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On 21/05/2018 14:06, Ed Kellett wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:b29625fd-5c00-f7f5-7539-ba697add4795@kellett.im"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I think it's
a bit unfair to call this "exposing yourself to creeping insecurity". It
shouldn't ever be dangerous to *read an email* with an up-to-date email
client, no matter what, because emails shouldn't be able to phone home.
And the emails we're sending and receiving now aren't going to become
more dangerous as time passes (though they could become less so, if a
current vulnerability is mitigated by future client software).
I guess what I'm trying to say here is that it's not decrypting old
crypto that's wrong. It's accepting new emails with old crypto that is
wrong.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Well said (both paragraphs).<br>
<br>
What Andrew Skretvedt suggested is a clear example of what I earlier
described[1] as "throw your long-time users or their data under the
bus". It's not a reasonable option.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
[1]
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060512.html">https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060512.html</a><br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Mark Rousell</pre>
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