"known in advance" public key authentication?

[Ivan Shmakov]

>>>>> Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> writes:

[…]

 > I think the OP may want to avoid calling
 > gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2, and write their own function to be
 > passed to gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function that just compares
 > the certificate received against a local file.

	The problem is that I'd need to either pass around an otherwise
	superfluous X.509 (private key, certificate) file, or to create
	it when a connection is to be established.

 > https://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/html_node/Certificate-credentials.html

 > Alternately (for a bit more flexibility in re-keying, should that
 > come up, at the cost of extra administrative overhead), the OP could
 > run their own X.509 or OpenPGP signing authority; then ship that
 > signing authority with both peers, and use it to sign the
 > certificates of either peer.

	To put it short, the application in question uses
	“self-certified identifiers”; i. e., the public key /is/ the
	identifier of the peer.  Thus, there doesn't seem to be any
	reason whatsoever to sign the public keys used, and both X.509
	and OpenPGP hence become of little use.

-- 
FSF associate member #7257