GnuPG design goals (Re: Bikeshedding while the world burns)

[Robert J. Hansen]

> Forward secrecy is definitely more challenging in a high-latency 
> environment like email. It's not impossible, but Signal's double ratchet 
> protocol is designed to be tolerant of reasonably long periods of 
> disconnection (in *very* handwavey terms, that's what the second ratchet 
> in "double" ratchet is there for).
One of the things I'm concerned about, with respect to LibrePGP/OpenPGP 
direction, is it's easy to lose some of the best use cases of *PGP in 
pursuit of the New Hotness In Crypto.

One of the best use cases is in bootstrapping a secure communications 
network. From an almost wholly untrusted set of connections, with just a 
little usage of GnuPG you can bootstrap the maze of technologies we 
depend upon to communicate safely.

It would break my heart -- and endanger people -- if we lost 
bootstrapping in the pursuit of PFS and other goals. I'd like it if we 
could make it a point to remember it as a special high-value use case.

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