issues with OpenPGP certificate verification
simon at josefsson.org
Mon Apr 28 20:03:33 CEST 2008
Hi Daniel. Thanks for reporting this. I've modified them so that they
must be fixed before v2.4. I haven't had time to look at them yet, but
I hope Nikos and you will be able to come up with something that solves
the problem. I'll revisit this when I get closer to the release.
Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg-debian.org at fifthhorseman.net> writes:
> Hey Folks--
> I just opened a couple tickets concerning what appear to be serious
> problems with GnuTLS's OpenPGP certificate verification:
> * gnutls-cli continues connection when certificate User ID does not
> match hostname (even without --insecure):
> This is equivalent to accepting a valid TLS certificate from
> https://evil.com/ even though the connection was made to
> * gnutls will accept an unsigned UserID as a hostname match as long
> as some signed UserID exists:
> This appears to be a problem with the way that the library offers
> information about the UserIDs in the OpenPGP certificates. Since
> each UserID in an OpenPGP cert can be signed by 0 or more keys
> (other than the primary key), there needs to be a way to check the
> validity of specific UserIDs, not just the certificate as a whole.
> As usual, if you want more details, just post to the tickets, and i'll
> provide whatever help i can.
> I'm excited to see the library offering OpenPGP features for TLS, but
> these problems are significant security concerns. i want to make sure
> that the first major implementation of this extension is secure!
> Thanks for all the work on this,
> Gnutls-devel mailing list
> Gnutls-devel at gnu.org
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