[gnutls-devel] GnuTLS | Insecure OCSP signature should cause OCSP response to be ignored, not fail certificate verification (#1332)

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Daiki Ueno commented:


Given the [ballot](https://cabforum.org/2022/01/26/ballot-sc53-sunset-for-sha-1-ocsp-signing/) at CAB forum, I think the priority is now lower, though we probably still want to have an option to support internal OCSP deployments.

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