Announced chat control by the EU

[Robert J. Hansen]

> I have not checked (hint!) the source code (hint!) specifically, but I 
> have a vague recollection that 1.4 depended heavily or completely on / 
> dev/random.  If the system RNG is secure, so are the keys generated by 
> GPG 1.4.  It might be advisable to have the box running for some time (a 
> day or more if possible) to ensure that sufficient entropy has been 
> gathered before generating keys.

For Linux systems, for about five years now at system boot /dev/urandom 
is initialized. Once it's fully initialized calls to /dev/random are 
silently redirected to /dev/urandom. It doesn't take long at all for 
/dev/urandom to spin up, either.

A *lot* of effort has been put into making /dev/urandom a high quality 
CSPRNG. I highly recommend using it, and only it, and especially 
recommend abandoning any attempts at rolling your own CSPRNG.


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