re-) start the gpg-agent and try to SSH into the Jumphost using 
command ssh <fqdn-jumphost> in Windows PowerShell.
Here I get a popup window where I must enter the PIN previously set on 
Nitrokey.
After this I'm connected to the jumphost (Linux).

Now I want to connect to the server using command ssh <fqdn-server>, 
however I need to enter a password.
This means public key authentication fails.
And I think this fails because SSH agent forwarding is not working.

Can you please advise how to SSH agent forwarding in my setup correctly?

THX
Thomas


From verbuecheln at posteo.de  Sat Nov 25 12:30:45 2023
From: verbuecheln at posteo.de (Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Verb=FCcheln?=)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 11:30:45 +0000
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
Message-ID: <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>

Coincidentally, I have a similar setup. Fortunately, you do *not* need
Agent Forwarding for authentication via jump hosts.

The entry for your host (in ?~/.ssh/config?) for this host should look
something like this:

Host myalias
    HostName myserver.com
    ProxyJump jumpserver.net
    IdentityAgent %d/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh

There may be some Windows-specific pitfalls. Perhaps you have to be
careful with the line breaks (Unix versus Windows convention) in the
configuration files.

Regards
Stephan
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 260 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231125/c7dfea02/attachment.sig>

From t.schneider at disroot.org  Sat Nov 25 13:24:31 2023
From: t.schneider at disroot.org (Thomas Schneider)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 13:24:31 +0100
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
Message-ID: <20f04abb-9a6f-49e1-9a23-d2da18ff8053@disroot.org>

Hello Stephan,

thanks for your reply.

When you say I should modify ~/.ssh/config, where is this file?
On jumphost?

Actually I have a working setup on Windows 10, but here I use another 
terminal emulator: MobaXterm.
And in the settings of MobaXterm I enabled SSH forwarding.

As of now I don't want to continue using MobaXterm on Windows 11, but 
using Windows Terminal.

THX

Am 25.11.23 um 12:30 schrieb Stephan Verb?cheln via Gnupg-users:
> Coincidentally, I have a similar setup. Fortunately, you do *not* need
> Agent Forwarding for authentication via jump hosts.
>
> The entry for your host (in ?~/.ssh/config?) for this host should look
> something like this:
>
> Host myalias
>      HostName myserver.com
>      ProxyJump jumpserver.net
>      IdentityAgent %d/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh
>
> There may be some Windows-specific pitfalls. Perhaps you have to be
> careful with the line breaks (Unix versus Windows convention) in the
> configuration files.
>
> Regards
> Stephan
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me  Sat Nov 25 19:31:15 2023
From: t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me (Thomas)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 19:31:15 +0100
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
Message-ID: <b5f65734-f1ee-49c1-ac62-b18963c95502@getgoogleoff.me>

Hello Stephan,

thanks for your reply.

When you say I should modify ~/.ssh/config, where is this file?
On jumphost?

Actually I have a working setup on Windows 10, but here I use another 
terminal emulator: MobaXterm.
And in the settings of MobaXterm I enabled SSH forwarding.

As of now I don't want to continue using MobaXterm on Windows 11, but 
using Windows Terminal.

THX

Am 25.11.23 um 12:30 schrieb Stephan Verb?cheln via Gnupg-users:
> Coincidentally, I have a similar setup. Fortunately, you do *not* need
> Agent Forwarding for authentication via jump hosts.
>
> The entry for your host (in ?~/.ssh/config?) for this host should look
> something like this:
>
> Host myalias
> HostName myserver.com
> ProxyJump jumpserver.net
> IdentityAgent %d/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh
>
> There may be some Windows-specific pitfalls. Perhaps you have to be
> careful with the line breaks (Unix versus Windows convention) in the
> configuration files.
>
> Regards
> Stephan
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users




From kloecker at kde.org  Sat Nov 25 20:54:57 2023
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 20:54:57 +0100
Subject: Problems with [Q]GpgME and Qt6
In-Reply-To: <80ce2a923d8e6.ef451379bc9b@rjmx.net>
References: <80ce2a923d8e6.ef451379bc9b@rjmx.net>
Message-ID: <5735251.DvuYhMxLoT@daneel>

On Samstag, 25. November 2023 04:15:28 CET Ron Murray via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Here, for example, is the code I use to retrieve my secret key list:
> QGpgME::KeyListJob *job = QGpgME::openpgp()->keyListJob(false, false,
> false);
> // Prepare result vector
> std::vector<GpgME::Key> keys;
> // Execute it synchronously
> GpgME::KeyListResult result = job->exec(QStringList() <<
> QStringLiteral(""), // No pattern: get all
> true, keys); // Only secret keys
> delete job;
> Now, this is straight out of the "t-keylist.cpp" test file that comes with
> the GpgME source. It works perfectly well under Qt5. but under Qt6, it
> segfaults at the "job->exec" line.
> Anyone have a clue why it crashes under Qt6?

I cannot reproduce this on openSUSE Tumbleweed with Qt 6.6.0. I changed the 
`job->exec` call in t-keylist.cpp as above. This makes the test fail (because 
the assertion is no longer true), but it doesn't crash. It would help if you'd 
give us a backtrace of the segfault.

Regards,
Ingo
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part.
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231125/682beb87/attachment-0001.sig>

From bernd at kr217.de  Sat Nov 25 20:10:25 2023
From: bernd at kr217.de (Bernd Naumann)
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2023 20:10:25 +0100
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <20f04abb-9a6f-49e1-9a23-d2da18ff8053@disroot.org>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
 <20f04abb-9a6f-49e1-9a23-d2da18ff8053@disroot.org>
Message-ID: <82dd1464-391b-4d79-b73a-84b347b86719@kr217.de>

On 25.11.23 13:24, Thomas Schneider via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Hello Stephan,
> 
> thanks for your reply.
> 
> When you say I should modify ~/.ssh/config, where is this file?
> On jumphost?
> 
> Actually I have a working setup on Windows 10, but here I use another
> terminal emulator: MobaXterm.
> And in the settings of MobaXterm I enabled SSH forwarding.
> 
> As of now I don't want to continue using MobaXterm on Windows 11, but
> using Windows Terminal.

Hey Stephan,

I can not answer where to find that file on windows, but the first hit
with google: https://stackoverflow.com/a/56536275

You can also set these options directly on the command line:
```
ssh -o IdentityAgent='%d/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh' -o
ProxyJump=jumpserver.example.net targethost.example.org
```

I'm not sure if you really have to set the IdentityAgent if your GPG and
SSH Agent Socket is setup correctly...

Do you see something with `ssh-add -L`? If yes, then you should not have
a need to set IdentityAgent for a Host. (Only if you have multiple
Agents or you have to specify it only for certain hosts etc etc but if
its your only Agent and you have no special requirements, then just
leave it out IF `ssh-add -L` shows you the key from your card.)

Good luck,
Bernd


From t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me  Mon Nov 27 14:43:50 2023
From: t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me (t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me)
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 14:43:50 +0100
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
Message-ID: <3d610625ec3cd58803caf586494ed6c9@getgoogleoff.me>

Hello Stephan,

thanks for your reply.

When you say I should modify ~/.ssh/config, where is this file?
On jumphost?

Actually I have a working setup on Windows 10, but here I use another
terminal emulator: MobaXterm.
And in the settings of MobaXterm I enabled SSH forwarding.

As of now I don't want to continue using MobaXterm on Windows 11, but
using Windows Terminal.

Please not that I have not installed git for windows [1] that includes 
tool "Git BASH"; I don't think that this additional terminal is required 
to use SSH.

I can run ssh-add.exe -L in Windows PowerShell and get the correct SSH 
public key fetched from secure card.

But once connected to jumphost, all SSH relevant information is 
unavailable.

THX

On 2023-11-25 12:30, Stephan Verb?cheln via Gnupg-users wrote:

> Coincidentally, I have a similar setup. Fortunately, you do *not* need
> Agent Forwarding for authentication via jump hosts.
> 
> The entry for your host (in "~/.ssh/config") for this host should look
> something like this:
> 
> Host myalias
> HostName myserver.com
> ProxyJump jumpserver.net
> IdentityAgent %d/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh
> 
> There may be some Windows-specific pitfalls. Perhaps you have to be
> careful with the line breaks (Unix versus Windows convention) in the
> configuration files.
> 
> Regards
> Stephan
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



Links:
------
[1] https://gitforwindows.org/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231127/fe9bc41d/attachment.html>

From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Tue Nov 28 03:53:38 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 20:53:38 -0600
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <3d610625ec3cd58803caf586494ed6c9@getgoogleoff.me>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
 <3d610625ec3cd58803caf586494ed6c9@getgoogleoff.me>
Message-ID: <65655632.5000906@gmail.com>

Thomas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Hello Stephan,
>  
> thanks for your reply.
>  
> When you say I should modify ~/.ssh/config, where is this file?
> On jumphost?

You need to configure SSH agent forwarding on your client, which will 
provide access to your local SSH agent at the jumphost via the SSH 
connection between your client and the jumphost.  Since you are using a 
Windows client, ~/.ssh/config may not be relevant to your configuration.


-- Jacob


From t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me  Tue Nov 28 07:02:13 2023
From: t.schneider at getgoogleoff.me (Thomas)
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 07:02:13 +0100
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <65655632.5000906@gmail.com>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
 <3d610625ec3cd58803caf586494ed6c9@getgoogleoff.me>
 <65655632.5000906@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <018eb198-8104-4ce8-be80-9d708d7684b6@getgoogleoff.me>

Hi,
this is exactly what I thought.
However, there's no solution for it.

Let me repeat my comments posted previously to get an overview what is 
working...
Actually I have a working setup on Windows 10, but here I use another 
terminal emulator: MobaXterm.
And in the settings of MobaXterm I enabled SSH forwarding.
As of now I don't want to continue using MobaXterm on Windows 11, but
using Windows Terminal.
I can run ssh-add.exe -L in Windows PowerShell and get the correct SSH 
public key fetched from secure card.


THX


Am 28.11.23 um 03:53 schrieb Jacob Bachmeyer:
> Thomas via Gnupg-users wrote:
>> Hello Stephan,
>>
>> thanks for your reply.
>>
>> When you say I should modify ~/.ssh/config, where is this file?
>> On jumphost?
>
> You need to configure SSH agent forwarding on your client, which will 
> provide access to your local SSH agent at the jumphost via the SSH 
> connection between your client and the jumphost.? Since you are using 
> a Windows client, ~/.ssh/config may not be relevant to your 
> configuration.
>
>
> -- Jacob



From felix.klee at inka.de  Tue Nov 28 08:37:55 2023
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:37:55 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
 <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
 <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
 <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J2Ep5UMggSFsdPjJ6s8ykmySsCaGAjpsNXKBjo3DH3UFg@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 10:17?AM Felix E. Klee <felix.klee at inka.de>
wrote:
> Can you explain why the output of `ssh-add -L` did not change? Also
> why is it not the same as the output from `gpg --export-ssh-key
> yubikey at f76.eu`?

OK, I may have found the issue:

    $ grep -rl Use-for-ssh ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/*
    .gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786.key

That?s the key grip of the master key:

    $ gpg -k --with-keygrip yubikey at f76.eu
    pub   rsa4096 2023-06-29 [SC]
          7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
          Keygrip = 0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786
    uid           [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey at f76.eu>
    sub   rsa4096 2023-06-29 [E]
          Keygrip = 07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2
    sub   rsa4096 2023-11-22 [A]
          Keygrip = 9C67E5BBB72EF0BF2625792F8F134CE4FD961FF5

I don?t remember adding this, but I guess I did, maybe some months ago.
Anyhow, now I removed `Use-for-ssh` from that key.

I then added the keygrip of the authentication key to
`~/.gnupg/sshcontrol`. However, that doesn?t work:

    $ ssh-add -l
    The agent has no identities.

Only if I add the key grip of the master key to `~/.gnupg/sshcontrol`,
then `ssh-add -l` is happy. But this seems wrong.

I notice that the private key stub of the authentication sub key isn?t
present in `~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d`:

    $ ls -1 ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
    07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2.key
    0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786.key
    250CD54A263D092C462509D83D034E4BAAF73311.key
    BB1D7402E4603D0C12512AB235B12FE1F4BD9667.key

*How do I generate the private key stub for the authentication sub key?*

`gpg --card-status` doesn?t do it.


From felix.klee at inka.de  Wed Nov 29 03:52:36 2023
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 10:52:36 +0800
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J2Ep5UMggSFsdPjJ6s8ykmySsCaGAjpsNXKBjo3DH3UFg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <12329793.O9o76ZdvQC@daneel>
 <CA+m_8J3_a7Gnx5L-2xN8GitO1SWSc+EE983PSF1QYmz=cy+kjA@mail.gmail.com>
 <874jhedjz4.fsf@jacob.g10code.de>
 <CA+m_8J0LiCgV=rykop4tahd1Q0udumj-17zCgJmn0bO+Zg31xQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CA+m_8J2Ep5UMggSFsdPjJ6s8ykmySsCaGAjpsNXKBjo3DH3UFg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J37wCH9OPSfKLRW4pTdHkGvHEv9Qak=bKjF47Uo7N4_0A@mail.gmail.com>

So `gpg --card-status` imports [SC] and [E], but not [A]:

    $ rm ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/*
    $ ls -a1 ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
    .
    ..
    $ gpg --card-status
    [?]
    Signature key ....: 7A0F E73D DB74 4F0F 9734  1DA7 1BE3 49D1 1B6E
    D589
          created ....: 2023-06-29 03:50:43
    Encryption key....: DBBD 3239 D0F1 4326 808D  FC8F 7CC0 2D68 D2E3
    1736
          created ....: 2023-06-29 03:50:43
    Authentication key: 7A0F E73D DB74 4F0F 9734  1DA7 1BE3 49D1 1B6E
    D589
          created ....: 2023-06-29 03:50:43
    [?]
    sec>  rsa4096/1BE349D11B6ED589  created: 2023-06-29  expires: never
                                    card-no: 0006 18698016
    ssb>  rsa4096/7CC02D68D2E31736  created: 2023-06-29  expires: never
                                    card-no: 0006 18698016
    ssb#  rsa4096/32B106F6877CC64B  created: 2023-11-22  expires: never
    $ gpg --list-keys --keyid-format LONG --with-keygrip yubikey at f76.eu
    pub   rsa4096/1BE349D11B6ED589 2023-06-29 [SC]
          7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
          Keygrip = 0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786
    uid                 [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey@[?]>
    sub   rsa4096/7CC02D68D2E31736 2023-06-29 [E]
          Keygrip = 07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2
    sub   rsa4096/32B106F6877CC64B 2023-11-22 [A]
          Keygrip = 9C67E5BBB72EF0BF2625792F8F134CE4FD961FF5
    $ ls -a1 ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
    .
    ..
    07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2.key
    0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786.key

To me it looks like [A] is on the Yubikey, as it should.

*But how do I get the private key stub for [A] imported?*


From jcb62281 at gmail.com  Wed Nov 29 04:27:16 2023
From: jcb62281 at gmail.com (Jacob Bachmeyer)
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 21:27:16 -0600
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <018eb198-8104-4ce8-be80-9d708d7684b6@getgoogleoff.me>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
 <3d610625ec3cd58803caf586494ed6c9@getgoogleoff.me>
 <65655632.5000906@gmail.com>
 <018eb198-8104-4ce8-be80-9d708d7684b6@getgoogleoff.me>
Message-ID: <6566AF94.9040908@gmail.com>

Thomas wrote:
> Hi,
> this is exactly what I thought.
> However, there's no solution for it.
>
> Let me repeat my comments posted previously to get an overview what is 
> working...
> Actually I have a working setup on Windows 10, but here I use another 
> terminal emulator: MobaXterm.
> And in the settings of MobaXterm I enabled SSH forwarding.
> As of now I don't want to continue using MobaXterm on Windows 11, but
> using Windows Terminal.
> I can run ssh-add.exe -L in Windows PowerShell and get the correct SSH 
> public key fetched from secure card.

If you are using a Windows port of OpenSSH, try "ssh.exe -o ForwardAgent 
JUMPHOST" and see if that makes your local SSH agent available at the 
jumphost.  As I do not use Windows, I do not know where that Windows 
port would expect to find its configuration file.


-- Jacob


From verbuecheln at posteo.de  Wed Nov 29 07:01:32 2023
From: verbuecheln at posteo.de (Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Verb=FCcheln?=)
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 06:01:32 +0000
Subject: No SSH public key authentication using smartcard
In-Reply-To: <65655632.5000906@gmail.com>
References: <eb405f6b-8d52-48a4-8037-983e317cee10@getgoogleoff.me>
 <e2b3881dd1448599834e9afcc8deb16a071b5382.camel@posteo.de>
 <3d610625ec3cd58803caf586494ed6c9@getgoogleoff.me>
 <65655632.5000906@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <35a805f57733934b7ac7847e8c78289ebe6a8c2f.camel@posteo.de>

To my knowledge, no (explicit) agent forwarding is required for
ProxyJump configurations.

I am using the following configuration to access a LAN machine over the
Internet. Both machines use the GnuPG key for authentication.

Host rdeep
    HostName 192.168.1.151
    ProxyJump verbuecheln.ch
    IdentityAgent ${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh

This also works when the Internet connection is using IPv6 and the LAN
connection is using IPv4. SSH takes care of these things transparently.

Regards
Stephan

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 260 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231129/8f99a8b0/attachment.sig>

From kloecker at kde.org  Wed Nov 29 14:36:15 2023
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 14:36:15 +0100
Subject: Cannot export SSH public key
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J37wCH9OPSfKLRW4pTdHkGvHEv9Qak=bKjF47Uo7N4_0A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J0LXKtqmg+PRNpGbe8J+wHvKCg_tCcnQApDAencXAYA+Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <CA+m_8J2Ep5UMggSFsdPjJ6s8ykmySsCaGAjpsNXKBjo3DH3UFg@mail.gmail.com>
 <CA+m_8J37wCH9OPSfKLRW4pTdHkGvHEv9Qak=bKjF47Uo7N4_0A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4532235.LvFx2qVVIh@daneel>

On Mittwoch, 29. November 2023 03:52:36 CET Felix E. Klee wrote:
> So `gpg --card-status` imports [SC] and [E], but not [A]:
> 
>     $ rm ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/*
>     $ ls -a1 ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
>     .
>     ..
>     $ gpg --card-status
>     [?]
>     Signature key ....: 7A0F E73D DB74 4F0F 9734  1DA7 1BE3 49D1 1B6E
>     D589
>           created ....: 2023-06-29 03:50:43
>     Encryption key....: DBBD 3239 D0F1 4326 808D  FC8F 7CC0 2D68 D2E3
>     1736
>           created ....: 2023-06-29 03:50:43
>     Authentication key: 7A0F E73D DB74 4F0F 9734  1DA7 1BE3 49D1 1B6E
>     D589
>           created ....: 2023-06-29 03:50:43
>     [?]
>     sec>  rsa4096/1BE349D11B6ED589  created: 2023-06-29  expires: never
>                                     card-no: 0006 18698016
>     ssb>  rsa4096/7CC02D68D2E31736  created: 2023-06-29  expires: never
>                                     card-no: 0006 18698016
>     ssb#  rsa4096/32B106F6877CC64B  created: 2023-11-22  expires: never
>     $ gpg --list-keys --keyid-format LONG --with-keygrip yubikey at f76.eu
>     pub   rsa4096/1BE349D11B6ED589 2023-06-29 [SC]
>           7A0FE73DDB744F0F97341DA71BE349D11B6ED589
>           Keygrip = 0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786
>     uid                 [ultimate] Felix E. Klee (YubiKey) <yubikey@[?]>
>     sub   rsa4096/7CC02D68D2E31736 2023-06-29 [E]
>           Keygrip = 07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2
>     sub   rsa4096/32B106F6877CC64B 2023-11-22 [A]
>           Keygrip = 9C67E5BBB72EF0BF2625792F8F134CE4FD961FF5
>     $ ls -a1 ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
>     .
>     ..
>     07D6164F019D2EDF59C650992CF93776B2DD17F2.key
>     0E67508AC6866D82ABB95E0B53CF5D18DC48A786.key
> 
> To me it looks like [A] is on the Yubikey, as it should.
> 
> *But how do I get the private key stub for [A] imported?*

If you compare the information for Signature key and Authentication key you'll 
notice that they are identical. Further, if you compare the information for 
Authentication key and the A subkey of you'll see that the key ID of the A 
subkey doesn't match the fingerprint of the Authentication key (which is 
logical because the Authentication key is identical to the SC key.

Hint: Add --with-fingerprint (maybe twice) to --list-keys to see the 
fingerprints of the subkeys.

I don't know how you did it, but it looks like you have overwritten the 
Authentication key on your Yubikey with the SC key. Or your Yubikey or gpg is 
seriously broken.

Regards,
Ingo
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part.
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20231129/9083482c/attachment.sig>

From csh at bluehome.net  Tue Nov 28 20:15:10 2023
From: csh at bluehome.net (Caleb Herbert)
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 13:15:10 -0600
Subject: No pinentry but pinentry installed
Message-ID: <35ccfa05-2eaf-b9cc-d04a-eea08ff10369@bluehome.net>

OS: GNU Guix System

caleb at miller ~? which pinentry
/home/caleb/.guix-home/profile/bin/pinentry
caleb at miller ~? cat ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 ?????? ? File: /home/caleb/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
 ?????? ? Size: 191 B
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 ?? 1?? ? pinentry-program 
/gnu/store/rfy36kapnhx9djhxdi3a54x5p2n097xv-pinentry-gtk2-1.2.1/bin/pinentry-gtk-2
 ?? 2?? ? default-cache-ttl 600
 ?? 3?? ? max-cache-ttl 7200
 ?? 4?? ? default-cache-ttl-ssh 1800
 ?? 5?? ? max-cache-ttl-ssh 7200
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
caleb at miller ~? gpg --export-secret-keys
gpg: key 1D8491A90EAAF79C2C4703847BD4B05F950655F8: error receiving key 
from agent: No pinentry - skipped
gpg: key 9759A4302192716BF627EB09F8FA778FF955FB20: error receiving key 
from agent: No pinentry - skipped
gpg: key DE84748EB625295D3DA758528B0AAA3568A35C3C: error receiving key 
from agent: No pinentry - skipped
gpg: WARNING: nothing exported
caleb at miller ~? 
/gnu/stor/gnu/store/rfy36kapnhx9djhxdi3a54x5p2n097xv-pinentry-gtk2-1.2.1/bin/pinentry-gtk-2

(pinentry-gtk-2:4807): Gtk-WARNING **: 13:13:03.314: Unable to locate 
theme engine in module_path: "adwaita",

(pinentry-gtk-2:4807): Gtk-WARNING **: 13:13:03.323: Unable to locate 
theme engine in module_path: "adwaita",
OK Pleased to meet you
^C
caleb at miller ~?



From gniibe at fsij.org  Thu Nov 30 03:22:57 2023
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 11:22:57 +0900
Subject: No pinentry but pinentry installed
In-Reply-To: <35ccfa05-2eaf-b9cc-d04a-eea08ff10369@bluehome.net>
References: <35ccfa05-2eaf-b9cc-d04a-eea08ff10369@bluehome.net>
Message-ID: <87a5qwrncu.fsf@akagi.fsij.org>

Hello,

Your configuration of pinentry-program is:

Caleb Herbert <csh at bluehome.net> wrote:
> /gnu/store/rfy36kapnhx9djhxdi3a54x5p2n097xv-pinentry-gtk2-1.2.1/bin/pinentry-gtk-2

But what you tested in your command line is:

> /gnu/stor/gnu/store/rfy36kapnhx9djhxdi3a54x5p2n097xv-pinentry-gtk2-1.2.1/bin/pinentry-gtk-2

Is it intended?  I mean that there is "/gnu/stor" prefix in your command
line.  If you would like to test your configuration, it should be:

/gnu/store/rfy36kapnhx9djhxdi3a54x5p2n097xv-pinentry-gtk2-1.2.1/bin/pinentry-gtk-2

(with no prefix of "/gnu/stor")
--