WARNING: gnome-keyring ??
nmav at gnutls.org
Thu Nov 8 10:41:21 CET 2012
On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 8:14 AM, Phil Pennock
<help-gnutls-phil at spodhuis.org> wrote:
>> (this is about smart cards) is transparent and system wide because we
>> want all applications that use gnutls to be able to use smart cards
>> transparently (e.g. you can load your private key from a smart card
>> the same way you'd load it from a file).
> This doesn't make sense in all cases; for system daemons, mostly not,
> and Exim does TLS init at start-up, to validate the config.
Well a system daemon may use a hardware security module (HSM) to speed
up, e.g., RSA and protect its keys, so it still makes sense there
(smart cards and HSMs are both accessed via the PKCS #11 API).
> So we got
> user complaints when I released 4.80 in May with my changes to overhaul
> the GnuTLS integration. I wrote the fix below a few months back and it
> will be part of 4.82 (whenever that's released). Perhaps this approach
> is of use to others?
> If we ever have Exim daemons which need pkcs11 support and folks still
> want to run mailq with GNOME_* environment variables set, I may have to
> start inhibiting the start-up TLS check for some cases.
The approach seems correct to disable PKCS #11. I should also document
it if it is not already there. However, were the requests to disable
PKCS #11 due to the messages being printed by gnome-keyring, or
because of some other reason?
If it is the former could the gnome-keyring module be more silent on
failures and print messages only if some debugging environment
variable is present?
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