safe renegotiation bug?
nmav at gnutls.org
Tue Jun 1 09:48:48 CEST 2010
Simon Josefsson wrote:
>> So which solution do you prefer?
> I'm not sure that is a good idea -- then there is no way to configure
> mod_gnutls to talk to anyone. People would need to use an older GnuTLS,
> or install mod_ssl or mod_nss instead to get that behaviour.
> However, we already have %INITIAL_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION so we already have
> four different priority strings. I think we could be feature complete
> with four different priority strings if we redesign things slightly:
> %DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION: Disable the extension, permits unsafe
> %SAFE_RENEGOTIATION: Enable extension and require it for all handshakes.
> %PARTIAL_RENEGOTIATION: Enable extension and require it on all
> re-handshakes but permit initial handshakes without it.
> %UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION: Enable extension and permit all (re-)handshakes
> without extension.
> The default for both clients and servers would be
> %PARTIAL_RENEGOTIATION. We'll change the defaults to
> %SAFE_RENEGOTIATION in two years or so.
> What do you think about this approach?
As a concept I agree... The only problem might be that
%PARTIAL_RENEGOTIATION might be misleading in client side because it
doesn't really protect from the https renegotiation attack, but this can
be made clear in the documentation. I'll try to check it today.
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