Reading new key packages

[Andrew Gallagher]

On 19 Jan 2024, at 08:47, Werner Koch via LibrePGP-discuss <librepgp-discuss at librepgp.org> wrote:
> 
> If we would implement that we need to do this
> 
> if (signature version < 5 or is 6 and has meta data)
>  Print warning that meta data is not protected

That sounds reasonable to me, if the metadata is populated with something. In crypto-refresh, it is recommended that the literal packet filename and timestamp fields are not populated, so in practice this warning should not be triggered very often with v6 sigs.

> Further the presence of a signature salt would also render the signature
> bad given that GnuPG tries to help organizations to protect their
> communication also from insiders by minimizing covert channels.

How do you currently tackle data leakage in signatures, e.g. via hashed-area subpackets? Would any of these techniques be more broadly applicable?

> The involved complexity for the above check is not that high so, thus it
> might eventually be done.

Would you be willing to accept a patch for this?

Thanks,
A

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