[Help-gnutls] Re: gnutls fails to verify server sertificate while openssl works

[Simon Josefsson]

I brought this up in the TLS WG:

http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.tls/3782

Thanks,
/Simon

Simon Josefsson <simon at josefsson.org> writes:

> The specification is clear that the chain must be in proper order.  I'll
> bring this up in the TLS WG to see if there is any consensus to make the
> specification more in line with what some implementations do.  I can see
> several reasons for NOT doing this (e.g., covert channels,
> DoS-considerations, and unneeded complexity).  We should have a strong
> reason before we violate explicit recommendations in the protocol
> specification.
>
> /Simon
>
> Peter Volkov <pva at gentoo.org> writes:
>
>> Is it possible to do something similar in gnutls? It looks like there
>> are reasons to validate certificate with wrong order...
>>
>> -------- Forwarded message --------
>> From: Tim Hudson <tjh AT cryptsoft  com>
>> Reply-TO: openssl-dev at openssl.org
>> TO: openssl-dev at openssl.org
>>
>> Peter Volkov wrote:
>>> CC'ing openssl developers for their opinions, since I think this
>>> behavior better to have consistent or configurable. Description of the
>>> problem is here:
>>
>> Placing this in context - connect with internet explorer or firefox to 
>> https://metasploit.com/ and you will see that both of those independent 
>> implementations see nothing wrong with the certificate chain and handle the 
>> redirect to http://metasploit.com/ without and errors or warnings.
>>
>> Implementations typically take the list of certificates as untrusted 
>> certificates to add into the process of walking the certificate chain to a 
>> trusted root certificate. There are pragmatic reasons for doing it this way.
>>
>>  From an interoperability point of view remember the adage - "Be strict in what 
>> you generate, be liberal in what you accept"
>>
>> Tim.
>> ______________________________________________________________________
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Peter.