Support for trusted_ca_keys extension during TLS handshake
nmav at gnutls.org
Wed Oct 31 18:32:03 CET 2012
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 4:50 PM, David Fuhrmann
<david.fuhrmann at googlemail.com> wrote:
>> Does this mean that you would have two overlapping CA
>> keys/certificates, with the same name but different validity periods?
>> This sounds like a strange setup to me. Why can't the client system
>> differentiate the (updated) issuer itself, by changing the common name
>> of the new root?
> How naming is handled doesn't matter here.
> The problem is, that the client has (in the simplest case) only one CA / root certificate, and also no internet
> connection or any possibility to update this root certificate.
> Now after specified intervals, a new root certificate is created, to have a fresh one to be installed into newer clients.
> So, every Client has a root certificate, which has a validity of minimum x years.
I don't know whether you can apply it in your case, but why not use
the "traditional" PKI there. Have a root CA to sign all other temporal
CAs and have all the devices to trust the root one. It sounds more
elegant approach than having the server decide which certificate to
use based on the connecting client trusted CA.
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