[gnutls-devel] GnuTLS | Add GOST-CNT ciphersuite support (!1119)

[Development of GNU's TLS library]

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos commented on a discussion on tests/tls13-server-kx-neg.c: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/merge_requests/1119#note_249442200

> +	},
> +	{
> +		.name = "TLS 1.2 server TLS 1.3 client with cred and GOST-512 cert",
> +		.server_ret = 0,
> +		.client_ret = 0,
> +		.have_cert_cred = 1,
> +		.have_gost12_512_cert = 1,
> +		.not_on_fips = 1,
> +		.server_prio = "NORMAL:-KX-ALL:+VKO-GOST-12:" "-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2",
> +		.client_prio = "NORMAL:-KX-ALL:+VKO-GOST-12:"PVERSION,
> +		.exp_version = GNUTLS_TLS1_2,
> +	},
> +	/* Ideally for the next two test cases we should fallback to TLS 1.2 + GOST
> +	 * but this is unsuppored for now */
> +	{
> +		.name = "TLS 1.3 server and client VKO-GOST-12 with cred and GOST-256 cert",

I also understand we are about to to make an ugly compromise; disabling tls1.3 globally in order to enable tls1.2/gost globally will break other tls1.3-only applications (too early for them but they will happen). Do you have a plan for the deployment of gost ciphersuites? Would it make sense to document this as a feature with known issues instead and keep the failure behavior you suggest?

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