[Help-gnutls] Problems with Key usage violation
Andreas Thienemann
andreas at dicp.ghb.fh-furtwangen.de
Wed Mar 30 23:29:55 CEST 2005
On Wed, 30 Mar 2005, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> In DHE_RSA the RSA certificate is used to sign a diffie hellman key exchange.
> This offers perfect forward secrecy, which means that if the certificate
> is compromised at a future date, the old session data are still safe. This
> property is not available in the plain RSA ciphersuite.
I see.
Okay, I changed the CA setup so that key usage is now Digital Signature
and Key Encipherment.
Now connecting with gnutls-cli works.
However, I am still seeing problems with another smtpd which is linked
against gnutls.
Connecting with gnutls-cli --x509certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt --x509keyfile
/etc/exim4/smtp_client.key -s -p 25 mail2.bawue.de
still gives:
*** Fatal error: Key usage violation in certificate has been detected.
*** Handshake has failed
As this only happens when the x509keyfile is used, I checked the keyfile
for the allowed usages and is has Digital Signature and Key Encipherment
as well.
Reading http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt it is not exactly clear if
this is correct or not.
keyAgreement and decipherOnly might be okay as well.
Any suggestions?
> Well it would be useless for a certificate to have the key usage bits set when
> nobody actually checks them. If you use them, it's probably because you want
> to limit the key's scope, and gnutls is just enforcing it. If you don't want
> these checks, you shouldn't put such extensions to your certificates.
True. But it might be considered a bad idea for programs which worked
previously to fail as soon as they are linked against gnutls.
bye,
andreas
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