[gnutls-devel] GnuTLS | Update docs for session ticket key rotation (!768)

Development of GNU's TLS library gnutls-devel at lists.gnutls.org
Thu Oct 11 21:38:00 CEST 2018

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos started a new discussion on doc/cha-gtls-app.texi:

>  Those keys should be associated with the GnuTLS session using
> - at funcref{gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server}, and should be rotated regularly
> -(e.g., every few hours), to prevent them from becoming long-term keys which
> -if revealed could be used to decrypt all previous sessions.
> + at funcref{gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server}.
> +
> +Those will be the initial keys, but GnuTLS will rotate them regularly. The key rotation interval
> +can be changed with @funcref{gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration}. The key rotation interval will be
> +three times the ticket expiration time (ie. three times the value given in that function).
> +Every such interval, new keys will be generated from those initial keys. This is a necessary mechanism
> +to prevent the keys from becoming long-term keys
> +and as such preserve forward-secrecy in the issued session tickets. If no explicit key rotation interval
> +is provided, GnuTLS will rotate them every 18 hours by default.
> +
> +The master key can be shared between processes or between systems. Processes which share the same master key
> +will generate the same rotated subkeys, assuming they share the same time.

Maybe a clarification here:
assuming they share the same time (irrespective of timezone differences).
To underline that the generated keys do not depend on timezones and thus you can use the same key in differently located servers.

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