Announced chat control by the EU

[Robert J. Hansen]

> It may well be that it is only practical to use 1.4x on an
> air-gapped device. If 4096bit RSA is considered sufficiently
> resistant to cryptanalysis (i.e., ignoring signing!), can
> such keys generated by 1.4x be considered just as secure as
> are the equivalent keys generated by 2.xx?

There is no reason to doubt RSA-4096's safety for signing: none 
whatsoever. The United States National Security Agency has certified 
RSA-3072 for signing TOP SECRET data until 2030.[1] Given TOP SECRET 
data has a default classification period of 25 years, that means NSA 
expects RSA-3072 to be secure until 2055.

Now, to answer your question: there are no known security issues with 
generating certificates on GnuPG 1.4. But please, please, please, stop 
using 1.4 already. Switch to the 2.6 series.


[1] 
https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/30/2003728741/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS.PDF
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