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On 21/05/2018 13:34, Ben McGinnes wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:20180521123430.vwfkpz4wsqpq5awn@adversary.org"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I agree with most of the article and largely with the need to break
compatibility to an ancient flawed design. Particularly since we
still have a means of accessing those ancient formats if we have to in
the form of the GPG 1.4 branch. The ancient archives are as safe as
they've ever been (for whatever definition of "safe" is being implied
by the user/archivist).</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Indeed, this satisfies my archive retrieval concerns.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:20180521123430.vwfkpz4wsqpq5awn@adversary.org"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">There is, however, one aspect of this issue that you touched on
lightly, but didn't really delve into and which is at the centre of
my, mostly unvoiced (until this email), criticism of the Efail team.
That being the *incredibly* unhelpful and likely actively harmful
recommendation to remove encryption and decryption functionality from
vulnerable MUAs.
To say, “we have this edge case scenario that really needs an active
targeted attack on a case by case basis, so everyone should just stop
integrating encryption” is the kind of thing that can get people
killed.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
This has been commented on by a few people on this list, myself
included: [1]<br>
<br>
To my mind, it reeks of slanted propaganda for Signal, and there
does seem to be a lot of it around at the moment. Signal has
security benefits but it's not (yet?) a replacement for encrypted
email, whereas a number of commentators seem to treat it as if all
email, encrypted or not, should be deprecated in favour of Signal.
This is not sensible or good advice without considering individual
use cases (regardless of Efail).<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:20180521123430.vwfkpz4wsqpq5awn@adversary.org"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I *do*, however, care that their
recommendations may have lasting and potential final consequences for
OpenPGP users living with and attempting to mitigate real threats to
their lives and/or liberty.
Playing with that sort of thing with the recklessness with which the
Efail team have done is, in my not so humble opinion, an absolute
disgrace.
You pointed out that the vast majority of OpenPGP use is no longer
email or other communications encryption. This is both true and a
valid point of discussion. Nevertheless, there are still a
considerable number of people who do use it that way and a number of
them have to deal with threat assessments with considerably higher
levels of personal risk than security researchers in academia or
cryptographic developers.
We must not forget these people. Ever. Even if we never hear from
them. Their cases are also not a matter of being apathetic; it's that
their priorities are surviving the world they're in, so they need to
rely on the tools we provide (and I get the community apathy issue is
actually a more general thing, so this isn' having a go at that part).
The Efail researchers did forget them and their conduct demonstrates
this. While they may have made some useful technical contributions
regarding S/MIME and highlighting certain poor implementations in
MUAs, that's no justification for reckless disregard of the lives of
end users.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Well said.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:20180521123430.vwfkpz4wsqpq5awn@adversary.org"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">So in my opinion it's not the merits or lack thereof in the
demonstrated attacks they released that have the gravest consequence
here, it's that the number one recommended mitigation technique is to
remove cryptographic functions from MUAs.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Without wanting to sound like a conspiracy geek, removing encryption
from email would, of course, benefit Signal and its takeup.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
[1]
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060450.html">https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060450.html</a><br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Mark Rousell
PGP public key: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp">http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp</a>
Key ID: C9C5C162
</pre>
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