GnuTLS 2.9.2

[Simon Josefsson]

The GnuTLS 2.9.x branch is NOT what you want for your stable system.  It
is intended for developers and experienced users.

Here are the compressed sources:
  http://alpha.gnu.org/gnu/gnutls/gnutls-2.9.2.tar.bz2 (5.9MB)
  ftp://alpha.gnu.org/gnu/gnutls/gnutls-2.9.2.tar.bz2

Here is the OpenPGP signature:
  http://alpha.gnu.org/gnu/gnutls/gnutls-2.9.2.tar.bz2.sig
  ftp://alpha.gnu.org/gnu/gnutls/gnutls-2.9.2.tar.bz2.sig

Windows build:
  http://josefsson.org/gnutls4win/gnutls-2.9.2.exe
  http://josefsson.org/gnutls4win/gnutls-2.9.2.exe.sig
  http://josefsson.org/gnutls4win/gnutls-2.9.2.zip
  http://josefsson.org/gnutls4win/gnutls-2.9.2.zip.sig
  http://josefsson.org/gnutls4win/mingw32-gnutls_2.9.2-1_all.deb

Improving GnuTLS is costly, but you can help!  We are looking for
organizations that find GnuTLS useful and wish to contribute back.  You
can contribute by reporting bugs, improve the software, or donate money
or equipment.

Commercial support contracts for GnuTLS are available, and they help
finance continued maintenance.  Simon Josefsson Datakonsult AB, a
Stockholm based privately held company, is currently funding GnuTLS
maintenance.  We are always looking for interesting development
projects.  See http://josefsson.org/ for more details.

/Simon

* Version 2.9.2 (released 2009-08-14)

** libgnutls: Fix problem with NUL bytes in X.509 CN and SAN fields.
By using a NUL byte in CN/SAN fields, it was possible to fool GnuTLS
into 1) not printing the entire CN/SAN field value when printing a
certificate and 2) cause incorrect positive matches when matching a
hostname against a certificate.  Some CAs apparently have poor
checking of CN/SAN values and issue these (arguable invalid)
certificates.  Combined, this can be used by attackers to become a
MITM on server-authenticated TLS sessions.  The problem is mitigated
since attackers needs to get one certificate per site they want to
attack, and the attacker reveals his tracks by applying for a
certificate at the CA.  It does not apply to client authenticated TLS
sessions.  Research presented independently by Dan Kaminsky and Moxie
Marlinspike at BlackHat09.  Thanks to Tomas Hoger <thoger at redhat.com>
for providing one part of the patch.  [GNUTLS-SA-2009-4] [CVE-2009-2730].

** libgnutls: Fix rare failure in gnutls_x509_crt_import.
The function may fail incorrectly when an earlier certificate was
imported to the same gnutls_x509_crt_t structure.

** minitasn1: Internal copy updated to libtasn1 v2.3.

** libgnutls: Fix return value of gnutls_certificate_client_get_request_status.
Before it always returned false.  Reported by Peter Hendrickson
<pdh at wiredyne.com> in
<http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/3668>.

** libgnutls: Fix off-by-one size computation error in unknown DN printing.
The error resulted in truncated strings when printing unknown OIDs in
X.509 certificate DNs.  Reported by Tim Kosse
<tim.kosse at filezilla-project.org> in
<http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/3651>.

** libgnutls: Fix PKCS#12 decryption from password.
The encryption key derived from the password was incorrect for (on
average) 1 in every 128 input for random inputs.  Reported by "Kukosa,
Tomas" <tomas.kukosa at siemens-enterprise.com> in
<http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.network.gnutls.general/1663>.

** libgnutls: Return correct bit lengths of some MPIs.
gnutls_dh_get_prime_bits, gnutls_rsa_export_get_modulus_bits, and
gnutls_dh_get_peers_public_bits.  Before the reported value was
overestimated.  Reported by Peter Hendrickson <pdh at wiredyne.com> in
<http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/3607>.

** libgnutls: Avoid internal error when invoked after GNUTLS_E_AGAIN.
Report and patch by Tim Kosse <tim.kosse at filezilla-project.org> in
<http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/3671>
and
<http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/3670>.

** libgnutls: Relax checking of required libtasn1/libgcrypt versions.
Before we required that the runtime library used the same (or more
recent) libgcrypt/libtasn1 as it was compiled with.  Now we just check
that the runtime usage is above the minimum required.  Reported by
Marco d'Itri <md at linux.it> via Andreas Metzler
<ametzler at downhill.at.eu.org> in <http://bugs.debian.org/540449>.

** tests: Added new self-test pkcs12_s2k_pem to detect MPI bit length error.

** tests: Improved test vectors in self-test pkcs12_s2k.

** tests: Added new self-test dn2 to detect off-by-one size error.

** tests: Fix failure in "chainverify" because a certificate have expired.

** API and ABI modifications:
No changes since last version.
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